Antipater's summons to Babylon

[Jim Boudreaux]

Greetings to you theaccursed,
I loved that letter. Laughed heartily. Now that we're friends can I just call you "the"?

It is not my opinion that Antipater was trying to provoke Alexander at all. I adhere to your GÇÿreasonable interpretationGÇÖ that he was trying desperately to appease him in every way. Given that, I can see Antipater hedging his bets and I was wondering on what he could reasonably depend to defend himself if Alexander had killed Cassander while beating his head against a wall and decided it was then necessary to beat a hasty path to Pella and take care of Antipater as well. I donGÇÖt imagine anyone savored the idea of going into battle voluntarily against Alexander, but if Alexander had gone west would Antipater have flown to Athens, Syracuse or Carthage rather than stand and fight? And if he fought with what would he do so and what would his likely strategy have been? Speculation, nothing more. But it does have a bearing on reality and is the nub of what I am trying to understand

Alexander returns from India and arrives in Babylon. From Babylon he then marches the army and court to Opis where he redeploys 11,500 Macedonians toward the west via Cilicia. He then marches north to Ecbatana arriving there in the autumn of 324. Consider the situation he was in at that time. The neighboring province, Armenia, had operating in it a renegade Persian named Pigres. Beyond him Ariarathes controlled Pontic Cappadocia with 45,000 men. South of Cappadocia Lycaonia was in open rebellion having killed Balacrus, former bodyguard of Alexander and son-in-law of Antipater. Harpalus had run off with a fortune to Athens, who now harbored him, against repeated requests to return him. Seuthes was independent in Thrace with 28,000 men to say he should stay so. And Antipater is showing signs of recalcitrance in Europe.
Alexander was the quintessential strategist. I study Alexander to understand, not why Hellenism created the brotherhood of man, but how the mind of the quintessential strategist worked. Given his strategic situation and his position in Media, from which he could launch a campaign to eradicate these troubles in the west, I wonder why instead he chose to return to Babylon that summer with the intent of invading Arabia. Arabia? What about the reconquest of Anatolia and Greece? What about Magna Graecia? What about Carthage? No, the mind of the quintessential strategist instead chose Arabia and IGÇÖd like to know why.

[Thomas]

Had he truly wanted to provoke Alexander, he could have simply sent only a messenger, with a letter beginning with (something like):

I don't think I would have wanted to be the messenger. Probably would have been sent off with the words "Take this happy news to Alexandros"...

[Paralus]

So, just to make sure I understand you correctly now: In your opinion, Antipater was trying to lure Alexander to return to Macedon - the "inevitable retaliation" (that, however, proved not to be inevitable), raise as large an army as he could, persuade Craterus and the returning macedonians to join him against Alexander, and then, when Alexander himself returned, greet him perhaps in Cilicia, with an army ready for battle - perhaps 80 000 soldiers - and focus, not so much on winning the battle as on killing Alexander. And the reason for such a drastic idea: Alexander's "orientalisation" - that he had heard of for 7 years or so, but never (like the rest of Macedon) actually seen for himself. Correct?

G'day "theaccursed".

Two answers: yes you misunderstood; and no, the above scenario was not ever postulated. (I too liked the letter). What I have said though, was that Antipater was in no way serving himself up as the next course in Alexander's pre-Arabia banqueting. Given what had transpired to date, he well knew what would result from his refusal to attend to his king's summons.

Comfortable in Macedonia, he was about to march nowhere that circumstances didn't force upon him. As Jim argues, despite restructuring GÇô with extreme prejudice GÇô the empire's administration, it could in no way be said that the situation was stable. The situation in Greece (the exiles decree) was one entirely of his own making (as with Gedrosia) and was brushfire awaiting a decent breeze. That breeze, in the event, turned out to be Leosthenes. Alexander's death became the petrol used to put it out.

I doubt Antipater will have moved on Alexander. He'd have left his king to make that move. Where, when and with what Antipater defended himself, we may conjecture until the Cross turns over. But, defend himself he would.

