Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

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Taphoi
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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

Post by Taphoi »

chris_taylor wrote: Once you assume Alexander went to Troy twice, everything just falls into place.

Yes?
No.
My original objection was to the idea that Alexander did not go to Troy initially, which has now been dropped. However:

a) I do not accept that there is any reason why Alexander could not have chosen the site of Alexandria Troas during his original visit - the site is only about 10 miles from the Scamander where Alexander would have camped near Troy, so was well within the scope of reconnaisance trips.
b) You and Engels are posing the wrong question in asking what route Alexander would have preferred from the point of view of terrain and logistics.
c) The correct question is: "Where did the retreating Persians go after the Granicus?" Seemingly not eastwards along the coast to Dascylion, because if they had Alexander would have taken his whole army there and not just sent Parmenion (else his general would have been exposed to counter-attack). Since they could not go north across sea and the route west along the coast was blocked by Alexander, they must have gone south up into the hills, probably up one of the river valleys a little further east than the Granicus. They must have gone that way anyway, because we are next told that they reached Miletus. Alexander had inevitably to pursue them. If he had retreated to Troy, he risked them re-grouping in the hills and coming down to block his retreat across the Hellespont. Those rivers (e.g. the modern Koca) flow roughly NE and spring up close to the sources of other rivers (e.g. the Euenos) that run down W to the Ionian coast near Adramyttium, so I would suggest that the fleeing Persians and Alexander came back down to the Ionian littoral there. No retreat to Troy nor any diversion to the site of Alexandria Troas.

Best wishes,

Andrew
Last edited by Taphoi on Mon Sep 24, 2012 6:06 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

Post by agesilaos »

Ah, that old stand-by an accusation of rhetoric followed by unsubstantiated assertion. Here is a link to a digitised map of the ancient Med http://pelagios.dme.ait.ac.at/maps/greco-roman/

There you will find but one town on the central route Daskyleion to Stratonikaia, Hadrianotherai, a settlement as Roman as the road it sits upon. Maybe you could give a link to Ptolemy’s thickly populated highlands. Ptolemy is also writing about the Roman Empire, of course half a millenium after Alexander.

Your pre-occupation with the pursuit of a defeated foe is touching but at odds with Alexander’s practice following Issos and Gaugamela, where the remnants did recombine and cause him some bother, but typically he kept his eye on the ball and did not waste time on mopping up which could be safely left to others. Parmenion was sent to follow up with his mounted command, he will have observed their dispersal and having accepted the surrender of Daskyleion returned to Alexander.

The route is not a question of ‘preference’ but of sheer practicality; do you wish your army to starve on a 160 mile, ten days at least, march or maintain a fighting force?

You are over estimating the value of defeated troops, they had no possibility of cutting Alexander off from the Hellespont, they were purely cavalry on blown horses and probably unarmed, weapons tending to be dicarded in a rout.

Had Alexander deigned to pusue the Persians he would have caught them; otherwise the effort would be totally wasted.
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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

Post by chris_taylor »

Taphoi wrote: c) The correct question is: "Where did the retreating Persians go after the Granicus?"

Seemingly not eastwards along the coast to Dascylion, because if they had Alexander would have taken his whole army there and not just sent Parmenion (else his general would have been exposed to counter-attack). Since they could not go north across sea and the route west along the coast was blocked by Alexander, they must have gone south up into the hills, probably up one of the river valleys a little further east than the Granicus. They must have gone that way anyway, because we are next told that they reached Miletus. Alexander had inevitably to pursue them. If he had retreated to Troy, he risked them re-grouping in the hills and coming down to block his retreat across the Hellespont. Those rivers (e.g. the modern Koca) flow roughly NE and spring up close to the sources of other rivers (e.g. the Euenos) that run down W to the Ionian coast near Adramyttium, so I would suggest that the fleeing Persians and Alexander came back down to the Ionian littoral there. No retreat to Troy nor any diversion to the site of Alexandria Troas.
I hear your arguments and looking at it from our modern point of view, where Google maps are an integral part of culture, they do make sense. However (please forgive the hubris) I'm trying to understand how the world looked seen through Alexander's eyes at any moment in time.

Two things gave a surprising insight.

The first was a neurobscience lecture on how the the human brain perceives & maps our bodies moving through (horizontal) space, the second a lecture on Granicus. The lecturer, momentarily overawed by Alexander's military genius, said "Alexander had a tremendous sense of terrain".

Alexander had never seen a satellite view. His perception of the world was from ground level - mountains, rivers, seashores were spatial objects relative to the same physical plane as himself.

And a military commander on a ground campaign has a mental map of the world relative to his own position: enemy & the territory to be comquered are always in front, his own forces and the safety of the secured terrain behind. The "North" on his mental compass doesn't point to the physical North, but towward the strategic goal. Is a quintessenially human trait, hardwired into our DNA.

With that in mind, I spread my map of Alexander's Empire on the floor, stood on the Troad (it's a very large map) and looked south, towards Sardis.

It took a good while to adjust looking at an atlas "upside down" ...

