pothos.org

I found a map of the terrain about Kerkyra, the line of the walls and the positions of the gates being determined archaeologically. The Spartan troops are in 500 man blocks, those with Mnasippos eight deep the others four; as you will observe it would be difficult to cover the ground were the others also eight deep, we know the extreme left was close to the northerly gate and also that Mnasippos, could observe the flight of his left and centre and be close enough to have intervened, had he not been occupied among the tombs. The only way that a flank could have been presented would be if the mercenaries set their left flank towards the enemy gate which is militarily improbable. The Kerkyraians are not to scale but the Spartan frontages are; I changed the original which was way over scale. The salient in the walls makes the case for the source of the weakness being the formation’s depth inevitable and that in turn makes the translation of ‘ep’okto certain as ‘[the individual units] in eight files’ rather than ‘eight deep’.
To respond to your last post, Paralus, yes, Pausanias must be used with caution but his account has epigraphic confirmation too, in that the Boetarch he names is the subject of the epitaph System1988 posted on the defunct thread. It would be rash to guess at his sources, though I wonder if he actually saw a monument to the battle-dead forty-nine is such a specific number, (guess I'm being rash!).

Forty-nine is rather a specific number. Pauline's posting of that epitaph certainly proves the role of the Boetarch Xenocrates. Plutarch (Mor. 193B) also records the separate taking up of the dead at Leuktra. It is one of only four points where Pausanias and Plutarch can be clearly seen to agree.

Agesilaos wrote on Wed Aug 6:

The notion that Xenophon was disguising hoplites as his reformed Persians founders once one reads the text; which I am doing for the references to depth.

Indeed. And I am guessing that Agesilaos has not yet reached the second half of the Cyropaedia, or he could not have framed this post in the way he did. It saddens me to have to correct various errors and misconceptions, when it would be better to get onto the subject matter of this thread – what the manuals have to say about the fighting formations of troops “armed in the Macedonian manner”, but alas it is necessary.

On the first page of the thread, Xenophon of Brisvegas, stated that

Moreover, the first thing Cyrus does is re-equip his army with ‘hopla’[ heavy infantry equipment] for hand-to-hand fighting, abandoning bows and javelins and missile weapons. [Cyropaedia II.1.9 et seq]. Thus his drill is ‘hoplite drill’, intended as a model for Greek heavy infantry, fighting hand to hand in close order

.

In fact his men are equipped with a thorax, breastplate, a gerrha, light wicker shield and a kopis(cutting sword) or sagaris (a light axe); and would look like this,

Oh dear ! It would seem we are going to have to start with the definition of ‘hoplite’, and go on from there.

‘Hopla’ broadly means ‘equipment or tools’ and in a military context 'hoplite' means men-at-arms armed for hand-to-hand fighting, as opposed to missile troops. Xenophon’s fictitious Cyrus points out [XC II.1.9 -21] that if troops broadly have the same equipment – slings, bows, and javelins and fight in the same manner ( at a distance) then whoever has the largest numbers is likely to prevail, and as a remedy he proposes equipping the Persians with ‘hopla’ – heavy infantry equipment - for close-quarter fighting, which will allow them an advantage and thus win ( just as Greek hoplites prevailed over superior numbers of Persians historically). He also ensures they are appropriately drilled [II.1.21]

We, of course, are familiar with Greek hoplites, but ‘hoplite’ actually can refer to any ‘heavy’ infantryman equipped for hand-to-hand combat. Carians, Lydians, Phoenicians and Egyptians could all be called ‘hoplites’.The pieces of equipment that define ‘hoplite’ were firstly a large shield – so much so that the Greek ‘aspis’ in later times could be termed a ‘hoplon’, and secondly hand-to-hand weapons rather than missile ones and lastly armour – many Greek hoplites in Xenophon’s day did not wear greaves or body armour. Yet by virtue of a large shield and thrusting spear they were clearly hoplites. The ‘gerrhon’ was a large shield equivalent to the Greek 'aspi's, and was certainly not ‘light’. ( indeed some archaic Greek hoplites may have carried ‘gerrha’, referred to as the ‘Theban’ shield)

Agesilaos’ illustration figures are broadly correct for Cyrus’ fictitious ‘new’ heavy-armed Persians, though there is one error. As can be seen from the leftmost figure, the gerrhon has a ‘boss’ and is in fact held by a horizontal handgrip ( like a Roman scutum), not the porpax/arm-grip shown on the right-hand figure. Xenophon points out the disadvantages of this arrangement at [ VII.1.33-,34 ], when Egyptians, with 'porpax' equipped shields physically push back with their shoulders Cyrus' Persians who have only hand-grips.

