Antigonid : Play misty for me: Kynoskephalai

[Paralus]

Whether you disagree or not is not really relevant ...

Thank you. Nice I'm allowed to.

What is the function of a half-file leader if not to lead a half file in forming 'close order' ( or to reverse it back to 'normal/open order' ? Similarly a quarter-file leader if not to facilitate 'synaspismos' ? [...] I referred to Aelian's description of 'halving' depth into close order earlier -' interjection' at 29.2 and 31.1. [...] and the much more common 'halving' of depth and retaining the same frontage' , which also at this final evolution of phalanx drill also has two methods - bringing up the rear half-file, which is evidently the older traditional method, going back to Xenophon, and which from the presence of half-file leaders was still practised in Hellenistic armies.

Please excuse the 'cherry picking' to keep to the point. No one involved in this debate has questioned that this form of compacting occured in Macedonian style phalanxes. No one. It absolutely did not happen here and is thus irrelevant.

All refer to two forms of 'compacting/pyknosis' - closing up the frontage and retaining the depth - apparently uniquely used at Cynoscephalae...

I imagine that rather than 'testis unis, testis nullis' this would be 'tetsis unis, testis anteoccupatio'?? Perhaps Alexander's eight deep formation at Issos is yet another example of this argument??

I'll not repeat myself by stating yet again that Polybius is NOT reporting verbatim Philip's orders etc- which you apparently don't dispute. What he wanted them to do was form up on half the frontage, in close order and in 'double depth' 16 deep, as Polybius says. This they were able to do by a simple, single order. No need to interpret Polybius' words so as to involve imaginary impossible formations, no matter how 'clear' you may think Polybius' meaning, your interpretation leads to impossible results......

Then we will simply have to disagree. Readers can make their own minds up.

[agesilaos]

So there it is Xenophon's Greek is better than mine, and LSJ etc, despite the wishful thinking 'diaplazein to bathos' the very words of the sacred manuals mean ' to double the depth' of the formation in which one is standing and Aelian explains the manner of doing this, it does NOT mean 'move to double a notional standard depth', if your solution is to simply ignore what does not fit a preconception well 'nuff said. Only in future post please do not forget that it is not just Paralus and I who describe two orders and subsequent evolutions, Polybios does too.

[Paralus]

At least with that I find myself in complete agreement - particularly the last sentence.

[Paralus]

What Polybios does NOT say is that the battlefield was cramped, he says it was uneven, precipitous and rocky.

Correct: he does not say that the field was cramped; describing it as you say. That does not mean that those features did not limit the suitable ground for phalanx deployment though - as it obviously did for Philip to double his depth and contract to right as he did.

It's not often I find myself in agreement with Hammond (well, his occasional methods I should say) but I find myself agreeing with the reading of the battle site. Jona's Livius site has a Google satellite link to Hammond's site. IT's worth playing around with. Having done so I can only agree that Pritchet and Kromayer have it wrong. From the details of the movements of both forces in Polybios, Flamininus' route was via Eretreia to Zoodochos Pigi seems fairly cut and dried. Philip, departing from somewhere near to Megalo Monastiri, heads west towards Skotoussa. At a remove where the scale shows 2km, the ridge between the two routes is obvious. That Philip's final camp was at or near to Chalkiades seems logical to me. The notion that where the modern highway crosses the ridge - via a ridge it might be noted - must mean that this was where an ancient route did so is not necessary (Greek roads were hardly Roman roads). Here, walking the ground is hard to argue against. My first thoughts were that the original route went from Chalkiades between the Kremaste ridge and that ridge east of it. On re-reading Hammond this is what he postulates. Thus the phalanx would ascend from Chalkiades to a point midway between Kremaste and the ridge to the east whence it turns left to deploy into line. The 'charge' is made to the south east into the valley towards the "level ground". There does not appear to be a great deal of room and any formation across the ridge (which Hammond refers to as the "watershed ridge") an a deployment across the ridge would see a full phalanx (18,000) split over a ridge running south.

As I say, the sites proposed by Pritchet and Kromayer don't convince.

[Paralus]

Whilst I'm here, a couple of catch-ups are in order...

As another example of interpreting material in isolation, Paralus ( and others) would have it on the strength of XVIII.28 et seq that the phalanx normally fought 16 deep in close order, for having described it, Polybius goes on to say [XVIII.30]:

“From this we can easily conceive what is the nature and force of a charge by the phalanx when it is 16 deep”.

Notice that he does NOT say “16 deep in close order”. That is simply an (incorrect) assumption. He knew and would expect his readers to know that generally a phalanx 16 deep would move into ‘close order/pyknosis’ by halving their depth ( to 8 ) before engaging.

Readers might be nonplussed attempting to locate that supposed "example of interpreting material in isolation" of mine on this thread. I do believe the only claim relating to that passage was made by yourself. I merely supplied some context.

That Philip’s phalanx stood at ‘double depth’ 16 deep is perhaps also suggested by the fact that after describing Cynoscephalae, Polybius gives the famous comparison of Legion v Phalanx, describing the phalanx as 16 deep while charging (i.e. ‘double depth’), and Polybius is writing this with Cynoscephalae in mind......A straw in the wind perhaps, but suggestive.