Next, add up up the Alexander of June 334 BC: his cultural and literary background. Military objective. Granicus won, ie the bridgehead is secure. Behind him, Macedonia secure base, troops & fleet in control of the strategically most important position, Hellespont & Troad. Enemy now fleeing in front. Now he wants to get to Sardis with a minimum risk of an attack from the rear?

Add up what Alexander could be sure about regarding terrain & supplies available in a 180 degree field of vision: Hellespontine Phrygia, Mt Ida and the interior of Anatolia.

Alexander's route becomes a no brainer. Whichever way the Persian's went.

Chris.
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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

Post by Paralus »

The carts, the wagons where are the wagons??!!

There exists no source attestation for the journey between Granicus River and Sardis other than Diodorus 17.21.7. Here the Sicilian is at his abbreviating best: "Recovering his forces, Alexander led them down through Lydia and took over the city of the Sardians with its citadels and, what is more, the treasures stored therein, for Mithrines the satrap surrendered them without resistance". Arrian simply claims that Alexander marched upon Sardis encamping some nine miles from the city. Aside from that we are left with allusions and "side notes". Those, though, point to an inland route.

What we are told is that Alexander took the time to bury and honour the dead of both sides. He set in place structures for Hellespontine Phrygia and sent Parmenion on to Dascylium. He also pardoned the citizens of Zeleia noting they'd been forced into cooperation with the Persians. All of this, pace Taphoi, shows little urgency in the pursuit of a routed foe. More likely, to my view, is that the Persian camp was looted for all it contained (including money and supplies) and Alexander, as part of his ordering of the province, visited Zelia to so pardon it. Here will have been the Persian "base" camp (cf Damascus after Issus) likely with further supplies.

When we get to Ephesus Parmenion is sent out to meet the emissaries from Magnesia and Tralles. Parmenion is last mentioned as being sent on to take possession of Dascylium. Parmenion had rejoined the army and, as this is not mentioned at Sardis, the logical conclusion is that it transpired before the departure from Zeleia/Dascylium. Locially, to me, this occurred after Alexander's arrangements and pardon at Zeleia and probably as the main force joined up with the old general for the march south to Sardis from somewhere near to Zeleia. Alexander's objective, given his well attested impecunious state, is Sardis and its money. This is a recurrent theme where the Persians (as opposed to Darius) are not pursued after defeat but their monetary "dumps" or treasuries most certainly are (Damacus after Issus and Babylon, Susa and Persepolis after Guagamela).

We are explicitly told, after Alexander settles affairs at Ephesus, that he sent Alcimachus into Ionia and Aeolis to liberate the cities still under Persian rule (1.18.1) This is an odd thing to do if Alexander and his armament - including shadowing navy - had only just traveled by those very cities. It could be argued that Alexander did not have time but it is far more likely that, given Parmenion's treatment of recalcitrant Greek cities in the year leading up to the invasion, these cities simply sat and watched to see how matters would play out. Alexander can hardly have marched by so many hostile Greeks and left them in peace so to speak.

We are also told that earlier, from Sardis, Alexander had sent Calas into "Memnon's territory" (in the Troad) with a large force consisting of the "Peloponnesians and most of the other allies" (1.17.8). Clearly not a sight-seeing trip this. This, too, is a rather odd thing to do if Alexander and his army had just passed through it.

To me it is more logical that Alexander has not retraced his steps but has, in fact, headed south from the area of Dasylium. He has done this - not to pursue defeated forces or so as not to "retreat" (as Taphoi would have it - the word used deliberately to bolster a point) - but to secure the readies secured in Sardis. Ancient authors are never particularly interested in logistics and supply. It is more than probable that supplies were taken from Zeleia and Dascylium (the Persians surely thought to supply themselves) and that further such supplies were sought from the areas about modern Balikesir and Kircagac (on Chris's map). The routed Persians might well have taken any route to perceived safety. Alexander did not concern himself with these just as he didn't concern himself with those who escaped into Phrygia after Issus: they were to be his satraps' problems.
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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

Post by chris_taylor »

Paralus wrote: Fri Sep 28, 2012 5:54 am ]
an early start ...
Paralus wrote: The carts, the wagons where are the wagons??!!

There exists no source attestation for the journey between Granicus River and Sardis other than Diodorus 17.21.7. Here the Sicilian is at his abbreviating best: "Recovering his forces, Alexander led them down through Lydia and took over the city of the Sardians with its citadels and, what is more, the treasures stored therein, for Mithrines the satrap surrendered them without resistance". Arrian simply claims that Alexander marched upon Sardis encamping some nine miles from the city. Aside from that we are left with allusions and "side notes". Those, though, point to an inland route.
<snip>
Paralus wrote: What we are told is that Alexander took the time to bury and honour the dead of both sides. He set in place structures for Hellespontine Phrygia and sent Parmenion on to Dascylium. He also pardoned the citizens of Zeleia noting they'd been forced into cooperation with the Persians. All of this, pace Taphoi, shows little urgency in the pursuit of a routed foe. More likely, to my view, is that the Persian camp was looted for all it contained (including money and supplies) and Alexander, as part of his ordering of the province, visited Zelia to so pardon it. Here will have been the Persian "base" camp (cf Damascus after Issus) likely with further supplies.
I'm trying to map his (most likely route) as a sequence of POVs: when he was at X, what did he want next and what did the world look like from his POV. In other words, I'm trying to map it looking forward, from Alexander's present.

