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chris_taylor wrote:thanks for providing this quote. I cut it together to double check that I didn't misunderstand the numbers: 254 skeletons, they took 3 skulls to examine and in 2 of those, the injury pattern suggests the assailants were above the victim.

is that what they're saying?

Your welcome. Yes - of the ten skeletal remains procured and among the Sacred Band which revealed overt battle wounds, two skulls showed head wounds which were almost certainly delivered from a mounted man slashing downward, probably denoting the vaunted kopis cavalry weapon. It seems to finally have become a little less tantalizing, in terms of ‘there is no evidence that cavalry played a part in the action at Chaeronea’; the kopis (κοπίδι) is indeed the hacking weapon Cleitus was armed with when he seemingly saved Alexander at the Granicus (Arrian, Book 1.15.8.). The story may be apocryphal, but that Macedonian cavalrymen wielded the kopis is not. EDIT: indeed, on p. 5 of John Ma’s 2008 paper (Chaironeia 338: Topographies of Commemoration) he writes of the Theban remains, “some of the head wounds might have been produced by the kopis”. But Liston’s work deem the considerations more substantial.

Paralus wrote:…Even should we accept Hammond's 30,000 hoplites for the allied army…

Well, superfluous to mention, Hammond did not just pull that out of the air with baseless arbitrariness; in the same passage of Demosthenes mentioning 2,000 cavalry provided, he also mentions 15,000 infantry (non-citizens among the Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leucadians, and Corcyraeans) to join the Athenians. Moreover, Diodorus tells us Philip’s army numbered upwards of 30,000 infantry, which is universally accepted, but from Justin we read that the ‘Athenians’ (viz., the allied army) heavily outnumbered Philip (Book 9.3). Justin directly followed the reputable Pompeius Trogus, whose massive work of the late 1st century BCE had Philip II as the central theme of classical history, and whose primary source was Theopompus. The allied army was primarily one of hoplites, and there were surely at least 30,000 of them fielded between both wings.

What also rests on reasonable merit is Polyaenus’ specificity of Philip utilizing higher ground. Sarissai-bearers would probably not have marched backwards in tandem, but Polyaenus wrote that those who did pull the Athenians out of position were to ‘cover themselves with their shields from the attacks of the enemy’ (Book 4.2.2) - something probably not feasible with the small shield of a Foot Companion. Thus there’s likely something circumstantial in there glossed over by Diodorus (Philip was ‘at the head of picked men’, at Book 16.86.1) and Polyaenus. Due to their smaller shields slung from the shoulder, Philip’s phalanx could contract in closer formation than a hoplite phalanx, and expand its length if needed; at Chaeronea, cavalry wedges could be afforded enough space between phalanx brigades to operate should gaps open up (which occurred consistently here at Chaeronea, per Diodorus, Book 16.86.3).

Philip’s army of 338 BCE was not going to fight a conventional hoplite-style battle, and he was compelled to take the offensive against the allied pragmatic defensive line, so whatever did occur involved some maneuvering by his very seasoned army. The excavations of the early 20th century (Sotiriades and Kromayer) revealed that the southern plain of Chaeronea had silted up since the 4th century BCE, and the site of the Lion was indeed some six feet lower than the polyandrion on the Macedonian left at the time of the battle (why the Lion, the burial of the Thebans, was constructed on the other side of the battlefield from where they fell remains unexplained). Hence that Philip found an eminence on his right that day to exploit for his counter-attack is quite reasonable (the rising ground he utilized was possibly the rising bed of the Haemon, a tributary to the Cephissus, at the time). He could not turn their flanks due to the topography, but whatever he did with his calculated offensive was achieved with the capacity to break the integrity of the allied defensive lines, which included opening gaps among them, a precious detail providrd by Diodorus. The brash prince of Macedon, Parmenio, Attalus, et el commanding on foot? Improbable.

chris_taylor wrote: ↑Thu Feb 16, 2023 7:07 pm

SpartanJKM wrote: ↑Wed Feb 15, 2023 4:49 pm
...The multiple head wounds on three of the hoplites’ skulls

The nature of the wounds on the Theban dead provides some evidence in this debate. The sharp force trauma wounds on the skulls from Chaironeia are consistently on the top of the head.

