Phalanx and Legion: Hellenistic armies

[Paralus]

G'day all.Borrowed Peter Green's descriptive chapter title GÇô apologies.Alejanro raised some interesting points in the Roman thread with respect to post Alexander (Hellenistic) armies. Whereas we can never say that these armies (including those constituted immediately following Alexander's death) were his (as he is not commanding them) they are "Macedonian" in every respect GÇô including the fact that are trained after "the Macedonian fashion".Hellenistic armies invariably deployed the phalanx in the fashion of Philip and Alexander. As well, they stationed their cavalry on either flank. Almost always, these armies fielded elephants. These armies (as with Alexander's) fielded light-armed infantry and peltasts in association with the phalanx. In summation, these armies (aside from the addition of elephants) were a "traditional" Macedonians army. Preserving the nomenclature as well ("Companion Cavalry" etc). And, as with Alexander, the army stood or fell on the performance of the phalanx (Philip's "anvil" to his cavalry's "hammer").The Macedonian armies at Cynoscheplae, Pydna and Magnesia are all described as containing the above the above elements. Pyrrhus' army was of similar make up. The army of Antiochus III at Magnesia is described in minute detail by Appian (translation at Livius http://www.livius.org/ap-ark/appian/app ... ca_07.html #[-º32] ). Interestingly, Antiochus is criticised for placing his "reliance" on his cavalry rather than the "GǪserried phalanx, in which he should have placed most confidence, on account of its high state of discipline". Going on to point out later its experience and professionalism in the engagement. It appears that these phalanxes were still well skilled, highly trained and drilled in what Alexander would call the "Macedonian fashion".In the Diadochoi Wars, the armies fielded reflected the above. As with Philip and Alexander's armies, it was the performance GÇô or lack thereof GÇô of the cavalry (and light-armed troops) in concert with the phalanx that determined the outcome. When (at Ipsus, Magnesia and Cynoscheplae in particular) the cavalry lost contact with the phalanx, disaster usually followed. Usually in Hellenistic warfare, the losses were of a number to be expected and inflicted by the light-armed infantry and cavalry of the opposition. Cont....

[Paralus]

With Roman armies it took on a more disastrous note. In all engagements of Hellenistic and Roman consular armies it is the maneuverability of the Roman maniples as opposed to the rigidity of the phalanx that is emphasised in the accounts. At Cynoscheplae in particular it is the commander of several Roman maniples that takes the decision to wheel his corps around the side and rear of the phalanx and start the massacre. A massacre that is possible becuase the legionary - not burdened with a sixteen foot pike - is able to hack and slash at unprotected phalangites with his gladius. The thoroughly professional maneuvering of Antiochus' phalanx did not spare it the same ultimate fate.The infantry - heavy infantry - was always the rock on which was predicated a Macedonian victory. Hence the appearence of an infantry tug-of-war when it opposed well drilled enemy infantry. It was the same at Chaeronea and Issus. It was this Macedonian strength that Darius sought to negate with overwhelming numbers of cavalry at Gaugamela.

In my view, the armies deployed by Pyrrhus and the Hellenistic monarchs that followed were the same (in essential aspects) as those deployed by Alexander (elephants aside). They would most probably have proved as good GÇô given the same commander. They did not though, have the same commander. They did not posses even a Seleucas I, Antigonus or Cassander when it mattered most.
Paralus

[smittysmitty]

I don't think Pyrrhus's phalanx consisted of Macedonian phalangists - if I remember correctly they were inferior Epirots who had adopted the Macedonian tools of war.

[Paralus]

G'day Smitty.The truth is we donGÇÖt really know the ethnic make-up of Pyrrhus' army. We do know that he was King of Macedonia from sometime in 289/8 to 285. This following his defeat of a Macedonian army in Aetolia sometime around 290/89 and temporary rapprochement with Demetrius Poliorcets.He remained King untill Lysimachus bought his commanders outright and seized half of Macedonia. It is after this that we find him being engaged by Italian affairs. Just what was the ethnic nature of the army he took with him to Italy, I cannot (without some study) say. I can say though that it was experienced, as were its commanders: a point made by Plutarch with respect to his losses post Asculum.As to "inferior Epirots", well the above loss in pitched battle by a Macedonian army in the field, was GÇô I think GÇô the first (in Greece) since Philip II retired in front of Byzantium. Rather a blow to Macedonian prestige and delivered by an Epirote army (we assume GÇô there may have been Macedonian levies loyal to the former king?).
Paralus.

