pothos.org

I guess as a huge fan of Alexander and an apreciate of his brilliance and genius. It would suit my fantasical views to think were it not for the Mutineers Alexander could have conquered the whole world. Its never been done an never will.

With comparisons to modern Empires. The British Empire with the age of gun powder became too far stretched to the extent that we couldntt realistically hold on to America. I would argue that with better Generals and more effort from the British at that time then the British could have won the so called revolutionary wars that the Americans so adamantly believe they won. but as the Film and Quotes go. A bridge Too far.

I believe Alexander did return to Babylon and intended conquests west. He was familiar with the territories and much more central to where he would probably have made his Capital. He could have made a bigger empire gained more prestige and became Greater with a more managable western Empire. And at the time of Alexanders vast wealth and unequaled military behaviour nothing west would have stopped him.

Kenny

The Eye Expanded arrived yesterday and I took a look at Philip O. Spann's contribution, Alexander at the Beas: Fox in a Lion's Skin.

Spann's reasoning as to why Alexander did not want to go further is extensive, and some points are the same as has been discussed in this thread. In addition, after commenting how every source describes Alexander's troops as ill-equipped, fatigued, and disheartened, Spann asks:

If he did indeed wish to embark on a major campaign beyond the Beas, was this the time to insist upon it? From Curtius and Diodorus we learn that reinforcements and supplies were near at hand. Would it not have been wiser, if Alexander really meant to continue, to wait for these reinforcements to catch up with him? By then his Macedonian troops might have recovered their vigor and morale, especially as they witnessed an end to the rainy season. Alexander had in the past shown no little ability to sense and manipulate the emotional temper of his troops. Why now this sudden insistence on a campaign for which he knew they were physically and mentally unprepared?

Contending that Alexander, having set out to conquer the whole world, needed a reason for turning back that did not impugn his Olympian self-image, Span lays out his scenario:

There was no mutiny. Alexander gave no order to move out and no order was refused, and he probably could not have induced his men to disobey a direct order at this point in the campaign.

Alexander did not address the troops (who might have said yes) but called together his top officers, per Arrian. This is very important for his argument - citing Brunt and N.G.L. Hammond - that Diodorus' and Curtius' statements that the entire army was addressed are GÇ£almost certainly unhistorical.GÇ¥ Instead, Alexander spoke only to his officers, all of whom were aware that the encircling ocean was not near, and made a plausible pretense of trying to persuade them that it was not distant. Span claims that Alexander ran no risk of convincing them, and also contradicted himself shortly afterwards when he spoke of the many tribes to be conquered before the ocean was to be reached. Then, after a long period of silence, Alexander most unusually invited his officers to disagree. As Spann says, Alexander was not an Athenian politician and

. . .did not have to debate anyone to make his will prevail. Moreover, he had been manipulating his army now for some eight years. If he wanted them to react for or against something, he simply installed in their midst a man or a claque of several who had spoke spontaneously, as it were, in favor of what Alexander wanted done. Coenus had served in this capacity before. Several years earlier, when Philotas had been brought before the army for trial and his miserable and manacled condition was arousing pity in the soldiers, Coenus had jumped up spontaneously, as it were, and had begun to attack him in the most virulent language. Already part of Alexander's inner circle, Coenus subsequently had advanced rapidly in command, and by the time Alexander had reached the Beas, Coenus was the senior person present in age and rank.

I have to say that the above is a reasonably credible argument, IMO - the suggestion that Coenus was Alexander's mole in the trial of Philotas is as plausible as saying he spoke against Philotas because he feared for the danger in which he found himself (Heckel).

The rest we have pretty much discussed, although Spann does add that it was an excellent idea of Alexander's to threaten to go on with volunteers - if it was his ntent to coerce the unwilling. He did not, however, make any attempt to do so, but simply sulked in his tent for a couple of days and then offered the sacrifices. And when the army cried out that Alexander had submitted to defeat at their hands alone (Arrian 5.29), this was precisely the point that Alexander wished to convey to posterity.

Comments?

Best regards,

Alexander did not address the troops (who might have said yes)

Hello,
I think that they most certainly would have said no. Swords rusting in their sheaves, sleeping in hammocks so they werenGÇÖt bitten by poisonous snakes, rain that it is even worse than in England, there, for me at least, are simply too many reasons why the troops, rank and file were ready to go home.(or what was left of them)

I understand that Alexander wouldnGÇÖt have spoken to the whole army as that would have required loudspeakers to say the least- he wouldnGÇÖt have spoken to the rank and file yet I believe that Coenus was speaking up for the rank and file.

Alexander was intelligent and easily capable of drumming up such a scenario I am sure but I just donGÇÖt see the need for such a complicated final scene of the journey. Plus I find CoenusGÇÖ death just simply too suspicious.