The Diadochoi cynically and repeatedly rallied Greeks GÇô who by then you'd think would have known better GÇô with the "freedom and autonomy" slogan. It was cast about like so many covetous glances across the floor of a society ball. This was GÇô given Greek cities smarting over the interference in their internal affairs in direct contravention of the "League" GÇô the logical pose for the regent of Greece to take. I believe it was the course he would have taken when the inevitable happened and the king came politely asking for and explanation at the point of a levelled sarisa.

And Antipater would soon, as far as Alexander knew, be replaced.

I think a more reasonable interpretation is that Antipater simply didn't trust that Alexander would treat him fairly, had he come to Babylon, and that the "provocation" itself was a very unfortunate consequence. .

I sincerely doubt that the devious old dynast and former king-maker would ever have relinquished his position GÇô whilst alive. And, he well knew the result of refusing to attend on the king when so summoned. There is noway he made it into his seventies by being as naively credulous as Antigonus GÇô to his delight I'm sure GÇô later found Peithon to be.

In the deadly game of court poker, Antipater had just "seen" Alexander's summons and demotion and "raised him" insolence and disobedience. Perhaps it's as Alexander intended? His next bet to "call" and lay out the cards. Does a Graeco/Macedonian phalangite flush beat a full house topped by a royal army and a judicial murder?

[theaccursed]

Two answers: yes you misunderstood; and no, the above scenario was not ever postulated. (I too liked the letter). What I have said though, was that Antipater was in no way serving himself up as the next course in Alexander's pre-Arabia banqueting. Given what had transpired to date, he well knew what would result from his refusal to attend to his king's summons.

Believed and feared, rather than knew. Alexander after all didn't do what Antipater - in your opinon - "knew" he would.

I doubt Antipater will have moved on Alexander. He'd have left his king to make that move. Where, when and with what Antipater defended himself, we may conjecture until the Cross turns over. But, defend himself he would.

Apparently, it would have taken more than Antipater not coming to Babylon. You don't belive Antipater would have let Craterus replace him. That doesn't mean Alexander didn't think so. The "first move" would have had to be Antipater not letting himself be replaced by Craterus. That, I think, could have made Alexander return to Macedon (though I don't think he would have been in a hurry to do so). That would have been a declaration of war. It would have been Antipater declaring himself king.

I sincerely doubt that the devious old dynast and former king-maker would ever have relinquished his position GÇô whilst alive.

He only lived for four more years. And while he couldn't have known that, he must have known he wouldn't have many years left. I don't belive he would have brought civil war upon himself only so he could have ruled for a few more years and then be replaced anyway. And I think it would have been difficult to justify such a war to the macedonian soldiers - and to the macedonians in general.

[theaccursed]

It is not my opinion that Antipater was trying to provoke Alexander at all. I adhere to your GÇÿreasonable interpretationGÇÖ that he was trying desperately to appease him in every way. Given that, I can see Antipater hedging his bets and I was wondering on what he could reasonably depend to defend himself if Alexander had killed Cassander while beating his head against a wall and decided it was then necessary to beat a hasty path to Pella and take care of Antipater as well. I donGÇÖt imagine anyone savored the idea of going into battle voluntarily against Alexander, but if Alexander had gone west would Antipater have flown to Athens, Syracuse or Carthage rather than stand and fight? And if he fought with what would he do so and what would his likely strategy have been? Speculation, nothing more. But it does have a bearing on reality and is the nub of what I am trying to understand

It seems to me, had Alexander evaluated the "Antipater situation" the way you and Paralus have - or even better: had news reached him that Antipater had not let himself be replaced by Craterus - he still would have been in no hurry to return to Macedon. Also, I'm not as convinced as you or Paralus that Craterus and his soldiers would have betrayed Alexander, or that it would have been easy to convince the macedonians that Alexander was "the enemy". But yes, I realise this is only my personal opinion. But then, that's pretty much all there is to this discussion, isn't it? All we really know is that Antipater refused to come to Babylon. Personally, I think you and Paralus are taking your analysis of this action too far, and presume to much both regarding Antipater and regarding how macedonians, those returning and those already in Macedon, would have reacted to the idea of making an enemy out of Alexander (and regarding Craterus, that he would merely have accepted it if Antipater had refused to let himself be replaced).