Cyrus new ‘heavy close order’ infantry are thus called‘hoplites’/men-at-arms, and also described as ‘thorakaphoroi’/armoured men by Xenophon. They are most certainly NOT peltasts or light troops

ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ θώραξ μὲν περὶ τὰ στέρνα, γέρρον δὲ εἰς τὴν ἀριστεράν, κοπὶς δὲ ἢ σάγαρις εἰς τὴν δεξιάν:
...a corselet for round the chest, a wicker shield for the left hand and a kopis or sagaris for the right:
cyreans.jpg (57.08 KiB) Viewed 13 times


Not very ‘hoplite’ nor do any of their exercises imply close order fighting, close quarters, yes as inevitable for these as it was for the similarly armed Persians who attack in small bands in Herodotos, and are depicted on several vases; these were loose order troops.

Most definitely not so. These new ‘heavy infantry/hoplites’ replace the older style Persian troops, unarmoured, unshielded or only having the smallish pelta, and armed with missile weapons. They are NOT “similarly armed” to the troops described by Herodotus, who, being shieldless, unarmoured archers ( except for the front rank ‘sparabara’ who set up a row of pavises.) are reduced to trying to grab Spartan spears with their bare hands at Plataea [ Herodotus IX.62.2], and we are twice told [IX.62.3 and IX.63.2]their defeat is due to their lack of ‘hopla’ [anoploi].
“nor do any of their exercises imply close order fighting”? Has Agesilaos forgotten that Xenophon describes them performing close order drill in some detail ( the ‘dinner drill’)?
Common sense tells us that close quarter troops don’t fight in ‘loose’ order – suicidal - but in any event Xenophon tells us Cyrus ‘new model army’ drills for close order fighting ( see above), fights in ‘lines’ that advance in good order [VII.1.10 and 26], and are in phalanx[VII.1.22], stop and dress their ranks 3 times [VII.1.4] and advance in even step (like Spartans) [VI.1.4]. They also sing a ‘paean’ and shout a war-cry to Enyalius/Ares, just like Greek hoplites did. ( but real Persians did not, as Xenophon would have known)

Xenophon, of course never mentions intervals. In Book II 4 xxii ff Krysantas is sent with half the infantry to occupy a well wooded mountain, this is not the work of hoplites but peltasts or psiloi, the son of Gryllos is clearly thinking of actual Persian troops rather than cod-hoplites.

What are “cod-hoplites”, pray ?
As to hoplites occupying mountains, they didn’t always fight in phalanx on the plains, you know. At ‘Anabasis’[IV.8.9- ] Xenophon describes Greek hoplites not just ‘occupying’ but fighting their way up and capturing “a great mountain” occupied in force by Colchians. Even Macedonian phalanxes could and did fight on mountains ( Sellasia)

Nor has he thought his unit organisation out very well, at II 1 xxii , the pempadarch has command of five, and the dekadarch of 10 and at 1 xxv a ‘taxis’ is explicitly 100 and a lochos 50 at 2 ix, so there must be 5 decades to a lochos and two lochoi to a taxis. Then we get to the infamous ‘Dinner drill’ and suddenly there are only two decades to lochos and four lochoi to a taxis! But it gets better when the Indian envoy arrives and suddenly at 4 iv the dekadarchs have been promoted to dodekadarchs! This is not just fiction but fantasy fiction.