The angle of all but one of the injuries suggests the assailants were above their victims,

thanks for providing this quote. I cut it together to double check that I didn't misunderstand the numbers: 254 skeletons, they took 3 skulls to examine and in 2 of those, the injury pattern suggests the assailants were above the victim.

is that what they're saying?

Yes, that's correct. One victim's face was near sliced off. This is the result of the downward slash of a kopis - the cavalry sword. As I mentioned in an earlier post, Ma goes into all of this in his paper Chaeroneia: Topographies of Commemoration (http://www.jstor.org/stable/40651724). These injuries will have happened as the allied line collapsed and the real slaughter began. We know very little of the actual details of this battle due to Diodoros being at his dot point best but what we can see, from Plutarch's Pelopidas (18.5), is that this corps fought to the end. It is then, standing to the last, that these blows will have been delivered as the rest cut and run.

It makes for some reading and I've a copy should anyone want it.

SpartanJKM wrote: ↑Sun Feb 19, 2023 7:08 pm

Paralus wrote:…Even should we accept Hammond's 30,000 hoplites for the allied army…

Well, superfluous to mention, Hammond did not just pull that out of the air with baseless arbitrariness; in the same passage of Demosthenes mentioning 2,000 cavalry provided, he also mentions 15,000 infantry (non-citizens among the Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leucadians, and Corcyraeans) to join the Athenians. Moreover, Diodorus tells us Philip’s army numbered upwards of 30,000 infantry, which is universally accepted, but from Justin we read that the ‘Athenians’ (viz., the allied army) heavily outnumbered Philip (Book 9.3). Justin directly followed the reputable Pompeius Trogus, whose massive work of the late 1st century BCE had Philip II as the central theme of classical history, and whose primary source was Theopompus. The allied army was primarily one of hoplites, and there were surely at least 30,000 of them fielded between both wings.

Demosthenes, De Corona, 237 (18.237):
In spite of all these drawbacks, I made alliance for you with Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leucadians, and Corcyraeans: and from those states there was assembled a foreign division of fifteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, not counting their citizen-soldiery. I also obtained from them in money the largest subsidy I could.

Demosthenes is vindicating his role in the events that led up to Chaeroneia: we might have been beaten but that was not my fault; look what I did. So he enumerates, among other things, those states he brought into alliance with Athens as well as numbers and money. The notion citizen troops do not number among this number is not likely. Thebes, as one of the two major powers of the alliance, is hardly to be thought of as supplying mercenaries. It is clear that both major powers supplied their citizen troops, not mercenaries. As for citizen soldiers from the other states named, they will have been significantly smaller numbers. One wonders what, if any, infantry a maritime state such as Korkyra offered.

The reference to money will be to pay for trireme crews but also for mercenaries. This money Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of "mishandling" to his profit but it clearly paid for the 10,000 mercenaries led by Chares, Proxenus and Theagenes who were sent to garrison the Gravia pass late winter 339/8 (Polyaen. 4.2.8; Aesch. 3.146; Dien. 1.74). Now, just how many of these were still in service by late summer of 338 is only a guess.

That was not the point of should we accept Hammond's figures. That point was Hammond's insistence on finding ground in the valley which would fit his total of 30,000 hoplites all eight deep.

SpartanJKM wrote: ↑Sun Feb 19, 2023 7:08 pm What also rests on reasonable merit is Polyaenus’ specificity of Philip utilizing higher ground. Sarissai-bearers would probably not have marched backwards in tandem, but Polyaenus wrote that those who did pull the Athenians out of position were to ‘cover themselves with their shields from the attacks of the enemy’ (Book 4.2.2) - something probably not feasible with the small shield of a Foot Companion. Thus there’s likely something circumstantial in there glossed over by Diodorus (Philip was ‘at the head of picked men’, at Book 16.86.1) and Polyaenus.