And I'm glad we're friends, but the accursed fits me pretty well (and the space was not left out on purpose or by mistake, for some reason registering "the accursed" didn't work).

[Paralus]

Believed and feared, rather than knew. Alexander after all didn't do what Antipater - in your opinon - "knew" he would.

He only lived for four more years. And while he couldn't have known that, he must have known he wouldn't have many years left. I don't belive he would have brought civil war upon himself only so he could have ruled for a few more years and then be replaced anyway. And I think it would have been difficult to justify such a war to the macedonian soldiers - and to the macedonians in general.

GGÇÖday GÇ¥theaccursedGÇ¥.

Yes GÇô it is my opinion and I may well be taking my analysis too far. There was though, to my mind, absolutely nothing to be gained by Antipater in refusing to attend upon Alexander in Babylon. The situation is quite strange, AlexanderGÇÖs empire is already in that process of disintegration which would accelerate after his death: Thrace is GÇô to all intents and purposes GÇô independent and Cappodocia and Armenia are unsubdued or in revolt. The Indian provinces had already been GÇô in essence GÇô handed back to their rulers. Lastly, in Greece, we have a viceroy refusing his kingGÇÖs orders to bring himself and fresh troops to court and a marshal thoroughly indolent in Cyinda who GÇô in the event GÇô did not budge for the last nine months of AlexanderGÇÖs life. Indeed, he did not move until the Athenian fleet had been decisively flogged in two engagements during the GÇ£HellenicGÇ¥ (Lamian) war. And Alexander was heading off to Arabia. IGÇÖm with Jim, somethingGÇÖs missing in the puzzle.

The old kingmaker had no qualms about the trip to just north of the Bekaa Valley (Triparadeisus) in 320. Having lost Craterus in battle along the way, Antipater was in no hurry to reach this meeting. He let the veterans in the royal army stew whilst he made camp and proceeded to frighten the daylights out of Eurydice GÇô who wanted a say in the decision making. The royal army was mutinous and it is surmised that, in the end, he threatened to take his fresh levies and CraterusGÇÖ veterans into the field against it. He had no compunctions with resect to civil war here - nor, self evidently - did the others. Macedonians would be engaged against each other for some time to come yet.

IGÇÖve written it before, but it bears repeating here. Any cursory reading of the actions of these marshals from the time of AlexanderGÇÖs death down to that of Seleucus leaves one with a singular, overriding impression: they acted unfailingly and at all times in their own interests. Everything else was suborned to that and they were GÇô demonstrably GÇô capable of anything that secured their advancement. This was not a habit discovered post AlexanderGÇÖs death.

It is what Antipater did, though, after the GÇ£settlementGÇ¥, that is most instructive. Taking the GÇ£kingsGÇ¥, he turned back to Europe and marched home after having placed most of his armament in the care of Anrigonus GÇô a contemporary GÇô with instructions to remove the GÇ£pest from the ChersonesosGÇ¥, Eumenes. A job he seemed singularly uninterested in himself to judge from the rather desultory performance in the field prior to heading off to Pella. He, in effect, renounced the Asian empire for the comforts of Pella and a Greek hegemony as seemingly comfortable to him as old slippers.

He had secured his interest. A process that had GÇô in my opinion GÇô commenced prior to AlexanderGÇÖs death.

[alejandro]

Hi there,

I've been following this excellently argued thread, and I wanted to add something to it.

One possible scenario mentioned in your posts was one where Antipater refuses to yield his "de facto" kingdom to Krateros. Several options are hypothesized about the timing of Krateros' arrival to Macedon (if at all) and what he would do if Antipater offered him an alliance.

Certainly an interesting scenario, and I agree that Alexander would not be eager to return to Macedon to quench the revolt.

Implicit in this whole argument is the fact that Alexander remains alive for another five years, which certainly changes the scenario from the one we usually consider (the Diadochoi one, where it's evey man for himself).

But I think one important element was left out in your discussion, and that is Olympias. If she was powerful enough as to attract Macedonian soldiers away from Arrhidaios army (an Argead v Argead contest, or rather an Alexander v Philip one), I don't doubt that Antipater (someone Olympias was not very fond of) would face a difficult time facing her. Even more, with Alexander alive, her position would be much stronger, and I think that Krateros (if he ever arrives to Macedon), would join her side rather than Antipater's.