His last undisputed X was Granicus and his undisputed next goal Sardis. If you add to that (which I hadn't until you stated it), the predictable contents of the base camp at Zeleia, then his world at Granicus looked different: conquered territory and army behinf d him, looking towards Sardis, on his left are Hellesponite Phrygia, Dascylium and Zeleia which contained everything he needed in his immediate present, supplies and money.

So yes, it is indeed very likely that he personally went to Zeleia with his army.

The ancient route from Granicus to Zeleia went through the mountains (Google doesn't know of it today), but from the battlefield, it's about 50 - 60km. Using Zeleia as his new POV, the strategic goal of Sardis looks different:

Starting from Granicus, coastal route vs inland: 480 km vs 300 km
Starting from Zeleia coastal route vs inland: 530 km vs 250 km

We know he covered the 500 km between Pella and Sestus in 20 days, on comparable terrain (leaving aside it wasn't enemy country). There's no doubt he could have gone straight south to Sardis - he's covered a lot worse - but the question is how long would it have taken and at what risk. Parmenio would have known, but we don't. So the obvious thing to do is not to retrace a route that's well described, but the one that isn't.

It'll also go some way towards persuading my partner. The probability of him agreeing to the trip is proportional to the number of squiggly roads around mountains I put in.

Thanks to everyone here who helped clarify the plans.

Chris.
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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

Post by Paralus »

chris_taylor wrote:
Paralus wrote: Fri Sep 28, 2012 5:54 am ]
an early start ...
Actually 15:54 here. The wonderful vagaries of timezones.
chris_taylor wrote:There's no doubt he could have gone straight south to Sardis - he's covered a lot worse - but the question is how long would it have taken and at what risk. Parmenio would have known, but we don't.
Something I'd not considered. Parmenion and Calas had been operating throughout Asia Minor since 337. Although this is poorly attested we know that the Macedonian forces campaigned in Aeolis, Hellespontine Phrygia and Ionia . In the first Parmenion is attested dealing harshly with Gryneium; the second Memnon crosses the Mt Ida range to attempt to reclaim Cyzicus. The latter is more problematic with something of a "democratic revolution" and "divine honours" for Philip at Ephesus. Whilst this does not necessitate the active presence of Macedonians in the city, such strongly anti-Persian action is difficult to imagine without the proximity of Macedonian support. By the time of the invasion the Macedonian forces were essentially back to their bridgehead and friendly cities on the Hellespont.

Given all of this both Parmenion and Calas should, by 334, have been suitably familiar with the are of operations. What routes these commanders took when moving through Hellespontine Phrygia, Aeolis, Ionia and northeast to Cyzicus (north of Dascylium) is not known. We know that Memnon operated about Magnesia and crossed the Mt Ida range to reach Cyzicus. Either way, Parmenion and his co-commander will have known of the various routes to Sardis - be that back over Mt Ida or south from Zeleia/Dascylium - either by having used them or from the locals they surely must have made use of over their time there.
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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

Post by agesilaos »

Apologies for the delay in responding to Paralus’ well sourced comments but I think the passages are open to other interpretations.

Alexander’s actions after Granikos, and indeed the preliminaries to the battle (two scouting forces), do seem to have suffered from a less than satisfactory combination of his sources.

Let us consider the case of Kalas who is appointed Satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia at I xvii 1
καταστήσας δὲ Κάλαν σατραπεύειν ἧς Ἀρσίτης ἦρχε καὶ τοὺς φόρους τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀποφέρειν τάξας, οὕσπερ Δαρείῳ ἔφερον, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν βαρβάρων κατιόντες ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν ἐνεχείριζον σφᾶς, τούτους μὲν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἑκάστους ἐκέλευεν,
and is then sent to Memnon’s estates in the Troad from Sardis, with the Peloponnesians, except the Argives (garrisoning Sardis) and most of the other Greek allies.
[8] Κάλαν δὲ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Ἀερόπου ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν Μέμνονος ἐκπέμπει, ἄγοντας τούς τε Πελοποννησίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων τοὺς πολλοὺς πλὴν Ἀργείων: οὗτοι δὲ ἐν Σάρδεσι κατελείφθησαν τὴν ἄκραν φυλάττειν.
Yet a half chapter later at xvii 1, Parmenion and Alkimachos are both given 2,500 ‘foreign foot’, who can only be these same Greeks, the Thracians and Agrianians appearing in Alexander’s force which moves against Miletos.
ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐκ Μαγνησίας τε καὶ Τράλλεων παρ᾽ αὐτὸν ἧκον ἐνδιδόντες τὰς πόλεις: καὶ ὃς πέμπει Παρμενίωνα, δοὺς αὐτῷ δισχιλίους καὶ πεντακοσίους πεζοὺς τῶν ξένων καὶ Μακεδόνας παραπλησίους, ἱππέας δὲ τῶν ἑταίρων ἐς διακοσίους. Ἀλκίμαχον δὲ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέους ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰολίδας τε πόλεις ξὺν δυνάμει οὐκ ἐλάττονι ἐξέπεμψε καὶ ὅσαι Ἰωνικαὶ ὑπὸ τοῖς βαρβάροις ἔτι ἦσαν.
There are, naturally, more than one way of reconciling these accounts; I merely offer this as as likely an alternative as others.

