Macedonian Military Numbers

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agesilaos
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by agesilaos »

Just thought I ought to demonstrate Diodoros’ use of προσλαμβάνω. Examples from Book XVIII should suffice;
2 ii
[2] ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πεζῶν φάλαγξ Ἀρριδαῖον τὸν Φιλίππου μὲν υἱόν, ψυχικοῖς δὲ πάθεσισυνεχόμενον ἀνιάτοις προῆγεν ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν: οἱ δὲ μέγιστον ἔχοντες ἀξίωμα τῶν φίλων καὶσωματοφυλάκων συνεδρεύσαντες καὶ προσλαβόμενοι τὸ τῶν ἱππέων τῶν ἑταίρων ὀνομαζομένων σύστημα τὸμὲν πρῶτον διαγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις πρὸς τὴν φάλαγγα διέγνωσαν καὶ πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλαν πρὸς τοὺςπεζοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἀξίωμα ἐχόντων ἀνδρῶν, ὧν ἦν ἐπιφανέστατος Μελέαγρος, ἀξιοῦντες πειθαρχεῖν αὐτοῖς.

2 The phalanx of the infantry was supporting Arrhidaeus, son of Philip, for the kingship, although he was afflicted with an incurable mental illness.7 The most influential of the Friends and of the Bodyguard, however, taking counsel together and joining to themselves the corps of horsemen known as the Companions, at first decided to take up arms against the phalanx and sent to the infantry envoys chosen from men of rank, of whom the most prominent was Meleager, demanding submission to their orders.

7 v
ὁ δὲ Πίθων ἀναζεύξας μετὰτῶν δεδομένων αὐτῷ στρατιωτῶν καὶ παρὰ τῶν σατραπῶν προσλαβόμενος τοὺς συμμάχους ἧκεν μετὰ πάσηςτῆς δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀφεστηκότας.

Pithon, setting out with the troops that had been given to him and receiving the auxiliaries from the satraps, came upon the rebels with all his forces.

14 v
[5] διαβὰς οὖν εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην καὶ καταντήσας εἰς Μακεδονίαν προσελάβετο πολλοὺς στρατιώτας Μακεδόνας:

5 He crossed over, therefore, into Europe and went on to Macedonia, where he enlisted many additional Macedonian soldiers.

25 i
ἡ γὰρ τόλμα τῶν Αἰτωλῶν προσλαβοῦσατὴν ἐν τοῖς τόποις ὀχυρότητα ῥᾳδίως ἠμύνετο τοὺς διὰ τὴν προπέτειαν εἰς ἀβοηθήτους κινδύνους προπίπτοντας:

for the hardihood of the Aetolians joined with the strength of their positions easily turned back men who rushed headlong into dangers beyond reach of succour.

29 v
[5] ὁ γὰρ Εὐμενὴς νικήσας καὶ πολλοὺς ἀνελὼν τὸ λοιπόν τε πλῆθος τῶνστρατιωτῶν προσηγάγετο καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἰδίαν οὐ μόνον διὰ τῆς νίκης ἐπηύξησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσλαβόμενος Μακεδόνων ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν πλῆθος.

for Eumenes, after he had won the victory and had killed many, won over the remaining soldiers and increased his own power, not only by the victory but also by having acquired a large number of stout Macedonians.

29 vii
ὅπως εἰς ταὐτὸσυναχθεισῶν τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τοῦ Πτολεμαίου προσληφθέντος εἰς τὴν συμμαχίαν δυνατοὶ γένωνταιπεριγενέσθαι τῶν βασιλικῶν δυνάμεων.

after defeating him, to join Antipater. In this way, when they had combined their forces and had added Ptolemy to the alliance, they might be able to overmatch the royal armies.

63 vi
ὅπως Πολυπέρχων μὲν προσλαβόμενος τὰς ἐκ τῆς Φοινίκηςναῦς θαλαττοκρατῇ καὶ δύνηται διαβιβάζειν ἀσφαλῶς,

desiring to gather ships from all the cities and assemble a considerable fleet, so that Polyperchon, by the addition of the Phoenician ships, might have control of the sea

72 ii
προσλαβέσθαι δὲ καὶ Ἀρριδαῖον τὸν συμπεφευγότα μὲν μετὰτῶν στρατιωτῶν εἰς τὴν τῶν Κιανῶν πόλιν, ἐχθρὸν δ᾽ ὄντα τοῖς περὶ Ἀντίγονον

Cleitus was also to pick up Arrhidaeus, who had fled with all his soldiers to the city of the Cianoi since he was an enemy of Antigonus.

72 iii
ἐξαπεσταλμένος ὑπὸ Κασάνδρου μετὰ παντὸς τοῦ στόλου: προσελάβετο δὲ καὶ τὰς παρ᾽ Ἀντιγόνου ναῦς,

Cassander having sent him with his entire fleet. Nicanor had also taken over the ships of Antigonus so that he had in all more than a hundred
So the word has none of the specific connotations of our ‘enlist’; this does not demonstrate that the 4,000 were accretions to Alexander’s Army only that it is linguistically possible; it is the coincidence of a 10,000 total and the political and military improbability of Krateros splitting his force which strongly suggests that he moved with all his men contra Hammond and those that have followed him, Grainger, ‘Alexander the Great Failure’ and Waterfield, ‘Dividing the Spoils’, who compounds Hammond’s error by making them the Argyraspides! :shock:
When you think about, it free-choice is the only possible option.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by Xenophon »

Paralus wrote:
Xenophon wrote:I don’t think ‘pensioned off’ is an apt description. They were given the task of being Antigenes garrison and safeguarding the treasury in Susiane – perhaps the most important job of all, as well as tax collecting.

The Silver Shields were retired from the royal army to satrapal duty. 'Pensioned off' is an entirely apt description. No matter how important one wishes to make satrapal duty or bank vault guarding, the guard unit of Alexander (and his father before him) was no longer required for the royal army.
The ‘Silver Shields’ were neither ‘retired’ nor ‘pensioned off’. They remained intact and an active unit under Antigenes, still part of the Royal Army, and still under orders, as witnessed by the Royal Command procured by Polyperchon that they join Eumenes and put themselves at his disposal. Your terminology is incorrect and inappropriate. They were not ‘retired’, unlike Holkias’ men who returned to Macedon and “dispersed to their homes”.[see above].. Would you regard Craterus’ 10,000 as ‘retired’ because they were “no longer required for the royal army”? They were clearly intended to serve on in the ‘Home Defence Force’ replacing Antipater’s troops who would in turn replace them in the Royal Army.
Just as Kleitos was no longer required in Marakanda. The Silver Shields were no longer the Macedonian royal guard and so their whereabouts are irrelevant.
As we know, the ‘Silver Shields’ were too proud to serve anyone else after Alexander, and it must be doubtful if they’d be content serving as Bodyguard to a child and mental incompetent – one of the reasons they were sent off to Susiane.

I agree their whereabouts is not relevant to the question of the number of Polyperchon's Macedonian phalanx at Athens - which I'll remind everyone, could not have been 20,000 or anything like it.

Paralus wrote:It is not stated but is is a safe deduction that a Macedonian guard was also arranged. Unless, of course, we are to assume that with the 'retirement' of the aged original foot guard the Macedonians felt the subsequent kings and their court could do without.
Xenophon wrote:
I’m afraid I disagree. Not only is there no mention of a Guard unit for Philip, or in Polyperchon’s army, in our sources, but it would be embarrassing, even dangerous to have Philip with his mental affliction command his own personal elite Guard. Nor could he be given merely nominal command of such a unit, with actual command residing in, say, Polyperchon for that would be seen as him appropriating a Royal prerogative, and might also be embarrassing. In fact we don’t hear of ‘new’ Guards until Eumenes has a ‘new’ Hypaspist unit in his army in 317/316 who take precedence second only to the ‘Silver Shields’.

A couple of errors there. If we accept your reasoning that Polyperchon exercising actual command, as regent, is "appropriating a Royal prerogative" as well as being "embarrassing", then one wonders at the sheer effrontery of Perdikkas when he, as regent, took the Royal army into Kappadokia with the kings where he was clearly in command of the lot. More embarrassingly for the kings, Perdikkas then took it to Egypt where he must have actually commanded the Silver Shields. The sources are plain that the kings accompanied the royal army and their regent on these campaigns.
No, I don’t think so. A Regent rules a State/kingdom, during minority or incapacity of the true monarch (or both in this case), with both Perdiccas and Craterus being Regents. This however would not normally extend to personal Royal prerogatives. For example, Eumenes was specifically granted the Royal prerogative of awarding purple kausias etc as a Royal favour. If such minor matters were controlled, then how much more so the command of the “Royal Guard” Hypaspists ? Exercising command of the Army as a whole clearly fell within the remit of a Regent, and as you have pointed out, the ‘Silver Shields’ were no longer the King’s personal Royal Household troops, but just part of the army. Military protocols and personal Royal privileges can be a tricky subject !

Certainly, the Kings could accompany the Regent on campaign, and when they do Diodorus tells us so. Perdikkas, for example, seems to have had them always with him. But that does not mean you can extend that into a sweeping generalisation that they always did, in every circumstance. We should stick to the evidence, which is that the Kings only accompanied Polyperchon as far as Phokis, and when we next hear of them they are in Macedon. Of course Diodorus’ narrative is far from complete, and there are gaps so one can’t be certain.

