The Probable site of Kynoskephalae battlefield 197 BC
Posted: Sun Mar 08, 2015 5:40 am
As a spin-off from the Kynoskephalae thread ( all 15 pages!), as indicated, I shall write up here what I believe to be the likeliest site for the battle of Kynoskephalae between King Philip V of Macedon and the Romans under Titus Quinctius Flamininus.
The subject of just where this battle took place has not had a great deal of study focused on it, not least because in the past there were not even terribly good maps of Northern Greece and Albania ( ancient Macedon and Epirus) readily available. The last major study was by Nicholas Geoffrey Lemprière Hammond (15 November 1907 – 24 March 2001), who was a British scholar of the ancient Greek and Macedonian world, and who served as a spy and operative for the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) in German occupied Greece and Albania during World War II, and hence had a working knowledge of the geography of the region. He wrote a study on the subject of “The campaign and battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC” which appeared in the Journal of Hellenic studies in 1988, and was for its day a masterful analysis. I make no apology for making this the start point for this subject, and will refer to it frequently, rather than “re-invent the wheel”. For those with access, it is readily available on JSTOR and should be read before proceeding.
Unfortunately, Hammond’s choice of battle site does not fit many of the requirements of the Kynoskephalae battle field, as we shall see. Paralus, in the Kynoskephalae thread, mentioned an article he wrote for “Ancient Warfare” magazine, in which he essentially followed Hammond’s site, save that he moved the battle a few hundred metres east, and had it taking place in two adjacent valleys rather than Hammond’s two ridges, because he thought that there was some sort of watershed between the Roman Left and Right. Whilst I agree with him in this, that there was some sort of feature which split the Roman Left from Right, advancing up valleys overlooked by heights on three sides would be militarily inept ( as Philip II found to his cost when fighting the Phokians under Onomarchos in 353 BC – one of his very few defeats.)
It is also important to note that any consensus achieved can only be on a ‘balance of probability’ basis pending some archaeological research ( always difficult, even in respect of known battlefields)
For those without access to Hammond’s article, I’ll give a brief resume of the campaign situation leading up to Kynoskephalae. The terrain can be envisaged roughly as a triangle, with Larisa at its apex. This was Philip’s base at the commencement of the campaign. Down the right-hand [ Eastern] side was a major route into the Thessalian plain. This route passed south-east and crossed the East-West mountain range [the base of the triangle] via a pass at Pherae, some 40-45 km from Larisa. To the south of the pass Philip had a garrison covering it based at Pthiotic Thebes [not Boeotia!], and others in the area at Echinus, Larissa Cremaste, and Demetrias, his main base on the Gulf of Pagasae. At the other end of the base of the triangle, which was the Karadog mountain range, lay the other major route leading north from Pharsalus, via a pass at Palaepharsalus[ modern Krini or Krene] to Larisa, some 30 km or so to the north of the pass. The Romans, based to the south-west, would have to invade by one or other of these two major routes and passes. Poised at Larisa, Philip could swiftly head to either, depending on which route the Romans came by. The fertile Enipeus river paralleled the Karadag range to its south, and this was the natural route to the Eastern pass at Pherae for the Romans to take from their base in south-west Thessaly. Philip tried to deny this route to the Romans by a ‘scorched earth’ policy, evacuating the population and destroying the crops and buildings of five cities and many villages in the valley. Nevertheless, Philip received news that the Romans were at Pthiotic Thebes, approaching the eastern Pherae pass. He promptly marched down the south-east side of the triangle, some 38 km in one day, hoping to beat the Romans to the pass and secure it, denying them entry. Next day he resumed his march toward the Pherae pass, some 5-6km away, believing the Romans to still be in the vicinity of Pthiotic Thebes, some 15 km away to the south. To secure the pass, he sent on ahead his light forces in the pre-dawn darkness to seize the ridge which forms the head of the pass just south of Pherae. Towards dawn his main army started its march. At that moment he learned that his light forces had met enemy light forces at the ridge while it was still dark. He withdrew to his camp. [ note this action of securing the high ground overlooking a pass, for it will occur again]. Philip had failed to reach his intended objective, the vicinity of Phthiotic Thebes. It was a successful operation from Flamininus’ point of view. He had cut Philip off from the Macedonian garrisons at Phthiotic Thebes and Demetrias and also from the supplies accumulated there. He knew that the ground ahead was unfavourable for the Macedonian phalanx. His own supply lines from Xyniae were safe; and if the Roman fleet should anchor in the Pagasae Gulf, as it had done in 198 BC, a large force of marines could escort supplies to him from the supply-ships. Conversely, Philip had made a very serious miscalculation. Now he was cut off from the garrisons and the supplies of Phthiotic Thebes and Demetrias, he had lost contact with the southeastern sector of his defence line and he was faced by ground unsuitable for his phalanx. Worse still, he had come without adequate supplies in his haste to reach Pherae; for he had counted on making contact with Demetrias and Phthiotic Thebes to replenish. Next day there was fierce fighting between the forces of cavalry and light-armed infantry which each commander sent forward into the gap by Pherae, and the Aetolians were said [Polybius XVIII.9.11] to have distinguished themselves . The ground round Pherae was broken up by drystone walls, small enclosures and plantations, and it was unsuitable for any heavy infantry formation, whether Macedonian or Roman. Thus neither commander was prepared to bring on a major battle.Philip successfully barred the pass. Thwarted, Flamininus had little choice but to try for the 'western'pass on the other major route which ran north through Pharsalus, Palaepharsalus, Crannon and thence to Larissa. This pass lay some 38 km/24 miles or so to the west. Flamininus set off marching south of the Karadag range. Philip swiftly followed suit, knowing the Romans had little choice but to adopt this strategy, paralleling the Roman march north of the Karadag range. At the end of the first day, Philip had reached scotusa where he re-supplied his army, while the Romans stopped at Eretria. At the end of the second day, Philip was camped at ‘Melambium’, still in Scotussan territory on the way to Palaepharsalus. Flamininus was camped by a place called the ‘Thetideum’, south of the range in Pharsalan territory. Now the armies were unknowingly neck and neck, separated by the Karadag ridge, each unable to see the other, but having a rough idea where the other must be. There were storms overnight of the second day, making both armies tired and miserable. Both were within striking distance of Palaepharsalus and the pass at dawn of the third day, but in the aftermath of the storms, there was low cloud and thick mist, making visibility non-existent. Nevertheless, Philip broke camp and struggled westward, but was forced to abort and camp, by the weather conditions, and sent out troops to finish foraging for fodder. South of the range, Flamininus didn’t try to set out, but remained in camp. Both commanders, with the pass so temptingly close, were anxious to secure it, and both sent out strong forces to do so by once again seizing the Ground of Tactical Importance – the ridge heights which dominated the pass, just as they had at the eastern Pherae pass. When the two forces collided on the heights in the mist, the battle got under way ( see Kynoskephale thread for the actual battle.)
To get this thread underway, I will list what information can be gleaned from our sources (numbered, so the points can be referred to in subsequent posts by anyone wishing to contribute).
1. The first point, and one which has confused subsequent scholars, is whether the site was called ‘Kynoskephale’(singular)/The Dog Head or ‘Kynoskephalae’(plural)/ The Dog’s heads
2. The site of the respective camps. Philip had moved from “Melambium’ to an unknown site not far away but Flaminus was still encamped around the ‘Thetideum’. When Flamininus’ army deploys from camp he is ‘close to the hills’,[Pol XVIII.22.7] hence he camped on the level ground.
3. The ground is ‘very rough and broken’ and ‘attains a considerable height’.[Polybius XVIII.22.10]
4. The ridge, or ridges, run East-West. This ridge must be at least between 1,000 and 2,000 yards long
5. After ascending the ridge via the pass/hyperbolus, Philip’s phalanx deploys probably by sub-units /speirai 16x16, to the left along the summit of the ridge. In open order, they occupy 1,000-1,250 yards of frontage [ depending on exact numbers]
6. Flamininus’ advance force of about 1,000 infantry and 300 cavalry ‘proceed toward the pass going over the hills’[Pol XVIII.21.2]
7. Philip closes up to his right in double depth [i.e. close order, 16 deep, on a 500-625 yard frontage] and charges the Roman Left wing, on a similar frontage, pushing them back.
8. The Roman right, preceded by Numidian elephants, charges up the slope, scattering the Macedonian left who are still arriving on the ridge.
9. A Roman Tribune peels off 20 maniples ( probably the Triarii), marches along the ridge and charges down into the rear of Philip’s hitherto successful right. The Macedonians are completely routed.