Well that is to miss the introduction. Polybios actually says the following:

In my sixth book I made a promise, still unfulfilled, of taking a fitting opportunity of drawing a comparison between the arms of the Romans and Macedonians, and their respective system of tactics, and pointing out how they differ for better or worse from each other. I will now endeavour by a reference to actual facts to fulfill that promise.

That he chooses to fulfill his promise here is simply because this is the first battle he's narrated were both tactical systems clashed on the field. Now, he has promised to compare the two systems ("the arms of the Romans and Macedonians, and their respective system of tactics") not the deployments in a particular battle or, indeed, of this battle. Just as he speaks of the usual Roman formation in this comparison (rather than say that of Cannae), so too he speaks of the usual Macedonian formation. He compares both regular systems not the Roman regular deployment as against a particular Macedonian deployment. Were he so doing it is unlikely that he failed to mention the unusual nature of the deployment.

You are distorting what Aelian says, and also not comparing the other versions.

I can add distortion to my list of crimes it appears. I have to say I don't understand: just what have I "distorted"??

[agesilaos]

A couple of points; first, I cannot agree with any re-construction that ignores the frontage of the Roman army, no matter the terrain, Kynoskephalai is not Thermopylai , if it was it would have been Aioi Stene repeated.

Philip’s aims are stated at XVIII 20 ii

2 Philip for his part began to march towards Scotussa, hoping to procure supplies from that town and afterwards when fully furnished to find ground suitable for his own army.

He was clearly not intending any flanking movement on Flamininus’ left (a grand tactical rather than ‘strategic’ manoeuvre, in any case); for one he did not know where the Romans were, secondly his supply line ran NNE to Larissa if he moved SW he would be exposing his already fragile supply line; had he been ‘in supply’ he need not have retired upon Skotussa and, it follows, had Skotussa been able to meet his needs he would not have sent the rawer half of his army of foraging on the day of the battle. His strategic aim was to shorten his supply lines by falling back upon Larissa at the same time stretching Flamininus’, which ran to the coast, and would also be exposed to attack from Philip’s garrisons at Demetrias, Pthiotic Thebes and Pharsalos. He was attempting to move North when the weather prevented the movement. Nor, once contact had been established with the enemy did he move to outflank them via the pass, instead he chose to block them by occupying the heights, despite the alleged difficulty of using his phalanx there.

I would say that Philip acted defensively, until his eventual charge; sanguine reports drew him to the ridge, but he did not array his phalanx in the best formation to attack from his position, else he would not have had to ‘double his depth and close to the right’. Instead, he occupied the ground; this sounds more like a show of force to simply permit disengagement. Strategically he wanted to fall back , tactically he did not desire a battle on unsuitable terrain, only when the Roman left begins to advance does he commit to the attack, with a sigh of resignation I imagine; he had no other choice.

[Paralus]

I have no disagreement with Philip not wishing to fight at Kynoskephalai. Ditto Flamininus. I do not see Philip as necessarily falling back upon Larissa. Yes, Philip's supply lines ran NNW to Larissa: he'd marched from there to near Pherae. Polybios says that he camped some thirty stades (or roughly 5.5km) north of the town. Flamininus stopped some 50 stades (9 or so km) south of the town. Philip is thus near to Megalo Monastiri and Flamininus some three or so km south of Aerino. If Philip intends to fall back on Larissa he was taking the tourist route in doing so. From Megalo Monastiri he heads west south west towards Skotussa. A march across some 'up hill, down dale' terrain. Moving in such a direction does indeed draw Flamininus away from the coast and expose him. Moving directly back the way he'd come (to Larissa) will just as certainly have drawn him - unless Flamininus refused to follow. After Skotussa Polybios does not tell us the direction of Philip's march but his original intention was to find suitable ground for his phalanx. That might just as easily have been in the neighbourhood of Pharsalus. Falling back on Larissa was more easily achieved retiring NNW from his position north of Pherae (unless he'd denuded the route of supplies).

Polybios does say that Philip's right reached the ridge, turned left and deployed into line "and occupied the range of high ground". Philip also ordered the left to follow up onto this high ground as quickly as possible. He was deploying his entire army and I do not believe he did this as a 'show of force to permit disengagement'. Polybios represents Philip as drawing up his army against his better judgement, but drawing it up all the same. Whether he hoped by that to avoid an engagement is problematic.

On the frontage issue, it comes down to what Philip actually did. His right wing deployed into line and, as I've said, that would be standard sixteen deep in open order (as opposed to your eight deep in such with which I disagree). We both agree that, as Polybios states, the phalanx then doubled its depth and closed to the right. Unless you can convince me that the phalanx deployed from march into line only eight deep (it already occupied over 1,000 metres sixteen deep), this means it was thirty-two deep on a 312 metre frontage. Philip knew what he faced down the slope and he thought this formation suited to the initial task. Always remembering he intended for his left to form up and join the battle. Had he time, he'd have certainly waited. He did not have that time.