But as said earlier, it is irrelevant whether the Kings were with Polyperchon or not, or whether they had Hypaspists who are never mentioned or not. Such troops could only have been raised from within Polyperchon’s available manpower/Makedones, and these numbered around 12,000 or so as previously referred to.
We most certainly hear of hypaspists prior to Eumenes' 3,000 alongside the Silver Shields in 317: Antigonos, in 318, places the bravest of his hypaspists on ships (Polyain. 4.6.8); after Kretopolis, Alketas retires with his hypaspists and pages (Diod. 18.45.3). We then find Eumenes has his own as well as the Silver Shields. We might also note that these players all have a cavalry guard (agema) and pages as well. It would seem that all the generals might have hypaspists, pages and a cavalry agema but neither Philip III nor his regent, Polyperchon. We do know that Alexander IV had syntrophoi (Diod. 19.52.4) and Philip III had somatophylakes. I find your reasoning unpersuasive. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. On the whole, it is far more likely that Macedonian royal tradition was followed as the evidence which we do have indicates.
There are a number of unevidenced and misleading assertions here. I said “demonstrable unit of Hypaspists”, for Eumenes army in 317/316 is the first we hear of an indisputable unit of 3,000 ‘Hypaspists’. Antigonus’ improvised marines are not referred to by Diodorus as ‘Hypaspists’, rather simply “bravest infantry” [XVIII.72.5], and Plutarch refers to Antigonus’ Bodyguard as ‘Doryphoroi’, not ‘Hypaspists'.[ Eumenes 10.4], so there is considerable doubt as to whether Antigonus had ‘Hypaspists’ at this time. It should be borne in mind that Polyaenus was putting together a collection of Strategic anecdotes for the edification of the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius, and some of these are apochryphal, others downright fictional and Polyaenus was not particularly concerned with historical accuracy.
Alketas on the run has his Bodyguard/Hypaspists and paides, but this cannot be ‘Hypaspists’ in the sense of The Brigade of Royal Hypaspists, some 3,000 strong. Alketas simply didn’t have that many Macedonian Infantry, and most of the infantry he did have surrendered and went over to Antigonus.[ Diod XVIII.45.4].

In any event Eumenes 3,000 ‘Hypaspists’ are widely believed ( including Hammond, Bosworth and you) to have been native or men of mixed race, not Macedonians. If Alketas had ‘Hypaspists’ rather than just a General’s bodyguard ( which begs the question of defining ‘Hypaspists’ ) then these are mostly likely to have been non-Macedonian too.

The only Royal Bodyguard/Hypaspists for whom we have positive evidence of their existence, prior to Eumenes, is the 1,000 Persians Alexander raised at the end of his reign ( Arrian VII.10 and Curtius X.4.3 and Diodorus XVII.110.1 ).

Nor are we told that “all” the generals might have Hypaspists ( who are of course not “Royal”), paides and a cavalry agema – that is another sweeping assumption. On your own reckoning there are only 3-4 whom we are told might possibly have 'hypaspists', and these are generic Guards, not a Royal Guard unit, out of at least a dozen ‘Diadochi’, and Polyperchon is not one of these. Even if theses tantalisingly elusive units of non-Macedonian Hypaspists existed, it is not reasonable to assume the existence of Macedonian Royal Hypaspists in European Greece, when there is no evidence at all for such.

The evidence certainly does not support your somewhat sweeping general assumptions.
Xenophon wrote:The court and Polyperchon were not in fact with the army. The army, under the command of Alexander son of Polyperchon had arrived earlier in Attica [Diod XVIII.65.3], while Polyperchon and the Kings were in Phokis, near Delphi, in central Greece some 77 miles/124 kilometres away. He later joined the army and Alexander in Attica before moving into the Peloponnese and attacking Megalopolis.
An army arrived with Alexander. What is abundantly clear is that the regent and the court were marching through Phokis. To where? Diodorus tells us that Nikanor knew Polyperchon was coming to Athens with his army (18.64.1). Clearly, this what Polyperchon was doing, with the king and court in tow (Philip had his philoi with him). Given the situation in Athens (the embassies reaching he and the king - 18.64.3), Polyperchon sends Alexander on with a part of this army. Polyperchon then arrives after having dealt with Phokion and in all he has the number of troops under discussion (20,000). There is no reason for Polyperchon and the court to be marching near some small town in Phokis other than the fact that they were on their way to Athens.
Again, another assumption. The original intention may well have been that the kings accompany Polyperchon to Athens, but for some reason they are not mentioned after Phokis and are next heard of in Macedon, where they are certainly not in the company of Polyperchon – so they parted at some point, and that is most likely Phokis, since they are not mentioned in any source as being with Polyperchon after that. Neither Diodorus nor Plutarch record Polyperchon having an army with him in Phokis – the only army mentioned by both has gone ahead to Attica under Alexander.

A minor error, it is incorrect that Alexander and the army are sent on to Athens after Polyperchon hears the embassies, and deals with Phokion. They are already there in Attica, and Phokion’s party go first to Alexander, who then sends them back to his father in Phokis with letters of support.[XVIII.65.3 and 66.1]
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by Xenophon »

Agesilaos
.... Hammond’s assessment of Krateros’ mission is rather naïve;
A digression and critique on Hammond’s views would make an interesting subject in their own right, but are not really terribly relevant here – we may do our own analysis of just how many Macedonian troops, particularly non-Guard infantry, were around, and where they were located.
Perhaps we can agree to move this post to a new thread, in order, as you put it, “to engage without being de-railed” ? Those interested can then discuss Hammond freely.
Bosworth is probably closer to the mark with Krateros having a supervisory commission over the construction of a new fleet in the Lebanon.
Except that Craterus and his troops were not in Lebanon. They were ‘round the corner’ in Cilicia/south-east Anatolia. ( see e.g. Diod XVIII.12)
Moreover, if Craterus were needed to supervise the construction of a fleet in Lebanon ( Why? What did he know of ship construction? ), the presumably idle 10,000 veterans, eager to get home, could have been sent on under Polyperchon. More likely they were dealing with rebellions in the area – which had not in fact been actually conquered by Alexander, merely passed through by him. ( see below for more)
You will all note that Hammond does not mention any troops’ recruited on the march’ he too assumes the 4000 so described were veterans (his ‘some other troops’ may fit the 1,500 cavalry and 1,000 Persians but is hardly apt for a force equivalent to the 6,000 veterans).
That is because he is discussing the 4,000 veterans left behind and what became of them, and not being side tracked by referring to those newly raised on the march.


Agesilaos wrote:
....he abandons nearly half of his force of tried and tested men to gather non phalanx types and leaves them without an officer; Polyperchon went with him to Europe. It certainly takes at least 10,000 with Krateros to get to the numbers at Krannon.
It should be noted for reasons I have related that Craterus could not denude Cilicia and surrounding areas of troops, for that would be to abandon whatever fruits he had gained from previous campaigning in the region. A solid core of heavy infantry were needed. The troops recruited/enlisted on the march would have been mostly native tribal peltast types, plus any Greek mercenaries who could be swept up. Also where would Craterus have found Macedonian ‘opla’/arms for these ? Remember too that ‘Macedon’ now stretched to the Bosporus and Black sea and included what had formerly been Thrace – as I have mentioned the majority of available manpower were not ethnic Macedonians, and fewer still citizen ‘Makedones’.


Looking at the forces of Leonnatos we find further evidence that 20,000 is not outside the capacity of Macedonia for, with 13,000 phalangites at Lamia with Antipater Leonnatos increases his forces by specifically recruiting in Macedonia to 20,000 (Diod. XVIII 14 v). He is unlikely to have started with 5,000 men (Lysimachos had only 6,000 to fight an ongoing Odrysian Rising, Hellespontine Phrygia, Leonnatos’ satrapy was not on the front line) but even if we give him 10,000 he still raises another 10,000 to make 23,000 Macedonians.
This no evidence at all – nowhere are we told that these men were the sarisa armed citizen ‘Makedones’ of the phalanx. Leonnatus simply had more than 20,000 infantry “in all”. Recruiting in ‘Greater Macedon’ does not necessarily mean recruiting citizens, as I have repeatedly said. We often are not told and cannot decide the make-up and/or ethnicity of Diadoch armies. Often they may be several tens of thousands but contain only a few thousand ‘Makedones’ of the phalanx. ( Two examples which concern Polyperchon are that after switching sides to Antigonus, he has an army of 20,000 of whom only some 5,000 are Macedonian (IIRC), and later still, when he turns his coat yet again he has a “strong army” of perhaps some 20,000 who are non-Macedonian, and is given 4,000 Macedonian troops by Cassander to augment his army.[ Diod XX.28.3]

The starting point for any discussion must be the known numbers of 'citizen Makedone sarisaphoroi'. That is, the 12-13,000 or so of the 'European' army under Antipater, and a maximum of 16,000 that Alexander might have had at the end of his reign (divided into 10,000 vetrans under Craterus in Cilicia, and the 4-6,000 maximum under Perdiccas the Regent in Babylon - the 'Royal army'.) In addition, some 1-2,000 'new' Makedones could be recruited each year in Macedon, after casualties and men retiring as too old or injured and infirm.

This represents some 28-29,000 Makedones under arms, and the high water mark of the size of the Macedonian phalanx of all time. No wonder then that Diodorus reports "...for Macedonia was short of citizen soldiers because of the number of those who had been sent to Asia as replacements for the army." [XVIII.12.2]

One cannot simply conjure up additional thousands, or tens of thousands of Makedones without some explanation of their origin.
Last edited by Xenophon on Sat Nov 28, 2015 5:23 am, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by Xenophon »

I won’t comment on Hammond’s views – that can await a putative ‘Hammond’ thread, but I find your case unconvincing.