Using Google Earth images, I will attach the proposed sites of Hammond and myself. Since this is now a long post, I will save commentary on the numbered points above, and how well the two proposed sites fit the criteria for subsequent posts. By posting the proposed sites, this will allow interested parties to check out the area via Google Earth.....
The subject of just where this battle took place has not had a great deal of study focused on it, not least because in the past there were not even terribly good maps of Northern Greece and Albania ( ancient Macedon and Epirus) readily available. The last major study was by Nicholas Geoffrey Lemprière Hammond (15 November 1907 – 24 March 2001), who was a British scholar of the ancient Greek and Macedonian world, and who served as a spy and operative for the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) in German occupied Greece and Albania during World War II, and hence had a working knowledge of the geography of the region. He wrote a study on the subject of “The campaign and battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC” which appeared in the Journal of Hellenic studies in 1988, and was for its day a masterful analysis. I make no apology for making this the start point for this subject, and will refer to it frequently, rather than “re-invent the wheel”. For those with access, it is readily available on JSTOR and should be read before proceeding.
Unfortunately, Hammond’s choice of battle site does not fit many of the requirements of the Kynoskephalae battle field, as we shall see. Paralus, in the Kynoskephalae thread, mentioned an article he wrote for “Ancient Warfare” magazine, in which he essentially followed Hammond’s site, save that he moved the battle a few hundred metres east, and had it taking place in two adjacent valleys rather than Hammond’s two ridges, because he thought that there was some sort of watershed between the Roman Left and Right. Whilst I agree with him in this, that there was some sort of feature which split the Roman Left from Right, advancing up valleys overlooked by heights on three sides would be militarily inept ( as Philip II found to his cost when fighting the Phokians under Onomarchos in 353 BC – one of his very few defeats.)
It is also important to note that any consensus achieved can only be on a ‘balance of probability’ basis pending some archaeological research ( always difficult, even in respect of known battlefields)
For those without access to Hammond’s article, I’ll give a brief resume of the campaign situation leading up to Kynoskephalae. The terrain can be envisaged roughly as a triangle, with Larisa at its apex. This was Philip’s base at the commencement of the campaign. Down the right-hand [ Eastern] side was a major route into the Thessalian plain. This route passed south-east and crossed the East-West mountain range [the base of the triangle] via a pass at Pherae, some 40-45 km from Larisa. To the south of the pass Philip had a garrison covering it based at Pthiotic Thebes [not Boeotia!], and others in the area at Echinus, Larissa Cremaste, and Demetrias, his main base on the Gulf of Pagasae. At the other end of the base of the triangle, which was the Karadog mountain range, lay the other major route leading north from Pharsalus, via a pass at Palaepharsalus[ modern Krini or Krene] to Larisa, some 30 km or so to the north of the pass. The Romans, based to the south-west, would have to invade by one or other of these two major routes and passes. Poised at Larisa, Philip could swiftly head to either, depending on which route the Romans came by. The fertile Enipeus river paralleled the Karadag range to its south, and this was the natural route to the Eastern pass at Pherae for the Romans to take from their base in south-west Thessaly. Philip tried to deny this route to the Romans by a ‘scorched earth’ policy, evacuating the population and destroying the crops and buildings of five cities and many villages in the valley. Nevertheless, Philip received news that the Romans were at Pthiotic Thebes, approaching the eastern Pherae pass. He promptly marched down the south-east side of the triangle, some 38 km in one day, hoping to beat the Romans to the pass and secure it, denying them entry. Next day he resumed his march toward the Pherae pass, some 5-6km away, believing the Romans to still be in the vicinity of Pthiotic Thebes, some 15 km away to the south. To secure the pass, he sent on ahead his light forces in the pre-dawn darkness to seize the ridge which forms the head of the pass just south of Pherae. Towards dawn his main army started its march. At that moment he learned that his light forces had met enemy light forces at the ridge while it was still dark. He withdrew to his camp. [ note this action of securing the high ground overlooking a pass, for it will occur again]. Philip had failed to reach his intended objective, the vicinity of Phthiotic Thebes. It was a successful operation from Flamininus’ point of view. He had cut Philip off from the Macedonian garrisons at Phthiotic Thebes and Demetrias and also from the supplies accumulated there. He knew that the ground