Phalanx and Legion: Hellenistic armies

[alejandro]

Hi Paralus,I would like to comment on your arguments about getting allies once in Italy.I remember once talking to my little brother about Alexander and explaining him his grand strategy. I pointed out that once a conqueror GÇôwith limited manpowerGÇô defeats the defending army, the problem of dealing with the newly acquired land boils down to basically two options: if the native population is against the conqueror and hence prone to rebellion, decimate it (the GÇ£stickGÇ¥); if it is favourable/neutral, incorporate it to the administration (the GÇ£carrotGÇ¥). Alexander did exactly that: decimated the Uxians and Kossaians, attacked ruthlessly the Bactrian forts and killed numbers of Indians. But GÇ£liberatedGÇ¥ the Ionian cities and maintained many Persian satraps as well as local rulers (Ada of Karia, the Kind of Sidon (? The one chosen by Hephaistion), Porus in India). Even more, he learned from his father the basic principle of GÇ£divide and conquerGÇ¥ in Realpolitik, and thus gave Porus control over some extra land as to counterweight his ally OmphisGÇÖ power in the area.My point is, I find very difficult to accept that he will not find willing allies if he embarks in a campaign against Rome. Each nation in Italy will have to decide between joining Alexander and end up masters of the region, though paying taxes to him; and forming a grand alliance against him together with their former foes. The latter is not so simple as it seems: the Greeks themselves failed to get every polis on board against the Persian advance. Would Etruscans*, Romans, Carthaginians and Greeks from Magna Greece be willing to form a joint front? If Greeks had problems uniting despite their common origins and culture, I wouldnGÇÖt be surprised if the Italian peoples had them as well. And the problem with the grand alliance is that you need everyone to join it (or the large majority), otherwise everyone would rather be on the winning side. And the problem is that those who are relatively safe will not commit to the alliance until they think they need to, leaving the others to face the bulk of the losses. That is, before getting to Rome, Alexander would need to conquer the Greek cities of southern Italy, and do you think the Romans will rush to help them? I doubt it. They will see how the Greeks fare first. If they hold the line and the Macedonians end up retreating, the Romans are unscathed and may even have a shot at the weakened southern neighbours. And if the Romans arenGÇÖt that interested in

[alejandro]

(sorry for the length of the post)And if the Romans arenGÇÖt that interested in an alliance, what about the Etruscans? Probably even less. But then consider the problem from the perspective of Magna Greece: If they donGÇÖt expect any help from the Romans and, if anything, a pat on the back from the Etruscans, they may well think that they will be better off making an agreement with Alexander, paying him taxes and contributing men for his army in return of peace. Of course, when sending diplomats to Rome and Etruria, the Greeks will threaten to join Alexander if the alliance is not formed, and everything will depend on the levels of trust among these peoples, which will probably not be very high given their histories of fighting each other. When Athens and Thebes left aside their grudges to stand against Philip in Chaeronaia, the Spartans didnGÇÖt bother to send a contingent. Well, I am not surprised! Their a*ses were not at stake! (at least not immediately), and if the alliance managed to repel (or at least weaken) the Macedonians, the Spartans will be safe at no cost.In summary, I just cannot believe that a concerted grand alliance will be easy to form, and Alexander will crush them all one after another, getting more powerful each time and probably, in the end, just accepting their offers to be vassal kingdoms under his empire. The Macedonians did exactly that during the reign of Alexander I (I think), when he preferred to give the Persians GÇ£land and waterGÇ¥ and make Macedonia a de-facto Persian satrapy rather than to stand against the Great King only to be first defeated in battle and then become a Persian satrapy anyway.All the best,Alejandro* I am not sure if the Etruscans were still around circa 300BC. I think they were, but I am not sure at all. Anyway, the analysis below could be applied to any other relatively important tribe north of Rome.

[kennyxx]

Alej Im sorry.If it seemed I was disagreeing with your valid point that one man can change history for the long term. I was solely talking about Alexander as the nucleas and pivotal point of all his great victories.Of course nothing Alexander did short term was suatianed. It only lasted for as long as he was alive. Then it was busness as usual fopr the Greeks and Macedonians.Your detail with the Aliances and alies he would get upon entering Italy is spot on. I said peoples would egde there bets as much as they could one way or another. Or as you stated stay out of it like the Spartans and feed on the wreckage after. Unfortunately for the Spartans there was no real reckage and spoils for them.And as you say It must have been a little uneasy in Italy who would the neighbours go with. Its fare to say a lot would edge there bets with Alexander. By then Alexander was proven and somewhat lenient conquerer. Rome as yet hadnt conquered anywhere.Its basically like Choosing between Ghenghis Khan and Athens.Cheers Kenny