Agesilaos wrote:
Xenophon wrote:
Alexander III can hardly be said to have “... and four thousand from those who had been enlisted on the march” His Macedonian reinforcements were all enlisted in Macedon, then sent to join him, not “enlisted on the march.”.
Unfortunately the Greek does not mean anything so specific, it only means that they ‘became part of the army’, ie were entered into its actual ranks rather than on its nominal rolls.
I’d agree that ‘enlisted’ is a broad term with a number of synonyms.....I’ll comment further with regard to your post at the head of page 2.
Rebellion in Kilikia, Asia in ferment??!! I find none of this in Arrian ‘TMA’, Diodoros or Plutarch, please reference.
Upon the death of Alexander, rebellions broke out all over his fragile Empire. As I mentioned above, this whole area of southeast Anatolia was never actually conquered by Alexander. For example, Alexander’s original appointed Satrap, Balacrus the Somatophylax was killed campaigning in the area, and in the north of the region, Ariarthes the Persian Satrap ruled on in Cappadocia where he made a nuisance of himself by raiding the trunk roads from West to East. It would take Perdiccas the Regent and the might of the whole Royal army to destroy him in 322 BC so that Eumenes could take up his appointment as Satrap. [Diod XVIII.16 ff; Justin 13.6; Arrian frag. I.11; Plutarch Eumenes III.12-14 etc]. Perdiccas then moves on to Pisidia and destroys two rebel cities of the Isaurians [Diod XVIII.2.2], and in 321 is found in Cilicia, still presumably stamping out the embers of rebellion.
Here he decides to go to Egypt to attack Ptolemy ( with well known disastrous results for him), leaving Neoptolemus and Alcetas to guard the Hellespont and Asia minor. Both had Macedonian troops, likely the 4,000 veterans formerly of Craterus. The area was still in revolt as late as 319, with the Pisidians fighting an ongoing guerrilla war.


Agesilaos wrote:
Xenophon wrote :
Craterus has clearly recruited 4,000 men on his way to reinforce Antipater, probably mostly in Macedon.

So that’s an extra 4000 Macedonians!
See above. Troops recruited in ‘Greater Macedon’ which incorporated the former Thrace were not necessarily ‘Makedone’ citizens of the phalanx ( a decided minority) or even ethnically Macedonian. The majority would have been Thracian for example.
Perdikkas seems to have had c.15,000 Macedonian foot see Hammond in the article cited and Billows ‘Kings and Colonists’ p184ff. And since Neoptolemos’ troops are patently from his army he necessarily had sufficient troops.
That is to argue backwards, and is illogical. Hammond does not refer to 15,000 Macedonian infantry in the army of Perdiccas anywhere. At triparadeisos he estimates around 10,000 in all ( 6,700 for Alexander’s new phalanx, plus the 3,000 Silver Shields p.59. His footnote 21 is particularly muddled because his calculation of 6,700 needed seems to be in error – if Alexander did have 8 Taxeis at the end of his reign, then they would amount to a maximum paper strength of 16,000, or 1,000 files.( but in actuality be less). The new phalanx proposed 4 Macedonians per file i.e. a max of 4,000 Macedonians, and I think this the likeliest number)

If you are going to posit 15,000 'ordinary' Makedones, then that means Alexander had something like 25,000 Macedonian sarisophoroi at the end of his reign - and he patently didn't, he had a maximum paper strength of 16,000 ( and probably fewer in actuality). That means Perdiccas can only have had some 4,000-6,000, which number is consistent with Alexander's 'revised' phalanx in Babylon.

Agesilaos wrote:
Xenophon wrote:Perdiccas had only some 4-6,000 Macedonian infantry plus the 3,000 Hypaspists. He was hardly in any position to supply Alketas and Neoptolemus with Macedonian troops, both of whom had substantial armies including Macedonian infantry [Diod XVIII.29.4 Neoptolemus “had a considerable number of Macedonians...” likely including these veterans. These can only realistically be the balance of Craterus’ veterans, as Hammond argues pointing out that this explains why Neoptolemus could persuade Craterus that Eumenes Macedonians would desert back to their former commander [Plut. Eumenes 7.2 ]

Yet, as has been pointed out, Neoptolemos was given these Macedonians in Arnemia before the royal army left for Kilikia and Psidia (Plut. Eum. 4.1-2):


"However, Perdiccas felt confident of carrying out his projects by himself, and thought that the country they had left behind them needed an efficient and faithful guardian, and therefore sent Eumenes back from Cilicia, ostensibly to his own satrapy, but really to reduce to obedience the adjacent country of Armenia, which had been thrown into confusion by Neoptolemus. Accordingly, although Neoptolemus was a victim of ostentation and empty pride, Eumenes tried to constrain him by personal intercourse; then, finding that the Macedonian men-at war were conceited and bold, he raised a force of cavalry as a counterpoise to them..."


That cavalry force was a large 6,300 and so the "Macedonian men-at war" were a considerable number. Unless we suppose Krateros sent his 4,000 to Armenia, these are not any of his forces.
A ‘considerable number’ might easily be 2,000 or so of Craterus’ veterans ( a Taxis) with the other 2,000 being with Alketas. Nor does the passage mean Neoptolemos was given these troops in Armenia. At a guess, when Perdiccas and the Royal army arrived to embark on the campaign, they would have collected the veterans, or ordered them to join him. ( From Babylon, Perdiccas would have marched up the Euphrates valley, then through Cilicia to reach Cappadocia ). The accretion of these men allowed Perdiccas to give Alketas and Neoptolemus Macedonian troops. At some point later, Neoptolemus was despatched to Armenia.

Again, I’ll leave comments on Hammond to a putative new thread, by those interested.


The less said about the misleading translation of Plutarch that the Macedonians wanted Krateros as their king and the so called "sons of the hypaspists" the better.
Ditto.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by Xenophon »

Agesilaos wrote:
Just thought I ought to demonstrate Diodoros’ use of προσλαμβάνω. Examples from Book XVIII should suffice;
I’ve already noted there are many synonyms both in English and Greek to describe ‘enlistment’/ proslabomenoi’ – enrolment, admittance to [the army etc] ,joining with etc. The LSJ gives many variations, including 'enlistment.'
We could in fact translate ‘proslabomenoi’ as ‘enlisted’ and substitute that word in all your examples without altering the overall meaning.
So the word has none of the specific connotations of our ‘enlist’; this does not demonstrate that the 4,000 were accretions to Alexander’s Army only that it is linguistically possible; it is the coincidence of a 10,000 total and the political and military improbability of Krateros splitting his force which strongly suggests that he moved with all his men contra Hammond and those that have followed him, Grainger, ‘Alexander the Great Failure’ and Waterfield, ‘Dividing the Spoils’, who compounds Hammond’s error by making them the Argyraspides!
I agree we are talking in a general sense - ‘enrol’ could also be used as a generic translation - but in any event, Alexander did not ‘pick up’, ‘enrol’ or ‘enlist’ his Macedonian reinforcements “on the march”. They were enrolled or enlisted in Macedon, and then sent East to Alexander. Linguistically possible or not, it would be a very odd way to refer to Alexander’s Macedonian reinforcements.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by Paralus »

Xenophon wrote: Would you regard Craterus’ 10,000 as ‘retired’ because they were “no longer required for the royal army”? They were clearly intended to serve on in the ‘Home Defence Force’ replacing Antipater’s troops who would in turn replace them in the Royal Army.
The 10,000 from Opis were clearly and unarguably retired from / dismissed from the royal army – with their bonus retirement payment. Just as were the Argyrapsides at Triparadeisos who were demanding the same payment (and presumably received it in Susa).
Xenophon wrote:As we know, the ‘Silver Shields’ were too proud to serve anyone else after Alexander, and it must be doubtful if they’d be content serving as Bodyguard to a child and mental incompetent – one of the reasons they were sent off to Susiane.


And yet, as the sources relate, they did indeed come back into service for “a child and mental incompetent” or, more accurately, their representative in Asia, Eumenes. Just as they served under Perdikkas for “a child and mental incompetent” – a fact you seem to have neglected. For a unit too proud to serve anyone other than Alexander or to serve his infant heir and a mental incompetent, they seemed happy enough to be demoted from their premier status to a satrap's garrison.
Xenophon wrote:No, I don’t think so. A Regent rules a State/kingdom, during minority or incapacity of the true monarch (or both in this case), with both Perdiccas and Craterus being Regents. This however would not normally extend to personal Royal prerogatives. For example, Eumenes was specifically granted the Royal prerogative of awarding purple kausias etc as a Royal favour. If such minor matters were controlled, then how much more so the command of the “Royal Guard” Hypaspists ?
Firstly, Krateros was not the regent or a regent of the kingdom following the final stage of the Babylonian Settlement; that position belonged to Perdikkas alone as Diodorus makes plain describing him as ἐπιμελητὴν δὲ τῆς βασιλείας - exactly the terms for Peithon and Arrhidaios as well as Antipatros and Polyperchon (Diod. 18.2.4; 39.1; 39.2; 48.4).

Secondly unless we suppose that Philip Arrhidaios commanded the Argyraspides in Egypt someone must have usurped the “personal royal prerogative” of commanding the “the King’s personal Royal Household troops”.
Xenophon wrote:Certainly, the Kings could accompany the Regent on campaign, and when they do Diodorus tells us so. Perdikkas, for example, seems to have had them always with him. But that does not mean you can extend that into a sweeping generalisation that they always did, in every circumstance.
I’ve not ever made that generalisation. What I have plainly written is that Perdikkas commanded the entire army in both Kappadokia and Egypt and that the sources plainly state that kings accompanied their regent on these campaigns.
Xenophon wrote: Of course Diodorus’ narrative is far from complete, and there are gaps so one can’t be certain.
Just as we can’t be certain, from Diodorus, that Polyperchon returned to Macedonia from Megalopolis. For that we need to refer to Justin. Just as Diodorus doesn’t tell us how Kassandros nicked most of Polyperchon’s elephants in a confrontation he also doesn’t bother to describe in the same year. Yet you are certain that Philip Arrhidaios returned to Macedonia from Phokis.
Xenophon wrote: We should stick to the evidence, which is that the Kings only accompanied Polyperchon as far as Phokis, and when we next hear of them they are in Macedon. […]. Neither Diodorus nor Plutarch record Polyperchon having an army with him in Phokis – the only army mentioned by both has gone ahead to Attica under Alexander
Diodorus states the regent, the king and the court are marching through Phokis. This was in response to earlier requests from the Athenians to send aid so as to enforce the diagrama (Diod.19.64.3 which, as is clear, predates the embassies which met them on the march – 66.1-2). You would have it that the army had been sent and that the king, his court and the regent were somehow lolling about Phokis awaiting ambassies. It is to be remembered that the Aetolians had yet to be dealt with and it is militarily improbable that the king and his court were adjacent to Aetolian territory sans the army. The overwhelming probability is that Alexander had been sent ahead with a part of the army (there is only a garrison in Munychia at this stage) while the bulk of the royal army remained with its commander and king. It would arrive with Polyperchon at which time he fielded 20,000 infantry at Athens.
Xenophon wrote:Nor are we told that “all” the generals might have Hypaspists ( who are of course not “Royal”), paides and a cavalry agema – that is another sweeping assumption.
It is readily apparent that the generals operating in these wars possessed ‘companion cavalry’, an agema and paides (19.27.2; 28.3; 29.4 for example). Lennoatus seems to have been the first (Suda s.v. Leonnatus). The term used by both Polyainos and Diodorus is hypaspist and Alketas seems certainly to have had such as will Eumenes in Iran. That the royal army under Philip Arrhidaios did not have such is a stretch. As much a stretch is the seeming requirement you have for a unit of hypaspists to number 3,000. The example you provided shows that Alexander was content to create a unit of 1,000.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by agesilaos »

