Antigonid : Play misty for me: Kynoskephalai

[Paralus]

For Xenophon: a present. In Italian I'm afraid.

And I've made it to page seven. Again. For the moment.

[Xenophon]

Interesting.

The clip shows the original reconstruction of sarissas made by the late Minor M Markle III, (1913-1998) who appears in the video.
As can be seen, his 'sarissaphoroi' have some difficulty handling the reconstructions. This is because they are too big and too heavy, being based on parts that were wrongly assumed to be from a single sarissa.

In 1970 Andronicos found four iron spear fittings outside a Vergina tomb, presumably dropped or discarded by a tomb robber.

They consisted of a large, heavy, 'spearhead' shaped object 0.55m long, weighing 1.235 kg with a socket diameter of 36 mm; a small spearhead 0.273 m long which was made hollow and had a socket diameter of 20 mm; a winged butt spike 0.445 m long weighing 1.070 kg with a socket diameter of 34 mm; and a tube 0.17 m long which had a slightly waisted centre and slightly flared ends. Based on similarities of metal composition, Andronicos ( wrongly, as it turned out ) suggested that the large 'head' and winged butt spike were from a single sarissa, and that the tube was a 'joining section' for a stave in two parts.

Markle's reconstruction was based on this, had a 39 mm oak untapered shaft 18 feet/5.49 m long and weighed 14.5 lbs/6.58 kg.Straightaway one can see a problem. Markle's shaft thickness was the narrowest he could get to support the '1.235 kg assumed 'head' without bending too much, and this is larger than any of the socket diameters found.Its balance point was around half-way down the shaft making it very difficult to handle, as can be seen in the clip.

In fact the 'head' was not a spearhead at all, having a blunt 'rounded' point and blunt edges, and was most probably also a butt for a xyston/cavalry lance as seen wielded by Alexander on the famous mosaic, and more clearly by the rider in the Kinch's tomb fresco. The 'waisted' tube was probably not a spear fitting at all, and the small hollow spearhead was most likely a sarissa point.

Connolly later made a much more convincing reconstruction, longer at 19 ft/5.844 m, using the small hollow spearhead and winged butt. This produced a shaft that tapered from 34 mm to 20 mm, weighed 4.05 kg/8.9 lbs - less than two thirds Markle's shorter version - and a balance point just ahead of the forehand position described by Polybius, ( four cubits/6 ft aprox from the rear)and was so well-balanced that it could be readily wielded in all directions.

Connolly subsequently performed group experiments like those in the clip that verified 'doubling' into 'synaspismos' and suggested that because of formation restrictions there was an optimum length for the sarissa - shorter versions ( e.g. 4 m. as suggested by Tarn and Manti) or longer ones ( over 20 ft) were impractical, and interfered with the formation.

[Paralus]

Also, where do you get the idea that the left wing was ‘delayed’? Polybius says that Nikanor was ordered to follow “at once”, and as the right wing charged down the slopes, some of the left were also descending- to link up - while others had halted on the summit to wait for the rear to come up. They simply hadn’t yet had the chance to form ‘battle line’ and were largely in ‘marching’ or ‘open’ order.[ Pol XVIII.25.5-7] There’s no inference of any ‘delay’ that I can see.

Again, I'm not at all certain we can say that any of the left were descending to join with the right. In fact, it's highly possible that not all of the right had made it. As I wrote earlier, if one leaves out Poybios' repeating of the reasons why Philip's mercenaries are repulsed it reads somewhat easier:

But while he was still engaged in getting the right wing of his army into line, his mercenaries came on the ground, having been decisively repulsed by the enemy [...] Receiving therefore the men who had been already engaged, he massed them all upon his right wing, both infantry and cavalry; while he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right.

Now, what's been excised is the explanation ("for as I said just now..."). So, in terms of events and timing, Philip has received these returning troops while still getting his right into line. Some - not necessarily a lot (possibly a syntagma or so?) - may have missed the charge.

Secondly, unless we are to think the Megalopolitan contradicts himself within paragraphs, the left never made it into any order other than marching. Several passages show this:

but as for the rest of the army, that part of it which was in the rear of the actual fighters did not get into contact with the enemy; while the left wing, which had but just made the ascent, was only beginning to show on the ridge.

part being in contact with the actual fighters, part just in the act of mounting the ridge, and part halting on it and not yet beginning to descend

Then when Flamininus leads his right against the Macedonian left:

The Macedonians having no one to give them orders, and unable to form a proper phalanx, owing to the inequalities of the ground and to the fact that, being engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants, they were still in column of march...

and when he observed that the Romans in their pursuit of his left wing were already approaching the tops of the hills, he rallied as many Thracians and Macedonians as he could at the moment, and fled. [9] As Flamininus was pursuing the fugitives he came upon the lines of the Macedonian left, just as they were scaling the ridge in their attempt to cross the hills

All of which indicates that the Macedonian left had not engaged in the battle at all. The only two possible contrary indicators are "part being in contact with the actual fighters" and "that part of it which was in the rear of the actual fighters did not get into contact with the enemy". These are not clear though I'd suggest the former is the right and that which had not gotten into proper order. The latter may well be the rear of the phalanx itself if not those of the right who did not quite make the charge. Either way, Polybios is crystal in claiming that Philip's right was in the midst of success while the left wing had "but just made the ascent" and was only "beginning to show on the ridge".

As to Paralus’ post,[Thurs 29 may] I’d agree his first paragraph, but not his second. In regard to foraging, I strongly suspect that Diodorus’ “those soldiers who were in the habit of crossing in scattered groups in search of forage" really is a euphemism for looting – note that these are not ordered to go out, but habitually go of their own accord....... i.e. “unofficial” foragers.