A feigned retreat by one wing only I cannot see as a possibility - no matter how well drilled Philip's army was. There is little chance of a sarissa phalanx doing so and maintaining cohesion in the face of enemy attack. No less difficult for a hoplite phalanx (if Philip's picked men are hoplite armed hypaspists). One error is all it would take for complete confusion to ensue. At some stage - if we accept that the picked men (hypaspists) are hoplite armed - they are going to expose the flank of the sarissa-armed units.

What has begun as a hard fought battle giving neither the edge, as Diodoros describes, has morphed into Frontinus' tactic of Philip tiring out the Athenians. By the time we get to the Macedonian, Polyaenus, it is a feigned retreat (though he also mentions tiring the Athenians).

SpartanJKM wrote: ↑Sun Feb 19, 2023 7:08 pm Due to their smaller shields slung from the shoulder, Philip’s phalanx could contract in closer formation than a hoplite phalanx, and expand its length if needed; at Chaeronea, cavalry wedges could be afforded enough space between phalanx brigades to operate should gaps open up (which occurred consistently here at Chaeronea, per Diodorus, Book 16.86.3).

No.Extending the phalanx length while engaged is not anywhere attested throughout the ancient corpus. Nor is contracting its length while engaged. The phalanx famously " doubled its depth and closed up to the right" at Kynoskephalai, but this was well before engagement with the enemy (Polyb. 18.24.8). It is not possible for such an action to be performed in contact with the enemy by the phalanx as a whole or any syntagma. Compacting of the phalanx usually takes place by one or another form of insertion where it is termed doubling by length. Aelian 29.2 (cf Asclep 10.17 ):

Each of these takes place either by doubling the number or the place. Doubling by number takes place when the length is doubled, as when from a front of 124 files we wish to make a front of 248, while still occupying the same length of ground, by interjecting in the spaces between the soldiers some of the rear-rank-men that constitute the depth. This takes place when we wish to draw up the front of the formation in compact order.

Simply put, a (rear) half file inserts into the space between two files thus doubling density or each second, fourth, sixth, etc. man of a 16 man file steps right (or left) into the space between files and steps forward. As Aelian says, 124 files become 248 and puknosis is formed (compact order). The same is then followed for synaspismos. We see this at Sellasia where Polybios describes Doson deploying his phalanx as a double, one behind the other which closes up by insertion (Polyb 2.66.8 & 69.9).

In short, it is not possible that individual syntagma of the phalanx closed up to either the right or the left while in heavy contact with the enemy. Heavy contact is exactly what Diodoros describes. The only compacting possible is that outlined above and such does not effect the width of the phalanx unit.

Lastly, if such a brilliant tactic was devised and used by Philip it would most surely take precedence among those listed by the collectors of such such as Polyaenus rather than Philip simply tiring out the Athenians. Not a peep.

The closest to such is Pyrrhos (at Asculum) who, along with his cavalry agema, stayed out of the line so as to go to the aid of his infantry across the line should it be breached. This was a defensive move to cover breaches and breakthroughs in his infantry line.

SpartanJKM wrote: ↑Sun Feb 19, 2023 7:08 pm Philip’s army of 338 BCE was not going to fight a conventional hoplite-style battle, and he was compelled to take the offensive against the allied pragmatic defensive line, so whatever did occur involved some maneuvering by his very seasoned army. The excavations of the early 20th century (Sotiriades and Kromayer) revealed that the southern plain of Chaeronea had silted up since the 4th century BCE, and the site of the Lion was indeed some six feet lower than the polyandrion on the Macedonian left at the time of the battle (why the Lion, the burial of the Thebans, was constructed on the other side of the battlefield from where they fell remains unexplained). Hence that Philip found an eminence on his right that day to exploit for his counter-attack is quite reasonable (the rising ground he utilized was possibly the rising bed of the Haemon, a tributary to the Cephissus, at the time). He could not turn their flanks due to the topography, but whatever he did with his calculated offensive was achieved with the capacity to break the integrity of the allied defensive lines, which included opening gaps among them, a precious detail providrd by Diodorus. The brash prince of Macedon, Parmenio, Attalus, et el commanding on foot? Improbable.