Best regards,
Dean

dean wrote:

Alexander did not address the troops (who might have said yes)

Hello,
I think that they most certainly would have said no. Swords rusting in their sheaves, sleeping in hammocks so they were not bitten by poisonous snakes, rain that it is even worse than in England, there, for me at least, are simply too many reasons why the troops, rank and file were ready to go home (or what was left of them).

Hi Dean,

I am leaning towards the idea that it would not have made any difference whether Alexander had addressed the whole army or if they had said no. IF Alexander had truly wanted to go on, that is. Spann is correct in that Alexander threatened to ask for volunteers, but did not do so. If he had asked, there is no doubt in my mind that he would have found some of those Companions closest to him would have agreed no matter how concerned they were about what lay ahead. And it is hard to believe that the entirety of the rank and file would have refused to follow him. They were stuck in the middle of nowhere in what had proved to be very hostile lands. They had suffered through years in Bactria and Sogdia and then had had to face the terrors of the Indian armies with their elephants. If they refused to follow Alexander, which General was going to lead them home? (Yes, I know there were Greeks in the east who tried to return home after Alexander's death, but they had had a few years to familiarize themselves with the lands at this point.) I cannot imagine anyone, be it Coenus or Craterus or any Friend, saying okay, I will take the rest of the army home while Alexander goes on to the ocean. Do you think Alexander would have stood for that? Or that there was any real risk of a general rebellion in India? I think the men would have panicked at the thought of being without Alexander - look how they responded when they thought he had been killed by the Mali.

Spann is very convincing on one point, IMO. If Alexander really wanted to continue eastwards, why not wait for the supplies, reinforcements, and the end of the monsoon? Not only would his army have been in a much better frame of mind, he would have had new reinforcements who were most unlikely to have refused to follow him.

There is also the fact that Alexander finally agreed to return home based supposedly on the sacrifices. In his endnotes Spann quotes A.D. Nock, Religious Attitudes of the Ancient Greeks, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 85 (1942) who points out that as a rule you sacrificed victims until you got favorable omens; unless you desired otherwise. We know that Alexander did this on other occasions, so why not now - IF, as I said before, he really wanted to continue to the east?

To believe in a successful rebellion at the Hyphasis we have to accept that Alexander knew he could not convince or coerce his army to follow him - that they really did defeat him. I have my doubts. There are some good points in this article, I feel. ABM says Heckel's development of Spann's argument is not very convincing, but I am anticipating it with relish.

Best regards,

Hi Amyntoros,

Interesting, although I'll need to read the article itself properly. However, a couple of things:

amyntoros wrote:Alexander did not address the troops (who might have said yes) but called together his top officers, per Arrian. This is very important for his argument - citing Brunt and N.G.L. Hammond - that DiodorusGÇÖ and CurtiusGÇÖ statements that the entire army was addressed are GÇ£almost certainly unhistorical.GÇ¥

Agreed, but this is pure common sense, also - it is extremely difficult to address the entire gathering of over 50,000 men (or however many we've decided there were at the time). Even the best regimental sergeant major wouldn't be able to make his voice heard, and the sort of cajoling and berating that would have had to go on - especially if there is also "dialogue" with Coenus, would be, quite frankly, impossible. However, if Alexander gathered together all his companions, and all the officers from, say, dekarchos upwards, there would still be something more than 500 people in the crowd - more than enough to put forward the soldiers' views and to be roundly told off by the C-in-C!

Already part of AlexanderGÇÖs inner circle, Coenus subsequently had advanced rapidly in command, and by the time Alexander had reached the Beas, Coenus was the senior person present in age and rank.

Not sure I agree with that. Possibly in age, but I'm not sure I'd agree that he was the most senior in rank. I'd need to check where certain other officers were at the time, but I don't recall that there were any offshoots away suppressing the Indian tribes at the time - which means that I would argue for Craterus, probably Hephaistion, and possibly Perdiccas (at the least) having more seniority than Coenus.

ATB

Hi Amyntoros,

Just a minor point: I think that I remember that indeed several (or at least more than one) sacrifices were made by the Beas, and that (allegedly) all were negative. Then the construction of the pillars and the rest. I might be wrong, but that's my recollection at least.

And the point about the reinforcements is quite interesting, as well as the fact that the monsoon would be over by the time of their arrival. But about the volunteers, I am not so sure. It's true that the sources seem to suggest that the soldiers "would feel at a loss and totally freak out" without Alexander, but I think it is overrated.