Just my thoughts.

All the best,
Alejandro

[Paralus]

One possible scenario mentioned in your posts was one where Antipater refuses to yield his "de facto" kingdom to Krateros. Several options are hypothesized about the timing of Krateros' arrival to Macedon (if at all) and what he would do if Antipater offered him an alliance.

But I think one important element was left out in your discussion, and that is Olympias. If she was powerful enough as to attract Macedonian soldiers away from Arrhidaios army (an Argead v Argead contest, or rather an Alexander v Philip one), I don't doubt that Antipater (someone Olympias was not very fond of) would face a difficult time facing her. Even more, with Alexander alive, her position would be much stronger, and I think that Krateros (if he ever arrives to Macedon), would join her side rather than Antipater's.

G'day Alejandro.

A pertinent observation.

I've asked, on a number of occasions, the question with respect to Craterus' apparent indolence. At the time of Alexander's death, he'd been nine months going from Babylon to Macedonia via Cyinda, Cilicia. One could, I suppose, assume he'd borrowed a map from the same cartographer that drew up Moses' map from Egypt to Israel, but I'd seriously doubt the errant map-maker was still in business. Three possibilities come to mind: Christmas time is nice in Cilicia so why not hang about and see what summer's like; not a single thing had been done to begin the assembly of the armament Alexander wanted assembled; Craterus had little enthusiasm for the brief he carried and was furiously considering his options.

The first is, of course, "Paralisian" sarcasm. The second is possible, though unlikely, as the money was there in Cyinda and the battle fleet was of a size nine or ten months later to deal easily with an Athenian fleet of two hundred ships off Amorgas. As well the brief was not to "start" the process, but to check on the way through. No, the third GÇô at least to me GÇô appeals as the logical reason for the inactivity. I don't think he wanted to execute those orders. He didn't take the dual regency after the Babylon settlement either but chose to operate as the older man's "chiliarch".

What is seriously lacking is any evidence out of Macedonia for this period. That's not unusual, the Macedonian court was known for National Socialist (German) style record keeping. What we'd dearly love to have is the correspondence that may (most likely?) have transpired between Cyinda and Pella. We don't, so we guess. We extrapolate from what we have. Did Cassander meet with Craterus?

As to that dreadful old Atrax Robustus, ever dangerous and about as trustworthy as the nick-name I've accorded her, I'd think Craterus would most definitely have thought twice with respect that alliance. Polyperchon he wasn't. The murderous old matriarch would most definitely have sided with her son and, were Antipater's contumacy to become conflict, Olympias would need "neutering". Philip would have had her locked up and the key inserted where it wouldn't be found for the duration.

Now, there's one for the "fly on the wall" thread: what was going on between Antipater and Craterus?

[alejandro]

Hi Paralus,

I agree with your point that Krateros' stay in Cydna was a rather extended one. And I read with horror that Krateros may have met Kassandros while there: to think that Krateros could be plotting against Alexander is something difficult to digest. He was always portrayed as a loyal subject (the distinction between Hephaistion as philalexandros and himself as philobasileus comes to mind), and so cannot easily believe your thesis, though I must admit that it is a tempting one.

It was mentioned in the thread on the poll about people's perception of Alexander that it is difficult to abandon one's beliefs, especially if they were nursed for a long time, and I may be experimenting such a stubborn rejection of Krateros' treason (it cannot be labelled otherwise) because of that psychological need to cling to what I believed for so long. But I truly think that Krateros would not organize a coup against Alexander.

He was, as all the other marshals, an extremely capable and ruthless general, but being a traditionalist, he wouldn't face the institution of kingship, no matter the degree of orientalization of the current monarch.

But I would even prefer him to be a rebel for a just cause than a coward who would hide his hand behind a murderous plot. Yes, because the almost immediate inference from an alleged meeting between Krateros and Kassandros can only be seen as a pact to murder Alexander and Antipater's promise of "going back to good ol' Macedonian ways". Certainly a role that I wouldn't like to cast Krateros on. But then again, I may just be looking for ways of exculpating him because of the image I created of him.