As Ma has cogently pointed out, the sites of both the polyandrion and the Lion monument are no compelling evidence of where any unit stood or where a battle line began and / or ended.

As for a prince of Macedon commanding on foot, Alexander is very likely with a unit of the agema of the hypaspists. These are the sons of the hetairoi and the Macedonian nobility in their second stage of mock servitude as Heckel puts it. He may have commander these troops from horseback, he may not. He, too, may have been fighting with them. You might also wish to read Arrian 1.1.11-12. Not to mention Alexander leading the agema of the hypaspists at Tyre.

A big misconception, I feel, is a notion that Philip marshaled his cavalry behind the infantry at Chaeronea. That would leave with a shorter frontage, not to mention the cavalry was the mainstay of the infantry in Philip’s system. Earlier against a different opponent in the Scythians who advanced offensively against him, he did place some of his cavalry in the rear (Frontinus, Book 2.8.14) to prevent his own men from fleeing. It worked.

Paralus wrote:…Nothing compels us to believe that the Macedonians fell facing the Sacred Band where the mound sits. On this basis Hammond places the right of the Greek line. Nonsense…

We are most certainly led - if not ‘compelled’ - to believe that an oak tree near the Cephissus, which was named after Alexander, was near the Macedonian left’s camp, and the general sepulchre of the Macedonians was not far away (Plutarch, Alexander, Ch 9.3). Hammond has deciphered all this type of material as a professional historian, not to mention a surveying of the ground, and explains lucidly why he hypothesizes what he does. His fine 1999 paper What May Philip Have Learnt as a Hostage in Thebes imparts deeply his knowledge of Theban tactics, including the massed phalanx (a concentration of force, an offensive measure, would not have been viable at Chaeronea from the Greek right wing in their defensive stand) and how Philip was surely impressed upon by them. Thus echelon formations and an increased use of cavalry.

Plutarch, Alex. 9.2 does not mean that the Macedonian left was Alexander's position nor that of the Sacred Band. Unless you suppose the Macedonian army camped piecemeal with the left over here, the centre there and the right over there. Near to the river is logical for the obvious reasons.

The Macedonian mound dominates the plain. Nothing supposes that is where they fell just as the mound at Marathon is well away from where the Greeks fell. Plutarch's οὐ πόρρω / not far off does not mean adjacent to or opposite. Alexander will have camped with the Macedonian army and, more to the point, within spitting distance of his father's command tent.

Once again, Hammond postulates this ridiculously refused allied line so as to fit his 30,000 hoplites eight deep.

But you have other points to address.

SpartanJKM wrote: ↑Wed Mar 01, 2023 3:54 am

Paralus wrote:…Nothing compels us to believe that the Macedonians fell facing the Sacred Band where the mound sits. On this basis Hammond places the right of the Greek line. Nonsense…

We are most certainly led - if not ‘compelled’ - to believe that an oak tree near the Cephissus, which was named after Alexander, was near the Macedonian left’s camp, and the general sepulchre of the Macedonians was not far away (Plutarch, Alexander, Ch 9.3). Hammond has deciphered all this type of material as a professional historian, not to mention a surveying of the ground, and explains lucidly why he hypothesizes what he does.