I can see no reason for Kalas’ appointment to have been postponed until Sardis had fallen, with the battle won and Arsites fled the appointment surely belongs to the activity after the victory, the pardoning of Zeleia and ‘those barbarians who came down from the mountains and surrendered to him.’ These men are surely fugitive Persians from the battle, hence they are ordered to ‘disperse to their several abodes’. Alexander knows from these that the Persian army is no more and so can safely divide his command to send Parmenion to Daskyleion and detach the Greeks to ravage Memnon’s lands under Kalas. This will also have eased his supply situation, spreading the strain on the locals already close to supply exhaustion a week or so from the spring harvest.

Before Sardis had surrendered the detached troops will have rejoined him, and have been available for Parmenion’s and Alkimachos’ expeditions. Ionia was as yet untouched and the whole of Aeolis had not been traversed, even on the Coastal route; Smyrna, the satrapal capital lies south of Sardis. The argument that these expeditions speak of the territories not having been crossed by the army also falls by analogy with Asandros’ command in Lydia, which the army must have traversed if using the central Lydian route.
Ἄσανδρον δὲ τὸν Φιλώτα Λυδίας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης τῆς Σπιθριδάτου ἀρχῆς, δοὺς αὐτῷ ἱππέας τε καὶ ψιλοὺς ὅσοι ἱκανοὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἐδόκουν. I xvii 7
One could argue that the forces deployed, cavalry and light troops speak of a previously secured area, but I would say it points more to the nature of the terrain, mountainous.

None of these points is conclusive of itself, but I hope they demonstrate that the coastal route is by no means excluded by the ,admittedly peripheral, evidence of Arrian.

To Diodoros’ bald statement that Alexander went by Lydia two doubts may be introduced; we cannot be sure how the geographical unit of Lydia was understood by Diodoros or his source, it may have subsumed the language enclaves that Arrian calls Aeolis and Ionia; also, we can be sure that Diodoros’ source did not accompany the expedition and by analogy with the itinerary given from Susa to Ecbatana which seems detailed, complete with march lengths and halts, yet omits Opis and has the army cross the Euphrates twice, he had an inexact grasp of geography and the routes taken.

While I am defending Engels, I have to scotch Taphoi’s accusation above of optative emendment. The emendment ‘marganiam’ to Margianam is Vogel’s and perfectly fair, the line in question reads
Superatis deinde amnibus Ocho et Oxo ad urbem Margianam pervenit. VII x 15
Then, with the rivers Ochus and Oxus having been crossed he came to the city of Margiana (known) or Margania (unique).

Engels only notes p 104 n25 that at VII vi 10 the Mss read Marapunta for the editors Maracanda; no doubt you would accept the Mss reading and add another city to the gazeteer. Little wonder you have a well populated central route :twisted:
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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

Post by chris_taylor »

agesilaos wrote:Apologies for the delay in responding to Paralus’ well sourced comments but I think the passages are open to other interpretations.

<snip>

None of these points is conclusive of itself, but I hope they demonstrate that the coastal route is by no means excluded by the ,admittedly peripheral, evidence of Arrian.
well versed in Aristotelean logic :)
agesilaos wrote:To Diodoros’ bald statement that Alexander went by Lydia two doubts may be introduced; we cannot be sure how the geographical unit of Lydia was understood by Diodoros or his source
am I missing something here?

Diodorus statement "... he marched through Lydia to reach Sardis" is true whichever way Alexander went. It's a geographical version of a tautology: Sardis was the capital of Lydia. There is no way of getting to it *without* marching through Lydia.

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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

Post by chris_taylor »

As this thread was to answer a question for a specific project, I'd like to summarize the consensus as I understand it:

1) Alexander crossed the Hellespont at Eleaus (ie, not with Parmenio & the army at Sestus)
2) it is very likely that Alexander went to Zeleia personally, and took his army with him
3) neither coastal nor inland route from Granicus to Sardis can be excluded from the sources
4) neither coastal nor inland route can reasonably be excluded for any other reasons
5) Engels proposes the coastal route for logistics reasons, but didn't actually go to look
6) no invading army before or since Alexander is known to have used the inland route
7) there are no firsthand descriptions of the inland route from an army perspective

I've not been able to plot this on a map yet, because Google's "My Places" is too buggy and I can't find other software. I'll upload it once I've solved the problem.