I disagree. Diodorus has Antigonos in the middle of nowhere and marching by night due to the Susiane summer heat. Arriving at the river he sets about getting his army across. Diodorus says that due to the nature of the river it could only be crossed by boat and that Antigonos seized a small number of punts (ὀλίγα πλοῖα κοντωτὰ). With these he sent “some of the infantry across in them, ordering them to dig a moat and build a palisade in front of it and to receive the rest of the army”. These troops were to prepare a defensive encampment to prevent the disaster which actually occurred. We later find out that this force (or at least those there by the time Eumenes arrived) was “more than three thousand foot soldiers” and “four hundred cavalry”. Antigonos obviously intended conveying the rest of his army across and, as such, the ‘few’ punts were crucial. It would, then, beggar belief that 6,000 “looters” took to the few punts and crossed – without orders – for some light fingered work across the other side. Either the One Eye ordered them across to forage for the army which was following or we must accept that Antigonos was extremely lax in his discipline. I’d suggest these are those in the army whose customary job was to do exactly what Antigonos had given them his precious punts to do.

[Xenophon]

I don't think there is any serious disagreement here, but if I may, I'll add some comments to those of Paralus.
Paralus wrote:

Also, where do you get the idea that the left wing was ‘delayed’? Polybius says that Nikanor was ordered to follow “at once”, and as the right wing charged down the slopes, some of the left were also descending- to link up - while others had halted on the summit to wait for the rear to come up. They simply hadn’t yet had the chance to form ‘battle line’ and were largely in ‘marching’ or ‘open’ order.[ Pol XVIII.25.5-7] There’s no inference of any ‘delay’ that I can see.

Again, I'm not at all certain we can say that any of the left were descending to join with the right.

Normally the left wing of the phalanx would enter the field of battle in column,immediately behind the right wing column, and would continue the deployment of the phalanx to the left. This would normally be 'seamless', so that the end result was a single solid phalanx. The column of march would be in 'syntagma' one behind the other, 16 x 16 in 'open/normal' order, called 'epagoge' [Aelian 36.2], and each 'syntagma' would deploy to the left of its predecessor. We might expect therefore that the 'head' of the left wing would be in immediate touch with the leftmost unit of the right wing, and would start deploying as soon as Philip 'closed up' the right wing, making room for them. Thus it is possible that a few of the left wing went with the right when they charged. This seems to be confirmed, as Paralus notes below, when Polybius says "part being in contact with the actual fighters, "

Paralus wrote:

In fact, it's highly possible that not all of the right had made it. As I wrote earlier, if one leaves out Poybios' repeating of the reasons why Philip's mercenaries are repulsed it reads somewhat easier:

But while he was still engaged in getting the right wing of his army into line, his mercenaries came on the ground, having been decisively repulsed by the enemy [...] Receiving therefore the men who had been already engaged, he massed them all upon his right wing, both infantry and cavalry; while he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right.

Now, what's been excised is the explanation ("for as I said just now..."). So, in terms of events and timing, Philip has received these returning troops while still getting his right into line. Some - not necessarily a lot (possibly a syntagma or so?) - may have missed the charge.

I think Polybius is quite clear in his description, at least in my eyes. The 'lights and cavalry' were essentially in front of Philip's right wing. As each of the phalanx units/syntagma came into line, they were in 'open/normal order'. As the last of the deployment was taking place on the left of the phalanx line, some 1,000 yards from its right, the lights and cavalry withdrew through the phalanx, and were ordered to the right flank to protect it. As soon as the 'lights' had cleared the phalanx and were now in its rear, Philip ordered them to 'close up' to their right into 'close order' preparatory to charging down the slope at the two advancing Roman Legions. For some to have missed the charge, Philip would have had to launch it before the 'closing up' was complete. This may be possible, given the proximity of the Romans, but what Polybius [XVII.24.8 ] actually says is :
"Upon this being done [the closing up], the enemy being now close upon them, orders were sent to the men of the phalanx to lower their spears and charge...." i.e. the manoeuvre was completed before charging, so it would seem unlikely that any missed the charge, especially as there was time for a few of the leading elements of the left wing to join as well.

Parauls wrote:

Secondly, unless we are to think the Megalopolitan contradicts himself within paragraphs, the left never made it into any order other than marching. Several passages show this:

but as for the rest of the army, that part of it which was in the rear of the actual fighters did not get into contact with the enemy; while the left wing, which had but just made the ascent, was only beginning to show on the ridge.

part being in contact with the actual fighters, part just in the act of mounting the ridge, and part halting on it and not yet beginning to descend

Again,I think Polybius is clear. "that part which was in the rear of the actual fighters" is the rear half of the right wing phalanx, which it will be recalled was 'double depth', some 16 deep in close order, and naturally the rear half/8 ranks "did not get into contact with the enemy" The left wing is just breasting the ridge - though the leading elements would have been in touch with the right wing, as described above.

It should be borne in mind that the left-wing column would have been around a thousand yards long on the march, if in 'parade ground' order, and we may assume that with the foragers still hastily coming in and being organised perhaps 'ad hoc' by Nikanor, the rear of the column was probably not as orderly as it might have been, and the column perhaps strung out even longer. This left wing column would have taken 10-15 minutes to deploy, or perhaps longer. Thus it is easy to see how the head of the column was in touch with "the actual fighters", whilst part were halted on the ridge deploying, and the rear part still mounting the ridge, a thousand yards behind.

I'd therefore agree that the left wing column, save perhaps those few in contact with the fighters of the right wing, never got out of marching or 'open/normal' order.I don't think there is any doubt about that.[Polybius XVIII.25.6 says "...in part because they were trying to reach the combatants and were still in marching order and not in line, did not even wait until they were at close quarters with the Romans , but gave way thrown into confusion and broken up by the elephants alone."]