Again, we most certainly are not. Let's for the moment accept Hammond's rationale for the Macedonian and Greek lines and apply it to the archaelogy of Marathon. Here we've two tumuli: that of the Plataians and that of the Athenians. These are 3.2km apart. Applying Hammond's rationale, the Athenians thus held the right wing and the Plataians the left. There were 11,000 hoplites deployed in this line in close order. Clearly they cannot occupy this line. More to the point, the line is bisected by a ridge and Herodotus (6.111.1) clearly tells us the Athenians held the right wing and the one thousand Plataians the left. The two mounds just as clearly bear no relation to where either the Athenians or the Plataians fell. Nor do they in any way indicate where they stood in the battle line.
Any close look at Hammond's infantry lines reveals a salutary fact: his Macedonian line is some 2km long. Into this he fits the entire compliment of the Macedonian infantry: 24,000 sarissa armed phalanx troops. That number, in open order (deploying to battle) would occupy over 2.7km. Were they deployed sixteen deep in close order they would occupy 1,370 metres. Were the phalanx of 24,000 sixteen deep in open order to adopt close order by half file insertion (resulting in 8 deep), the line would again be 2.7km long. If Philip had closed up sixteen deep to his attacking right we need to fill out some 630m of the line. None of this fits the space occupied by Hammond's initial Macedonian deployment line.

Moreover, we need somehow to make this line match Hammond's line for the Greeks -3km. In fact, if you closely follow Hammond's battle diagram, he extends Philip's line to do exactly this yet that is not discussed in his battle description. He supposes that perhaps some light armed filled out the line but light armed did not slay the Sacred Band with sarissai. Just how does Hammond suppose the Macedonian phalanx extended it's left to oppose the GReeks - particularly the Sacred band? All the while executing an excruciatingly complex advance with one wing retreating and other discrete parts of the phalanx all advancing at different rates.
The Macedonian mound is visible to the right of the Macedonian line. The Greek line extended to the river beyond.

Are you proposing to address how the phalanx "battalions" opened to allow cavalry units to attack the gaps they've made in the enemy line?

Paralus wrote: ↑Thu Mar 02, 2023 12:56 am Let's for the moment accept Hammond's rationale for the Macedonian and Greek lines and apply it to the archaelogy of Marathon. Here we've two tumuli: that of the Plataians and that of the Athenians. These are 3.2km apart. Applying Hammond's rationale, the Athenians thus held the right wing and the Plataians the left.

Hammond doesn't claim his assumption about the position of tumuli at Charonaea is universally applicable across 150 years of battles fought on the Greek mainland and the tumuli at Marathon are for combatants who fought on the same side against a common enemy who wasn't Greek.

Introducing Marathon into the argument muddies the waters.

chris_taylor wrote: ↑Thu Mar 02, 2023 1:50 pm

Paralus wrote: ↑Thu Mar 02, 2023 12:56 am Let's for the moment accept Hammond's rationale for the Macedonian and Greek lines and apply it to the archaelogy of Marathon. Here we've two tumuli: that of the Plataians and that of the Athenians. These are 3.2km apart. Applying Hammond's rationale, the Athenians thus held the right wing and the Plataians the left.

Hammond doesn't claim his assumption about the position of tumuli at Charonaea is universally applicable across 150 years of battles fought on the Greek mainland and the tumuli at Marathon are for combatants who fought on the same side against a common enemy who wasn't Greek.

Introducing Marathon into the argument muddies the waters.

I disagree. Hammond states:

It [the Macedonian mound] presumably marked the spot where many Macedonians had fallen. These two identifications [the mound and the Lykouressi/Haemon] allow us to place the wings of the allied phalanx precisely as shown in figure 9, the left part of the line being held by the Athenians and the right part by the Boiotians, of whom the right hand unit was the Sacred Band.

As Ma cogently notes (Chaeroneia 338: Topographies of Commemoration; JHS V128 [2008] p 74):

None of this holds. There is no reason to suppose that the Macedonian mound marks any precise spot of the battlelines; at Marathon, for instance, the soros is located quite far from the actual battlefield.

Just as the soros at Marathon need not (and does not) establish where the combatants fell, nor does the Macedonian mound in the Kephissos valley. The Macedonian mound is simply the place where all the Macedonian dead were cremated and interred. It is located in a place where all the customary Macedonian obsequies could be held. These are briefly passed over by Diodoros (16.86.6) where he simply notes Philip making sacrifices. Arrian is more explicit about the νόμος/nomos and κόσμος/kosmos or customs and honours:

2.12.1:
The next day, although he had received a sword wound in the thigh, Alexander visited the wounded and when the corpses had been gathered, he honoured them with spendid funeral rites, the entire army drawn up in its brightest battle array.