[kennyxx]

Paralaus HiContinuing and adding to the previous thread. I think you touched on the most vital ingredient. The Commander. I have often doubted the saying one man dont make a team. But historically shown indeed one man is the difference between a great victory or a humiliating defeat. Your answer with Canea been proven point. Hannibal for me has been one of Histories most over rated generals. As you say he mopped up against aincompetence and arrogance and the funny thing was that the Romans took some time to learn they kept churning out fodder for Hannibal to chew up. Until a competent Scipio worked out the guy and took him.The Phyrus episode. I see about 3 engagements and Phyrus had the edge until the final one when whe Elephants were backed onto the Macedonians. Phyrus set off with 20000 Macedonians and 3000 Thracians the quality we cant vouch for. Were they the trained hero following warriors or generations of depleated and not so good. I dont thing Alexander would have had any use for Elephants from the Porus episode Im sure he learned they were as dangerous to friend and foe. You Also mention Pyrus cavalry becoming detatched from the Phalanx and the Romans took adavantage. Maybe Alexander at Issus and Gaugamela became somewhat detatched but he was lightning fast to refil the gap and hit very hard.Phyruss picked up about 35000 soldiers on the was through Italy we dont know the quality nor the way it was organised. It could have been a real mess. Organising 50000 troops on the way.But the bottom line Michael is commander. Still during a tea break Alexander would crush the Romans and further more Hannibal could win great battles but could never have a clue how to use them. Rome was very lucky Hannibal were not Alexander.Piece of cake. Unless they could have a Julius Caesar for ever present then only then would it be tough for Alexander.Rome in his spare time for practice.Kenny

[Paralus]

G'day KennyRome in his spare time for practice indeed!
The Pyrrhus episode gives some inkling I think. I have located my Plutarch and agree with the figures you have. By the time of Beneventum, a great deal of the elephants had been lost GÇô the Epirote infantry as well. The battle of Asculum, I think, has generally been considered something of a stalemate. The Epirote levies in this action must be considered those who defeated the Macedonians in Aetolia earlier and so were no slouches. The elephants at Beneventum did play their part, the advance guard already having been routed. Either way, the trick was to isolate or crack the phalanx.
I think your overall assessment is most likely correct: a Macedonian victory. It is a victory that would not come easily. It would GÇô in my view GÇô be a victory paid for at a cost. The key would be Alexander's plan of attack. If GÇô and is a presumption on my part GÇô he adopted his proven and very successful tactics of stringing out the enemy line and waiting for the weak point to present itself, then leading his massed cavalry charge, he may well have as much chance of coming a cropper as winning.I say this because had he allowed his infantry GÇô phalanx GÇô to be isolated at all (as at Issus and very nearly at Gaugamela), there would be gladius wielding legionaries present to exploit it. He may well wheel and force the Roman maniples onto his phalanx, but that phalanx may well be paying dearly in blood for the victory.Might be a close run thing though.Paralus

[kennyxx]

MichaelI like your style and your reasonings. With your point about Alexander charging at a created break or weakness. Once hed sent home the Roman cavalry to the senate with excuses. Its fair to say that the Phalanx with the holding. Both Alexanders cavalry wings would have got behing the legionaries giving them it at the rear.I dont care how flexible the Roman legions were compared to the Phalanx. Once the devastating Cavalry were rond the back It would be Roman mince meat. Only my opininion and yours is accepted. Maybe not befor breakfast maybe a little after.Then A matter of weeks he would definately be on Rome. He had no Roman superior fllet to neutralise. So he could and would advance on Rome quickly always consolidating. alexander would have had at least 40000 Macedonian veterans and if Phyrus ammassed as many levies as he did Alexander with his reputaion and name would have massed as many if moore as people siding with Alexander would be more confident of siding with the winner than tose who sided with Phyrus. Just a secondary thought Michael.He would have had at least 70000 how would any Roman stop such an emovable object. Maybe 2 Julius Caesras.Kenny