Yes, Cyrus’ army is fictional, and there are anomalies arising from mixing Persian and Greek details, but the ‘dinner drill’ is not – it is the standard drill of a phalanx, and Cyrus’ army is reported as forming up in files 12 deep, like contemporary Spartans ( even though 12 doesn’t divide into the decimal ‘100’ men of a ‘taxis’, hence reference to “dodekadarchs” and “hekadarchs”. Since these terms are used only once by Xenophon, and occur nowhere else as far as I can determine, they may be words he has made up to emphasise his advocacy of a 12 deep formation. Nor would I describe Xenophon’s book as “fantasy”. We should not lose sight of the fact that it had a purpose – to expound to a Greek audience Xenophon’s thoughts in detail on ‘taktike’.

As I showed in my post of 4th inst, the εἰς τέτταρας of the dinner drill can only mean ‘four abreast’ which necessarily opens the possibility that the other instances could. It is neither here nor there that no has translated it thus before; that is the nature of new ideas. That it has escaped notice that we are to believe seasoned troops believed a formation 8 deep ‘weak’ is preposterous as is their performing an anastrophe to mend matters if they habitually fought 4 deep.

And as I showed in my response on 7 Aug, your post of 4 Aug is almost all erroneous. We earlier agreed that the “epi tettaron/in fours” of the Anabasis[I.2.15] is the same as “eis tettaras/in fours” of the Cyropaedia ‘dinner drill’[II.3.21]. Since in the Anabasis it is the ‘etaxqsan/battle array/ battle line’ that is ‘in fours’, it can only mean ‘four deep’, and cannot mean ‘four abreast’. It therefore follows that the ‘in fours’ of the ‘dinner drill’ must also mean ‘four deep’. [ digression: In my reconstruction I showed the ‘lochos’as two files of 8 =16. Can it be co-incidence that the later Macedonian file of 16 was also called ‘lochos’?]

As for 8 deep being considered "weak" against massed formations, the Spartans - "seasoned troops"- were evidently concerned that attrition might wear down an 8/4 deep line, and increased it to 12/6 deep. Do you think Spartan tactical responses to massed formations "preposterous"? [ digression: they would not have been concerned about their lines being burst through by the massed deep formation, for modern experiments by both re-enactors and riot police have demonstrated that a depth of 3 or 4 is adequate to resist any mass of people.] Also, as I remarked earlier, the purpose of the anastrophe may have been to shorten the line, moving the threatened extreme end of the line out of harm's way, rather than just deepening the formation ( though this would be an advantage too) .

Greek and Latin both allow words to be ‘understood’, so the fact that enomotiai are mentioned is unimportant. Yes, Xenophon’s parade was in ‘battle-formation’, but that would strengthen the case for them being eight deep, which is by far the most common depth mentioned for fighting troops; in fact this would only leave the four deep cordon of Diodoros as a mention of a depth of four.

I don’t understand what you mean by your first sentence? Your next sentence makes no sense. How can the fact that the ‘taxqhnai/battle formation’ was ‘in fours’/four deep, as Xenophon very specifically tells us “strengthen the case for them being eight deep”(presumably in close order) ? You’ll be saying black is white next.....

The reference to Diodorus I take it is to the Spartan King Agis’ attempt on Athens 408 BC, where he formed up 4 deep. [Diod XIII.72.6].I have not mentioned it earlier, because again I do not wish to embark on yet another digression – in earlier private discussions some years ago, Paralus objected that this was not a battle formation, but a cordon against part of the city wall. I demurred, pointing out that it was not a cordon – not being long enough – but hoplites drawn up in battle formation to mask sorties.

As such each mention of eis/ep and a number needs to be evaluated on its own merits as far from monolithic Xenophon’s usage varies.

So you are saying that “in fours/eights” is ambiguous, and can mean abreast or deep, depending on which you want it to be ?

Yet we examined the various references to depth previously, including the half-dozen references to 'epi/eis number', and in context it turned out all had to refer to depth. ( see my post page 9 Aug 5).

In summary then, this; “The notion that Xenophon was disguising hoplites as his reformed Persians founders once one reads the text;” is completely wrong. In fact the opposite is true, as most commentators recognise. The fictional Cyrus’ reforms his army of Persians into heavy close-order infantry – hoplites, so that Xenophon can expound on hoplite ‘taktike’.