The 4,000 veteran Macedonian phalangites can be shown to have remained in Cilicia serving under Neoptolemus and Alcetas, and ultimately Eumenes ( see e.g. N G L Hammond "Alexander's veterans after his death" )
These can only realistically be the balance of Craterus’ veterans, as Hammond argues pointing out that this explains why Neoptolemus could persuade Craterus that Eumenes Macedonians would desert back to their former commander [Plut. Eumenes 7.2 ]
A digression and critique on Hammond’s views would make an interesting subject in their own right, but are not really terribly relevant here
I tend to think that when you simply cite another’s work as supporting your argument that work becomes relevant, however if you want to isolate the parts you actually mean support your POV by all means discuss the rest elsewhere. Conversely, you might choose the points to start with rather than cite whole articles and then classify discussion of them as an irrelevant digression.

Upon the death of Alexander, rebellions broke out all over his fragile Empire. As I mentioned above, this whole area of southeast Anatolia was never actually conquered by Alexander. For example, Alexander’s original appointed Satrap, Balacrus the Somatophylax was killed campaigning in the area, and in the north of the region, Ariarthes the Persian Satrap ruled on in Cappadocia where he made a nuisance of himself by raiding the trunk roads from West to East. It would take Perdiccas the Regent and the might of the whole Royal army to destroy him in 322 BC so that Eumenes could take up his appointment as Satrap. [Diod XVIII.16 ff; Justin 13.6; Arrian frag. I.11; Plutarch Eumenes III.12-14 etc]. Perdiccas then moves on to Pisidia and destroys two rebel cities of the Isaurians [Diod XVIII.2.2], and in 321 is found in Cilicia, still presumably stamping out the embers of rebellion.
Here he decides to go to Egypt to attack Ptolemy ( with well known disastrous results for him), leaving Neoptolemus and Alcetas to guard the Hellespont and Asia minor. Both had Macedonian troops, likely the 4,000 veterans formerly of Craterus. The area was still in revolt as late as 319, with the Pisidians fighting an ongoing guerrilla war.
We are well informed about the various risings at Alexander’s death, they are the attempted defection of the Greek settlers in the Upper Satrapies, dealt with by Peithon, and the Lamian War along with the Rhodian expulsion of their garrison and the Odrysian Rising. Not a mention of trouble in Asia Minor; Perdikkas attacked Ariarathes to bring that kingdom into the Empire and it is this land that Diodoros characterises thus
To Eumenes he gave Paphlagonia and Cappadocia and all the lands bordering on these, which Alexander did not invade, having been prevented from doing so by the urgency of his affairs when he was finishing the war with Darius; Diod.XVIII 3 i
There is no hint of your ‘…he made a nuisance of himself by raiding the trunk roads from West to East.’ In the sources, rather it is a war of Perdikkas’ making.

Alexander passed through and subjugated both Pisidia and Kilikia, the latter very thoroughly during the lead up to Issos, so your clams just don’t stand up.

Laranda and Isauria were simply strongholds of mountain brigands, in which capacity the Isaurians became famous. Diodoros’ note on Balakros XVIII 22 i
And having arrived in Pisidia, they determined to lay waste two cities, that of the Larandians and that of the Isaurians; for while Alexander was still alive these cities had put to death Balacrus the son of Nicanor, who had been appointed general and satrap
So the enemy were only these two cities and far from having been killed campaigning Balakros was most likely kidnapped and executed, there is no evidence of a rebellion in Kilikia nor any opposition in Pisidia beyond these two cities. In fact the Pisidians remained loyal to the Perdikkan cause, supporting Alketas in defiance of Antigonos’ overwhelming force (until wiser and older heads prevailed).

Neoptolemos had already been left in Armenia with his Macedonians who must have been from the Royal army. So nice try but no cigar and no source references to trouble in Kilikia requiring 4-10,000 veterans to supress it. Further indication of the generally peaceful nature of Asia Minor can be gleaned from the fact that both Kyannane and Kleopatra passed through without trouble from the natives.

But it gets even better,
Troops recruited in ‘Greater Macedon’ which incorporated the former Thrace were not necessarily ‘Makedone’ citizens of the phalanx ( a decided minority) or even ethnically Macedonian. The majority would have been Thracian for example.
Having invented a rebellion in Kilikia you now forget the actual rebellion that was underway under Seuthes in Thrace, nor did ‘Greater Macedonia’ exist, this is a post WWII construct, Macedonia and Thrace were separate entities and had separate Satraps. Diodoros is clear, XVIII 14 v,
He crossed over, therefore, into Europe and went on to Macedonia, where he enlisted many additional Macedonian soldiers. When he had gathered together in all more than twenty thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry, he led them through Thessaly against the enemy
.

He crossed into Europe marched into Macedonia and raised Macedonian troops; it does not get much clearer than that. You seem to not understand the structure of Macedonian society. There were only two classes, other than slaves, the equestrian nobility the hetairoi and their followers and the general populace for whom we have no name all owed the King armed service and enjoyed limited ‘rights’ and were ‘Makedones’. The reservoir of potential phalangites was vast as that was how the majority of the population would serve, there being no native psiloi.

40,000 foot at Krannon were heavy armed and largely Macedonian, it would seem as she had no allies to provide heavy foot and the mercenaries seem to have sided with their home states.
From Babylon, Perdiccas would have marched up the Euphrates valley, then through Cilicia to reach Cappadocia
A highly improbable route when there was a Royal Road leading straight into Kappadokia from Babylon

Royal road running from sardis to Comana and to Babylon
Royal road running from sardis to Comana and to Babylon
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

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Xenophon wrote:A ‘considerable number’ might easily be 2,000 or so of Craterus’ veterans ( a Taxis) with the other 2,000 being with Alketas.
Interesting. A 'considerable number' requiring the raising of a 6,300 cavalry force "might easily be 2,000 or so". Earlier in this thread, a 'considerable number' "can only realistically be the balance of Craterus’ veterans" - the 4,000 you agree with Hammond that were left behind in Kilkia. A considerable variation.
Xenophon wrote: Nor does the passage mean Neoptolemos was given these troops in Armenia. At a guess, when Perdiccas and the Royal army arrived to embark on the campaign, they would have collected the veterans, or ordered them to join him. ( From Babylon, Perdiccas would have marched up the Euphrates valley, then through Cilicia to reach Cappadocia ). The accretion of these men allowed Perdiccas to give Alketas and Neoptolemus Macedonian troops. At some point later, Neoptolemus was despatched to Armenia.
Several things militate against that. The royal army left Babylon to march on Ariarathes. In doing so it almost certainly followed the route of Seleukos in 302 to Ipsos - that is the royal road into Kappadokia from the east.There is absolutely no source attestation of Krateros and Perdikkas meeting and no source attestation of any kind that Perdikkas went to Kilikia prior to Kappadokia. Indeed we are told that he went directly to Kappadokia and following two battles spent time settling the province with Eumenes after which he moved into Kilikia for what is clearly the winter of 322/1. The campaign in Kappadokia occupied the summer and early autumn of 322.This is logical given the fact that the royal army will have been able to take advantage of the harvest for that campaign. A campaign timed for summer also allows for Peithon's Macedonians to rejoin the royal army. Having settled Kappadokia, the royal army moves into Kilikia for the winter of 322/21 and Eumenes follows. It is at this time (the leaving of Kappadokia) that Perdikkas deputes Neoptolemus to clean up the remnants of Arirathes' force which will have retired into adjacent Armenia. Neoptolemus is here accorded the "considerable" Macedonians that Eumens deals with when sent back from Kilikia in late winter/early spring 321.

In the spring of 321 Perdikkas moves north to reduce the towns of Laranda and Isauria. One wonders why, on military and logistical grounds, Perdikkas did not deal with these towns in the spring of 322 on his way to Kappadokia via Kilikia. Why would the regent march to the Halys and leave such in his rear only to march back for the winter and then deal with them the following spring? The answer is that he did not. Krateros and his 10,000 had been encamped in Kilikia since late summer / early autumn 323 and the arrival of the royal army in spring on the following year is likely a depredation too far. I think we should stick to the evidence - the sources - which state that the royal army mrched from Babylon to Kappadokia. Here they campaigned and settled the province after which they then went to Kilikia for the winter with Eumenes along for the ride. From Kilikia Eumenes is sent back to Armenia to sort matters with Neoptolemus and his Macedonians. Neoptolemus still has these Macedonians in 320 when he receives letters from Perdikkas to put his forces under Eumenes' command (Plut. Eum 5.2). It all runs perfectly logically without inventing a recruiting stopover in Kilikia on the way.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

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Thereafter, it is estimated some 2-3,000 new recruits could be called up annually
27/8/6.02 first post
In addition, some 1-2,000 'new' Makedones could be recruited each year in Macedon
22/11/3.49
Have you found some new research or source for your revised view? I can see the original one is based on some figures of Macedonian Reinforcements viz.,
Arrian I 29 iv 333BC
The newly-married men also, who had been despatched to Macedonia, now arrived at Gordium, and with them another army which had been levied, and put under the command of Ptolemy, son of Seleucus, Coenus, son of Polemocrates, and Meleager, son of Neoptolemus. This army consisted of 3,000 Macedonian foot-soldiers and 300 horse-soldiers, 200 Thessalian cavalry, and 150 Eleans under the command of Alcias the Elean.