Anyway, it is an interesting theory, and usually you are not able to say that one hypothesis (say, soldiers wanted to come back) excludes the other (Alexander wanted to come back). But what is quite certain is that, whatever the reasons, Alexander would ensure that his image as an undefeated conqueror would be everlasting. And the "defeated only by his own soldiers" is exactly that!

All the best,
Alejandro

amyntoros wrote: They were stuck in the middle of nowhere in what had proved to be very hostile lands. TheyGÇÖd suffered through years in Bactria and Sogdia and then had had to face the terrors of the Indian armies with their elephants. If they refused to follow Alexander, which General was going to lead them home?

Pardon me, but, I think that might just miss the point. Yes they were stuck in the middle of nowhere and, yes, these were very hostile lands. Many did not willingly submit and much of those GÇô after defeat GÇô indicated their feelings by rising in rebellion at the merest suggestion of Alexander's attention being elsewhere. The army and GÇô a fortiori GÇô its senior officers were only too well aware of this. Alexander himself appears to have been well aware. His "settlement" of the Indian "provinces" belies an understanding that Macedonian control was largely ephemeral as well as dependent upon himself being within reprisal-shot (so to speak).

The thing here is that those in the army command who felt enough was far enough did not necessarily expect to be going home Alexander-less. Rather, this was more a case of the children deciding they wanted to go home: enough touring the galleries of the museum. If we make enough ruction and discord here, mum and dad will take us home. I doubt they ever seriously contemplated that mum and dad (Alexander and Hephaestion) would continue on and tell them to take themselves home.

amyntoros wrote:Spann is very convincing on one point, IMO. If Alexander really wanted to continue eastwards, why not wait for the supplies, reinforcements, and the end of the monsoon? Not only would his army have been in a much better frame of mind, he would have had new reinforcements who were most unlikely to have refused to follow him.

How much Alexander knew of these replacements and their current disposition is anyone's guess. It is interesting that Arrian does not mention them though and I'm not about to buy into any arguments based on the silence of the "non-friend" Aristobulos or Ptolemy for that matter. Another likely explanation is that common sense obtruded here and Alexander GÇô like his general staff GÇô acceded to the looming problems of controlling and administering these rambunctious and restive Indians. A recalcitrant conqueror bows to what he already knew (and would preferred to have ignored) and set about putting the Indian "satrapies" in order. In as much as they ever were "in order" and subjugated

I too agree with Marcus' assessment of Coenus and his position in the army. Senior commanderGÇô in a infantry sense and able to command a cavalry (secondary) wing GÇô yes, but only in comparison to brigade commanders below him. Hephaestion, Craterus and Perdiccas certainly "outranked" him. And, one suspects, by a good margin.

Interesting those reinforcements by the way. Why does Arrian omit them? Bosworth's estimation of some 30,000 or so crossing the Makran and Craterus' 10-12,000 or so going home by a different route tends to tally with Alexander's normal operating numbers (when one considers he released the Indian native contingents prior to the crossing)

Thanks for all the responses! It may seem like I am playing devil's advocate but the truth is that I am fascinated by theories that contradict something we thought was understood about Alexander. Whether or not we concur with a new theory or tear it to shreds, I think the ensuing debates help us to better understand and define Alexander. That said, here are my responses to your comments:

marcus wrote: I would argue for Craterus, probably Hephaistion, and possibly Perdiccas (at the least) having more seniority than Coenus.

I had wondered about Spann's statement that Coenus was senior in age and rank, but refrained from commenting as I know that there are Pothosians much better informed than myself about military matters. Frankly, I had never paid much attention to him at all outside of the events at the trial of Philotas and the Hyphasis. I did take a quick glance at Heckel's Who's Who in the Age of Alexander the Great and was quite surprised to see the extent and importance of his commands. If he were (possibly) fourth-ranked as you suggest, that still gives him a higher status than I had ever realized.

Paralus wrote:The thing here is that those in the army command who felt enough was far enough did not necessarily expect to be going home Alexander-less. Rather, this was more a case of the children deciding they wanted to go home: enough touring the galleries of the museum. If we make enough ruction and discord here, mum and dad will take us home. I doubt they ever seriously contemplated that mum and dad (Alexander and Hephaestion) would continue on and tell them to take themselves home.

But this begs the question: What if mum and dad had done just that - said they wouldd continue on with volunteers, Persians, etc! If the army had never seriously contemplated such a response from Alexander, does not that imply that he could have continued eastwards and the dissenters in the army would have realized that they had no option but to follow him? So if Alexander really wanted to continue on and it is our consensus that the army would have followed him, then it lends credence to Spann's theory, don't you think?