They are :
re-equipped with ‘hopla’ =arms for close quarter fighting[II.1.9-21]
Drilled in close order drill [II.3.21]
fight in ‘lines’ that advance in good order [VII.1.10 and 26]
form phalanx[VII.1.22]
stop and dress their ranks 3 times [VII.1.4]
advance in even step (like Spartans) [VI.1.4].
Send a watchword up and down the phalanx line
They also sing a ‘paean’ and shout a war-cry to Enyalius/Ares, just like Greek hoplites
Go into battle garlanded
Worship heroes, and swear “By Zeus”
None of which real Persians did.
Cyrus’ infantry are not just hoplites, but patently Greek hoplites, not terribly well disguised as "Persians".

Most importantly, from Xenophon's detailed explanation of how his idealised army should be equipped, trained. march, supplied and even function in battle we learn a great deal about how real hoplites fought - in half-files.

EDIT: errata; contra the LSJ, which claims 'dodekadarcha'/commander of 12 is used only once at II.4.4, Xenophon actually uses the word twice, the second at III.3.11, where it is used together with 'hekadarch'
EDIT: correct 'typo', missing word 'hoplite' para 4

Xenophon wrote:The founding of Megalopolis, some 3 years later had little or nothing to do with Leuktra, and everything to do with the defection of the Arcadians as Spartan allies - due to the ascendancy of the 'anti-spartan' factions, and the subsequent defeat of the Arcadians at "The Tearless Battle". There is no evidence to suggest the change in Arcadian politics had anything to do with Leuktra, and any link is just modern assumption based on hindsight […]Following Leuktra, the 'King's Peace' which guaranteed the independence of the cities was re-affirmed by all save Thebes, and it was on this basis that Mantinea and Tegea began to assert their independence [XH VI.5.3-9].

I agree that hindsight should always be guarded against (more below) but I do not agree it is at play here. Whilst you are correct that the basis of Arcadian independence was the just reaffirmed King’s Peace, you misunderstand the circumstances. In fact, the evidence is that Leuktra was the major contributing factor in the ‘revolt’ of Arcadia (or greater parts thereof).

The King’s Peace was agreed in 386 and Sparta was the prostatai of that peace (5.1.36). For what that term meant in practice, the epitomised version can be found in Hellenika, 6.3.7-9 in Autokles’ speech at the peace conference of 375. Under this peace “all Greek cities, large and small, would be autonomous” – something Agesilaos forced upon the Thebans at near spear-point. This koine eirene, with minor differences, was renewed in 375 (with dual hegemons: Sparta on land and Athens on sea), 372/1 just prior to Leuktra and in 371/0 after Leuktra. In all, the autonomy clause was included. In the aftermath of the peace of 386, Sparta declared war on Mantinea and resettled the Mantineans into four separate villages – all in flagrant breach of the just declared peace under which the Mantineans appealed to Athens though not a word of that appeal is found in Xenophon (Diod.15.5.1-5). Polybios (4.27.7) archly remarks: “But indeed a man is a fool, as much as a knave, if he imagines that, because he shuts his own eyes, his neighbours cannot see”.

The point was not lost on the Mantineans or other Spartan allies though. Mantinea, Tegea and Arcadia remained loyally bound to Sparta and showed no signs of independence after the peace of 386 as well as those of 375 and 372/1. After Leuktra, Athens convened a congress to reaffirm the peace made prior to Luektra and all – including Sparta – signed aside from Thebes. In its aftermath Mantinea and Tegea ‘revolted’. Having shown no inclination to throw off Spartan rule after the previous iterations of this peace – all containing the same autonomy clause – both now chose to do so. The question would be why? The answer is obvious: Sparta and her vaunted homoioi had just been dealt a severe defeat in pitched battle. The mirage Spartiate was fractured and Athens, not Sparta, ‘chaired’ the peace congress. Leuktra was the spur for both these cities to claim independence under the autonomy clause not the clause itself. Although that trigger had been available for fifteen years, neither city, whilst Sparta was prostatai and her 'mirage' intact, had sought to use it. It was a different matter once she'd been rocked by Leuktra.