[4] καὶ οἱ νεόγαμοι δὲ οἱ ἐπὶ Μακεδονίαςσταλέντες εἰς Γόρδιον ἧκον καὶ ξὺν αὐτοῖς ἄλλη στρατιὰ καταλεχθεῖσα, ἣν ἦγε Πτολεμαῖός τε ὁ Σελεύκου καὶΚοῖνος ὁ Πολεμοκράτους καὶ Μελέαγρος ὁ Νεοπτολέμου, πεζοὶ μὲν Μακεδόνες τρισχίλιοι, ἱππεῖς δὲ ἐςτριακοσίους καὶ Θεσσαλῶν ἱππεῖς διακόσιοι, Ἠλείων δὲ ἑκατὸν καὶ πεντήκοντα, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Ἀλκίας Ἠλεῖος.
And
Curtius V 1 xl (see also Arrian III 16 x) 331 BC
40 Namque Amyntas Andromeni ab Antipatro Macedonum peditum VI milia adduxit, 41 D praeterea eiusdem generis equites, cum his DC Thracas adiunctis peditibus suae gentis III milibus D et ex Peloponneso mercennarius miles ad IIII milia advenerat cum nongentis octogintaº equitibus. 42 Idem Amyntas adduxerat L principum Macedoniae liberos adultos ad custodiam corporis:

And now Amyntas son of Andromenes led up 6,000 Macedonian foot from Antipatros and 500 horse from the same nation, along with 600 Thracians and 3,500 foot of that people and 4,000 mercenaries from the Peloponnese arrived with 980 horse. This same Amyntas also brought fifty noble adolescents for the bodyguard:
The implication being that the annual levy was 3,000, one year after leaving Alexander receives 3,000 Macedonian foot and after a space of two years a further 6,000. If one chooses to plead special circumstances and an increased levy three years in a row you still have to accept 3,000 per year groups as being available to Antipatros when the Lamian War breaks out, though he did not choose to raise so many they were there to be enrolled by Leonnatos later. I can see no basis for an estimate of potential recruits as low as 1,000 per annum.

When Agis began his war in 331 Antipatros has already sent 9,000 Macedonian phalangites east, yet for the battle of Megalopolis either in that year or the next, Antipatros has an army of 40,000 probably at least half Macedonian – the populous states of Greece had joined Agis, Thrace had been in Revolt right up to Antipatros’ patched up peace with Memnon; Diod XVII 62 iv ff.
4 There was also an upheaval in Thrace at just this time which seemed to offer the Greeks an opportunity for freeing themselves. 5 Memnon, who had been designated governor-general there, had a military force and was a man of spirit. He stirred up the tribesmen, revolted against Alexander, quickly possessed a large army, and was openly bent upon war. 6 Antipater was forced to mobilize his entire army and to advance through Macedonia into Thrace to settle with him.
While Antipater was occupied with this, the Lacedaemonians thought that the time had come to undertake a war and issued an appeal to the Greeks to unite in defence of their freedom. 7 The Athenians had been favoured beyond all the other Greeks by Alexander and did not move. Most of the Peloponnesians, however, and some of the northern Greeks reached an agreement and signed an undertaking to go to war. According to the capacity of the individual cities they enlisted the best of their youth and enrolled as soldiers not less than twenty thousand infantry and about two thousand cavalry. 8 The Lacedaemonians had the command and led out their entire levy for the decisive battle, their king Agis having the position of commander in chief.
63 1 When Antipater learned of this Greek mobilization, he ended the Thracian campaign on what terms he could and marched down into the Peloponnesus with his entire army. He added soldiers from those of the Greeks who were still loyal and built up his force until it numbered not less than forty thousand. 2 When it came to a general engagement, Agis was struck down fighting, but the Lacedaemonians fought furiously and maintained their position for a long time; when the Greek allies were forced out of position they themselves fell back on Sparta. 3 More than five thousand three hundred of the Lacedaemonians and their allies were killed in the battle, and three thousand five hundred of Antipater's troops.
And this after Zopyrion’s lost army and Memnon retaining his troops. You will have to supply some source reference for your assertion
It is perhaps likely that Zopyrion’s army included few if any actual Macedonian phalanx troops...
Good luck :lol:
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

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I agree we are talking in a general sense - ‘enrol’ could also be used as a generic translation - but in any event, Alexander did not ‘pick up’, ‘enrol’ or ‘enlist’ his Macedonian reinforcements “on the march”. They were enrolled or enlisted in Macedon, and then sent East to Alexander. Linguistically possible or not, it would be a very odd way to refer to Alexander’s Macedonian reinforcements.
In fact the Greek makes it much more likely that the distinction is between those veterans who began the Expedition and those who had joined Alexander later.
A B Bosworth ‘The Legacy of Alexander’ p73, n31
Diod.18.16.4.: the distinction is between the troops ‘who crossed into Asia along with Alexander’ and ‘those who were added to the army in transit (ev parodoi)’ . I take the troops added in transit to be reinforcements who joined Alexander’s army during the passage of Asia (so Beloch III2.2.345: Brunt, Arrian ii.489: Billows 188 n.9). There is , however, another interpretation which goes back at least to Benedictus Niese (geschicte der greichischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaironeia i.207): the troops were added by Craterus himself during his passage of Asia minor and Macedonia (cf. Goukowsky, Diodore xviii 129: Hammond, GRBS 25 (1984) 54-6: JHS 109 (1989) 65 n.49; Heckel 130). This alternative view has Craterus enlist exactly the same number of troops as he supposedly leaves in Cilicia – a remarkable coincidence. Beloch also objected (rightly, in my mind) that we should expect an accusative in Diodoros’ text (tous d’en parodoi proseilemmeous ‘the 4,000 who were added in transit’), not the partitive genitive that we have (‘4,000 of the men who were added in transit’). The text as we have it would imply that Craterus enlisted a larger number of Macedonian troops than he actually took to relieve Antipater. That is surely impossible. The distinction must be between the old campaigners at the Hellespont and the later reinforcements.
Bosworth is slack in his use of ‘enlisted’ and should have said ‘had under his command’ but the Greek is odder if it is read your way it seems; I certainly do not feel qualified enough to dispute the matter with Beloch nor Bosworth. :oops:
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

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For a critique of Luke Ueda-Sarson’s idea that the Phalanx was divided into 2,000 man units readers are invited to review the arguments presented in this existing thread, which is both short and well-mannered :shock:

Unit strengths and organisation

You should also be aware that there only seem to have been seven phalanxes, with the seventh only appearing in the Indian campaign and most likely comprising those reinforcements that were superfluous to the existing territorial units and constituting Curtius' and Diodoros' 'Ataktoi', which should be interpreted as 'unassigned' rather than their fanciful 'ill-disciplined'.

7 x 1,500 = 10,500 + 3,000 minus 10,000+ leaves 3,500, so when Perdikkas gives Peithon 3,000 chosen by lot he has only 500 men or if one makes the phalanxes 2,000 he has 4,000 phalangites and 3,000 Argyraspides (any Argyraspides with Krateros having their posts filled by promotion from the phalanx). It will be noted that neither figure supplies enough common phalangites for the 'mixed phalanx' to absorb the 20,000 Orientals (6,700); Arrian is clear that the pikemen in the mixed phalanx are Macedonian and the authority is Aristoboulos, so Bosworth's argument that they included the recently arrived contingents 'trained in the Macedonian manner' ('Legacy' somewhere, have not got it on me :oops: ).

If we take the 10,000 plus dischargees and divide by 7, each phalanx lost 1,430 men (either as crocks or by promotion to the Argyraspides); 6,700 divided by seven yields 957, so one might conclude that the phalanxes had swollen to 2,500 by the time the army reached Babylon which is to say they had ten hekatostyes of 256 rather than the six with which they crossed the Hellespont (the building block of the phalanx was the square formation 16 by 16). Thus Perdikkas would have

70 x 256 = 17, 920 minus 10,000 leaving c.7,900 plus 3,000 Argyraspides; 10,900 or more Macedonians explains why Perdikkas could leave a sizeable force of them with Neoptolemos to settle Armenia.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

Post by Xenophon »

Paralus wrote 22/11/2015
Xenophon wrote:Would you regard Craterus’ 10,000 as ‘retired’ because they were “no longer required for the royal army”? They were clearly intended to serve on in the ‘Home Defence Force’ replacing Antipater’s troops who would in turn replace them in the Royal Army.

The 10,000 from Opis were clearly and unarguably retired from / dismissed from the royal army – with their bonus retirement payment. Just as were the Argyrapsides at Triparadeisos who were demanding the same payment (and presumably received it in Susa).
I have said the word ‘retired’, which you keep using, is inappropriate. ‘Retired’ implies they no longer served, and went to their homes, as Holkias’ 3,000 ultimately did, and as the Silver Shields wished to, but were not allowed to. [Justin XIV.3]. These veterans did not ‘retire’ and were never intended to, as I have said. They would replace a similar number of younger, fitter men in Antipater’s army, which troops Antipater was to bring east to Alexander.
These men were therefore intended to be ‘transferred’, or ‘rotated’ but definitely not ‘retired’ ( and see ante for why the ‘Argyraspides’ were not retired either, but continued on in service. Nowhere in our sources does it say they were ‘retired’. In fact Justin XIV.3 has the Argyraspides reproaching Eumenes, because they had not yet been ‘retired/disbanded’) Furthermore they were not given a ‘bonus retirement payment’. The word in Greek has no connotation of ‘retirement payment’. “Epidwsein” means ‘give besides’ (their pay) The L.S.J. defines it broadly as a gift of money, a donative, a gratuity, or on occasion, even a bribe. No reference to ‘retirement’ whatsoever. Arrian uses it five or so times, all in a general sense and never as meaning ‘retirement payment’. This another inappropriate use of ‘retirement’.