Paralus wrote:

Then when Flamininus leads his right against the Macedonian left:

The Macedonians having no one to give them orders, and unable to form a proper phalanx, owing to the inequalities of the ground and to the fact that, being engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants, they were still in column of march...

and when he observed that the Romans in their pursuit of his left wing were already approaching the tops of the hills, he rallied as many Thracians and Macedonians as he could at the moment, and fled. [9] As Flamininus was pursuing the fugitives he came upon the lines of the Macedonian left, just as they were scaling the ridge in their attempt to cross the hills

All of which indicates that the Macedonian left had not engaged in the battle at all. The only two possible contrary indicators are "part being in contact with the actual fighters" and "that part of it which was in the rear of the actual fighters did not get into contact with the enemy". These are not clear though I'd suggest the former is the right and that which had not gotten into proper order. The latter may well be the rear of the phalanx itself if not those of the right who did not quite make the charge. Either way, Polybios is crystal in claiming that Philip's right was in the midst of success while the left wing had "but just made the ascent" and was only "beginning to show on the ridge".

See above. The passage makes sense and is clear if we read the former as referring to the leading elements of the left wing, and the latter as the rear part of the right wing phalanx that charged. Polybius is merely telling us that the right wing formation was too deep for all to take part in the fight. It is not necessary to assume that any of the right wing did not make the charge - surely Polybius would have mentioned it if the charge was carried out partly in disarray, and as mentioned above, Polybius says specifically that the manoeuvre was completed. .

[Paralus]

I was merely taking my lead from your own attempted humour – see for example May 15 “But wait, what's that there.... below... I spies me an explanation........ Now, that's one of the better and more extensive glosses of a very clear text I've seen in a while. A gloss of convenience or a gloss of presumption?? More likely the latter.”

I might well agree with the first though, in defense as explained earlier, that was a pointer to the fact that one had to read through five more paragraphs (from recollection) before alighting on the substantiation for the original assertion.

The second is, rather, a straightforward comment on the argument deployed. Polybios’ text – clearly written – is glossed into either an ‘understood’ single action by the phalanx or, because the Megalopolitan ‘understood’ how to double depth and close to the right, he reports a result rather than the two actions. The question was is this gloss one of convenience or of presumption? I believe, as I wrote, the latter as you proceed from the presumption that the standard closed up depth for the Macedonian phalanx was eight (aside from the 'unique' or 'exceptional'); so, therefore, the argument follows. Possibly a little circular.

Nor were my comments in this instance intended as personal attack, merely a kinder way, via humour, to avoid saying bluntly that you were deliberately avoiding the issues under discussion..... not a personal criticism, rather drawing attention to a debating style of avoiding issues, evasions of the point in question and instead digressing into minor issues and irrelevancies that one can argue with.

And yet ‘humour’, in generating the laugh, very often belittles. I have addressed the issues that have been raised by the thread as they’ve arisen. I do not see that I’ve raised any ‘irrelevancies’ for myself to argue with.

At last ! Having agreed that the basic file was 16 in open order previously, you now (apparently) unequivocally agree that ‘close order’ was half that depth, at 8. ( save for exceptional cases such as Kynoskephalae or Sellasia). Similarly for ‘synaspismos’.

I have never disagreed that the phalanx file was sixteen in open order and therefore haven’t somehow now agreed with that proposition on this thread (as that might seem to suggest). I have in fact stated it repeatedly on this thread. Also I have not had any epiphany relating to the fact that a phalanx could - and did - take close order eight deep as I’ve also remarked repeatedly on this thread (below). I do not hold with the parenthetic ‘exceptional’ though.

14/5

Once into line (16 deep) on the ridge Philip could order it to 'double down' to eight deep in pyknosis or close up to the right sixteen deep.

13/5

The only other possible order for closing up would be to 'double down' by insertion which order was demonstrably not given.

19/5

The statement has been repeated throughout that the regular close order of the Macedonian phalanx was 8 deep and formed by half file insertion. I disagree and reiterate that the field and its circumstances dictated just how the phalanx condensed. Half file insertion is disingenuously presented as the 'normal' or regular method of making the phalanx more dense. Yet when Aelian introduces "compaction" of the phalanx, his first (and entire) example is by closing to right or left with the resultant diminished frontages involved. He goes on later in his treatise to describe insertion as another method.

25/5

I have to agree with Xenophon. I cannot see the right of the phalanx deploying into line sixteen deep (as usual), then 'doubling down' (by half file insertion) only to afterwards resume sixteen deep open order (by counter march of the inserted half file?) and then close up to the right.

~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

It appears to me that Paralus is confused on the matter and its terminology.

Now that may well be true. In the interminable to and fro ranks and files have become confused. That said…

‘Doubling depth’ [29.6] is the insertion of one file into another – two files become one, now with twice as many men ( two files of 8 become one of 16, and the interval between files doubles from, say, 3 ft to 6 ft. It does NOT render the ranks (men side by side originally) into ‘close order’, but just the opposite, the space between men in a given rank becomes looser, and twice what it was. ( but the files are now in ‘close order’ front to back - presumably they then open out the depth from 3 ft to 6 feet to achieve full 'open order'). It is only the closing up of the files by a following right turn, and marching to their right which brings soldiers in the same rank standing side by side back into ‘close order’.

The passages have been quoted and requoted and likely belong on the "Taktike" thread. That, though, seems to have taken off on another tangent. That said, one point needs restating though. Asklepiodotos (10.17), does indeed describe file insertion to attain a compact formation (“maintaining all the while the length of the phalanx”). Aelian futher expounds on this (as he promised to do) “as when from a front of 124 files we wish to make a front of 248, while still occupying the same length of ground, by interjecting in the spaces between the soldiers some of the rear-rank-men that constitute the depth” (and the other method noted by Xenophon). Asklepiodotos then describes the folding of one file into the other. This results in the doubling of the number of ranks (or the numbers in each file) “so that a compact order arises only by depth”. This latter is not presented as the ‘loosening’ of the former - that comes at 10.18 & 19 (where, at 19, Asklepiodotos writes:"doubling of place is performed by depth when we change the above mentioned compact formation by depth [that is, that just described at 17] into a loose formation or when the interjected men counter-march by file"). Rather, it is explicit in noting that numbers (in file) are doubled and the resultant doubled file takes on compact order. Aelian (29.6), again as promised, more fully describes this folding of one file into its neighbour thus doubling the number of ranks (or the numbers in each file) and producing the same result. It is nowhere stated that these files, now doubled in number (by depth) and compacted (also in depth), then ‘presumably’ open their depth from three feet to six feet. Thus should a commander wish to ‘double’ his file depth, the mechanism is available. It does not, of necessity, follow that these files, prior to such doubling, must be four deep (locked shields) or eight deep (close order) to do so.