All the best,

Alejandro

PS: This whole discussion rekindled my desire of watching a film about the last days of Alexander's life, but focusing on the internal struggle among the marshals. What a thriller it would be!

[Jim Boudreaux]

Without doubt Olympias was a player in this drama, in fact had most likely been the catalyst of its creation. Her strategic position was strong but she could likely act only defensively. Antipater held the advantage vis-+á-vis Olympias as Epirus had an infant king and he controlled Pella where Cleopatra lived and Athens where a rival claimant to the Epiriot throne languished in exile.

It has been pointed out before that in 317 the Macedonian army led by Eurydice stood down rather than chance harming Olympias. I think the circumstances of this event need not indicate a relationship to what could have happened six years earlier had it been Antipater facing Olympias. In 317 Alexander had been dead for six years and Antipater for two. Polyperchon had been selected as Regent of the two kings but in his struggle against Cassander had enlisted the aid of Olympias and had split the fa+ºade of a united kingship by sending Alexander IV to Olympias. Wishing to move quickly into the Peloponnesus he left the Court in Pella and once heGÇÖd disappeared Eurydice had Philip III announce Cassander Regent. Polyperchon then went to enlist AeacidesGÇÖ help in Epirus and together they marched on Macedon. EurydiceGÇÖs Macedonians did not go out to fight Olympias, but rather as servants of the new Regent, Cassander, they marched to fight against his foe, Polyperchon, and his Epiriot supporter Aeacides. The appearance of Olympias was a shock to an army arrayed and ordered for battle. There were Macedonians on both sides, those of Polyperchon and those of Eurydice, so a struggle among contending Regents really had nothing to do with loyalty to Alexander through Olympias at all, IMHO.

Craterus is the enigma in all of this. What was the reason he stayed so long in Cilicia? Paralus has asked the question before, what had changed in the time that Craterus was dispatched to Europe and the time that Alexander died to cause him to remain in Cilicia against orders to move on to Pella and relieve Antipater in time for him to bring 10.000 Macedonian Pike men to assist in the invasion of Arabia? One big thing was the passage of Cassander. I imagine he could have taken either a land route or a sea route. If he went by land he must have met Antigonus and from there passed through the gates to Tarsus and met with Craterus. If he went by sea then he would have likely missed Antigonus and met Craterus in Cilicia. Either way I canGÇÖt see how someone on such a fact finding mission would not have sought out not only AlexanderGÇÖs take on the situation but also ascertained the feelings of his generals.

[Paralus]

But I truly think that Krateros would not organize a coup against Alexander...

He was, as all the other marshals, an extremely capable and ruthless general, but being a traditionalist, he wouldn't face the institution of kingship, no matter the degree of orientalization of the current monarch.

But I would even prefer him to be a rebel for a just cause than a coward who would hide his hand behind a murderous plot. Yes, because the almost immediate inference from an alleged meeting between Krateros and Kassandros can only be seen as a pact to murder Alexander and Antipater's promise of "going back to good ol' Macedonian ways".

Craterus is the enigma in all of this. What was the reason he stayed so long in Cilicia? GǪ what had changed in the time that Craterus was dispatched to Europe and the time that Alexander died to cause him to remain in Cilicia against orders to move on to Pella and relieve Antipater in time for him to bring 10.000 Macedonian Pike men to assist in the invasion of Arabia? One big thing was the passage of Cassander. I imagine he could have taken either a land route or a sea route. If he went by land he must have met Antigonus and from there passed through the gates to Tarsus and met with Craterus. If he went by sea then he would have likely missed Antigonus and met Craterus in Cilicia. Either way I canGÇÖt see how someone on such a fact finding mission would not have sought out not only AlexanderGÇÖs take on the situation but also ascertained the feelings of his generals.

G'day Alejandro/Jim

It's not so much the involving of Craterus in a murder plot as the sounding out of what he is thinking. Jim's point about sounding out the "lie of the land" via the two marshals, I think, is relevant. Were Antipater to find himself in line for what I'm sure must certainly have come his way, the disposition of Craterus and his troops was the first order of business to transact. Indolence would work, alliance would work better.