In this instance they were offered their arrears of pay, further pay to cover their march home and a Talent by way of gratuity/bonus [Arrian Anabasis VII.12]. An Attic Talent was around 6,000 drachma, with a drachma or so being a day’s pay, IIRC, so they were given over 16 years pay, assuming they actually received it.
Xenophon wrote:As we know, the ‘Silver Shields’ were too proud to serve anyone else after Alexander, and it must be doubtful if they’d be content serving as Bodyguard to a child and mental incompetent – one of the reasons they were sent off to Susiane.

And yet, as the sources relate, they did indeed come back into service for “a child and mental incompetent” or, more accurately, their representative in Asia, Eumenes. Just as they served under Perdikkas for “a child and mental incompetent” – a fact you seem to have neglected. For a unit too proud to serve anyone other than Alexander or to serve his infant heir and a mental incompetent, they seemed happy enough to be demoted from their premier status to a satrap's garrison.
This is to misrepresent what I said. After Alexander, they were unwilling to serve as Royal Bodyguard to any lesser man ( clearly they continued to serve as part of the army and obeyed orders, if sometimes reluctantly). And so far as we know, they did not. They continued to serve on as premier unit of the infantry ( where else could they go?) – they certainly weren’t demoted, as later events showed, and retained their prestige and place of honour on the right of the line infantry. They just ceased being a Royal Bodyguard. One can understand why they didn’t want to be a palace Guard, snapping to attention every time the child Alexander, or poor retarded Philip went past..... They evidently refused to serve Eumenes in the role of ‘Bodyguards’ too, for he had to raise his own separate unit of ‘Hypaspists’ ( who then as Guards took precedence over the 'Silver Shields).
And this misleading assumption of yours does not disguise the fact there is no evidence “The Kings” ever had a personal infantry “Royal Bodyguard” of any sort, either under Perdiccas, or Arrhidaeus and Pithon, or Antipater, or Polyperchon.

Xenophon wrote:No, I don’t think so. A Regent rules a State/kingdom, during minority or incapacity of the true monarch (or both in this case), with both Perdiccas and Craterus being Regents. This however would not normally extend to personal Royal prerogatives. For example, Eumenes was specifically granted the Royal prerogative of awarding purple kausias etc as a Royal favour. If such minor matters were controlled, then how much more so the command of the “Royal Guard” Hypaspists ?

Firstly, Krateros was not the regent or a regent of the kingdom following the final stage of the Babylonian Settlement; that position belonged to Perdikkas alone as Diodorus makes plain describing him as ἐπιμελητὴν δὲ τῆς βασιλείας - exactly the terms for Peithon and Arrhidaios as well as Antipatros and Polyperchon (Diod. 18.2.4; 39.1; 39.2; 48.4).
I didn’t say “following the final stage of the Babylonian settlement.” Craterus was appointed the original ‘Prostates’/Guardian-Regent at Alexander’s death for Philip Arrhidaios, at first the sole heir [ evidenced by Arrian’s “Successors” fragments but not mentioned by Diodorus.] Perdiccas was simply ‘Chiliarch’ – second in command. Unfortunately, Craterus was away with his veterans in Cilicia, and once Meleager was conveniently killed, Perdiccas and his supporters usurped the position of ‘Prostates’, taking over the position [Diod XVIII.23.2]
Secondly unless we suppose that Philip Arrhidaios commanded the Argyraspides in Egypt someone must have usurped the “personal royal prerogative” of commanding the “the King’s personal Royal Household troops”.
The Argyraspides were no longer a ‘Royal Bodyguard’ after Alexander’s death, and nobody’s “personal Royal Household troops”. [see e.g Justin XIV.2]

Xenophon wrote:Certainly, the Kings could accompany the Regent on campaign, and when they do Diodorus tells us so. Perdikkas, for example, seems to have had them always with him. But that does not mean you can extend that into a sweeping generalisation that they always did, in every circumstance.

I’ve not ever made that generalisation.
What I have plainly written is that Perdikkas commanded the entire army in both Kappadokia and Egypt and that the sources plainly state that kings accompanied their regent on these campaigns.
I see, so you were not implying that generic ‘regent’ applied to Antipater and Polyperchon as well? The Kings just always accompanied only Perdiccas then ? Well our sources certainly refer to at least one occasion when they did not accompany the Regent, just as I pointed out.....for the Kings were certainly not with Polyperchon later, but in Macedon, where Eurydike dismissed Polyperchon as Regent, raised a “Royal” army and confronted Olympias.

Xenophon wrote:Of course Diodorus’ narrative is far from complete, and there are gaps so one can’t be certain.
Just as we can’t be certain, from Diodorus, that Polyperchon returned to Macedonia from Megalopolis. For that we need to refer to Justin. Just as Diodorus doesn’t tell us how Kassandros nicked most of Polyperchon’s elephants in a confrontation he also doesn’t bother to describe in the same year. Yet you are certain that Philip Arrhidaios returned to Macedonia from Phokis.
That is not what I said. I said nothing about ‘certainty’, but rather:
“We should stick to the evidence, which is that the Kings only accompanied Polyperchon as far as Phokis, and when we next hear of them they are in Macedon. Of course Diodorus’ narrative is far from complete, and there are gaps so one can’t be certain.
But as said earlier, it is irrelevant whether the Kings were with Polyperchon or not, or whether they had Hypaspists who are never mentioned or not. Such troops could only have been raised from within Polyperchon’s available manpower/Makedones, and these numbered around 12,000 or so as previously referred to.”

I said just the opposite in fact.... “one can’t be certain”


Xenophon wrote:We should stick to the evidence, which is that the Kings only accompanied Polyperchon as far as Phokis, and when we next hear of them they are in Macedon. […]. Neither Diodorus nor Plutarch record Polyperchon having an army with him in Phokis – the only army mentioned by both has gone ahead to Attica under Alexander

Diodorus states the regent, the king and the court are marching through Phokis. This was in response to earlier requests from the Athenians to send aid so as to enforce the diagrama (Diod.19.64.3 which, as is clear, predates the embassies which met them on the march – 66.1-2). You would have it that the army had been sent and that the king, his court and the regent were somehow lolling about Phokis awaiting ambassies. It is to be remembered that the Aetolians had yet to be dealt with and it is militarily improbable that the king and his court were adjacent to Aetolian territory sans the army. The overwhelming probability is that Alexander had been sent ahead with a part of the army (there is only a garrison in Munychia at this stage) while the bulk of the royal army remained with its commander and king. It would arrive with Polyperchon at which time he fielded 20,000 infantry at Athens.
This is, alas, a rationalised supposition and not evidenced in our sources. I never said “lolling about in Phokis awaiting embassies”. Those are your words. They were on the march to Athens and had reached Phokis or thereabouts, and the army under Alexander was sent on ahead, presumably by a forced march to hopefully catch the Athenians off-guard. Part of his forces would not do, for Athens might call out its army. Obviously the court could not be expected to keep up, and were following on behind.

As for the Aetolians, they were in no position to intervene even had they wanted to, having been heavily defeated previously by the Macedonians under Polyperchon. [Diod XVIII.38 ], not to mention some ‘military realities’. In the time taken to get news that the Army had pushed on to Attica, and then for the Aetolians to mobilise, and march the roughly 100km/62.5 miles to Phokis, Polyperchon would have been long gone .

Given that no army is referred to as being with Polyperchon in Phokis in any of our sources, but only the army under Alexander is mentioned, the “overwhelming probability” is that having dealt with Phokion, Polyperchon pressed on to join Alexander and the whole army at Athens, and that the Kings, not heard of again with Polyperchon after Phokis, likely returned to Macedon, where they are next heard of.[see ante]
The army may have numbered “20,000 infantry” at Athens, but not an impossible 20,000 Makedones, as Diodorus claims. As I said at the outset, he must be mistaken in this.

Xenophon wrote:Nor are we told that “all” the generals might have Hypaspists ( who are of course not “Royal”), paides and a cavalry agema – that is another sweeping assumption.

It is readily apparent that the generals operating in these wars possessed ‘companion cavalry’, an agema and paides (19.27.2; 28.3; 29.4 for example). Lennoatus seems to have been the first (Suda s.v. Leonnatus). The term used by both Polyainos and Diodorus is hypaspist and Alketas seems certainly to have had such as will Eumenes in Iran. That the royal army under Philip Arrhidaios did not have such is a stretch. As much a stretch is the seeming requirement you have for a unit of hypaspists to number 3,000. The example you provided shows that Alexander was content to create a unit of 1,000.
As I have already mentioned, only some of the Diadochi seem to have raised Guard units – at least so far as our sources are concerned - none of whom seem to have been Macedonian as such. Antigonus and Eumenes raised personal ‘Agemas’/leading units/Guards - a single squadron of 150 in the former case, and a ‘double’ squadron of 300 in the latter. Eumenes raised his own Foot Guard of 3,000 ‘Hypaspists’, again almost certainly not Macedonian ( as you agree), who as a Guards unit, took precedence over the Silver Shields ( who were of course no longer ‘Body Guards’ since Alexander’s death). Antigonus does not have a ‘Guard unit/Hypaspists’ [ see detailed order of battle at Diod XIX.29.3 prior to Paratakene, and note that only Polyaenus refers to Antigonus’ ‘Hypaspists’ performing as Marines. Diodorus does not]. If only a few of the dozen or so Diadochi had raised ‘Hypaspists/Guards’ your rationale for assuming that Philip Arrhidaios must have had such vanishes. I re-iterate that no such unit is ever referred to in our sources for this period.
I never said that it was a ‘requirement’ for Hypaspists to number 3,000 – obviously not since I referred to Alexander’s 1,000 strong Persian Hypaspists, as you mentioned ! :?
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

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Post by agesilaos » Mon Nov 23, 2015 2:00 pm

I tend to think that when you simply cite another’s work as supporting your argument that work becomes relevant, however if you want to isolate the parts you actually mean support your POV by all means discuss the rest elsewhere. Conversely, you might choose the points to start with rather than cite whole articles and then classify discussion of them as an irrelevant digression.
I was not ‘citing’ Hammond as such and I didn’t quote him, as one normally would when ‘citing’, merely pointing out that his views were similar to mine – and in any case that doesn’t mean I wish to embark on a ‘digression’ regarding him or his article......that way lies the huge distraction of the ‘Decourt digression’ elsewhere.