For the section Sardis to Ephesus, I've plotted Engel's route for now: he went along the branch of the Royal Road across Mt Tmolus. That route makes no sense to me at all, but as Engels knows more than I do, I take his word for it. In any case, as it is the most difficult of the three possible routes, it's the one to exclude.

For the section Ephesus to Miletus, I'll open a new thread.

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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

Post by agesilaos »

I suppose nobody can be sure what I mean by Lydia! Oops, I meant that the coastal regions might or might not be thought separate from Lydia.

Despite Engels not having gone to Lydia, the Naval Intelligence Dept, whom he quotes for the barren nature of the central route, certainly did. I trust their findings rather than others unsubstantiated assertions; despite any supplies garnered from Zeleia the route would not be practicable for an army. In fact the reported coming in of the barbarians from the mountains may support the lack of provender to be found; their choice was surrender to a man who had massacred the surrendering mercenaries or starve. Memnon escaped with only a small mounted party, much easier to sustain than an army. So your point 4 is not quite right as the central route CAN be excluded on logistics grounds.
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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

Post by Paralus »

agesilaos wrote:Apologies for the delay in responding to Paralus’ well sourced comments but I think the passages are open to other interpretations.

Alexander’s actions after Granikos, and indeed the preliminaries to the battle (two scouting forces), do seem to have suffered from a less than satisfactory combination of his sources.
Error in combining sources is entirely possible: this is the Arrian who, after all, can have Craterus in two places at the one time at the Granicus. The two scouting forces though might be correct one more in a coastal direction and one, nearer battle time, inland toward the Granicus. There's no way to know of course.
agesilaos wrote:Let us consider the case of Kalas who is appointed Satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia at I xvii 1
καταστήσας δὲ Κάλαν σατραπεύειν ἧς Ἀρσίτης ἦρχε καὶ τοὺς φόρους τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀποφέρειν τάξας, οὕσπερ Δαρείῳ ἔφερον, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν βαρβάρων κατιόντες ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν ἐνεχείριζον σφᾶς, τούτους μὲν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἑκάστους ἐκέλευεν,
and is then sent to Memnon’s estates in the Troad from Sardis, with the Peloponnesians, except the Argives (garrisoning Sardis) and most of the other Greek allies.
[8] Κάλαν δὲ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Ἀερόπου ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν Μέμνονος ἐκπέμπει, ἄγοντας τούς τε Πελοποννησίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων τοὺς πολλοὺς πλὴν Ἀργείων: οὗτοι δὲ ἐν Σάρδεσι κατελείφθησαν τὴν ἄκραν φυλάττειν.
Yet a half chapter later at xvii 1, Parmenion and Alkimachos are both given 2,500 ‘foreign foot’, who can only be these same Greeks, the Thracians and Agrianians appearing in Alexander’s force which moves against Miletos.
ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐκ Μαγνησίας τε καὶ Τράλλεων παρ᾽ αὐτὸν ἧκον ἐνδιδόντες τὰς πόλεις: καὶ ὃς πέμπει Παρμενίωνα, δοὺς αὐτῷ δισχιλίους καὶ πεντακοσίους πεζοὺς τῶν ξένων καὶ Μακεδόνας παραπλησίους, ἱππέας δὲ τῶν ἑταίρων ἐς διακοσίους. Ἀλκίμαχον δὲ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέους ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰολίδας τε πόλεις ξὺν δυνάμει οὐκ ἐλάττονι ἐξέπεμψε καὶ ὅσαι Ἰωνικαὶ ὑπὸ τοῖς βαρβάροις ἔτι ἦσαν.
There are, naturally, more than one way of reconciling these accounts; I merely offer this as as likely an alternative as others.
The terminology used to describe the troops allocated is different. Those deputed to Calas are the "Peloponnesians and most of the other ξυμμάχων (xummakhōn) or "allies". These, in my view, are the rarely directly attested "allied" Greek troops (of the League of Corinth) in action. Hence the Argives - certainly allies - are singled out as being left out due to posting at Sardis.