The relationship between Craterus and Hephaestion was nothing short of the Asian version of Antipater and the Atrax Robustus in Epirus. In this case, it was most likely worse: Craterus had upset (and continued to do so) Alexander's real "life partner" GÇô in effect his first and most intimate "wife". A goodly amount of that spite was, most likely, aimed at the seemingly sycophantic orientalising behaviour and find "nothing to disagree with" attitude of Hephaestion. Never, ever upset a "wife" and, as Philip found out, never earn their hatred.

Alexander had taken to separating them as GÇô one suspects GÇô it wouldn't do to be rid of that marshal who, since Issus, had been second only to Parmenion and, since the older man's death, had (in effect) taken his position.

Why send that person home with demobbed troops? What did Craterus think of being GÇô essentially GÇô retired to the home "provinces"?

[agesilaos]

The position of Krateros is, indeed, an interesting one and one that throws light on this whole anti -Antipatrid line.

Krateros was sent with the demobees because he too was ill; he had orders to prepare a fleet in Cilicia, which commission the naval forces during the first Diadoch War show him to have completed. Alexander's tolerance of his stay in Cilicia can only mean one thing - that he was not disobeying his orders. It therefore follows that there was no rush in replacing Antipater.

IMHO the story of this replacement stems from the settlement at Babylon where Perdikkas was faced with the problem of Krateros and 10,000 veterans in an anomalous position. It would have been easy for him to represent Krateros as Alexander's replacement for Antipater as he had Alexander's papers including the Last Plans which he is alleged to have doctored.

[Paralus]

G'day Agesilaos.

Now there's a theory that merits consideration. It is indeed claimed that Alexander's last plans and paperwork were altered by Perdiccas. Some GÇô already known GÇô he could do little about without wider consent (Hephaestion's memorial, the temples and the rest of the armament in Cilicia). It's what was not known that could and, most likely was, altered for personal gain (Bosworth's assertion that Ptolemy is behind the Liber de Morte in 309/8 for example).

The clear impression I get is that this programme was already underway and Craterus (too long with the Latin I'm afraid) to check its progress and further it as necessary. The shipbuilding must have been substantially underway as it will have been terminated at Alexander's death (with the rest of those preparations) by Perdiccas. As you point out though, that fleet operated for Macedon during the Hellenic war.

The major sources (from memory though, possibly not Plutarch) report Craterus being given command of these demobbed veterans after the demobbing and the orders to replace Antipater. So, while it is possibly a corruption of the original material and the replacement edict was issued by Perdiccas, IGÇÖd have thought it more likely that it happened the way it is reported. It may have been conflated though.

As to Alexander not being concerned, it all comes down to the timeline and the exact time of Opis etc. Had Craterus left in summer, then his presence in Cilicia at the time of HephaestionGÇÖs death (Oct 324)is not untoward. He did, after all, need to make certain the kingGÇÖs construction was being carried out. This is a little more problematic were he to have left in March (as has been conjectured).

AlexanderGÇÖs reaction to HephaestionGÇÖs death was (after abject dismay and depression) was to GÇô in the vernacular GÇô go thump the daylights out the nearest uppity tribes. CraterusGÇÖ reaction will have been unbridled joy one can only imagine. Perhaps, comfortable in Cilicia, he may well have sat and waited to see what might next transpire. He was GÇô after Hephaestion GÇô the next most senior marshal of the empire. In any case he sat GÇÿround until his king died.

And, yes, AntipaterGÇÖs attendance upon his king may not have been seen as urgent by Alexander. That would depend on his departure schedule for Arabia GÇô I doubt heGÇÖd have left without those fresh Macedonian levies being in (whatever) place. He had returned 10,000 infantry and 1,500 horse.

[Jim Boudreaux]

Craterus has now assumed his rightful place as the figure in the pivotal role of this entire intrigue. Alexander, Olympias and Antipater have each been analyzed and while they are the major players it is upon Craterus that the key to all this has devolved. Arriving in Cilicia in or around September of 324 he still resided in Tarsus a year and a half later when he dispatched Cleitus to dislodge EutionGÇÖs fleet from the Hellespont. Why he was still there is the question and the answers come down to two possibilities. He was either there at AlexanderGÇÖs will or against it.