Upon the death of Alexander, rebellions broke out all over his fragile Empire. As I mentioned above, this whole area of southeast Anatolia was never actually conquered by Alexander. For example, Alexander’s original appointed Satrap, Balacrus the Somatophylax was killed campaigning in the area, and in the north of the region, Ariarthes the Persian Satrap ruled on in Cappadocia where he made a nuisance of himself by raiding the trunk roads from West to East. It would take Perdiccas the Regent and the might of the whole Royal army to destroy him in 322 BC so that Eumenes could take up his appointment as Satrap. [Diod XVIII.16 ff; Justin 13.6; Arrian frag. I.11; Plutarch Eumenes III.12-14 etc]. Perdiccas then moves on to Pisidia and destroys two rebel cities of the Isaurians [Diod XVIII.2.2], and in 321 is found in Cilicia, still presumably stamping out the embers of rebellion.

Here he decides to go to Egypt to attack Ptolemy ( with well known disastrous results for him), leaving Neoptolemus and Alcetas to guard the Hellespont and Asia minor. Both had Macedonian troops, likely the 4,000 veterans formerly of Craterus. The area was still in revolt as late as 319, with the Pisidians fighting an ongoing guerrilla war.

We are well informed about the various risings at Alexander’s death, they are the attempted defection of the Greek settlers in the Upper Satrapies, dealt with by Peithon, and the Lamian War along with the Rhodian expulsion of their garrison and the Odrysian Rising. Not a mention of trouble in Asia Minor; Perdikkas attacked Ariarathes to bring that kingdom into the Empire and it is this land that Diodoros characterises thus.
On the contrary, I don’t think we are well-informed at all about uprisings etc on the death of Alexander – save that they ran from Greece in the west, to India in the east. Most are understandably ‘played down’ in our sources. However, in the Anatolian region, Armenia maintained its independence under its Persian ruler Orontes, and would continue to do so (Orontes had led his numerous Armenian cavalry against Alexander at Gaugamela [Arrian III.8.5]). Pisidia was hostile to Alexander, who took one city, Sagalassos on the main road, but failed to take Termessos [333BC] and didn’t attempt other places. The Pisidians killed his appointed Satrap, the Somatophylax Balacrus, and resumed their independence. Alcetus, brother of Perdiccas would woo them as allies against Antigonus, and after his death they continued guerrilla warfare [Diod XVIII.47.2] Alexander by-passed Cappadocia, and it continued to be independent, ruled by Ariarathes as Persian Satrap, and then King ( his descendants would rule Cappadocia down to the 1st C BC.). When Perdiccas attempted to impose Eumenes as ruler, Ariarathes not unnaturally resisted. Cilicia consisted of the smallish coastal plain, and inland a larger mountainous region called ‘Rough Cilicia’ inhabited by independent tribal clans. Alexander quickly passed through it, anxious to secure the Cilician gates, but left a garrison at the hostile town of Soli, later removed. He did briefly mount one expedition into ‘Rough Cilicia’, lasting less than a week. Arrian [II.5-6] says:“...he marched against those of the Cilicians who were holding the hills/mountains. Some he drove from their positions, others he reached a composition/agreement with and within a week he was back in Soli...” or in other words, the mountain clans melted away at his approach as all good guerrillas do, and those who could not ‘submitted’. All doubtless resumed their life of brigandage as soon as Alexander moved on. It is fair to say that Alexander did not so much ‘conquer’ or ‘subdue’ eastern Asia minor as pass through it. The expedition under Neoptolemus against Armenia and its numerous cavalry and soldiers was a failure, and the troops became restive and mutinous and even the intervention of Eumenes availed little. Armenia was still independent and ruled by Orontes in 317 BC.
From the above it is evident that there is a darn sight more than “a mention of trouble” in Asia minor – the whole area was actively hostile against the Macedonians.

To Eumenes he gave Paphlagonia and Cappadocia and all the lands bordering on these, which Alexander did not invade, having been prevented from doing so by the urgency of his affairs when he was finishing the war with Darius; Diod.XVIII 3 i

There is no hint of your ‘…he made a nuisance of himself by raiding the trunk roads from West to East.’ In the sources, rather it is a war of Perdikkas’ making.
As can be seen from the above, the highlanders of Pisidia, Cilicia and Cappadocia all made a living from brigandage, and the juiciest target was commerce moving along the East-West roads.
Alexander passed through and subjugated both Pisidia and Kilikia, the latter very thoroughly during the lead up to Issos, so your clams just don’t stand up.
That assertion is totally incorrect. Neither Pisidia nor Cilicia was ‘subjugated’ at all, let alone ‘thoroughly. This area was largely independent right down to Roman times. ( also see above for the actual state of S.E. Anatolia)
Laranda and Isauria were simply strongholds of mountain brigands, in which capacity the Isaurians became famous. Diodoros’ note on Balakros XVIII 22 i
Laranda was more than just a ‘stronghold’, it was a major city[polis] of the area. Isaura too was a substantial strongly fortified city[polis] at the foot of Mt Taurus, and was not easy to capture. [Diod XVIII.22 ff].

And having arrived in Pisidia, they determined to lay waste two cities, that of the Larandians and that of the Isaurians; for while Alexander was still alive these cities had put to death Balacrus the son of Nicanor, who had been appointed general and satrap
So the enemy were only these two cities and far from having been killed campaigning Balakros was most likely kidnapped and executed, there is no evidence of a rebellion in Kilikia nor any opposition in Pisidia beyond these two cities. In fact the Pisidians remained loyal to the Perdikkan cause, supporting Alketas in defiance of Antigonos’ overwhelming force (until wiser and older heads prevailed).

Most of Pisidia was opposed to the Macedonians, and had been since Alexander’s time [Arrian I.29], though some took Alexander’s side against old rivals. The Pisidians allied with Alcetas against Antigonus on the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” principle, and continued to oppose the Macedonians after Alcetas’ death in a lengthy guerilla war. [Diod XVIII.47.2]
(small digression: In order to surprise Alcetas, Antigonus undertook a celebrated forced march from Cappadocia to Cretopolis in Pisidia, over 7 days and nights, averaging over 40 miles per day across the rough mountainous terrain of the Taurus range.)
Neoptolemos had already been left in Armenia with his Macedonians who must have been from the Royal army.
I rather doubt that assertion, not least because it is unevidenced.. Your proposed use by Perdiccas and the ‘Royal army’ of the Persian ‘Royal Road’ is not very likely for a number of reasons. Although no-one is sure of the exact route of the Royal Road ( no two maps show the same route!), it ran north of the Tigris and then straight into Armenia – held by a hostile Persian, Orontes, with his thousands of cavalry and troops, and thence on to Cappadocia. Not only that, but that route, involving heading north from Babylon to the Tigris ( the Royal road did not run via Babylon), thence along its north bank to Armenia and thence Cappadocia is some 20-25% longer than the more direct route direct from Babylon up the Euphrates and through Cilicia.
So nice try but no cigar and no source references to trouble in Kilikia requiring 4-10,000 veterans to supress it. Further indication of the generally peaceful nature of Asia Minor can be gleaned from the fact that both Kyannane and Kleopatra passed through without trouble from the natives.
I said “Craterus had been delayed in Cilicia on his march home, probably because of some local trouble or rebellion.” [p.1 Nov 16] There must have been some reason Craterus and his army of 11,500 veterans ( including the cavalry) paused in Cilicia for so long. If it was not to pacify the tribes and clans of ‘Rough Cilicia/Cilicia Tracheia’ ( as Alexander so signally failed to do ), then it it was probably to use the plain of ‘flat Cilicia/Cilicia Pedias’ against other rebels in the general area.

Doubtless Macedonian Royal princesses would have had a substantial escort, which explains why they were untroubled by brigands or hostile natives, and it certainly does not indicate “the generally peaceful nature of Asia minor”, the East of which was in considerable foment and uproar, as we have seen.
Troops recruited in ‘Greater Macedon’ which incorporated the former Thrace were not necessarily ‘Makedone’ citizens of the phalanx ( a decided minority) or even ethnically Macedonian. The majority would have been Thracian for example.

Having invented a rebellion in Kilikia you now forget the actual rebellion that was underway under Seuthes in Thrace, nor did ‘Greater Macedonia’ exist, this is a post WWII construct, Macedonia and Thrace were separate entities and had separate Satraps. Diodoros is clear, XVIII 14 v,
I didn’t ‘invent’ a rebellion in Cilicia, merely suggested it was a possible and likely reason Craterus and his army remained there so long, when they were keen to get home. Certainly more likely than Craterus supervising ship-building, which couldn’t occur along the rugged Cilician coastline, with its small coves so suitable for pirates to hide in. The nearest decent harbours were in Phoenicia, or far to the west.

Philip’s conquests included a substantial part of Thrace, and a large Thracian population. ( which for convenience I referred to as ‘Greater Macedonia’, a term I thought I had made up.) Seuthes rebellion did not encompass all of Thrace, or even Macedonian Thrace. It seems to have involved only his own Odrysian tribe. As I said, having crossed the Bosporus into Macedonian territory, most of the population were Thracian, and many would have likely been recruited - as many scholars postulate.
He crossed over, therefore, into Europe and went on to Macedonia, where he enlisted many additional Macedonian soldiers. When he had gathered together in all more than twenty thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry, he led them through Thessaly against the enemy
.