[alejandro]

Hi Kenny,I think I have to disagree with you here: I truly believe one man does not make a team. I will rather side with Kleitos and say that Alexander (genius and all) could only conquer the whole known world because he got his Macedonians with him. In the end, he stopped at the Beas because they refused to continue!I totally agree that a good general is better than hundreds of average soldiers, but you yourself said many times that Alexander was superior to many others because he took full advantage of his victories: he was politically clever (keeping Persians/natives as satraps and Macedonians as treasurers in many satrapies, though that changed after Gadrosia). But he was certainly not alone.History indeed shows that generalship is the difference between victory and defeat. But historical processes require a general change in the society as a whole (ie, the Hellenism didnGÇÖt start the very same moment Alexander died, or the modern era the very same moment the king of FranceGÇÖs head was guillotined). A person can certainly accelerate processes (I like to think about them as GÇ£catalystsGÇ¥), but rarely will s/he force society to change. This is what is usually meant when, referring to an underrated person, it is said GÇ£s/he is ahead of her/his timeGÇ¥.All the best,Alejandro

[alejandro]

Hi Paralus,I would like to check whether I understood your reasoning (as I said, I have no idea about tactical matters, so please bear with me).I think your point is that the Roman maniple is superior to the Macedonian phalanx because it is more mobile and hence can wheel around the phalanx and attack the latter on the sides and back. This is a plausible scenario because Alexander tactics usually detach cavalry on the right wing, waiting for a weak spot in the enemyGÇÖs line, thus creating a gap on the phalanx side.If my argument so far is right (please correct me if it is not), the problem to be solved is the defence of the phalanxGÇÖs sides.Now, in a first encounter, and assuming no intelligence about Roman tactics is collected beforehand, this problem can certainly arise and, according to your views, the final outcome of the battle can go either way.In the worse case scenario (not necessarily to happen: Pyrrhus indeed won his first battle in Italy) where Alexander is defeated in this first encounter, I think it is a safe thing to say (but I am open to debate it) that Alexander will retreat before being wiped out, trying to minimize losses. And having learned the Roman tactics, he would have easily spotted the problem of covering the phalanxGÇÖs flanks, and next time the result would be different: a strong unbroken line of infantry, well defended on both sides by, say, light infantry/cavalry/archers, will indeed be the anvil where the Roman infantry will be crushed once AlexanderGÇÖs cavalry finds the weak spot in the Republican line. And from there on, I cannot foresee anything but victories for Alexander (assuming he is not killed in battle or dies untimely after a drinking bout or from malaria or Nile bird flu =).All the best,Alejandro

[Paralus]

G'day Alejandro.That's about it. The major differences being the mobility of the maniple and the effectiveness of the Roman legionary after his spear was thrown and gladius produced.The phalanx (Macedonian) was a much more tightly packed unit (requiring much less GÇô about half GÇôthe gap between soldiers as the hoplite phalanx) as a result of the smaller shield which was worn on the left shoulder. Indeed Philip also trained levies in the hoplite phalanx as it was the more manoeuvrable and possessed a sword. In later years this was largely replaced by mercenaries.It is interesting that Alexander GÇô at Gaugamela GÇô is reported to have a totally Macedonian phalanx of 10,000. The rest are mercenaries and lighter armed infantry. Those who followed seem to have adopted somewhat larger Macedonian phalanxes: Pyrrhus has some 16,000 and if I remember correctly, some 20,000 were assembled at Cynoscephalae. This would render the army that much less flexible.As far as we can reconstruct, Alexander's success at Gaugamela was that he stretched his line to the right, constantly feeding cavalry divisions onto the gap formed and thus taking the Persians with him. The trick was to force a crack before he'd nothing left to throw into the gap. The Greek mercenaries were the last (behind the right wing and between the phalanx extreme right GÇô and lighter infantry guard GÇô and the extended cavalry). In the end Darius broke first. It is when Alexander pursues Darius single-mindedly that the dangerous gap (as at Issus) nearly presents itself. At Issus he wheels and comes to aid of the phalanx (in the process forcing the Persian troops onto his sarissas).The success of Pyrrhus was largely due to his elephants. Would Alexander have used them? Possibly not after Hydaspes. In any case, he would have needed to be far more protective or take a more cautious attitude to its flank protection than he did against the far inferior Persian infantry.Paralus