The troops given to Parmenion for the job of dealing with the surrender of Magnesia and Tralles (and to Alchimachus for his mission into Ionia) are described in a quite different fashion. Here Parmenion receives 2,500 πεζοὺς τῶν ξένων (pezous tōn xenōn) and not a great amount less of Macedonians. In this context the word xenon is not used as "foreign" or "guest friend" but in its military sense of a hired soldier; πεζοὺς τῶν ξένωνa, mercenary infantry. So these commanders depart with 5,000 mercenaries between them as well as something approaching 5,000 Maceonians (who can only be phalanx troops). Confirmation of the difference (aside from the use of xenon) in force make-up is that Parmenion is not long in returning with what will be sorely missed Macedonians to the tune of 2,500. Alchimachus, like so many, is never heard of again but we can be reasonably certain that if force was "comparable" in make up (rather than simply numbers), his Macedonians too will have returned post haste job done.
agesilaos wrote:I can see no reason for Kalas’ appointment to have been postponed until Sardis had fallen, with the battle won and Arsites fled the appointment surely belongs to the activity after the victory, the pardoning of Zeleia and ‘those barbarians who came down from the mountains and surrendered to him.’ These men are surely fugitive Persians from the battle, hence they are ordered to ‘disperse to their several abodes’.
Leaving aside Calas for the moment, I agree these could well be Persians or locals drafted for the battle and the splitting off of Parmenion will have eased supply problems: both from the split column and those to be garnered from what must have been well supplied dumps at Zeleia and Dasylium, Arsites' seat. My view is that Alexander marched on Zeleia and sent Parmenion on to wrap up Dascylium (a la Damascus)
agesilaos wrote:Before Sardis had surrendered the detached troops will have rejoined him, and have been available for Parmenion’s and Alkimachos’ expeditions. Ionia was as yet untouched and the whole of Aeolis had not been traversed, even on the Coastal route; Smyrna, the satrapal capital lies south of Sardis. The argument that these expeditions speak of the territories not having been crossed by the army also falls by analogy with Asandros’ command in Lydia, which the army must have traversed if using the central Lydian route.
Ἄσανδρον δὲ τὸν Φιλώτα Λυδίας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης τῆς Σπιθριδάτου ἀρχῆς, δοὺς αὐτῷ ἱππέας τε καὶ ψιλοὺς ὅσοι ἱκανοὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἐδόκουν. I xvii 7
Alexander's overarching need (aside from supplies) in this first month in Asia was money. He needed money both to pay his forces and purchase those supplies he did not simply take. On crossing the Hellespont his entire focus was to bring the Persian forces to battle as soon as absolutely possible. Like just about every other Hellenistic general, he wanted a quick and decisive confrontation and the spoils that followed. Alexander had no intention of anticipating Hannibal's supply driven wanderings about Italy for over a decade. After Granicus available "readies" (and supplies) will have been lifted from the satrapal capital of Dascylium. That taken, the next available target was Sardis and its treasury. He would reach this as soon as humanly possible. He cannot ever have expected that the storied Lydian capital would simply handed to him and thus was unlikely to split the army until it was seized. Its defensive strength was near legendary. Once Sardis was his Calas was detached to his duties (along with dealing with "Memnon's territory" and other as yet pacified parts of the Troad I suspect).

I don't understand the analogy of Asander. The Lydian capital was Sardis and, in his famous description of the satrapies conquerer by Alexander, Diodorus clearly describes the Ionian, Aeolian and other coastal Greek cities as being in these satrapies (18.5.4-5):
Lydia and Caria are to the side; above Phrygia and beside it is Pisidia, with Lycia next to it. In the coastal regions of these satrapies are established the cities of the Greeks; to give their names is not necessary for our present purposes.
So, whilst Asander is given the role of Lydian satrap and placed in Sardis, another force is sent to bring the Ionian koinon - those who have not yet come over to the conqueror because they are still under the yoke of the barbarian's control - "freedom" and democracy along with those in Aeolis. If Stylianou is correct, this meant incorporation into the League of Corinth with all its responsibilities.
agesilaos wrote:To Diodoros’ bald statement that Alexander went by Lydia two doubts may be introduced; we cannot be sure how the geographical unit of Lydia was understood by Diodoros or his source, it may have subsumed the language enclaves that Arrian calls Aeolis and Ionia; also, we can be sure that Diodoros’ source did not accompany the expedition and by analogy with the itinerary given from Susa to Ecbatana which seems detailed, complete with march lengths and halts, yet omits Opis and has the army cross the Euphrates twice, he had an inexact grasp of geography and the routes taken.
The geographical inaccuracies within Diodorus (misplacement of Nineveh for example) are well known. I agree his source did not travel with the expedition. Unless we are assuming that Diodorus himself decided that the army marched "down through Lydia" he has taken it from that source. Lydia was well enough known, I'd have thought (certainly Sardis), even if not in exact Michelin-like terms. Certainly Diodorus, repeating his source's description in book 18, associates 'these language enclaves' (or ethnic Greek enclaves/coastal cities) as a part of the relevant satrapies. On that basis "down through Lydia" can mean either a coastal route or an inland route; neither are out of the equation.
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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

Post by chris_taylor »

agesilaos wrote: Despite Engels not having gone to Lydia, the Naval Intelligence Dept, whom he quotes for the barren nature of the central route, certainly did. I trust their findings rather than others unsubstantiated assertions; despite any supplies garnered from Zeleia the route would not be practicable for an army.
I had another look at the map you posted (http://pelagios.dme.ait.ac.at/maps/greco-roman/) and compared it with a Google terrain map.

Arrian says Alexander send Parmenio to Dascylium. To go the inland route, Alexander couldn't start from Zeleia. He had to start from Dascylium.