He crossed into Europe marched into Macedonia and raised Macedonian troops; it does not get much clearer than that.
I don’t dispute that – indeed I referred to it myself. Except you seem to have mixed up your Macedonians, for this was Leonnatus, not Craterus. And for reasons I won’t digress into, by far the bulk of his 20,000 foot must have been non-Macedonian, with only a few thousand ‘Makedone’ phalangites.
You seem to not understand the structure of Macedonian society. There were only two classes, other than slaves, the equestrian nobility the hetairoi and their followers and the general populace for whom we have no name all owed the King armed service and enjoyed limited ‘rights’ and were ‘Makedones’. The reservoir of potential phalangites was vast as that was how the majority of the population would serve, there being no native psiloi
.
On the contrary, it is you who have grossly over-simplified Macedonian society. It included ethnic Macedonians (not all of whom were Makedones, as the existence of non-Makedone ‘Macedonian archers’ proves – whoops native psiloi !), not to mention all the grooms and servants who were clearly not citizens – and that’s just the army. Macedonian society was multi-cultural and included in addition Greeks, Illyrians, Molossians, Thracians and sundry other ethnic groups. We don’t know the population figures, nor what fraction were citizens/Makedones, as I have related - which every scholar I can think of agrees.. We do know the reservoir of phalangites was far from ‘vast’, the maximum number on service ever, being 28,000 or so at the death of Alexander, which left Macedon short of citizens ( see ante and [Diod XVIII.12.2])
40,000 foot at Krannon were heavy armed and largely Macedonian, it would seem as she had no allies to provide heavy foot and the mercenaries seem to have sided with their home states.
I have already explained why this not possible (page 1 post Nov 15 ), and given a reasonable estimate of the number of Macedonian ‘phalangites’ present – about 20-22,000. What is your evidence that mercenaries deserted the Macedonian army to side with their home states and Macedon had no allies - Greeks were not the only potential allies, nor did all the Greeks unify against Macedon, or to use a term you seem fond of, did you just ‘invent’ that ? Also, it would be surprising if an army consisted solely of “heavy foot” and indeed this appears to be a mistranslation in the Loeb, for the Greek simply says “pezoi” – foot or infantry, and does not say at all that they were all ‘heavy’.[Diod XVIII.16.5] (Also, ‘pezoi’ can have the generic meaning of ‘army’ [LSJ], though probably not in this instance where archers, slingers and cavalry are mentioned separately.)
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

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Paralus wrote » Tue Nov 24, 2015 1:46 pm
Xenophon wrote:A ‘considerable number’ might easily be 2,000 or so of Craterus’ veterans ( a Taxis) with the other 2,000 being with Alketas.
Interesting. A 'considerable number' requiring the raising of a 6,300 cavalry force "might easily be 2,000 or so". Earlier in this thread, a 'considerable number' "can only realistically be the balance of Craterus’ veterans" - the 4,000 you agree with Hammond that were left behind in Kilkia. A considerable variation.
‘considerable number’ is a generic term meaning more than just a few. It can refer to hundreds, thousands or millions. A 2,000 strong Macedonian phalanx would be quite capable of matching 6,300 Asiatic cavalry on the battlefield in most circumstances, and indeed after defeating Neoptolemus, the phalanx withdraws in good order, and Eumenes cavalry dare not attack them.[ Eumenes, Neoptolemus and PSI XII 1284 A. B. Bosworth].
I have earlier expressed the same view as Hammond – that the 4,000 veterans ( or their equivalent) were split between Neoptolemus and Alcetas, if you recall. What is your point, if any?

Xenophon wrote:Nor does the passage mean Neoptolemos was given these troops in Armenia. At a guess, when Perdiccas and the Royal army arrived to embark on the campaign, they would have collected the veterans, or ordered them to join him. ( From Babylon, Perdiccas would have marched up the Euphrates valley, then through Cilicia to reach Cappadocia ). The accretion of these men allowed Perdiccas to give Alketas and Neoptolemus Macedonian troops. At some point later, Neoptolemus was despatched to Armenia.

Several things militate against that. The royal army left Babylon to march on Ariarathes. In doing so it almost certainly followed the route of Seleukos in 302 to Ipsos - that is the royal road into Kappadokia from the east.
Perdiccas’ route is not specified in our sources, and I have already given good reasons why that route is unlikely, being some 20-25% longer and rather roundabout, and worse still, leading straight into hostile Armenia under Orontes, and an inevitable confrontation.
There is absolutely no source attestation of Krateros and Perdikkas meeting and no source attestation of any kind that Perdikkas went to Kilikia prior to Kappadokia.
...Nor any source attestation that he did not march the better route via Cilicia..... Craterus and his 6,000 men had departed before Perdiccas arrived, and it is possible that Craterus decided to join Antipater in part to avoid Perdiccas....
Indeed we are told that he went directly to Kappadokia and following two battles spent time settling the province with Eumenes after which he moved into Kilikia for what is clearly the winter of 322/1. The campaign in Kappadokia occupied the summer and early autumn of 322.This is logical given the fact that the royal army will have been able to take advantage of the harvest for that campaign. A campaign timed for summer also allows for Peithon's Macedonians to rejoin the royal army. Having settled Kappadokia, the royal army moves into Kilikia for the winter of 322/21 and Eumenes follows. It is at this time (the leaving of Kappadokia) that Perdikkas deputes Neoptolemus to clean up the remnants of Arirathes' force which will have retired into adjacent Armenia. Neoptolemus is here accorded the "considerable" Macedonians that Eumens deals with when sent back from Kilikia in late winter/early spring 321.
I would largely agree the above, but there is good reason to believe he passed through Cilicia on his way to Cappacia, as has been related – both the likely route, and the 4,000 veteran reinforcements.
In the spring of 321 Perdikkas moves north to reduce the towns of Laranda and Isauria. One wonders why, on military and logistical grounds, Perdikkas did not deal with these towns in the spring of 322 on his way to Kappadokia via Kilikia. Why would the regent march to the Halys and leave such in his rear only to march back for the winter and then deal with them the following spring? The answer is that he did not.
I agree he did not, but not for the reasons you give. You seem somewhat “geographically challenged”. Laranda and Isauria were not ‘north’[sic] of Cilicia, but some 150 km west of it, in Pisidia ! [see attached map] They were therefore not ‘in his rear’ at all.
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Re: Macedonian Military Numbers

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Postby agesilaos » Thu Nov 26, 2015 10:10 am
Xenophon wrote: Thereafter, it is estimated some 2-3,000 new recruits could be called up annually
27/8/6.02 first post
In addition, some 1-2,000 'new' Makedones could be recruited each year in Macedon
22/11/3.49

Have you found some new research or source for your revised view? I can see the original one is based on some figures of Macedonian Reinforcements viz.,

Arrian I 29 iv 333BC
The newly-married men also, who had been despatched to Macedonia, now arrived at Gordium, and with them another army which had been levied, and put under the command of Ptolemy, son of Seleucus, Coenus, son of Polemocrates, and Meleager, son of Neoptolemus. This army consisted of 3,000 Macedonian foot-soldiers and 300 horse-soldiers, 200 Thessalian cavalry, and 150 Eleans under the command of Alcias the Elean.
And


Curtius V 1 xl (see also Arrian III 16 x) 331 BC
And now Amyntas son of Andromenes led up 6,000 Macedonian foot from Antipatros and 500 horse from the same nation, along with 600 Thracians and 3,500 foot of that people and 4,000 mercenaries from the Peloponnese arrived with 980 horse. This same Amyntas also brought fifty noble adolescents for the bodyguard:

The implication being that the annual levy was 3,000, one year after leaving Alexander receives 3,000 Macedonian foot and after a space of two years a further 6,000. If one chooses to plead special circumstances and an increased levy three years in a row you still have to accept 3,000 per year groups as being available to Antipatros when the Lamian War breaks out, though he did not choose to raise so many they were there to be enrolled by Leonnatos later. I can see no basis for an estimate of potential recruits as low as 1,000 per annum.
The first figure (3,000) is an estimate of the possible number of annual recruits – which of course would vary year to year, so is only approximate. The second refers to the ‘net’ amount after allowing for casualties, sick and wounded etc. These are of course only estimates and again would vary year to year. Some years, e.g 359 BC when Perdiccas III, brother of Philip was killed along with 4,000 Makedones, or 197 BC when PhilipV reputedly lost 8,000 dead and 5,000 taken prisoner at Cynoscephalae, there would be ‘net’ losses which could not be replaced at once.
When Agis began his war in 331 Antipatros has already sent 9,000 Macedonian phalangites east, yet for the battle of Megalopolis either in that year or the next, Antipatros has an army of 40,000 probably at least half Macedonian – the populous states of Greece had joined Agis, Thrace had been in Revolt right up to Antipatros’ patched up peace with Memnon; Diod XVII 62 iv ff.
Antipater had some 12-13,000 or so Makedones in his phalanx, as we know, and there is no evidence for ‘probably at least half Macedonian’ (i.e. 20,000), that is just a wild ( and unlikely) guess. He also had Greek allies as your quotation shows, not to mention some 3,000 Talents sent him by Alexander at the end of 331, with which he could hire as many Greek, Balkan and Thracian mercenaries as he could handle. In addition, Memnon did not command all Thrace – you are over-simplifying again.



And this after Zopyrion’s lost army and Memnon retaining his troops. You will have to supply some source reference for your assertion

It is perhaps likely that Zopyrion’s army included few if any actual Macedonian phalanx troops...

Good luck :lol:

Neither Zopyrion nor Memnon are recorded as having Macedonian troops. In fact off the top of my head, I can’t think of any Macedonian Governor or Satrap who was given command of a Macedonian army, or even substantial numbers of ‘Makedone’ phalangites in his territory. Troops allocated to such officials seem to have been invariably mercenaries or allies.( see e.g. Diod.XVII.111.1; Arrian I.17.8 ; I.23.6 and many other examples) Neither Zopyrion nor Memnon are likely to have been exceptions, but perhaps you can find evidence for ‘Makedone’ phalangites in garrisons......

Good Luck ! :wink: :lol: :lol:
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