When I observed that Thebes, having just fought a battle for its existence, was in no position to invade the Peloponnese until an alliance was in place that would supply the necessary manpower, you replied…

Xenophon wrote:...But Thebes did have just such an alliance. The two major Arcadian cities of Tegea and Mantinea ( not to mention Argos and Elis) could field more men than the Spartans, and alone could challenge Sparta as the forced retreat of Agesilaos from an awkward situation demonstrated [XH VI.5.18]

And to Agesilaos...

Xenophon wrote: Anti-Spartan factions took control of some of the Arcadian cities, and asserted their independence. Naturally they appealed for help to Thebes. King Agesilaos took the field, and campaigned well into the following mid-winter, grimly hoping Epaminondas and his Boeotians would answer Arcadian pleas and give him a chance to avenge Leuktra. The Thebans timidly waited until Agesilaos returned home before poking their noses into the Peoloponnese…

This is to 'telescope' matters more severely than Diodorus at his worst while ignoring other evidence. In the aftermath of Leuktra Thebes looked to Boeotia and central Greece. Orchomenus and Thespiae needed to be dealt with and the Boeotian Confederacy put into firm order. At this stage, Thebes had no alliance with any Peloponnesian state. In the year following, the above discussed situation with Mantinea and Tegea erupted and Sparta attempted (unsuccessfully) to block the synoecism of Mantinea. Thebes still has no alliance with any Peloponnesian state. Over the summer and autumn, following Mantinea’s success (as opposed to 385), Arcadian ‘nationalism’ rose and moves began to form a ‘federation’. Sparta now had an ‘uprising’ on her hands and mobilises an army under Agesilaos who marches into Mantinean territory, ravages some land and extracts his army eventually returning home. This is midwinter and Xenophon glibly tells us that the reason the Mantineans and Arcadians ceased deploying was that they were awaiting the Thebans who would surely come because they’d taken money to do so. No word of when this appeal had been made (6.5.19).

If Xenophon were all we had we’d have no idea of when or to whom the Arcadians appealed for help. Firstly, Agesilaos is hardly to be presumed to be waiting in the field for months on end somehow “hoping for a chance to avenge Leuktra” (indeed Xenophon describes Agesilaos as "very much wishing to lead his army back home", 6.5.20). This will have been a limited campaign late in the year just as Xenophon narrates it. At this point it will be remembered that Athens had called and ‘presided’ over the peace conference of late 371. Diodorus describes the same campaign and, whilst supplying a different name for the Arcadian general, coheres with Xenophon (in summary form). There is one difference though. Although Xenophon, just as with Mantinea above, breathes not a word of it, the Arcadians first sent to Athens for aid as Diodorus makes plain (15.62.3). Athens declined and that having been conveyed, the Arcadians only then sent to Thebes which duly took up the offer. This appeal is clearly late in the year and near certainly during the winter.

Thebes, then, had no alliances in the Peloponnese immediately after Leuktra. In fact it was not until late in 370 that Thebes contracted an alliance with the Arcadians. That Agesilaos waited in the field “hoping for a chance to avenge Leuktra” and Thebes “timidly waited until Agesilaos returned home before poking their noses into the Peoloponnese” is little more than an entertaining rhetorical flourish.

Xenophon wrote:

Paralus wrote:Whatever else might be said, the disasters that enveloped Sparta over the following few years can all be laid at the door of Leuktra. There could be no decent land alliance and grand campaign against Sparta without it. This was no mora defeated by Iphikrates' peltasts nor was it Sphacteria. This was a comprehensive and catastrophic defeat of homoioi arms in pitched battle. It was, for Sparta, the Titanic's iceberg: the SS Lakadaemonia ,while still afloat, was on severely limited time and its allied passengers were inevitably abandoning ship.

I don't believe that is so. It is a 'modern topos' using plenty of hindsight. At the time, second Mantinea and the death of Epaminondas undid everything Leuktra stood for.