Your map does not show a road from Zeleia to Balkhisir (called Hardianoutherai on the map). I thought initially that might be a gap in our knowledge, but it isn't. It's 2 days march from Zeleia to Dascylium, and with the Royal Road from there to Sardis already in existence, it would have made no sense to build one. The terrain makes it a non-starter. It's a roller coaster that crosses every river valley at right angles and it would have been crumpled up, flushed away or buried under a landslide by every other earthquake.

Zeleia - Dascylium - Sardis = 200 miles
Zeleia - Coastal Route = 300 miles

According to Xenophon, Cyrus marched from Tarsus to Cunaxa averaging 20 miles per day. Assuming comparable terrain, the maximum difference is 5 days.

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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

Post by agesilaos »

Diodoros gives the following figures for the infantry with Alexander

Macedonians 12,000
Allies 7,000
Mercenaries 5,000
Thracians 7,000 (Odrysai, Triballoi, Illyrians)
Agrianes 1,000 (archers included)

Having dispatched Parmenion and Alchimachos with 5,000 Macedonians and ‘Foreign foot’, Alexander leaves the next day with the rest of his infantry, the archers and the Agrinians’ and occupying Lade with ‘the Thracians and 4,000 other foreigners.’ Since the 5,000 mercenaries are used up in the forces of Parmenion and Alchimachos, the Thracians are separately attested along with the Agrianoi and the archers the ‘foreign’ troops must embrace the Greek allies too, yet they are supposedly with Kalas in the Troad. ArrI xviii
[3] τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀναλαβὼν τῶν τε πεζῶν τοὺς λοιποὺς καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ Θρᾷκας ἱππέας καὶ τῶν ἑταίρων τήν τε βασιλικὴν ἴλην παὶ πρὸς ταύτῃ τρεῖς ἄλλας ἐπὶ Μιλήτου ἐστέλλετο: καὶ τὴν μὲν ἔξω[δον] καλουμένην πόλιν ἐξ ἐφόδου ἔλαβεν ἐκλιπούσης τῆς φυλακῆς: ἐνταῦθα δὲ καταστρατοπεδεύσας ἔγνω ἀποτειχίζειν τὴν εἴσω πόλιν. [4] Ἡγησίστρατος γάρ, ὅτῳ ἡ φρουρὰ ἡ Μιλησίων ἐκ βασιλέως ἐπετέτραπτο, πρόσθεν γράμματα παρ᾽ Ἀλέξανδρον ἔπεμπεν ἐνδιδοὺς τὴν Μίλητον: τότε δὲ ἀναθαρρήσας ἐπὶ τῷ Περσῶν στρατῷ οὐ μακρὰν ὄντι διασώζειν τοῖς πέρσαις ἐπενόει τὴν πόλιν. Νικάνωρ δὲ τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ναυτικὸν ἄγων ὑποφθάνει τοὺς Πέρσας τρισὶν ἡμέραις πρότερος καταπλεύσας ἢ τοὺς Πέρσας Μιλήτῳ προσχεῖν, καὶ ὁρμίζεται ναυσὶν ἑξήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ τῇ Λάδῃ: κεῖται δὲ αὕτη ἐπὶ τῇ Μιλήτῳ. [5] αἱ δὲ τῶν Περσῶν νῆες ὑστερήσασαι, ἐπειδὴ ἔμαθον οἱ ναύαρχοι τῶν ἀμφὶ Νικάνορα τὴν ἐν τῇ Λάδῃ προκαταγωγήν, πρὸς τῇ Μυκάλῃ τῷ ὄρει ὡρμίσθησαν. τὴν γὰρ Λάδην τὴν νῆσον προκατειλήφει Ἀλέξανδρος, οὐ τῶν νεῶν μόνον τῇ ἐγκαθορμίσει, καὶ τοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς Θρᾷκας τῶν ἄλλων ξένων ἐς τετρακισχιλίουςδιαβιβάσας ἐς αὐτήν. ἦσαν δὲ τῶν βαρβάρων αἱ νῆες ἀμφὶ τὰς τετρακοσίας.
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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

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It really is amazing just how well a "mouse" remembers. Posted a reply earlier today and it's not up??!! Good thing is - oddly - that the site threw me out whilst writing but, before I (supposedly) posted, I religiously "copied" just in case and then logged in again, pasted and (supposedly) posted. Having just now woken the pc from "sleep", checked the site (no post), and... voila! The mouse remembers!




agesilaos wrote:Diodoros gives the following figures for the infantry with Alexander

Macedonians 12,000
Allies 7,000
Mercenaries 5,000
Thracians 7,000 (Odrysai, Triballoi, Illyrians)
Agrianes 1,000 (archers included)
Numbers are a constant problem...