To bolster your interpretation you have invented a formation that not only never existed, but is quite impossible practically…

This is at least the second time you have accused me of deliberate invention for a purpose. Above, in a ‘humorous’ discussion with Baldrick, you made it even plainer:

a formation 32 deep which must entail ‘doubling’ the intervals between files to 12 feet – such 32 deep formation nowhere described in our sources - one which Paralus has invented to allow his interpretation of what Polybius meant by “double their depth and close up toward the right.” ? ( he even used Aelian’s method 29.6 above).

You may very well find the accusation of inventing material to ‘bolster’ an interpretation or to ‘allow’ an interpretation of a very clear and concise passage humorous (at least via Baldrick); I do not. The import is that having decided on the meaning of the passage I have then gone about inventing material to substantiate that meaning. I reject that.

I assure you no ‘jibe’ was intended, we have been friends far too long for such pettiness...

Wholeheartedly agreed. In which case, let’s proceed without the ‘humorour' - interlocutory or otherwise.

[Xenophon]

Paralus wrote:

Xenophon wrote:
As to Paralus’ post,[Thurs 29 may] I’d agree his first paragraph, but not his second. In regard to foraging, I strongly suspect that Diodorus’ “

those soldiers who were in the habit of crossing in scattered groups in search of forage

" really is a euphemism for looting – note that these are not ordered to go out, but habitually go of their own accord....... i.e. “unofficial” foragers.

I disagree. Diodorus has Antigonos in the middle of nowhere and marching by night due to the Susiane summer heat. Arriving at the river he sets about getting his army across. Diodorus says that due to the nature of the river it could only be crossed by boat and that Antigonos seized a small number of punts (ὀλίγα πλοῖα κοντωτὰ). With these he sent “some of the infantry across in them, ordering them to dig a moat and build a palisade in front of it and to receive the rest of the army”. These troops were to prepare a defensive encampment to prevent the disaster which actually occurred. We later find out that this force (or at least those there by the time Eumenes arrived) was “more than three thousand foot soldiers” and “four hundred cavalry”. Antigonos obviously intended conveying the rest of his army across and, as such, the ‘few’ punts were crucial. It would, then, beggar belief that 6,000 “looters” took to the few punts and crossed – without orders – for some light fingered work across the other side. Either the One Eye ordered them across to forage for the army which was following or we must accept that Antigonos was extremely lax in his discipline. I’d suggest these are those in the army whose customary job was to do exactly what Antigonos had given them his precious punts to do.

It is the last proposition that I have difficulty with. "Foraging" consisted largely of three things - fetching water, and an army consumed vast amounts daily, hence the importance of rivers in all campaigns; fetching fuel, usually wood, but often dung, for cooking and keeping warm; and finally crops as food for both men and animals ( the Romans had a separate word for each of these tasks). Since societies in those days were largely rural, pretty much everyone was familiar with these chores, which differed little from ordinary civil life. I am therefore sceptical that there were troops who 'specialised' in foraging, or whose 'customary job' it was. I certainly don't recall any references in our sources to such 'specialist' troops. Certainly “those soldiers who were in the habit of crossing in scattered groups in search of forage" doesn't sound like disciplined troops carrying out orders.....and it is an old military truism that the tougher the situation, the more the reins of discipline must be relaxed.

I don't doubt that on occasion designated forces might undertake the task e.g.cavalry being designated to forage for hay for the horses, or that a large portion of the army might scour a particular area. As i said previously, the actual work was usually done by camp servants, guarded by as many troops as deemed necessary, but troops also undertook the task themselves. Equally, there wasn't much of a difference between 'foraging' and 'looting', and troops from all armies were known to go 'foraging' without having orders to - even if only to 'bunk off' to the nearest village to grab a chicken or piglet to enhance the pot .

[agesilaos]

A1) [….the watchmen] must not reply to the patrols, but must keep quiet and show that they are present and on their feet. Concerning patrols. In each strategia the tetrarchs must go th ethe rounds in turn / without any light and anyone found sitting down or [sleeping] while on guard duty the tetrarchs shall fine one drachma for every offence and the secretaries (grammateis) shall obtain th epayment [of the fine]…
A2) …[if they do not report] the offenders [to the king] they shall be fined three twelfths of a drachma(?) which shall be given to the Hypaspists in the event of their being the first to send in a written denunciation of the offenders./Concerning the construction of the camp. When they have completed the enclosure for the king and the rest of his quarters and an interval has been left, they shall straightaway build barracks for the Hypaspists…
A3)[…][anyone who has been awarded?] a crown shall receive a double share of the booty, but nothing is to be given to the cheiristes, [and] the royal philoi [shall adjudicate?]./ Concerning the watchwords. They shall also take the [watchword…when?] they close the entrances to th e[king’s quarters?]…
B1)… they shall punish according to the written rules those who are not bearing the arms appropriate to them : two obols for the kottybos, the same amount for the konos, three obols for the sarissa, the same amount for the dagger, two obols for the greaves, a drachma for the shield./ In 5the case of the officers (hegemones) double the fine for the weapons mentioned, and two drachmai for the corselet and one drachma for the half-corselet. The secretaries and the chief attendants (archyperetai) swhall receive the fines after reporting the offenders to the king./ Concerning Discipline over War Booty. [If] anyone brings booty to the camp , the generals taking with them the speirarchs and the tetrarchs and the other officers (hegemones), and together with these the [attendants] in sufficient numbers shall go to meet them at a distance of three stadia from the camp,/ [and they shall not allow] those who captured the booty to keep it. And shouls any insubordination [of this kind ] take place, the [generals], speirarchs, tetrarchs and the chief attendants shall pay a sum equivalent [to what each of them owes?] last 4 lines very mutilated.
B2)First 10,lines very fragmentary
[…the superintendent] of the court; and if […they shall fine him] a twelth of an obol and the superintendent of the [court ]shall do the same thing….Concerning [Foraging]/ If anyone forages in enemy territory, [a reward for his denunciation?] shall be promised and given…[And if anyone?] burns crops or [cuts] vines [or] is guilty [of any other offence, the generals shall promise?] a rerwrd for his denunciation….

Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 12 Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 11 Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 13
Makedonia (Edonis) — Amphipolis — ca. 200 BC — ISE II 114 — SEG 40.524
See also: SEG 52:589; SEG 53:589
frg. A.col. I
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
1
μηθὲν ἀποκρινομένους τοῖς ἐφόδοις, ἀλλὰ μετὰ σιωπῆς
αὑτοὺς ἀποδεικνύοντας ὅτι μένουσιν ὀρθοί.
ἐφόδων.
ἐφοδεύειν δὲ τὴν μὲν στρατηγίαν ἑκάστην κατὰ μέρος
5
τοὺς τετράρχας ἄνευ φωτὸς καὶ τὸν συγκαθήμενον ἢ κα-
θ̣εύ̣δ̣οντα φύλακα {ι} ζημιούτωσαν οἱ τετράρχαι καθ’ ἑκάστην
ἀ̣τ̣α̣ξί[α]ν δραχμῆι καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς ποιείσθωσαν τὴν πρᾶ-
col. II
[ξιν — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
1
[— — — — — — — — ἐὰν μὴ παραδείξωσι τῶι βασι]-
λεῖ τοὺς ἀτακτοῦτας ζημιούσθωσ{θ}αν {²⁶ζημιούσθωσαν}²⁶ δωδεκαίοις
τρισὶν καὶ διδόσθωσαν τοῖς ὑπασπισταῖς, ἐὰν φθά-
σωσιν εἰσπέμψαντες οὗτοι τὴν τῶν ἀτακτούτων γραφήν.
5
περὶ στεγνοποίας.
ὅταν δὲ τὸν φραγμὸν συντελέσωσιν τῷ βασιλεῖ
καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σκηνοποιίαν καὶ γένηται διάστασις,
εὐθὺ τοῖς ὑπασπισταῖς ποιείτωσαν ἐκκοίτιον

col. III
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
1
σ̣τ̣ρ̣α̣τ̣η̣γίαν̣ ΕΠ[․]#⁷[․․]ΑΝ̣[․․․]Ι̣ΔΗ[․․․․․․]Ε̣Ρ̣Ι̣ΕΜ̣[․․․․․]-
χέτω στέφανος, διπλῆν λαμβάνειν τὴν μερίδ[α τῆς ὠ]-
φελίας, τῶι δὲ χειριστᾷ μηδὲν δίδοσθαι, κρ̣[ίνειν δὲ]
τοὺς φίλους τοῦ βασιλέως. vacat
5
συνθη̣[μά]τ̣ων.
λαμβανέτωσαν δὲ καὶ τὸ σ[ύνθημα — — — — — ὅταν(?)]
κλείωσι τὰς διόδους τοῦ φ̣[ραγμοῦ(?) — — — — — — —]
vacat

frg. B.col. I
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1
γειν τοὺς μὴ φέρο̣ντάς τι τῶν καθηκόντων αὐτοῖς ὅ-
πλων ζημιούτωσαν κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα· κοτθύβου̣
ὀβολοὺς δύο, κώνου τὸ ἴσον, σαρίσης ὀβολοὺ<ς> τρεῖς, μα-
χαίρας τὸ ἴσον, κνημίδων ὀβολοὺς δύο, ἀσπίδος δρα-
5
χμήν. vacat
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἡγεμόνων τῶν τε δεδηλωμένων ὅπλων
τὸ διπλοῦν καὶ θώρακος δραχμὰς δύο, ἡμιθωρακίου δραχμήν.
λ̣α̣μ̣β̣α̣νέτωσαν δὲ τὴν ζημίαν οἱ γραμματεῖς καὶ οἱ ἀρχυ-
[πηρέτ]αι, παραδείξαντες τῶι βασιλεῖ τοὺς ἠθετηκότας.
10
εὐταξίας τῆς ἐκ τῶν ὠφελιῶν.
[ἐὰν] δὲ ὠφελίαν ἄγωσί τινες εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, ὑπαν-
τάτω[σαν οἱ] στρατηγοὶ τοὺς σπειράρχας καὶ τετράρχας
ἔχον[τες κα]ὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἡγεμόνας καὶ μετὰ τούτων τοὺς
ἱκανο̣[ὺς ὑπηρ]έτας πρὸ τῆς παρεμβολῆς τρεῖς σταδίους
15
[καὶ μ]ὴ [ἐπ]ι̣τ̣ρεπέτωσαν τοῖς διαρπάζουσιν. ἐὰν δέ τι γένη-
[ται τοιοῦ]τον ἀτάκτημα, τὰς διατιμήσεις ἀποτινέτωσαν οἱ
[στρατηγοὶ] κ̣α̣ὶ οἱ σπειράρχαι καὶ τετράρχαι καὶ οἱ ἀρχυπηρέται,
[ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι ὀφ(?)]ε̣ίλωσιν.
[․․c.8․․․]#⁷Τ#⁷Ν
20
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]σθωσαν τὴν ἐνδε-
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —] vacat
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —] τῶν τετράρχων
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]ν ἐλευθε-
vacat
25