To argue that it was at AlexanderGÇÖs will, support is found in his orders to GÇ£prepare a fleet in Cilicia.GÇ¥- Agesilaos, May 17,2006. He had been sent on this mission, as a prelude to his eventual return to Macedon, because GÇ£he too was ill.GÇ¥ - Agesilaos, May 17,2006. It is reasonable to understand that an ill man would not care to travel far or quickly if not required to. A protracted stay in Cilicia could therefore be excused under such circumstances.

To argue that it was against AlexanderGÇÖs will, support is found in GÇ£this programme was already underway and CraterusGǪ to check its progress and further it as necessary. The shipbuilding must have been substantially underway.GÇ¥-Paralus, May 17, 2006. Also, GÇ£[He] remain[ed] in Cilicia against orders to move on to Pella and relieve Antipater in time for him to bring 10.000 Macedonian Pike men to assist in the invasion of Arabia.GÇ¥-Jim, May 16, 2006. The point here is that the work Craterus was to oversee had been underway for some time and anything other than his assertion that it was going well was needed in passing through PhiloxenusGÇÖ satrapy. Ill or not Craterus would indeed have been under pressure for it was AlexanderGÇÖs will that Antipater march to Babylon in time to incorporate 10,000 additional Macedonians into his army.

The suggestion that Perdiccas manufactured the mission of replacing Antipater is worth considering because of its implications of why Craterus may have stopped in and then stayed so long in Cilicia. If Perdiccas wanted empire wide acceptance of the Babylonian Solution, which placed him above all others, then he would tread warily on the egos of those to the west capable of establishing a contrary solution. He needed Antipater, Antigonus and Craterus incorporated into that solution so that its survival would be a goal they would all work towards. To that end Perdiccas could woo Phila, place Antipater securely in military control of Europe, place Craterus in control of the kingsGÇÖ interests in Europe and expand AntigonusGÇÖ holdings in Anatolia. This scheme in fact held the peace until Perdiccas himself dismantled it by subjecting himself to OlympiasGÇÖ ambitions following the Lamian War.

To fabricate the story that Antipater was to be replaced by Craterus would have alienated the two. It would have implied that Antipater had lost the confidence of Alexander and had acted treasonously by refusing his kings command. It would have implied Craterus was complicit in that treason or worse was incapable of enforcing it on his own authority. It would have caused rumor and sidewise glances; it would have caused posts to a thread in a web site even after 2300 years! Not the best gift to a future father-in-law or his associates with whom Perdiccas sought alliance and not acrimony.

If this fabrication was in the Last Plans and it was made before these plans were presented for consideration to the army then Perdiccas would have done himself a severe disservice. Then there would not have been need of CassanderGÇÖs trip to Babylon for anything other than sight seeing. I think therefore that this was not the case. Which brings us back to why was Craterus still in Cilicia following the winter of 324/323. I believe he was waiting for something. Was that something a call to arms by Alexander; by Antipater; or was he waiting for the completion of the fleet?

A call to arms by Alexander is possible. Alexander was a capable commander, no doubt. He was adept at any number of military stratagems including deceitfully misinforming his enemies of his intentions. Examples are that he didnGÇÖt tell Craterus to dismantle the tents he left behind before the Persian Gates and at the Hydaspes so the enemy could be sure to notice his absence. Nor did he tell Polydamus to be sure to send word ahead to Parmenion to get his affairs in order so that upon his arrival some generals could stab him to death. Alexander sent Craterus away with 11,500 Macedonians with the explanation that he was ill. Maybe, maybe not. Craterus goes to Cilicia to where a fleet is supposed to be about ready to- what? Invade Carthage in the years ahead or perhaps to accompany and provision a force bound for Europe. Alexander meanwhile had gone to Ecbatana to winter. He leaves Babylon and goes to Ecbatana for the winter? ShouldnGÇÖt it have been the other way around? Was he perhaps planning to go somewhere in the spring best approached from Ecbatana? As it turns out the ships are not quite finished for, what do you know, Harpalus has just passed through town and now the money is gone which prompts PhiloxenusGÇÖ participation in the letter writing campaign to Athens to return him and it. Then Hephaestion dies and winter passes. If Craterus were waiting for spring to be the southern pincer of an assault on Fortress Europe then he would have had to await AlexanderGÇÖs return from Babylon to begin the campaign. In that case the visit of Cassander would have alerted Craterus that something was amiss and he would have been remiss not to have warned Alexander and put Cassander in chains.