From Diod. 17.3-5 where Diodorus also states "These were the men who crossed with Alexander to Asia". These round figures are in close ball-park agreement with all other sources - for those who crossed with Alexander - except Anaximenes who gives a total of 43,000 foot. It is certainly in very close accordance with Arrian who has Alexander lead "30,000 infantry together with light-armed troops and archers, and more than 5,000 cavalry" to the Hellespont. The difference has long been held to be the advance force in Asia under Parmenion and Calas and this is likely correct else we must postulate very large drafts to reach the 47,000 at Gaugamenla (or even Polybius' 45,000 by Issus) including all those left dead on various battlefields, garrison duty, etc. Like many a Macedonian force under Philip, this advance force near certainly comprised mercenaries and a nucleus of Macedonians. The pezous tōn xenōn numbers in the army are likely to be higher than the 5,000 that crossed with Alexander.
agesilaos wrote:Having dispatched Parmenion and Alchimachos with 5,000 Macedonians and ‘Foreign foot’, Alexander leaves the next day with the rest of his infantry, the archers and the Agrinians’ and occupying Lade with ‘the Thracians and 4,000 other foreigners.’ Since the 5,000 mercenaries are used up in the forces of Parmenion and Alchimachos, the Thracians are separately attested along with the Agrianoi and the archers the ‘foreign’ troops must embrace the Greek allies too, yet they are supposedly with Kalas in the Troad. ArrI xviii
Calas has "most" of the other allies - not all. That aside, there is clearly compression (time wise) in Arrian's narrative. This compression occurs either between 1.18.1 and 1.18.3 or Alexander's arrival and taking of the "outer city" (of Miletus) at the first attempt (1.18.3) and 1.18.6. The key is that Parmenion is on hand to advise of a naval battle after Nicanor carries your above quoted soldiers out to Lade. It could rationally be either but my guess is the compression occurs at Ephesus. The text, as received, has Alexander ordering Parmenion out to accept the surrender of Magnesia and Tralles and Alcimachus off to Ionia with his freedom mission and leaving for Miletus "the next day". In between we have the sorting of the two army groups; Alexander sacrificing to Artemis and Alexander holding a parade of the "entire army" in full battle dress and order. I would guess that he awaited the return of Parmenion before attacking Miletus.

If so, the amount of mercenary foot (pezous tōn xenōn) sent to Lade included those Parmenion took. To my mind, there were certainly other pezous tōn xenōn from the advance contingent (outside of Diodorus' 5,000) that can have made up the rest.
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Re: Alexander's Route from Granicus to Sardis

Post by Xenophon »

Paralus wrote:
The difference has long been held to be the advance force in Asia under Parmenion and Calas and this is likely correct else we must postulate very large drafts to reach the 47,000 at Gaugamenla (or even Polybius' 45,000 by Issus) including all those left dead on various battlefields, garrison duty, etc. Like many a Macedonian force under Philip, this advance force near certainly comprised mercenaries and a nucleus of Macedonians. The pezous tōn xenōn numbers in the army are likely to be higher than the 5,000 that crossed with Alexander.
I would concur with this view. The Advance Force likely numbered 10-12,000 foot, ( see Polyaenos Stratagems V.44 ) and that the nucleus was composed of Macedonian 'pezaitaroi' infantry is supported by Diodorus' statement that the Advance Force was composed of both mercenaries and Macedonians ( XVII.7). In addition Polyaenos records Memnon disguising his troops as Macedonians in an attempt to capture Cyzicus by fooling the citizens into thinking this was a force under Chalcas/Kalas. This Advance Force is likely to have comprised one 2,000 man strong 'Taxis' of 'pezetairoi, plus around 8-10,000 Greek and Thracian mercenaries ( probably hoplites and peltasts respectively), and perhaps 1,500-2,000 cavalry, also including Macedonians.

Whilst it used to be supposed that the 'Taxeis' was 1,500 strong, this was based on Diodorus statement of 12,000 Macedonian infantry "crossing with Alexander", less the 3,000 Hypaspists recorded much later. This simply does not accord with known or likely Macedonian organisation.

A more likely alternative for the organisation of the Army at various stages of the campaign under Alexander, arguing for 2,000 strong 'Taxeis' was postulated in detail over 10 years ago by Luke Ueda-Sarson, ( I had earlier postulated 6 x 2,000 man 'taxeis' in "Warfare in the Classical World" 1980 on p.76 and pp80-81, short descriptions of Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela, without giving any reasoned argument due to lack of space).

Alexander then, will have crossed with 1 x 2,000 man 'Taxis' of Hypaspists and 5 x 2,000 'Taxeis' of 'pezaitaroi', to join the Advance Force of 1 x 2,000 man 'Taxis' of Macedonians, and some 8-10,000 or so Greek and Thracian mercenaries, plus some 1600-2,000 cavalry, all originally serving under Parmenion, Attalus ( executed following Philip's assassination) and Chalcas/Kalas.

For Pothosians interested, Luke's well argued strengths for Macedonian troops at different phases of the campaign can be found here:-

http://www.ne.jp/asahi/luke/ueda-sarson ... Notes.html

for the infantry, and here for the cavalry....

http://www.ne.jp/asahi/luke/ueda-sarson ... otes2.html

Further evidence for a 2,000 man 'taxis' comes from known later forces such as Philip V's phalanx composed of 8,000 'chalkaspides' ( bronze shields) and 8,000 'leukaspides' ( white shields), both divisible by 2,000 but not 1,500.
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