[kennyxx]

Alej HailI didnt mean as whole Alexander was a one man band. But in battle and conflict that one man in my opinion made all the difference. The one man made all the difference to the moral and discipline of the soldiers. Look at the situation when Alexander took the arrow to the chest. That the whole army was realy terrified they couldnt get back home without him. I would encourage you to take a look at the movie El Cid. The fianal battle and the way the Cid got hit with the arrow. Seeing him return back to Valencia the troops lost heart and retreated in panic. Even the scene where Charlton Heston gets up from his bed to show himself to the troops was Alexander. Without Alexander the Macedonian army would have done nothing and his father of course.I must take point with the argument that the first engagement that Alexander would make with the Romans would have forced him to retreat and regroup.Sorry guys I doubt it. Alexanders recon and intelligence reports would have told him exactly what to do to sent those pesky Romans home for dinner. I guess you guys underestiamte Alexanders brain tactics and his abiliries as a general.Kenny

[Paralus]

G'day KennyNo underestimation here. He was an outstanding field commander as were his high command GÇô a fact attested to by subsequent events.The difference is that in going to the East, Philip and Alexander fully comprehended what it was they were dealing with. The Greek world had a long history of combat and service with Persian armaments (and their subject allies) from the Persian wars through the Athenian experience to Xenophon's Anabasis and the myriad of battles Greek mercenaries took part in for Persian pay. There was precious little unknown about Persian tactics and armaments. It hadn't really changed (nor improved in any material sense). It is a salutary reason for their loss. The sea of fish scale armored cavalry occupying the field at Gaugamela would (and apparently did) give pause though.The same cannot be said for engaging a Roman Consular army in Italy. This was a new frontier. No (major) Greek army (if any Greek army or mercenary for that matter) had met a Roman army in the field. There had been no major conflicts between the two and absolutely negligible contact. The Greeks were ignorant of Rome and its resources or abilities. A state of affairs that largely continued for almost two hundred years until Rome imposed its final settlement on the Greeks after Corinth.At the time we are speaking of (the close of the fourth century) the Romans were occupied with the Samnites GÇô a powerful group of warrior tribes in central Italy. These quite possibly may have come over to Alexander, but, noting how other Italian and (Italian) Greek populations treated both Alexander of Epirus and Pyrrhus (when they divined their true intentions) that cannot be taken for granted. As an example, both Carthage and Sicily allied themselves with Rome against Pyrrhus and his allies murdered Alexander of Epirus.Alexander would be coming as the conqueror of the East GÇô his intentions being absolutely crystal GÇô the Greeks of Magna Graecia, fully aware of the situation in the Balkans and Ionia, would have a choice. There could be no pretence of war of "liberation" or revenge here.The outcome of that decision would balance as precipitously as the first engagement of the Macedonians and the Romans.Paralus.