[Nicator]

Hello Paralus,
One thing that stands out to me besides the obviousness of one great man's tactical ability is the pathetic weakness of the latter day Hellenistic calvary in the Roman victories. Surely, had the cavalry been up to snuff and well lead, the Legions would have been hamburger. later Nicator

[Paralus]

G'day AlejandroAh, hypotheticals! There's nothing like the sound of hypotheticals in the morning! (Well it is here in Sydney anyhow). Where to start? The alliance matter. At the time we are hypothesising about GÇô closing decade or so of the Fourth century GÇô Rome already was taking the steps that would enable it both to control the entire Italian Peninsular and inevitably bring conflict with the commercial interests of Carthage. We need to make no mistake here: this was not the off-hand almost incidental expansion into the Greek East that occurred as a result of Rome finding itself the Greek's "court of appeal" that would take place post the Punic wars. This was power politics and empire building. The Latin tribes had been forcibly absorbed and it was now the turn of the Samnites. Magna Graecia was next GÇô a process hastened by Pyrrhus' abortive invasion.We can only go on what eventually happened. The Greeks of Magna Graecia bumped off their first GÇô albeit unsuccessful GÇô commander, Alexander of Epirus, in the face of Samnite aggression. Sicily, Carthage and Rome Allied against Pyrrhus and his Magna Greacian allies deserted when his real intentions became clear.Alexander, King of Kings and Lord of Greece and the East, appearing form across the Adriatic, could wave no such niceties as "war of liberation" waged on behalf of Magna Graecia. These Greeks would be only too well aware of what was coming and for what purpose. Fractious and bellicose they may be GÇô a fact demonstrated by their relations and shifting alliances with the "home states" during the Peleponnesian War (and afterwards). To the Sicilians GÇô tired of tyrants and petty despots GÇô the armada bringing the Macedonian forces would appear as some ghostly apparition of the Athenian armada of 415 GÇô only on a rather large course of steroids. Carthage, well aware of the fates of Sidon, Tyre and Gaza, could well read the Macedonian writing on the shield wall.Continued...

[Paralus]

It would all depend on some rapprochement between Rome and the Samnites. Personally, I think Rome would have viewed an invasion of Italy from the south with serious alarm. Its history is littered with deals and alliances GÇô the making or breaking thereof at Rome's fiat GÇô built for situations such as we are describing. The Romans (particularly in this period down to the end of the Republic) were a very warlike people. They rarely acted in any fashion other than with a cold, practical calculation of what was in their interest. When action was taken it was not ever characterized by passivity. That word would be aggression. Alliance with the Lord of Asia was not in their interest GÇô that was for the subjugated Greeks of the Balkans.Whilst the Greeks of Magna Graecia may have dithered, the Romans would most certainly have not. Those that would stand with them they would ally with. The Samnites would need to brought in or sidelined and the Latin "allies" pressed into service. Rome would then GÇô as with Carthage GÇô deal with her erstwhile "allies" at her leisure.Paralus

[kennyxx]

alej HailYour on the ball again. Its assumed by the late time of Alexander he turns up with the Troop numbers he left Macedonia with. As you say by the end Alexander had the man power and resources to equal at least Darius numbers. And of course these troops were not led by inept Persian Kings. But a seasoned organiser and a seasoned Army. With levies from all parts of the Empire.The same army was not the one that left Macedonia. Its compositions units and speciality troops were totally different. Shock troops Infantry Alexander had all the tentacles of an octopus in his army and they were well used to fighting.By the time of his planned expedition. Having rested those that wanted to stay organised his Asian recruits and indeed New Macedonians who must have heard the stories and victories woulkd love a slice of the Cake.The army and forces Alexander would hit Italy with would be very different from the army he inherited from Philip. fair enough some elements were the same. But Alexanders inovation made it a totally new beast.Once hese marmalised the Cavalry. The Romans have blocks of Legionaries. what could that do against Alexanders all round enormous war machine. Not the cumbersome Persian armies from centuries befor led by a throne sitting watching king.Michael can argue the Roman peoples would stand together but I doubt it.Common sense says they would edge their bets. Even those in doubt must have beheld Alexanders conquests and the consequences of falling against him. I doubt the Romans would have faced him anyway at that time.To say they would look for splits in Alexanders line is kinda risky. If the splits dont come then its Roman sausage meat.Kenny

[kennyxx]