[agesilaos]

I think you have hitthe nail on the head with that 'Unless he had denuded the supplies on his route'; the season was clealy before harvest - the fighting around Pherai was hampered by the standing crops as well as the walls etc, Skotussa's reserves were not enough to resupply the army which would indicate that the cities were low on provisions themselves, one might even speculate that the harvest had been delayed by unseasonable weather like the storm which hit the night before the battle, stretching a bit but posible.

I doubt I can convince you, but I am not saying what you think; they were eight deep in close order (3ft) having arrived in open/marching order sixteen deep and stepped down to eight and fighting order; I cannot see the value of remaining in open order, Philip's initial sucess shows that the ground was not an issue, on his wing at least. When they 'double by depth' they simply reform their initial formation, sixteen deep and in open order, for which there must have been room as they had already stood on the ground in it, the front only contracts from 1km to 1/2, assuming 8,000 men, the furthest file has to move 500m, say 5 minutes? The frontage would now match those troop that we are told they drove back, again assuming they were in their standard formation; it is not that thirty-two deep is somehow outlawed by the manuals, no wonder the Seleukids broke at Magnesia their thirty-two deep formation left them non-plussed, rather it is unusual and was noted as such by Appian when he talks of Magnesia (possibly ultimately based on Polybios?), had Philip V used it sucessfully I think it would have merited a mention. If Philip's formation was standard, ie sixteen deep in close order it would not be remarked upon and it suits the respective frontages too.

Now, we would both agree that if the attack was delivered sixteen deep, then it had stood eight deep before the doubling; similarly were they sixteen deep then I have to concede that the use of a thirty-two deep formation was not exclusive to Magnesia, despite the impression given by Appian.

To further confuse matters, I am still quite taken by the notion of a final move into 'synaspismos', Polybios says that when the Tribune with no name struck Philip's rear the Macedonians broke and were

attacked now also by the troops who had yielded before their frontal charge and who now turned and faced them.

συνεπιθεμένων αὐτοῖς ἐκ μεταβολῆς καὶ τῶν κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐγκεκλικότων.

XVIII 26 v

So the Romans had been retreating, seemingly in good order with their backs to the phalanx, yet the phalanx could not catch them; in synaspismos they would certainly not be able to run, but maybe the same held in pyknosis, yet another advantage of the legion over the phalanx; like being a fat kid in the playground you know you can pulverise all the little squirts teasing you but you can never catch them!

[Paralus]

I have to agree with Xenophon. I cannot see the right of the phalanx deploying into line sixteen deep (as usual), then 'doubling down' (by half file insertion) only to afterwards resume sixteen deep open order (by counter march of the inserted half file?) and then close up to the right. This is to make "War and Peace" from a five hundred word precis! I can only presume you see this as being necessary because of two things:

• * A need for Philip to occupy the ground in a battle ready formation whilst awaiting his left. It didn't arrive in time and so the convoluted evolutions.
  
  * The need for a 500 yard or so frontage so as to take on two legions.

On the first Philip already occupied the ground even if in open order. If push came to shove he could double down to eight deep and take on the Roman left. He did not and this has to be down to the peculiarities of the field. Whatever the outcome, Philip intended to fight with the full phalanx (or as much as he could get into order). He did not seek simply to occupy the entire ridge with half his phalanx in close order awaiting his left. What was he to do when it got there given, as I believe, that force will have occupied the available ground? Polybios says only that Philip deployed into line after turning left on the ridge. He does not say that they closed up (as he baldy states later) and so it is inevitable, to me, that they deployed sixteen deep in open order awaiting final battle orders (which Polybios duly reports). Otherwise we are in the realm of "Polybios knew that the phalanx would adopt close order after deployment, he just doesn't bother to tell his understanding audience".

The second proceeds from the assumption that two legions were faced by the Macedonian right in its charge. That may be correct but, as I've argued, it is called into question by what Polybios reports Philip as ordering his phalanx to do. Unless we are to follow Xenophon's very free reading, Philip has doubled depth and contracted right. He cannot have done this if he thought it suicide.

Magnesia is not really comparable. What raises comment from Appian (and likely Polybios, his source) is the fact that Antiochus has crowded his phalanx into the centre with his heavy reliance on cavalry. This, again, most likely had to do with the ground. Antiochos would rely on his chariots on the left and so left them room. Livy makes plain that the king, on the right, had minimal room, attacking down a channel alongside a river from which he wheeled and drove the Roman left across and back. The 'surprise' in the description is not the depth of thirty-two (as if this was a first or only occurrence) but the fact that it was divided into ten sections with elephants between them. This phalanx did not break because its members were 'nonplussed' by its depth, rather it broke due to the elephants inside it became unmanageable due to the missile fire. Appian's comment on the 'unusual' nature of this deployment relates both to the divisions with the elephants ("like a wall") and the fact that Antiochus did not put his trust in it relying on the other oddities (chariots, camels, etc).

On the fleeing Romans, it seems to me they'd been put to near flight as Flamininus had given up with his "only hope" residing in his right. The phalanx - in either of its close orders - was hardly to engage in Olympic stadion races. More akin to a three legged race I'd think. The Roman front lines will have been engaged, if not pinned by sarisae, and being trampled as the phalanx inexorably rolled downhill. Those turning are like those yet to be engaged as their comrades in front are pushed back and down.