A call to arms by Antipater requires the demand that he relinquish his post to Craterus and bring a force to Babylon be historical and not created by Perdiccas. Craterus would have had no need of the fleet and its completion would have been seen to by his return to Pella where he could secure Harpalus and his money, sending one to Alexander and the other to Philoxenus. In that case CassanderGÇÖs visit would have been the inducement to remain in Cilicia and await developments in Babylon. His remaining in Cilicia would have put him in control of the remainder of the money at Cyinda and the fleet that later under the command of his admiral, Cleitus, would defeat the Athenian fleet at the Hellespont and off Amorgos. It would have been to protect these assets in uncertain times that he dallied in Cilicia until forced to abandon it to relieve Antipater at Lamia.

[agesilaos]

I have been looking at the sources again and the first tthing to strike one is Arrian's confusion VII 12 he notices Krateros' orders 'to take charge of the Macedonia, Thessaly, Thrace and the freedom of the Greeks' And appends Antipatros' summons with the new drafts of full-aged recruits.

Then there is an excursus on bad writers thinking up conspiracy theories which have nothing to do with the truth; then he admits that Alexander had been swayed by his mother's letters but suggests that Antipatros' recall was to avoid an irreparable breach rather than anything sinister but that the charges laid were just those most likely to influence royalty adversly although there is noevidence of any action or word on the part of Alexander to show the slightest diminution of trust in Antpatros. Dithering or what?

Brunt in the Loeb edition suggests that this criticism is lifted from Arrian's main sources, Ptolemyy and Aristoboulos; I cannot agree what we have is Arrian trying and failing to reconcile matter outside his main sources, whom he would not characterise as 'surreptitiously spreading rumour' this is surely meant to puncture a secondary but popular tradition. The parenthetical suggestion that Antipatros was being summoned to prevent a rupture with Olympias is otiose and clearly Arrian's own imposition.

Plutarch and Curtius both have passages reminiscent in the detail to whit the letters of Olympias the list of charges - arrogance after his Spartan victory, holding that what had been granted him was his by right etc - even the phraseology is similar.

Since Curtius is an amalgm of Ptolemy and Kleitarchos and Plutarch had read Kleitarchos he would be a good candidate for this information were it not for the fact that he can be shown in these passages to have criticised it himself see Curt 10 right at the end .

So the ultimate source must come before Kleitarchos, Onesikritos or Nearchos are possible with Onesikritos favourite but coming via the Liber de Morte where chapter 87 links Antipatros recall and Olympias' letters that the text is abbreviated need not surprise us as it is bound with an epitome and may represent the distillation of a longer original.

So can we believe it? I would think not Arrian clearly did not believe there was any rift even though he could not explain why (surely because his main sources did not mention it).

There are further clues the phrase 'the freedom of the Greeks' is a commonplace of Diadoch propaganda which points to a later source, in Plutarch at the very time Alexander is discharging the veterans it is Antipatros who is ordered to make sure 'they have the finest seats in the theatres and at public entertainments and go garlanded'. Strange if Krateros is being sent to replace him. The dalliance in KIlikia of the one and Macedonia of the other going unpunished for over a year, the supposedly disgraced Antipatros sending his eldest son to court where he feared to go and where two sons already abided, Alexander continuing to trust Iollas and Philip as his taster and cup-bearer just do not fit.

In Diodoros too we have the story of Krateros' relief of Antipatros before Krannon and it is expressly stated that he ceded the supreme command easily and it must have been publically, surely this relates to something more recent than a secret order three years plus before. I would suggest Perdikkan propaganda designed to put his rivals in the West in a bad light, not fulfilling the dead king's orders.