Nicator wrote:Paralus,
I can see that you posts are becoming increasingly 'hostile' in nature. And I can see that this hostility is 100% aimed at me. This is strange coming from you.
Oh I think you've misread that. Then again, you wouldn't be the first. After a while one becomes somewhat direct. Whether such directness is "hostile" is in the eye of the "directee" I suppose. Such as the following occasion it:
Nicator wrote:Nonetheless, I am well aware of where the army was, where Alexander died, the context of all of it, where Alexander got his army, engineers, and siege train...
Yet you also write:
Nicator wrote:He took the machine developed by his father and fundamentally changed its character and capability by reversing the role of infantry and cavalry [...] his adaptations to so many different military styles of combat (pitched battle, skirmish, guerrilla,and siege) and his willingness to expand his machine with whatever tools (personnel, weapons) was beyond what Philip ever did.
One might be excused for thinking that Philip had never "adapted" to these forms of combat nor "expanded his machine". The rude fact is that he engaged in all those forms of warfare and even used what today would be termed disinformation (not the first time) to storm the mercenary force holding the pass into Boeotia prior to the confrontation at Chaeronea.
It might, in rejoinder, be roundly proclaimed that Philip's siege of Perinthus (and Byzantium) was a failure the like of which Alexander would not abide. Whilst the siege was abandoned, such a judgement would be to seriously misunderstand the strategic situation. You'll pardon me, I hope, for digressing as the background is necessary. At the time Philip was at war with Athens - a matter largely of choice as she was largely destitute – and was consolidating gains in eastern Thrace and the Propontis. His actions raised the concern of the Great king – far too early for Philip’s liking you can be certain – as well as “the Chians, Coans, Rhodians, and some others of the Greeks” (Diod. 16.77.2). The importance of these latter is easy to overlook but critical. In the mid 350’s Athens had been fighting a war with her “allies” of the second “Athenian Confederacy” (the "Social War"). Her general, Chares, had supported Artabazus (as we know from elsewhere). The Great King, having had enough of the rubbish, sent a direct diplomatic word to Athens that he would enter the war on behalf of those allies in revolt with 300 ships. Athens recalled her general and the “rebel” allies were allowed their secession. Who were they? None other than the “Chians, Rhodians, Coans, and also the Byzantians” (Diod.16.27.1). Philip had not only succeeded in arousing the interest of Persia but had mended relations between his enemy, Athens, and her estranged former “allies”. Time, only for the moment, to pull one’s head in.
More importantly, not one scintilla of evidence is presented for Alexander's apparent
complete remaking of the entire tactical use of the Macedonian army and its components; simply a bald statement. This is redolent of M. M. Markle's assertion that Philip did not employ the sarisa until Chaeronea (even then, it was the so called "cavalry sarisa" and used by Alexander) and that, under Alexander, the Macedonians only "very rarely" used the weapon (really only at Gaugamela). At least he attempted proof of what remains a silly position.
Diod.16.4.5-7
When the armies approached each other and with a great outcry clashed in the battle, Philip, commanding the right wing, which consisted of the flower of the Macedonians serving under him, ordered his cavalry to ride past the ranks of the barbarians and attack them on the flank, while he himself falling on the enemy in a frontal assault began bitter combat […] but later as the horsemen pressed on from the flank and rear and Philip with the flower of his troops fought with true heroism, the mass of the Illyrians was compelled to take hastily to flight. When the pursuit had been kept up for a considerable distance and many had been slain in their flight…
Clearly Philip used his cavalry well in this battle and used it for pursuit and rout. Philip is also described as having 3,000 cavalry at Crocus Field (Diod. 16.35.4-5) where he won due to the bravery of the Thessalian cavalry contingent. Seems he used cavalry well - especially in pursuit.
At his ultimate battle – Chaeronea – he had some 2,000 cavalry. Seems this cavalry was not used outside of pursuit as it does not appear in what remains of the source tradition. That will be due to the fact that the Greeks took up a defensive infantry position anchored on both flanks thus denying the use of the Macedonian cavalry.
Nicator wrote:… and that Alexander was the Argead heir (though, why exactly you bring that up in this context is beyond me). Then you bring up something about his army being alarmed because all they see is a clamoring clack of marshals...isn't this a case where YOU have taken things out of context to prove your own point(s)?
Arrian Anabasis 6.12.2-3:
When they ceased their lamentation, they became spiritless, and felt perplexed as to the man who was to become the leader of the army; for many of the officers seemed to stand in equal rank and merit, both in the opinion of Alexander and in that of the Macedonians. They were also in a state of perplexity how to get back in safety to their own country, being quite enclosed by so many warlike nations, some of whom had not yet submitted, and who they conjectured would fight stoutly for their freedom while others would no doubt revolt as soon as they were relieved of their fear of Alexander.
The context is clear: the army fears it has lost its king and has no clear choice as successor. This is the self same situation that would result in armed rebellion in Babylon. The marshals were clearly not “bestest pals” as Arrian and Plutarch note later
Nicator wrote:It seems though, that you've only helped to prove my point, i.e...Alexander was more than just a cheerleader, he was king and the undisputed leader of the army. Indeed, he was heavily relied upon.
No. I have only stated the obvious fact that the Macedonian king – be it Philip, Alexander or Perdiccas – was more than a cheerleader.
Diod.16.2.4-5
But when he [Perdiccas] was defeated in a great battle by the Illyrians and fell in the action, Philip his brother, who had escaped from his detention as a hostage, succeeded to the kingdom, now in a bad way. For the Macedonians had lost more than four thousand men in the battle, and the remainder, panic-stricken, had become exceedingly afraid of the Illyrian armies and had lost heart for continuing the war.
And they were at home when they lost Perdiccas. The situation will have been no different had Philip led them to this position and died.
Nicator wrote:I am also well aware of the fiscal and monetary context to which the ancients were subjected in contrast to our own. Like Marcus' comment about the sophisticated accounting methods, it's ridiculous to even make this comment.
Well it wasn’t me postulating “international […] big money types”. Where they smoking Peter Stuyvesant? (now that's "rediculous").
Nicator wrote:But beyond all that, come on Paralus take a stand and tell us...IS IT YOUR CONTENTION THAT PHILIP WAS GREATER THAN ALEXANDER?
Why must it come to such? There are other sites where such useless comparisons are de rigueur. The simple – and utterly unalterable fact – is that Alexander would never be spoken about had not Philip created both Alexander and the state he inherited.