[agesilaos]

Almost; I do not say that they formed eight deep by file insertion, quite the other method; the even numbered troops stepped diagonally left into the space (6ft) between the files ie the reverse of the doubling by depth, this is simple and quick to effect and yes it puts one in a fighting position (I am, as you say concerned not to have the army standing about in non combat ready formation, that is a recipe for poor morale and fretting, especially with the enemy in sight), doubling the depth simply reverses this evolution and gives the oncoming left the room it needs to deploy onto the ridge. By the way, they did not 'turn left', that is an incorrect translation in the Loeb, the greek has them 'fill the line from the left' ie the right flank was the first to deploy and had thus turned right to face the Romans and the subsequent units fell in on their left.

I was only being sarcastic about Magnesia and the non-plussedness (for those who posit that only formations in the manuals may be adopted), yes the phalanx broke because the piqued pachyderms progressively panicked, but Appian is clear that the great depth of the files was considered useless and a hinderance.

We get very few references to actual formation changes in battle narratives, which was why I picked Kynoskephalai to look at first (as I wrote in the proem though it may have been in another version) as here we actually have that reported order to 'double by depth and close to the right', so I don't think it unreasonable to fill things in, as long as they are consistent with the story and do not ignore what is stated.

I think we have reached an impasse here, for now...maybe we should pick another battle to muse about, I have to go away for the weekend so it would give me some focussed reading for the train if we can all agree on one, Sellasia is a good one which I know you have covered elsewhere how about we have a poll? if we post a list here then make any additions we can then post a poll on the main board, or is that like setting up as 'the Brains Trust' ?

[Paralus]

Other than the fact that the phalanx must close up from the rear; the reverse of which being adopting open order by stepping back allowing room for the transposed half files to step back out again. Again I fail to understand why adopting normal line order from march (16 deep, open order) "is a recipe for poor morale and fretting, especially with the enemy in sight". This order, even with an enemy on the field or approaching, is nothing unusual and is the basis for Polybios' erratic criticism of Kallisthenes. Philip simply deployed into line sixteen deep and waited to see just how much of his phalanx would make it before having to close up and commit. As the Romans advanced up the ridge Philip was still engaged in getting this phalanx into line.

I agree that we rarely are given battle descriptions with phalanx deployment detail and changes to same. Thus it is a bit of a stretch to claim, when we do, that this or that is "unique", "exceptional" or "standard". It is preferable, when given such, to take it as written.

Sellasia? I really do not think we need to chase visitors to the site away by what will become trench warfare over ἐπαλλήλου φάλαγγος...

[agesilaos]

I think you will find that it was the retreat of his advanced force which happened 'before he had the whole phalanx in line', the Romans then had to receive their own advanced force and then begin to advance; during this time Philip got the whole of his force into line and seeing the left arriving issued the much discusssed order he was clearly in fighting order when he attacked, since he was winning. Polybios kaleidescopes these events to give the impression of rapid action but analysis of the physical movements he describes would give a lull of fifteen to twenty minutes between the flight of the Macedonian advanced force and the advance of the Roman left, more if we go with your version (the closing to the right would take half as long again since the men have to move 750 rather than 500 yards). The Roman camp was on the other side of the valley, it seems, we are told that the second Macedonian surge push the Romans back to the foot of the ridge Philip occupies and also that his men were struggling near to the Roman camp further that in their first push the Romans had been pushed back further onto the flat ground, though still not as far as the camp. The actual distance we cannot guess at until I get a decent map upon which further progress hangs I fear.

Yes, Sellasia might degenerate into the same trench warfare.

Re the inadvisability of not adopting a fighting formation, imagine marching upto the ridge at Waterloo but with all the muskets and packs in a cart following the regiment, while the Iron Duke casually opines that 'there will be time enough to arm the men, aye and beat the French!' - which there would be, but I for one would prefer the reassuring weight of a brown Bess in my grubby little mitts. A slightly more extreme example, the systems are so different that it is hard to find a good comparator, but it illustrates my point and the flight of the left demonstrates that the Macedonians too reckoned marching order useless for fighting, as it is their unsuitable formation which Polybios says causes them to flee before contact had been made.

How about Raphia or maybe Pydna, that would be the natural follow up to Kynoskephalai?

[Paralus]

I think you will find that it was the retreat of his advanced force which happened 'before he had the whole phalanx in line', the Romans then had to receive their own advanced force and then begin to advance; during this time Philip got the whole of his force into line and seeing the left arriving issued the much discusssed order he was clearly in fighting order when he attacked, since he was winning.