col. II.1
Σ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
ΟΜΟΙ̣[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
ΝΑΣΩ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
ἐὰν δέ τι[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]-
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μένων ἢ ΟΣ̣[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
ἢ ὁ ἀεὶ πρὸς τ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — στα]-
θμοὺς καὶ τ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
εἰσπρασσ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]-
ΣΤΑΙΣ ἀναγκ̣[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — ἀ]-
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τακτεῖν τῶν τ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — ὁ ἐπὶ]
τῆς αὐλῆς· ἐὰν [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
δωδεκαίωι {⁷ΔΩΔΕΚΑΙΩΝ}⁷ καὶ προστ̣[ίμου(?) — — — — — — — — τὸ]
αὐτὸ ποιείτω καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ τ̣[ῆς αὐλῆς — — — — — — — — — — — — — —].
περὶ τῶν [προνομῶν].
15
ἐὰν δέ τις ἐν τῆι τῶ%⁸⁰ν π[ολεμίων προνομὰς ποιήσηι, μήνυτρον(?) ἐ]-
παγγελῆναι καὶ δοθῆναι [— — — — — — — — — — — — — ἐὰν δέ τις(?)]
σῖτον ἐμπυρίσηι ἢ ἄμπελο[ν τέμηι ἢ ἄλλο τι ἀτά]-
κτημα ποιήσηι, μήνυτρον ἐ[παγγελέτωσαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ(?) — — — —]

Whilst not germane to Antigonos, these regulations of Philip V pre-date Kynoskephalai, and demonstrate that both looting and foraging were highly regulated, and here it is foraging in enemy territory, Philip was actually on friendly ground.

Diodoros XIX 18 v

καὶ τῶν εἰωθότων σποράδην διαβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὰς προνομὰς οὐκ ἐλάττους ἑξακισχιλίων.

and of those who were accustomed to proceed in loose formation ( lit.scatteredly) after forage not less than six thousand

So these 6,000 may, in fact be camp servants, it is difficult to see what plunder there is to be found in the mountainous foothills, maybe they were hoping to mug a lone boulder!

[agesilaos]

Normally the left wing of the phalanx would enter the field of battle in column,immediately behind the right wing column, and would continue the deployment of the phalanx to the left. This would normally be 'seamless', so that the end result was a single solid phalanx. The column of march would be in 'syntagma' one behind the other, 16 x 16 in 'open/normal' order, called 'epagoge' [Aelian 36.2], and each 'syntagma' would deploy to the left of its predecessor. We might expect therefore that the 'head' of the left wing would be in immediate touch with the leftmost unit of the right wing, and would start deploying as soon as Philip 'closed up' the right wing, making room for them. Thus it is possible that a few of the left wing went with the right when they charged. This seems to be confirmed, as Paralus notes below, when Polybius says "part being in contact with the actual fighters, "

I cannot let this latest series of assertions pass. Normally??? Perhaps you could list the battles in which you think this is true.

The fact is that there are only a couple or so in which we hear of how the phalanx deployed; Issos, Kynoskephalai and Pydna; and of these only Issos represents a deliberate approach to battle. The other two are piecemeal engagements that grew and grew. At issos, we do not find the phalanx advancing in column but deploying as soon as the plain allows, the aim is to be in battle line before the ‘field of battle’ is reached. This is why we do not hear much about how the deployment of various armies in other battles proceeded; they had deployed long before but the story of these three battles hinges on the deployment , fortunately for Alexander, who is deploying head on to the enemy, fatally for Philip V and Perseus who are deploying from a flank.

Philip’s case is quite clear, he is deploying from a marching column to face an enemy on the right of this column, which is why the head of his column deploys as soon as they reach the heights. Had the enemy been on the left the whole column would have marched straight to the end of the ridge and simply left –faced. This meant that the late arriving left had, perforce to march behind the deployed right wing before they could reach their station.

Syntagma? Philip V would have looked blankly, ‘ Oh! Speirai!’ He would subsequently exclaimed, and wandered off shaking his head – since we are talking about a ridge above a pass a narrower front would be more likely, so tetrarchiai would be more likely on a frontage of five yards rather than thirty, we are talking a track here, I think. But, yes, a march in column of units of the same type is ‘epagoge’, however, whilst I too prefer this option, nothing excludes and ‘paragogic’ march with the file-leaders all on the left if you think there was room for an advance by speirai.
You have mis-typed your reference, it is XVIII 24 viii, but are quite right that the right wing had completed its manoeuvre, but steadfastly wrong in ignoring its two-fold nature; the order is ‘to double depth and close to the right’.

Again,I think Polybius is clear. "that part which was in the rear of the actual fighters" is the rear half of the right wing phalanx, which it will be recalled was 'double depth', some 16 deep in close order, and naturally the rear half/8 ranks "did not get into contact with the enemy" The left wing is just breasting the ridge - though the leading elements would have been in touch with the right wing, as described above.

Polybios IS clear, he is describing the various states of disorder in the oncoming left, the right wing has advanced the troops behind are from the left, as are those still in marching order attempting to catch up with the melee; they will be from the lead units of the left whose officers have decided to get into the action without getting into line first (something like kids playing soccer, who crowd towards the ball and ignore formation) other units proceeded along the ridge in order to make room for those following before deploying themselves; it is clear that all the left were in marching formation; the various positions of the troops are down to local level decisions, Polybios is also clear that lack of direction was a root cause of the disorder.

Since sixteen was the normal fighting depth, the right was not in ‘double –depth’. Or do you think Philip thought ‘I have the best trained part of my army here, ready on the ridge and can get them into fighting formation by a simple evolution (halving by each even soldier stepping into the four cubit gap and dressing by rank), but here comes the lesser part, I had best order them to double their depth [they will understand that I don’t really mean it] and close up so that there is room for the others, the half that are now useless will appreciate the rest, bugger better get a shift on the Romans are pretty close!’ I believe you mention ‘military probability’ from time to time; one to chew on.

I am not going to address the fantasy version of the battle of Magnesia but will open another thread on it; any discussion thereof deserves its own space.