ahead was unfavourable for the Macedonian phalanx. His own supply lines from Xyniae were safe; and if the Roman fleet should anchor in the Pagasae Gulf, as it had done in 198 BC, a large force of marines could escort supplies to him from the supply-ships. Conversely, Philip had made a very serious miscalculation. Now he was cut off from the garrisons and the supplies of Phthiotic Thebes and Demetrias, he had lost contact with the southeastern sector of his defence line and he was faced by ground unsuitable for his phalanx. Worse still, he had come without adequate supplies in his haste to reach Pherae; for he had counted on making contact with Demetrias and Phthiotic Thebes to replenish. Next day there was fierce fighting between the forces of cavalry and light-armed infantry which each commander sent forward into the gap by Pherae, and the Aetolians were said [Polybius XVIII.9.11] to have distinguished themselves . The ground round Pherae was broken up by drystone walls, small enclosures and plantations, and it was unsuitable for any heavy infantry formation, whether Macedonian or Roman. Thus neither commander was prepared to bring on a major battle.Philip successfully barred the pass. Thwarted, Flamininus had little choice but to try for the 'western'pass on the other major route which ran north through Pharsalus, Palaepharsalus, Crannon and thence to Larissa. This pass lay some 38 km/24 miles or so to the west. Flamininus set off marching south of the Karadag range. Philip swiftly followed suit, knowing the Romans had little choice but to adopt this strategy, paralleling the Roman march north of the Karadag range. At the end of the first day, Philip had reached scotusa where he re-supplied his army, while the Romans stopped at Eretria. At the end of the second day, Philip was camped at ‘Melambium’, still in Scotussan territory on the way to Palaepharsalus. Flamininus was camped by a place called the ‘Thetideum’, south of the range in Pharsalan territory. Now the armies were unknowingly neck and neck, separated by the Karadag ridge, each unable to see the other, but having a rough idea where the other must be. There were storms overnight of the second day, making both armies tired and miserable. Both were within striking distance of Palaepharsalus and the pass at dawn of the third day, but in the aftermath of the storms, there was low cloud and thick mist, making visibility non-existent. Nevertheless, Philip broke camp and struggled westward, but was forced to abort and camp, by the weather conditions, and sent out troops to finish foraging for fodder. South of the range, Flamininus didn’t try to set out, but remained in camp. Both commanders, with the pass so temptingly close, were anxious to secure it, and both sent out strong forces to do so by once again seizing the Ground of Tactical Importance – the ridge heights which dominated the pass, just as they had at the eastern Pherae pass. When the two forces collided on the heights in the mist, the battle got under way ( see Kynoskephale thread for the actual battle.)
To get this thread underway, I will list what information can be gleaned from our sources (numbered, so the points can be referred to in subsequent posts by anyone wishing to contribute).
1. The first point, and one which has confused subsequent scholars, is whether the site was called ‘Kynoskephale’(singular)/The Dog Head or ‘Kynoskephalae’(plural)/ The Dog’s heads
2. The site of the respective camps. Philip had moved from “Melambium’ to an unknown site not far away but Flaminus was still encamped around the ‘Thetideum’. When Flamininus’ army deploys from camp he is ‘close to the hills’,[Pol XVIII.22.7] hence he camped on the level ground.
3. The ground is ‘very rough and broken’ and ‘attains a considerable height’.[Polybius XVIII.22.10]
4. The ridge, or ridges, run East-West. This ridge must be at least between 1,000 and 2,000 yards long
5. After ascending the ridge via the pass/hyperbolus, Philip’s phalanx deploys probably by sub-units /speirai 16x16, to the left along the summit of the ridge. In open order, they occupy 1,000-1,250 yards of frontage [ depending on exact numbers]
6. Flamininus’ advance force of about 1,000 infantry and 300 cavalry ‘proceed toward the pass going over the hills’[Pol XVIII.21.2]
7. Philip closes up to his right in double depth [i.e. close order, 16 deep, on a 500-625 yard frontage] and charges the Roman Left wing, on a similar frontage, pushing them back.
8. The Roman right, preceded by Numidian elephants, charges up the slope, scattering the Macedonian left who are still arriving on the ridge.
9. A Roman Tribune peels off 20 maniples ( probably the Triarii), marches along the ridge and charges down into the rear of Philip’s hitherto successful right. The Macedonians are completely routed.
Using Google Earth images, I will attach the proposed sites of Hammond and myself. Since this is now a long post, I will save commentary on the numbered points above, and how well the two proposed sites fit the criteria for subsequent posts. By posting the proposed sites, this will allow interested parties to check out the area via Google Earth.....