Yes, well, we've been here before. As I wrote then, and will write now (read on!), the Roman light troops and cavalry drove off their Macedonian opposites - as Flamininus wanted. The legionaries did not engage in any head long pursuit and Polybios' description of the Macedonians "having been decisively repulsed" is simply describing the clearing of the field for the 'real' infantry combat. That does not mean that the legionaries were not in motion; they clearly were as Polybios' description makes clear. Your confusion (it will be the end of you) with the retreat of the Macedonian light force comes from Polybios' retrospective inserted in his narration (18.24.5-7 removed):

As soon as his first files reached the summit, he deployed his men into line by the left, and occupied the range of high ground: for the Macedonians who had been sent in advance had forced the Romans a considerable distance down the other side of the hills, and therefore he found the ridges unoccupied by the enemy. But while he was still engaged in getting the right wing of his army into line, his mercenaries came on the ground, having been decisively repulsed by the enemy. [...] Receiving therefore the men who had been already engaged, he massed them all upon his right wing, both infantry and cavalry; while he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right. By the time this was effected the enemy were close at hand; and, accordingly, the word was given to the phalanx to lower spears and charge; to the light infantry to cover their flank.

Reading the passage without the retrospective makes Polybios' narrative clear: the Roman lights and cavalry achieved the objective of clearing their Macedonian opposites from the field and, having been received back, the legionaries advanced upon the still deploying Macedonian right. That Polybios describes the Roman lights being so received after the lowering of sarisae is of no consequence: he is describing concomitant (or near enough) events. One, in a narrative, has to follow the other. As the subject of his description is the Macedonian charge, this comes first.

Your example of Waterlooo, far from being "slightly more extreme example", is a more than inapt comparison and to be rejected in toto. A more correct comparison would be Philip ordering his right to deploy on the ridge and for Nikanor to bring up their sarisae as soon as practicable. Your assumption is that by deploying into line from marching column sixteen deep in open order they somehow unarmed. Piffle! Xenophon's doubling down (by either method) or Philip's closing to spear will have (and did) see to this in smart time. The Macedonians of the left did not have the time to even deploy into line: they were taken in column of march. If any managed to deploy into line it was it the van which is of no consequence as we've no idea what (little) number managed such. You are capable of better than that!!

Yes, Sellasia might degenerate into the same trench warfare.

Indeed: carpentry has no place in ancient warfare...

Mmm.... Pydna. Maybe. Raphia?? We could do that though I do not see that it is any more enlightening than this battle - the only one where such clear evolutions are present (aside from Kallisthenes' description of ALEXANDER'S battle at Issos....)

[Xenophon]

Whilst I have tried not to fuel the repetitive word tsunami that has flowed on this thread, even I get to the point where I can no longer bite my tongue ( though I made a conscious attempt to!).....nor do I think we have any 'readers' any longer...Hypaspist seems to have drowned in the tsunami, and I suspect even our long-suffering 'lunch room monitor' has long since ceased to follow this thread....

Paralus wrote Mon may 19:

“The statement has been repeated throughout that the regular close order of the Macedonian phalanx was 8 deep and formed by half file insertion. I disagree and reiterate that the field and its circumstances dictated just how the phalanx condensed. Half file insertion is disingenuously presented as the 'normal' or regular method of making the phalanx more dense. Yet when Aelian introduces "compaction" of the phalanx, his first (and entire) example is by closing to right or left with the resultant diminished frontages involved. He goes on later in his treatise to describe insertion as another method. Similarly he clearly describes doubling depth but this seems simply to be passed over.”

...and...

“Xenophon wrote:Whether you disagree or not is not really relevant ...


Thank you. Nice I'm allowed to.”

You seem to have missed the point, leaving out the all-important part “...it is what the evidence suggests that counts.”

“No one involved in this debate has questioned that this form of compacting occured in Macedonian style phalanxes. No one. It absolutely did not happen here and is thus irrelevant.”

Look again at the above quote. You do indeed question that after ‘compacting’ the Macedonian phalanx was generally 8 deep etc.....and it is not the only time ( see below)

“I disagree and reiterate that the field and its circumstances dictated just how the phalanx condensed.”

I would agree that circumstances alter cases, but nevertheless there was a ‘norm’; standard formations that were the tactical optimum.

“Then we will simply have to disagree. Readers can make their own minds up.”

So much for this ! Paralus promptly continues his argument regardless ....even when I deliberately don’t respond in an effort to avoid such !!

Agesilaos wrote 19 May:

So there it is Xenophon's Greek is better than mine, and LSJ etc, despite the wishful thinking 'diaplazein to bathos' the very words of the sacred manuals mean ' to double the depth' of the formation in which one is standing and Aelian explains the manner of doing this, it does NOT mean 'move to double a notional standard depth', if your solution is to simply ignore what does not fit a preconception well 'nuff said. Only in future post please do not forget that it is not just Paralus and I who describe two orders and subsequent evolutions, Polybios does too.

I would never claim a knowledge of Greek better than that of Agesilaos – and have acknowledged his expertise here on Pothos a number of times, including this thread!
I don’t dispute the translation, but rather the interpretation put upon it. Suppose for a second that the simple, single, manoeuvre I described took place, the phalanx ‘closed up’ to its right, halving its frontage to 500 yards or so and ending up being ‘double depth’ at 16 deep( which we agree is highly probable). In general terms, how could Polybius express this two moves in one, after the light troops had withdrawn through the open order phalanx and been despatched to the right flank ? He could say that Philip “[i...]ordered the Peltasts and that part of the phalanx he had with him to double their depth and close toward the right” [/i]( as he does). Or he might have expressed the two actions in one as “... to close up to the right and double their depth”. or similar....