I will close with a couple of observations; in my reconstruction the right start in pyknosis 8 deep, double to 16 in open (let’s not call it ‘normal’) order and close up to pyknosis again 16 deep, which must be normal fighting formation, why else would Philip be so keen on forming it? As I have said before we are not told explicitly how the right initially formed up (other than by ‘filling the line to the left), but assuming this, allows for sensible command decisions by an experienced commander, and allows for all the subsequent orders. Paralus’ version too has the virtue of obeying the orders of which we are informed, although I find it falls once the Roman army is factored in, for reasons of frontage in both our opinions. By contrast you insist on rejecting half of the battle field command purely on the grounds of dogma, based itself on arguments that can only be described as ‘dogm###’ themselves.

[Paralus]

Yes. I do believe we are getting somewhere Agesilaos. I agree that the right has deployed, doubled depth and closed to the right. After which it leveled sarisae and charged. Although, as I've mused excising the retrospective, Polybios' text might indicate it had not all made it, that might be pushing his words too far. Similarly the Megalopolitan states that Philip advanced with "his peltasts and the right wing of the phalanx" indicating that he'd the lot of this part of the army (though, again, it might not pay to push it). Immediately following that Polybios says that he "left instructions" with Nikanor to see that the rest of the army "followed at once". Polybios is clear that Philip only advanced from camp only with his peltasts and the right; he does not say the left followed in this column. The somewhat unavoidable implication is that Nikanor was not leaving as part of the king's column and that the left was not yet ready to follow when Philip ascended the ridge with his right. Were it ready to tag along - 'seamlessly' as Xenophon pictures it - there was no need to leave such instructions for it will have done so in Xenophon's 'normal' fashion. My reading of this is that the left was not ready to march when Philip's right departed for combat as it was still to some degree (whatever that degree might be) falling out from camp. Later descriptions of it being taken in column would seem to confirm this.

I still do not see any evidence in the text that Philip had deployed his troops into line (16 deep) and doubled down to 8 deep. You're correct that Polybios doesn't bother us with the details of the exact depth or density only stating that it deployed (obviously) from column of march into line. While Philip was likely aware this was a race of sorts to get into line, I cannot see any reason for that part of the phalanx with him not deploying into sixteen deep in open order and occupying the extent of the ridge. Philip must still have planned to fight with his entire phalanx, not just half. It had to become obvious, watching the action down slope, that there was not going to be time for that. From there the fateful orders are given. Here I think Xenophon is correct: I do not see time (or the necessity) for doubling down to eight, loosening back to 16 and closing to right.

You rely on Polybios not informing us that a major evolution of the phalanx had taken place. Two in fact: close order by file insertion and open order by reversing that. I find that difficult to credit given that he does give us two clear deployment orders. We all (all three I think) agree that the Roman line had not formed despite Polybios' two statements that the consul drew up his army in line ("he drew out his entire army and got them into order of battle close to the hills" and "Having got his main body into order, Flamininus gave his attention..." 22.7 & 23.1). I believe we all see these as 'summary' statements and, much like Diodorus' stock phrases, these neatly convey the impression that the Romans fell out of camp and into line in minutes. I think we all agree that those are are a synopsis for something that was an ongoing and time expensive process (as with Philip's deployment). So, it might be ever so slightly churlish of me (or all of us) to claim that whilst Polybios doesn't bother us with the details of the Roman deployment leading us to postulate a version, to claim that he does do so for Philip and so your sixteen to eight deep and back again cannot stand. I will accept that churlishness though for the difference is, as I see it, that Polybios does provide detail for the Macedonians that he does not for the Romans (aside from his description of the left lights and 2,000 infantry sent to support them): the very details occasioning the discussion. No such detail is available for the Roman heavy infantry lines; they simply and, in miraculous time, deploy into battle order.

On the foragers, I am in agreement with you. There is, to my mind, no way that Antigonos decided to turn his blind eye to 6,000 'looters' appropriating his precious punts. He needed his army across the river and into a defended encampment to guard against the very disaster that befell him. Having transported his 'fieldwork' infantry (and some cavalry) he then sent over foragers to supply that defensive encampment with whatever was available. That done he will have continued transporting his army.

[agesilaos]

Paralus, I have NEVER said that Philip's wing went from marching column to eight deep in fighting order by file insertion, rather they use the every even man moving to the left ie the method for doubling by depth reversed. the why is that he could see he had more ground to cover than he had troops (one of the skills expected by a general was that of being able to judge the appropriate length and density for the ground available - which is why the Taktikeis mention the lengths in stadia of the ideal phalanx in various densities). This method would be quick and also easy to reverse, by doubling the depth and closing to the right or left. I know we feel differently about the need to be in fighting order but Philip had no way of knowing how long Nikanor would take to assemble the left wing and arrive, nor could he foresee how the Romans would act. Yes, Nikanor is oredered to follow 'at once', but that means 'as soon as the left has assembled', rather than straight after the right had left, otherwise the whole phalanx would just have deployed sixteen deep onto the ridge; there would have been time since the right had time to deploy across the same front.

Philip doubles his depth and closes to the right both to put his right in its optimum fighting formation and to make room for the left to deploy on his flank; were eight the fighting depth he would not need to change his dispositions (had his force been standing sixteen deep in open order he would have ordered them to 'halve by depth and close to the front' which he did not, if eight were the fighting depth). Were the Macedonians still sixteen deep and in loose order across the ridge and the doubled to thirty-two and closed up, the frontage would reduce not by half but by three quarters, but the ground that has been vacated is not about to be occupied by a fore three times that of Philip's but only one of the same strength so they would have to deploy ten deep to cover the ground, which is not a natural fracvtion of a sixteen strong file. This presupposes that either Philip occupied too much ground initially, which does not seem the case given the probable frontage of the Romans, or he decided to set his right strangly deep.

I note your churlish quibble and raise you an arrogant shrug; all I can suggest is that Polybios or his source having got Philip to the ridge lost their narrative focus, by switching back to events concerning the advanced force, whilst we are interested in the nitty gritty of the manoeuvres, no ancient audience would be, we are lucky to have Philip's battlefield order, such is the curse of 'style'.