5.20.1:
When those who had died in the battle had been honoured by Alexander with the appropriate ceremony, he performed for the gods the customary rites that honour victories...

Pace Hammond's presumption that the mound marks where many Macedonians had fallen, the mound is near certainly located where it is precisely for the customary nomos and kosmos that Philip - like his son after him - will have performed. It dominates the valley for good reason: it is a statement and is in stark contrast to the hasty and "make do" burial of the Thebans. It also allows for the performance of the customary rites Arrian describes.

The comparison of the tumuli placements at both battles is hardly a matter for muddying the waters.

I agree that Hammond is wrong: the position of the tumuli has nothing to do with where the battle lines where. That's my opinion. I have no proof either way.

I take issue with putting words into his mouth: Hammond did NOT claim that it was universally true.

But I concede that it was Ma who muddied the waters by introducing Marathon into the argument. The argument contains a logical fallacy, but I can't remember what this particular type is called.

'nuf said, we can agree to disagree.

While on logic: I wanted to point out that the findings on the Theban skeletons are not sufficient to say anything about the presence or absence of cavallary: that 2 out of 254 men had wounds consistent with a fatal assault by a rider doesn't prove there were a few hundred of them.

Furthermore: a direct sword blow aiming at the top of the skull succeeds either by pure chance or because the victim doesn't move much: the top of the skull is extremely hard, and even the slightest head movement would cause the blade to slide off sideways. Imagine yourself trying to split a coconut with a pointy kitchen and you'll know what I mean. Therefore finding 2 randomly selected skulls out of 254 with such an unusual injury is more suggestive of post-battle execution: winners mounted on horses went around killing off injured survivors.

chris

chris_taylor wrote: ↑Sat Mar 04, 2023 8:46 am While on logic: I wanted to point out that the findings on the Theban skeletons are not sufficient to say anything about the presence or absence of cavallary: that 2 out of 254 men had wounds consistent with a fatal assault by a rider doesn't prove there were a few hundred of them.

Furthermore: a direct sword blow aiming at the top of the skull succeeds either by pure chance or because the victim doesn't move much: the top of the skull is extremely hard, and even the slightest head movement would cause the blade to slide off sideways. Imagine yourself trying to split a coconut with a pointy kitchen and you'll know what I mean. Therefore finding 2 randomly selected skulls out of 254 with such an unusual injury is more suggestive of post-battle execution: winners mounted on horses went around killing off injured survivors.

chris

From recollection,much of the bones (if not all) were removed to the National Museum during WWII. From those, only ten partial or complete skulls are still available representing 10-12 individuals (possibly 15-18; So Maria Liston in James' linked paper). Of those , Maria Liston unequivocally states that three have suffered sharp force trauma to the top of the head. Liston goes on to demonstrate that these wounds can only have come from above; none of the sharp force trauma wounds come from below or level blows. This, in my view, is the slaughter as the Sacred Band is killed where it stood with the allied line now in flight. Many of them - in Liston's view - killed from sword strikes.

The Macedonian kopis was a slashing weapon: edged on the one side and weighted forward to contribute momentum to the downward stroke. As Ma notes, the nature of the wounds inflicted by this weapon give the lie to Livy's silly claim that the Macedonians had never seen injuries the likes of which the Roman gladius occasioned. The kopis was a cavalry weapon for all the obvious reasons. That said, the commanders of the Macedonian infantry - senior officers such as taxis commanders, etc - will also have carried them as they commanded on horseback.