Paralus wrote:Interesting those reinforcements by the way. Why does Arrian omit them? Bosworth's estimation of some 30,000 or so crossing the Makran and Craterus' 10-12,000 or so going home by a different route tends to tally with Alexander's normal operating numbers (when one considers he released the Indian native contingents prior to the crossing)

Yeah, we have discussed these replacements before and I agreed that the numbers seem grossly exaggerated; but surely there were some additions to the army? The bringing of supplies and replacement armor seems to be quite credible, so I would expect there to have been a certain number of new recruits accompanying the supplies.

alejandro wrote: But what is quite certain is that, whatever the reasons, Alexander would ensure that his image as an undefeated conqueror would be everlasting. And the "defeated only by his own soldiers" is exactly that!

You are unconsciously echoing Spann's words, except he believes he knows the reason!

And this was precisely the point that Alexander wished to convey to posterity. The failure to conquer all of Asia, to reach the eastern Ocean was indeed a defeat, but the army was responsible for it. His speech at the Beas, indeed his behavior as a whole, was a disingenuous fiction designed to flatter his self-image while inflaming the misgivings of his officers by appeals to arguments that he knew that they knew were false.

dean wrote:Alexander was intelligent and easily capable of drumming up such a scenario I am sure but I just do not see the need for such a complicated final scene of the journey.

I think the final scene seems more complicated than it really was - it is still the same single speech before the officers and the only difference is how we view Alexander's intent and Coenus' participation. It was not the first time that Alexander had been disingenuous (to quote Spann); there is the incident with Callisthenes (Plutarch, Alex 53.3-5) where Alexander asked Callisthenes to speak in praise of the Macedonians. When the men applauded Callisthenes and threw garlands at him, Alexander then asked him to give a denunciation of the Macedonians so that they may become even better by learning their faults. In this speech Callisthenes was even more eloquent and spoke boldly against the Macedonians so that they acquired a stern and bitter hatred of him. According to Plutarch, Callisthenes was not popular with many of those close to Alexander (the flatters) but favored by many of the younger and older men. I have to believe that Alexander knew what he was doing when he asked Callisthenes to speak against the Macedonians and I see it as a carefully calculated move, much as Spann considers the speech at the Hyphasis to have been. All my opinion, of course.

Best regards

Never was nor will it be conquered. I would just add my little penneth worth here and reckon Alexander wanted to turn back. History tells us that Afghanistan In particular cant be conquered look at the Russians and the Aliance forces now.

Arguement would say that the region as a awhole was basically a route between the far East and the West. Maybe another reason why Alexander crossed the Makran a far closer and theoretically risk free route if you can as Alexander hoped hugged the coast with wells along the way. Maybe if Alexander had gone furher and the people maybe became more Pacifiable he would have hade success. But Afghanistan as a whole as many later conquerers have learned is a bloody nightmare.

Sure his troops had had enough but I feel so did he and needed a face saving excuse of the so called mutiny then the Omens. If Alexander was as argues by some scolars a tyrant he could have gone on and had a a few executions here and there.

We all know Alexanders drive and nature if he really wanted something that bad he usually found a way to get it.

Kenny

Hi Kenny,

kennyxx wrote:Sure his troops had had enough but I feel so did he and needed a face saving excuse of the so called mutiny then the Omens. If Alexander was as argues by some scolars a tyrant he could have gone on and had a a few executions here and there.

That raises a very interesting question about how deep the feeling was in the army (or in the command tent). A tyrant would rely on force, and the early tyrants of Greece demonstrated force by hiring mercenaries, who obviously would be loyal so long as they were getting paid. How can a tyrant impose his will if *everyone* is against him? If Alexander still wanted to continue into India and said "Right, Coenus, I won't have any of that. Someone execute him", who would have rushed to do his bidding? Hephaestion, almost certainly, but would there be enough support to stop the other malcontents from intervening and possibly even killing Hephaestion to prevent their spokesman from being killed. What would they then have done with Alexander? And, if they decided that they just had to deal with A., would the army have decided that they couldn't bear to lose him?

Hmm, I'm starting to see how Alexander could have contrived the situation to make the army follow him into India! ...

ATB

Hi Marcus,

I know this is going way off topic but you mention that Hephaestion would certainly have executed Coenus if Alexander had ordered it-

I was reading a very interesting bit of speculation by Michael Wood regarding the death of Hephaestion and the time of conception of Alexander IV.
In his book, Wood, in one of the final chapters, has just finished describing the lavish funeral pyre of Hephaestion and then mentions about Alexander's and his,possibly sexual relationship. He finishes saying that it is curious how Roxanne becomes pregnant a month after Hephaestion's death. of course it is just Wood speculating that Alexander subsituted his sexual partner for Roxanne after Hephaestion's death- but it made me think.

It doesn't either detract from the fact that Roxanne had already been pregnant and lost the baby in India near the Jheleum.

Best wishes,
Dean