Nic With all this rhetoric with Roman ability. And your spot on with Roman cavalry.Up to Scipio the Roman tactics were very much predictable. Or why would it have been so easy for Hannibal to sucker them in again and again to anhialation. Only when we get generals like Scipio and a few others do we see brains and tactical out manouvering of the apponents.Canea is a prime example of Driving off the Roan Cavalry then drawing the Roman forces into a box trap and slaughtering them from all sides. Once Alexander had sent the Roman cavalry home to mommy then the Macedonians would be on the Romans from all sides.Kenny

[Paralus]

G'day Kenny/Nicator/AlejandroIf there is one thing wrong with this site it is the interweaving threads within threads. I hadn't noticed these responses earlier. Some of this I will have opined on earlier today (God, it's 02:00 here, but let's go).First Nicator, for his point of difference agrees with Kenny. The suggestion that the Hellenistic cavalry was nowhere near that of Philip's or Alexander's is not quite on the money. While one is loathe to compare later versions with the Companion Cavalry of Alexander, it must be said that the "institution" was maintained GÇô as with the phalanx and the Hypaspists. Indeed, it might be said it was this stark reticence to change or adapt the Macedonian armament that wrought its eventual downfall.Possibly the two greatest charges by a cavalry wing ("Companion" or otherwise) post Alexander (ignoring Cannae) are Dimetrius Poliorcetes at Ipsus (c 301) and Antiochus III ("The Great") at Magnesia (c 190). Both were victory winning charges by Macedonian heavy cavalry. Both were executed near enough to the manner that Alexander was accustomed. Unlike Alexander, both exposed a vulnerable phalanx long enough for it to be decimated and the battle lost. In Antiochus' case, he seemed so enthralled by (finally) overcoming a Roman army that he simply carried on to the baggage train. What was that quip from Alexander at Gaugamela?One needs to recall that Antiochus was no dill: his "anabasis" (march up county) to regain the lost satrapies of Alexander (and his prime predecessor, Seleucas I) including India and what would become Parthia was what gained him the Alexandrian moniker.Which leads to another point. Antiochus had at his disposal (the Greek homeland and Ptolemaic Egypt aside) the resources of what was once the empire of Alexander. When intervening in Greece (after Philip IV's defeat at Cynoscephalae), why not embark an army of the size (some 70,000) which he mustered for Magnesia? Because of the cost and the trouble. And the fact that if it didn't work, he'd need it back "home". (He should have thrown the lot behind Philip, butGǪ)I don't believe that Alexander would have taken anything near Antiochus' Magnesia horde to Italy. The transport by sea would have made such logistics prohibitive. And by sea he would have come (like Pyrrhus after him). He'd have been looking for a trusted army of some 40 GÇô 50,000 foot and 8-10,000 cavalry. He'd long ago learned that it's not the size but how you wield it. Cont.

[Paralus]

As to the Romans, well, as we have seen GÇô the pit was always bottomless. As it would have been here. I argue in another post on this thread that the Romans were by far the most "warlike" people at this time GÇô and right down to the Republic's end. There would be no capitulation on their part. Sydney or the bush as one would say in these parts at the last race.It seems that I have painted the picture in which Alexander loses to a Roman Consular army. Far from the truth. My purpose has been to show the very slow change in armaments and tactics on the Macedonian side. And, although he displayed minor variations, Alexander was a creature of (winning) habit. It is also a fact that history shows the superiority of the Roman maniple as compared to an unchanging Macedonian infantry.As I've conceded: Alexander would probably prevail. It is whether he gets a bloody nose doing so and the price he'd pay in doing so. I firmly believe that this would have been no walk in the park.

A Roman Consular army was not populated by outdated Persian wicker protected infantrymen.Paralus.

[Nicator]

Hi Paralus,
Of course you are spot on (as usual). My feelings are that the latter day cavalry would not have been quite up to snuff because of the cost of training and maintaining such a force. Philip's (II) cavalry had been undergoing constant training and war for decades before Alexander offically got his capable little mits on them. I can imagine that under the devious tactical genius son that they became even sharper and more capable. How many of the successors would have the financial ability or military acuity to get a cavalry arm to that level. Not to mention the close cooperation needed between cavalry and infantry which made the whole thing so lethally effective. It seemed to me that the lengthened pike of the successors made the phalanx even more vulnerable to the flanking maneuver than heretofore experienced. They would have needed even better cavalry to adequately protect such a flank. A cavalry force better than that wielded by Alexander never existed. So changing one major piece of weaponry caused the whole scheme to unravel. So, again, you are spot on, in that the phalanx was not as flexible as the maniple, but in this case the flexibility was not the inability to move, but rather the inability to adapt to a changing world. The inability of the phalanx to move (or be moved)was its strength. Power and Rigidity was integral to the the design of the Macedonian phalanx. That it could maneuver (under Alexander or Philip) seems certain. Recall the controlled withdrawal of Philip's phalanx at Chaeronea and Alexander's brilliant rolling maneuvers at Pelium. For real maneuverability (flanking maneuverability) you need speed and the cavalry force supplied that speed. I would argue that such a force needed even better cooperation between units. Mobile ground corps such as the Hypaspists and slingers would have been even more necesarry. Their high level of importance at Guagamela to roll and roam between the phalanx battalions repulsing any invaders that made penetrations speaks of a high level of cooperation between all units. No maniple could have ever competed with this scheme. It was the best of the ancient world. later Nicator