Actually, upon a fresh search, Hammond does allocate for Theban massed depth at Chaeronea in both his works pertaining to this (Studies in Greek History, p. 542, 1973 ed., and Philip of Macedon, pp. 151-152, 1994 ed.)- but for the Thebans and Sacred Band per se, thus the allied army could still extend its frontage with 30,000 hoplites across a 3km front anchored on two watercourses, all at eight-men deep with a massed Sacred Band and other Thebans (3km = 3,000 hoplites lined across x eight-deep with fighting space of 1 meter per man = 24,000 hoplites, with the remainder constituting the massed Thebans; this can be determined with confidence due to the evidence we have from of Trogus via Justin, almost surely deriving from Theopompus, that the Macedonians numbered 30,000 total infantry, this detail probably accurate from Diodorus, and were outnumbered, including the lighter allied foot and horse). The once proposed 2km line would require an impracticable depth of the allied army for their defensive undertaking. I was thinking of the whole Boeotian contingent being massed in depth as not being feasible. Duris of Samos described the Haemon, then a tributary of the Cephissus (Plutarch, Demosthenes, Ch. 19.3).

SpartanJKM wrote: ↑Mon Mar 06, 2023 2:03 am Actually, upon a fresh search, Hammond does allocate for Theban massed depth at Chaeronea in both his works pertaining to this (Studies in Greek History, p. 542, 1973 ed., and Philip of Macedon, pp. 151-152, 1994 ed.)- but for the Thebans and Sacred Band per se, thus the allied army could still extend its frontage with 30,000 hoplites across a 3km front anchored on two watercourses, all at eight-men deep with a massed Sacred Band and other Thebans (3km = 3,000 hoplites lined across x eight-deep with fighting space of 1 meter per man = 24,000 hoplites, with the remainder constituting the massed Thebans; this can be determined with confidence due to the evidence we have from of Trogus via Justin, almost surely deriving from Theopompus, that the Macedonians numbered 30,000 total infantry, this detail probably accurate from Diodorus, and were outnumbered, including the lighter allied foot and horse). The once proposed 2km line would require an impracticable depth of the allied army for their defensive undertaking. I was thinking of the whole Boeotian contingent being massed in depth as not being feasible. Duris of Samos described the Haemon, then a tributary of the Cephissus (Plutarch, Demosthenes, Ch. 19.3).

Yes he does. There would be no point in the Sacred Band, alone, forming up 25 deep as this leaves only a 12 man frontage. It would make sense were several of the other Theban lochoi were also fielded 15 or more deep. Were this the case, these troops would, for reasons that should be obvious, be on the "attacking" wing. Yet Hammond's (and those before him) reconstruction has the best of the allied infantry on the severely refused wing while the far less experienced Athenians are thrown forward. None of that holds to me.

Your 24,000 hoplites eight deep take up your entire 3km line (a 3,000 man / metre frontage). The Athenians and Boiotians (including the Thebans) between them likely fielded some 17-18,000 hoplites. Attestations for Boiotian levies generally average 7,000: 7,000 at Delium (Thuc.4.93.3); 6,000 at Leuktra (Diod. 15.52.2); 7,000 in 369/8 (Diod. 15.68.1); 8,000 in 368/7 (Diod.15.71.3); 7,000 in 364/3 (Plut Pelop. 35.2). Didorus' 13,000 at 16.30.4 clearly refers to the Amphytyonic levy. Athenian levies in this period range between 5,000 to 10,000 (6,000 in 394 Xen. Hell. 4.2.17; 5,000 in 379/8 and 377/6 Diod. 15.26.2 & 32.6) The 10,000 figure comes from Polybius (2.62.2) and is the highest figure we have (Diod.15.29.6 gives 20,000 hoplites which is gross exaggeration: the city never fielded such in any time we have information for). Thus in the emergency of 339/8 we might assume 10,000 from Athens (notably only 5,000 sent to Leosthenes for the Lamian War Diod. 28.11.3) and a top of 8,000 Boiotians. We then need to find another 12,000 from the allies and mercenaries. An army of 30,000 likely included peltasts and cavalry.

Either way, my view is that the allied plan was entirely defensive: they would plug the valley and invite Philip to break his forces on their defensive wall. To that end, there is no need, per Hammond, to find a line 3km or more in length to fit 30,000 men eight deep. For the Greeks this would be Thermopylai on a wider front. The entire line might have formed up 12 deep. The Theban end perhaps 16 or more deep. Depth will have been an advantage in a defensive posture.