[Paralus]

Paralus, I have NEVER said that Philip's wing went from marching column to eight deep in fighting order by file insertion, rather they use the every even man moving to the left ie the method for doubling by depth reversed.

Whoa there laddie!! I don't believe I said 'file insertion' above (might have way back earlier in the thread). When I say 'double down' I use it as a general term for either method of doubling the files. That is, either the rear eight inserting or the method you employ. Both result in the doubling of the number of files and the halving of the depth thus 'double down'.

I understand your rationale but I disagree on the grounds that it is nowhere mentioned. We are only told that the phalanx deployed into line (from column of march). Without anything to indicate it was other than a usual deployment I can only see that as sixteen deep and staying that way until Philip decided what to do. He was expecting his left to arrive but matters were quickly beyond his control.

The question is, of course, why the double depth and close to right? If Hammond has the field correct (and I think near enough as I said far earlier) then Philip is deploying near abouts the Kremaste ridge. If the Romans are encamped about the hill just north of Zoodokhos Pege then it is somewhat easy to see how a two theatre battle might have occurred. Polybios description certainly, to me, reads of a battle fought in two separate actions. If the Romans are fully deployed (and I don’t think they were) then Flamininus has ordered his fully formed right to stand its ground while the left departs up the ridge leavingthe rightt where it was (23.7). Whether or not the right was in battle order, this speaks to Flamininus having to deal only with the Macedonian right when this order was given. Further, I’d suggest it also means that a ridge formed a ‘break’ in the Roman line. The ridge lines all run SSW from the ridge running west to east from Kremaste. I would think that Flamininus saw Philip’s deployment of his right on the Kremaste heights above the valley to the north and set off up that valley after it. Much investigation of the land is needed methinks.

I don’t think there’s any disagreement between us on the order to Nikanor and its meaning. The left was obviously not ready in its entirety and would follow as soon as it was. Hence the delay of how ever long or short. On the ‘arrogant shrug’, if Polybios (or his source) loses narrative focus it is with the Roman deployment. This is all summarily formulaic aside from the specific 2,000 infantry to help the pressured lights. He is not so, to me, in the Macedonian deployment detailing the ‘greater part’ of the army forming out of camp, the problem with the foragers, the left not being quite ready and the order to Nikanor and the now infamous orders issued by Philip to that part of the phalanx with him on the ridge.

[agesilaos]

You rely on Polybios not informing us that a major evolution of the phalanx had taken place. Two in fact: close order by file insertion and open order by reversing that.

Touche! From your post before my last, but it was no splenetic outburst, as I have said I do not find this method to be the standard one, going against the general feeling that one wants the best fighters in the front ranks.

The main problem with a 'two-theatre' battle is that the Macedonian left are entering the battlefield from the same point as Philip, some are still behind the fighters when the collapse occurs, with others attempting to move onto Philip's flank, the left one. On the topography I agree more study is required but until I can print out the map my stone age brain will struggle; locating 'the pass' would be a start as thence all else flows, I have my doubts about Hammond's specific site but agree with his general area (if, and it is a big if, the road does follow the ancient pass then his site is on the wrong side).

Currently, I am both Printer and Scanner less, might have to investigate the Library and then make a scale model of the terrain...delusions of grandeur perhaps or just another item on an exponential to do list!

[Paralus]

Bugger!!! Apologies. You'd made that plain earlier can't imagine why I'd write that. No aircon (or heating) and a brain stewing under a beanie...

On the 'two front' thing, the distinct impression of the narrative is of exactly that. IF Hammond's location is correct he has the Romans camped 'around' the 260m hill immediately north and east of Zoodokhos Pege (the stand of trees, lower foreground left). He has Philip deploy onto the Kremaste ridge where the farm buildings are (straight north up the 'spine' from 'Pigi"). I guess some 300+ metres of useable ground. The problem with Hammond's location (if I have read him correctly) is what to do with his left (had it deployed)? There seems no room. The phalanx is going to roll down a 'friendly' ridge but there is only 300-400 yards of space and it will, inevitably, roll off either side of that ridge as it descends to the Roman camp. This perhaps is why Polybios says that the left could not form into phalanx "owing to the inequalities of the ground".

On the Roman camp, if that location is correct, it can readily be seen how a two front battle could eventuate. Flamininus takes his left up the Kremaste ridge and the right, left standing across the ridge and into the adjacent 'valley' to the right. Flamininus leads this wing up that ridge towrds the marching Macedonian left which, I assume, is cresting somewhere near the 'saddle' near to the 362m hill.

Much "Earth" work I think and a diversion just arrived from Belgium....

[Paralus]

As to Macedonian sources, Polybius is unlikely to have interviewed any witnesses, writing as he was some two generations later. Being Achaean, he was somewhat anti-Macedonian, and so far as is known, never went there. That he knew little or nothing of the Macedonian viewpoint is shown by his comments on Andriscus’ rebellion [xxxvi.17.15], and by his treatment of Philip and his son Perseus as simple tyrants. He may have relied for his information on Macedon second-hand from Demetrias of Phalerum, whom elsewhere he dismisses as ‘a cheap explanation’. Hence his information is at best second-hand, and not from a contemporary Macedonian source. I rely here on Walbank’s commentaries.

As to 'Macedonian sources' for Cynoscephalae, you may have noted I said “contemporary” Macedonian sources, for obviously it is POSSIBLE that Polybius consulted the Macedonian exiles of his own era, some 40 years later, for matters Macedonian, but he does not appear to have done from the evidence of his writings, as Walbank points out.

I’m uncertain just which part of Walbank’s ‘Historical Commentary’ you were reading , but that dealing with Kynoskephalai is pretty clear. It hardly supports your view.

[Xenophon]

I stand by my comments. Unfortunately my reference was a full online version, which has since been taken down/removed, and I don't have a hard copy, so can't give exact references..........