[kennyxx]

MichaelYour still underestimating Alexander as a general and commandere. You quote the Greeks knew little of Roman tactics.I would argue Alexander knew little of Elephants in the proper sense until he met Porus. He met new obsatacle after new obsatcle. Tyre. Guerilla Hit and run tactics of Spitamenese and of course his near impossible sieges of the Sogdain Rock and Pir sar.Alexander had challenge after challenge and nearly always leasured and acted with desisive presision.To say by the time of his end he was so inept he couldnt work out the Romans is to say the least dismisive and ignorant of Alexanders generalship and tactics. To say he would be out foxed by a mediocre Roman general and a legion or two is pretty thin.I notice you bring up the cracks in the lines at Issus and Gaugamela. I am pretty sure Alexander would expect this as at both battles he had to spread his forces pretty thin to prevent or thry prevent envelopment as the Persians had as many cavalry as Alexander had troops. he must have realised and expected. and when it did hapeen he was on it like a tiger. I for one dont go with the story it was in Alexanders mind to take after Darius as soon as he caught up with him. His primary task was to smash the Persian army and with this in mind he would have and was prepoared for the cracks.Michael you are really basing a Roman vivtory onluck. That in some event Alexanders cavalry and cover became detached and the Romans could credit from it. The Forces would be much more even. And the Roman cavalry would be smashed. Once this happens and even if the Romans were making headway against the Phalanx. How would they hold the rear from a two pronged envelopment From both Alexanders cavalry wings. And these cavalry were not rubbish they would have gone at the Roman rear and slaughtered them to a man.Kenny

[alejandro]

Hi Paralus,Thanks for the explanation and the particular application to Gaugamela. It is clear in it that Alexander was indeed aware of the tactical problem and planned accordingly (feeding new cavalry divisions into the gap). And he was cool enough as to stop Dareios pursuit and finish the main task, ie, ensuring the victory with minimal loss of troops. But you still think that Alexander would have failed in a pitched battle against the Romans GǪ One last question: what would be the (expected) sizes of the Republican and AlexanderGÇÖs armies if they met around, say, 300BC? I would assume Alexander could muster an army as big as that available to Dareios in Gaugamela (and of higher quality: replace satrapal levies by the Macedonian army plus Macedonian-style trained foreign corps a-la-Epigonoi), but the true question is about the Roman numbers. Would Alexander get one-and-a-half-times the number of Roman soldiers? Twice? Ten-fold? Half? My hunch (based on nothing but guesswork) is that he will probably get at least one-and-a-half-times as many soldiers as Rome. If this is correct, this would mean that Alexander will have plenty of men to fill the gap between the Companion cavalry and the phalanx AND play the GÇ£wait for the weak spotGÇ¥ game. Once the latter reveals it would be GÇ£game, set and matchGÇ¥ for the Romans since, as Kenny said, once Alexander wipes out the Roman cavalry, heGÇÖll push the infantry towards the solid phalanx while killing its rear ranks.But of course this relies on the estimated numbers. Can you help with them? What would be your GÇ£hypothetical account of the battleGÇ¥ in that case?All the best,Alejandro

[alejandro]

Hi Kenny,I didnGÇÖt say that one man cannot turn the tide of a battle. I totally agree with you that Alexander, El Cid and others can be the key factor in such encounters. I was looking for more permanent situations, those that can change the direction of history.If you want, I wanted to stress the long-run, strategic perspective of history, rather than the short-term, tactical view.Let me illustrate my point. In historical terms, for example, the Greek occupation of India was a tactical victory, but did not affect Indian life very deeply. Greek conquest of Persia, on the other hand, had a much more profound (GÇ£strategicGÇ¥) impact because the many cities founded and the settlers who lived there and because Seleukos (after several years of struggle) managed to pacify it.My point is simply that individuals do not turn the path of history, simply find shortcuts that allow society to reach the next stage more quickly. This explains some peopleGÇÖs argument (not mine, though I think it does play a role) that Alexander simply sped up the crumbling of the already rotten and ripe-for-picking Persian empire.An example where the opposite occurs, despite the attempts of a man/class, is the communist experiment. It lasted while the ruling class got the power to control people, but when it was lost, people did what they wanted to do without the fear of being punished. For example, church attendance in Russia jumped up almost the very same day when the Soviet Union was dissolved.You just cannot go against the tide. In the best cases, you can surf it!All the best,AlejandroPS: I donGÇÖt think that Alexander would lose the battle against the Romans. I was considering the worst-possible scenario and argue that even then Alexander would prevail at the end of the day.