The essence here was speed – the Roman Legionaries were advancing (charging?) up the slope, not far behind the withdrawing lights and can only have been a few hundred yards distant at most – as Polybius says, when Philip's closing was complete, the enemy was “close upon them.”[XVIII.24.8], and they charged immediately. So quickly did this occur that the light infantry were still in the act of proceeding to the flank behind the now closed up phalanx. At normal marching speed ( around 100 or so paces/ min, a pace being 30 inches aprox ) the “closing up”, as I have proposed would have taken at least 6-8 minutes, allowing time for order transmission from syntagma to syntagma, (some 30-40 of these). If the soldiers moved ‘at the double’ they could shave a minute or two off that. The Romans of course would have covered a similar distance in that time – so were presumably at least 500 yards away at the outset. Two or more separate manoeuvres ( as proposed by you and Paralus) would have taken at least twice as long – and there was simply no time for this, and barely time for the single movement I have proposed, which accords with Polybius’ remarks above.

Paralus then commented ( 20 May )

“At least with that I find myself in complete agreement - particularly the last sentence.”

As the oft-quoted Mandy Rice –Davies put it at the Profumo sex scandal trial:
“Well ‘e would say that, wooden ‘e ? “


Paralus wrote Sun 18 May

“Now, I see no one is accusing Aelian of creating "a new, unheard of, formation which might be called ‘double open’". The form of depth doubling is clearly described and, if its use would lead to disaster, one wonders why it was ever practised.”

You still don’t seem to grasp the nature of these drills and what Polybius is trying to describe - and that it is one thing to describe particular individual drill manoeuvres, but one shouldn’t take them out of context. One can’t use these to expand formations/doubling depth ‘ad infinitum’......your argument would presumably allow doubling to 64 and 128 etc

The manuals describe the ‘doubling of depth’ for a particular purpose, as being how normal/open formation (16 deep) was returned to from close order/pyknosis ( or from synaspismos)– and that is what and why it was practised.

If you read the manuals carefully, you won’t need to "wonder" any more....but of course that was presumably just rhetorical, wasn’t it ?
Nor does one accuse Aelian of anything, but rather the 32 deep 'double open' formation is Paralus' invention. Agesilaos seems happy enough that was only momentary/temporary, but as he pointed out, large numbers don't deploy instantaneously. Assuming that this unrealistic formation was known and pratised ( which so far as we know, it wasn't), the order would have to have been given on the right, then passed down the 1,000 yards or so line of 30-40 syntagma, and then presumably carried out syntagma by syntagma, with the first on the right having to wait for the last on the left to comply, all of which would have taken time. Only when the files were standing 32 deep, each some 12 feet apart could the closing up then begin - taking the 6-8 minutes as before.....

As Paralus agrees, the basis of manouevre was the 16 deep file ( there was no such thing as a file 32 deep ; technically what we have is two 16 deep files one behind the other when we do hear of such - Issus, Sellasia and Magnesia, or two 'merged' half-files when moving back into normal order of each file 16 deep as per the manuals), and there were only 3 formations – normal order 16 deep, pyknosis/close order 8 deep, and locked shields/synaspismos at 4 deep. [Aelian V.11-14; Arrian Tactica 11-19; Asclep Tactica III.5-9] usually achieved by ‘doubling’ a.k.a ‘halving depth’ [Aelian 29; Arrian 25; Asclep X.19-20]
No ’32 deep’ file formations are EVER described, and I’ll return to this later for how on occasion such a formation came about, from one phalanx formation 16 deep being placed behind another.....

On May 19, Paralus wrote:

“Agesilaos is free to task me on the notion of the Roman left and Philip's deployment should he feel unsatisfied with my reply.
This method of doubling is related inthe above post. I will not rewrite it. One wonders why it is included....”

And since I too raised the same objections, I take it that I too “am free to task you” on the subject? I did so, like Agesilaos, and you have just ignored the matter, and continue to avoid questions.....which speaks volumes. Your hypothesis simply does not hold up, for it has fatal flaws as I have explained previously, and there is the further issue of ‘timings’ raised above......
See above for the answer to your ‘wondering’ (again ?)...

Paralus wrote thurs May 22:

“Whilst I'm here, a couple of catch-ups are in order...”

I’ll translate this euphemism. “ And another thing.... I want to go back and re-open/continue an argument”
Paralus seems to be like a dog with a bone, and just can’t let go of an argument, despite this earlier:

“Then we will simply have to disagree. Readers can make their own minds up.”

Xenophon wrote:As another example of interpreting material in isolation, Paralus ( and others) would have it on the strength of XVIII.28 et seq that the phalanx normally fought 16 deep in close order, for having described it, Polybius goes on to say [XVIII.30]:

“From this we can easily conceive what is the nature and force of a charge by the phalanx when it is 16 deep”.

Notice that he does NOT say “16 deep in close order”. That is simply an (incorrect) assumption. He knew and would expect his readers to know that generally a phalanx 16 deep would move into ‘close order/pyknosis’ by halving their depth ( to 8 ) before engaging.