[Nicator]

Hi Kenny,
I've often wondered what Alexander could have done in such a trap. He was so fast that in more than a few instances he'd allowed himself to be drawn into one, and in this case, I wonder if he could have escaped. The hordes of Parthians (right?) brought camels with loads of arrows and rained tens of thousands of arrows down onto the hapless Roman legion before simulating a retreat. Of course, we all know what happened later. It's one of those tragic military battles that pitted an overconfident Roman army against overwhelming odds. The end result was (and should have been) predictable. A legion was vanquished. later Nicator

[Paralus]

G'day NicatorAs the Saxon King in the Arthur remake was wont to say "Finally, somebody worth posting with!"No doubt the cavalry of Alexander and his coordination of other units with the phalanx were incomparable. It's the reason he would most likely have prevailed GÇô but it's much more fun arguing!The successor monarchs certainly had access to the funds. The difference, I believe, is the fact that this is no longer a "Macedonian" cavalry crafted in the home land, but one in Babylon or Asia Minor. That said, in the engagements mentioned, they performed as well as any Alexander wielded GÇô pity about the commanders.The description (by Appian) of Antiochus' 16,000 strong phalanx's (if I remember correctly) desperate counter manoeuvres is well worth the read. Here is a superbly trained and experienced unit executing moves that would have made Alexander proud. Unfortunately, given a lack of flank protection, the outcome was predictable.And you are correct regarding the length of pike. A deadly unit the phalanx, but lengthen the pike and you lessen what flexibility you have. Lose your flank protection and the Phalanx became a deadly place to be.Paralus.

[alejandro]

Hi Paralus,True, AlexanderGÇÖs intentions will be crystal clear to Romans, Magna Graecians, Samnites and Carthaginians. But the question each one of them will have to answer is still the same: should we unite and fight against him or join him and be a vassal province in control of former enemiesGÇÖ neighbouring lands? And Alexander is not Alexander of Epiros or Pyrrhos, but the conqueror of the whole world. That will certainly play a role in the decision.IGÇÖm pretty sure Alexander will find willing allies everywhere. Philip did it marvellously in his way to political control of the Greek world. For example, he became the de-facto ruler of Thessaly and got a dominant position in the Amphyctionic (sp?) league by playing the role of GÇ£defender of the cult and traditionsGÇ¥. And he didnGÇÖt need to alienate everyone, but simply lull them to his side. And Alexander certainly learned from him, as his bloodless conquest of Egypt shows.He will almost certainly try first to get them to accept his rule, and only if they donGÇÖt heGÇÖll attack. The first stop would probably be Carthage. But heGÇÖll first contact Sicilian and Magna Graecian polis and ask for help (or at least neutrality). I am pretty sure nobody will help the Carthaginians. In the meantime, his allies will see him as the judge of their petty disputes (ie, the very same role you correctly attach to Rome in later years), meaning his power will be recognised and sought after, making his de-facto control very powerful (as Philip himself did previously), even though the de-jure control will remain in the hands of the original peoples. And then he can ask for permission to GÇ£help the Samnites, unjustly attacked by those unlawful and bellicose RomansGÇ¥. The Samnites, being offered the option, will gladly join Alexander.It is hypothetical, of course, but the pattern was seen many times before, and Alexander was (I follow a Badian-Bosworth line here) a Realpolitik animal that will not let things degenerate into a grand alliance against him (and remember most of these tribes sent gifts and diplomats to Alexander in Babylon after his return from Gadrosia, so there were "pre-existent pacts" to be honoured that could be used by Alexander as "casus belli" (sp?). There will be plenty of legal gibberish to wield and justify the campaigns and get allies)We may never reach an agreement on these matters and the experiment will never take place, but I will stick to my guns here, and say that Alex will either beat or ge

[alejandro]

We may never reach an agreement on these matters and the experiment will never take place, but I will stick to my guns here, and say that Alex will either beat or get an alliance with each tribe/region in turn, both increasing his power and weakening the position of those not in alliance with him at every step.All the best,Alejandro