Readers might be nonplussed attempting to locate that supposed "example of interpreting material in isolation" of mine on this thread. I do believe the only claim relating to that passage was made by yourself. I merely supplied some context.

How about this ( your post may 14) as but one of several examples?

“As Spock would intone, it is only logical that Philip's phalanx deployed into line sixteen deep as was the practice. If it shows nothing else, Polybios' splenetic criticism of Kallisthenes demonstrates this. In this formation it occupied over 1,140 metres, err, 1,246 yards. The same as the unsubstantiated eight deep in 'fighting' order.”

In fact, pyknosis/close order 8 deep is fully substantiated by the 3 surviving versions of the manual. [e.g. Aelian 11.0; Arrian 11-12; Asclep IV.2-3 ], just as I said in your quote of me.

“Xenophon wrote:You are distorting what Aelian says, and also not comparing the other versions".


I can add distortion to my list of crimes it appears. I have to say I don't understand: just what have I "distorted"?? “

A number of things, for example you quote Aelian’s ‘doubling’ drill movement [29] without referring to the fact that its purpose was to get from close order/pyknosis ( or synaspismos) back to normal order, [ e.g. Arrian 25; Asclep X.19-20],and take this section out of context as support for your invention of a ’32 deep’ formation with files 12 feet apart ( which never existed).


..and...

“Having drunk from the fountain of historical infallibility, I find nothing to disagree with in anything I've posted. This is as it should be, debate without end. Amen.”

I thought this to be a jest.....but no! It is all too literally true. I have posted over 15,000 words in this thread, and both Agesilaos and Paralus have been far more prolific !! That’s of the order of 60,000 words – book length ! ....and on and on we go! Once again you two prolific posters have run on ahead.....I just ( sadly) can’t keep up.

“Philip "ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right". Two actions were required and two, as above, performed. If they began in open order the phalanx can only have finished 32 deep.”

...and....

Paralus wrote Sat May 24 :

“On the frontage issue, it comes down to what Philip actually did. His right wing deployed into line and, as I've said, that would be standard sixteen deep in open order (as opposed to your eight deep in such with which I disagree). We both agree that, as Polybios states, the phalanx then doubled its depth and closed to the right. Unless you can convince me that the phalanx deployed from march into line only eight deep (it already occupied over 1,000 metres sixteen deep), this means it was thirty-two deep on a 312 metre frontage. Philip knew what he faced down the slope and he thought this formation suited to the task.”

Repetition doesn’t make it so..... and you still haven’t explained how this could have worked, or answered the question of how this non-viable formation ( on a frontage of 250-312 yards max) could have pushed back the Roman left wing, which would have had a frontage of at least 500 yards and perhaps as much as 800 yards....perhaps you’d like the Legions to have lined up one behind the other? LOL !! As Agesilaos says, Cynoscephalae is not Thermopylae.....

Since Paralus , by repetition without explanation is "unpersuaded" by arguments of unrealistic formations and physical impossibility, I shall ( futilely, I know ) try to move the immovable object of his unshakable belief, by trying a different approach.

Here's why no sane commander ever intentionally deployed his men 32 deep, in order to fight:

1. A 32 deep formation has only the first 5 ranks participating, so that 27 ranks - over 80% of the formation - are just useless spectators who can have no effect on the outcome ! ( having a depth of 16 would be bad enough, with 11 ranks - some two thirds - not participating.)

2. As we have seen, such a narrow column is highly vulnerable to flank attacks.

Let us consider the three occasions ( so far as I recall) when there is a reference to "32 deep" formations. The first is Alexander at Issus, as related by Callisthenes via Polybius. His phalanx begins some 32 deep, as it debouches through a narrow pass. Since the phalanx was always divided into two wings ( lit: keras = horns), the easiest explanation is that due to topography - the narrow pass - we have the left wing of the phalanx marching behind the right. As soon as the plain broadens out, the left wing deploys beside the right, and we have the normal phalanx line formed 16 deep. Finally, on getting close to the enemy, the phalanx closes up into 'pyknosis' and fights 8 deep.....all very normal.[Polyb XII.19.6-9]

Next is Sellasia. On the left wing, Antigous has to march his phalanx up a ridge to a peak, and forms his phalanx of 16 deep files into two parts, one behind the other, for a total of 32 deep. The fight takes place across the ridge on this narrow frontage, and the Makedones are pushed back by the Spartans, 16 deep. ( incidently demonstrating the falseness of the belief that the deeper formation would always outshove the shallower one - beyond a certain point, depth is useless.)

To force the issue, Antigonus marched the rear phalanx into the forward one so as to form 'synaspismos' 16 deep, and with twice as many men in the front line finally prevails against the Spartan phalanx. [Polyb II.69 et seq including the infamous meaning of 'epallelos' that Paralus fears more 'trench warfare' over - as do I !!]

Once again, no 'fighting formation' 32 deep.

Finally, we have Magnesia. Livy and Appian ( and possibly Polybius too) don't seem to understand what Antiochus was doing, when he drew his phalanx blocks up one behind the other, so as to be 32 deep overall. He certainly didn't intend to fight thus.

His line was punctuated by armoured elephants, with their light infantry escorts. The phalanx was divided into some 10 'blocks', each on a frontage of 100 yards in open order, with one 'block' of 16 deep sarissaphoroi behind front block, rather like the 'prior' and 'posterior' centuries of the Roman maniple, with gaps between of 100 yards containing a pair of elephants plus their light infantry guard. As Antiochus ( and his advisor Hannibal, who doesn't seem to have been present at the battle ) well knew, elephants could be a two-edged sword, as likely to trample their own side as the enemy if forced back. Therefore these 'elephant lanes' were left ( c.f. Scipio at Zama a few years before) If the elephants succeeded in disrupting the Roman infantry, all well and good, the rear phalanx would fill the 100 yard gap, forming the usual solid 16 deep line, which could then close up to 8 deep in 'pyknosis' to attack the disrupted Romans. Equally, if things went awry, the elephants could withdraw down the lanes, and once again the phalanx could form line, and then 'pyknosis', without being disrupted by their own elephants.

In the event, before the plan could be executed, the Seleucid light infantry panicked [ see Livy XXXVII.42.4; Appian X. 35] fell back through the phalanx, which was in 'open' order and disrupted it. Despite this, the phalanx managed to deploy in a hollow square around the elephants and lights ( in close order) and started to withdraw in an orderly manner. A constant missile barrage eventually panicked the elephants, who created mayhem, and the phalanx dissolved.....

Once again, no intention of going into action 32 deep.....

What possible reason could Philip have had for doing such a thing, which no other commander ever did, especially when there are far more likely explanations for Philip's manouevre on Cynoscephalae ridge ?

( Rhetorical question; no need to come back and tell us your monolithic belief wall remains 'unpersuaded'. )

[Xenophon]

Another seven posts to address ( at time of writing....wouldn’t surprise me if there were more before I get to posting....) !!

Agesilaos wrote Sat 24 May:

Philip’s aims are stated at XVIII 20 ii

2 Philip for his part began to march towards Scotussa, hoping to procure supplies from that town and afterwards when fully furnished to find ground suitable for his own army.


He was clearly not intending any flanking movement on Flamininus’ left (a grand tactical rather than ‘strategic’ manoeuvre, in any case); for one he did not know where the Romans were, secondly his supply line ran NNE to Larissa if he moved SW he would be exposing his already fragile supply line; had he been ‘in supply’ he need not have retired upon Skotussa and, it follows, had Skotussa been able to meet his needs he would not have sent the rawer half of his army of foraging on the day of the battle. His strategic aim was to shorten his supply lines by falling back upon Larissa at the same time stretching Flamininus’, which ran to the coast, and would also be exposed to attack from Philip’s garrisons at Demetrias, Pthiotic Thebes and Pharsalos. He was attempting to move North when the weather prevented the movement. Nor, once contact had been established with the enemy did he move to outflank them via the pass, instead he chose to block them by occupying the heights, despite the alleged difficulty of using his phalanx there.

Can’t agree with this. Surely ‘ground suitable for his own army’ must mean a fairly flat area – and that must in turn mean the Plains of Thessaly. Having been ‘blocked’ at Pherae Philip’s only real strategic ( or grand tactical, if you will ) option was to ’cross grain’ the country to the west, and then turn south through the pass. ( this pass and the route near Pherae were the two main routes into Thessaly proper) Tactically this would offer him battlefields suitable to the phalanx on the flat(tish) Plains of Thessaly. Logistically, it also drew the Romans away from their coastal supply route, while easing his own due to the road running south ( and over the pass) from Larissa, not to mention local supplies from the plains themselves. I would agree that he may not have met all his supply needs from Scotussa, but he will in any event have been drawing supplies from the whole area around it as well – hence the foraging. (He camps “in the territory of Scotussa” rather than the city itself..

This is the second time you have stated that the foragers all came from the left wing, less experienced part of the phalanx, but I think this is just your assumption. Polybius just says:
“....sent out a fair number of his men from his camp to forage”[XVIII.22] which surely implies they came from the whole army, and would have consisted of servants etc to do the actual foraging, with vedettes and guards of troops to protect them, drawn from the whole army. I certainly don’t think that Philip was attempting to move north, toward his base at Larissa. His campaign aim was to engage the Roman army, and that purpose was best served by crossing the Karadag range southward, and entering south-west Thessaly via the pass. I believe Hammond correctly discerns Philip’s plans.

Philip certainly DID move to beat the Romans to the pass, setting off for the pass despite the weather, until he was forced to halt, and even then sending on an advance force to secure the pass by picketing the heights and overlooking the pass itself – the normal way of dominating the lower saddle of a pass from high ground. When he later deployed his phalanx to the heights east of the pass, it was because of the tactical situation, and to extricate his swollen advance force of lights and cavalry. Whilst doing so, the temptation of attacking the Romans from a tactically advantageous position, downhill, became obvious, but even then his hand was forced, for the Romans were advancing uphill to attack him !

Accordingly I would largely agree the rest of your post....save that he clearly ‘doubled his depth and closed up’ mainly in order to make room for the left wing of his phalanx, and secondarily to concentrate against the rapidly advancing Roman left wing....like you, I believe the Roman right was still deploying behind its screen of stationary elephants.