The result of Leuktra emboldened Mantinea and Tegea to assert their ‘rights’ under the autonomy clause of the post Leuktra koine eirene and ignite an independence movement. A right they had at their disposal ever since 386 and never utilised until Sparta’s clear and shocking defeat in the field. This independence movement saw the Arcadians seeking support from the Athenians which was rejected and, subsequently, from the Thebans which was accepted. From that moment the events that would reduce and confine Sparta to the Peloponnese were in train. No hindsight involved.

*Edited for source refs and clarity.

Xenophon calls these half-file leaders ‘pampadarchs’ and refers to them several times in his various works. He also describes the drill to form up four deep, by the pampadarchs/half-file leaders leading up the rear half-file, in ‘Cyropaedia’ II.3.21 et seq [ By the way, the file leaders are called ‘dekadarchs’ c.f. Macedonian manuals]. Obviously, quarter-files and 18 inch frontages for hoplites were not possible ( the formation would have been too thin at 2 deep, nor would the larger ‘aspides’ of the hoplites allow this). Because the 80-90 cm diameter aspides were all but touching, to a hoplite ‘close order/pyknosis’ was also ‘locked shields/synaspismos’ and the term is used in this way by Xenophon.

From your post, 3 July; that’s right you started the digression that allegedly saddens you so much LOL! Still I am always heartened when Xenophon begins his posts with an air of assumed superiority, as it inevitably proves to be just that, assumed. ‘It saddens me to have to correct various errors and misconceptions…but alas it is necessary.’

Oh dear ! It would seem we are going to have to start with the definition of ‘hoplite’, and go on from there.

‘Hopla’ broadly means ‘equipment or tools’ and in a military context means men-at-arms armed for hand-to-hand fighting, as opposed to missile troop

s.

Oh dear! First patronising jibe first two mistakes, we’ll forgive the ‘hopla’ meaning a man-at-arms, that is ‘ὁπλίτης’, but confusion over parts of speech seems to be an on going theme; but nothing stops missile armed troops being described as ‘hoplites’; the Indian archers at the Hydaspes are so described at Arrian V 15 vi

κατὰ στόμα τε γὰρ ἂν πρὸς τῶν ὁπλιτῶν προσβαλλόντων εἴργεσθαι καὶ καταπατηθήσεσθαι ἐπιστρεψάντων ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς τῶν ἐλεφάντων.

These Indians are either archers, or javelinmen both armed with long broadswords and thus unlikely to be packed shoulder to shoulder – ‘hopla’ just means ‘arms’ and caries no implication about the distance at which troops fight nor their interval. But, of course you never meant anything other than Greek hoplites when you formerly spoke of them so this is sheer flim-flam.

Sometimes I wonder if you re-read your posts, you assert without a qualm ‘The ‘gerrhon’ was a large shield equivalent to the Greek 'aspi's, and was certainly not ‘light’. ( indeed some archaic Greek hoplites may have carried ‘gerrha’, referred to as the ‘Theban’ shield)’
And in the very next paragraph, ‘the gerrhon has a ‘boss’ and is in fact held by a horizontal handgrip ( like a Roman scutum), not the porpax/arm-grip shown on the right-hand figure. Xenophon points out the disadvantages of this arrangement at [ VII.1.33-,34 ], when Egyptians, with 'porpax' equipped shields physically push back with their shoulders Cyrus' Persians who have only hand-grips.’. So ‘gerrha’ are not at all like hoplite shields! And the interesting thing about the passage you cite is that, it is the Egyptians who are described as ‘hoplites’ and the Persians are contrasted with them and thus clearly NOT being thought of as ‘hoplites’

VII 1 xxxiii
ἔνθα δὴ δεινὴ μάχη ἦν καὶ δοράτων καὶ ξυστῶν καὶ μαχαιρῶν: ἐπλεονέκτουν μέντοι οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ πλήθει καὶ τοῖς ὅπλοις. τά τε γὰρ δόρατα ἰσχυρὰ καὶ μακρὰ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἔχουσιν, αἵ τε ἀσπίδες πολὺ μᾶλλον τῶν θωράκων καὶ τῶν γέρρων καὶ στεγάζουσι τὰ σώματα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὠθεῖσθαι συνεργάζονται πρὸς τοῖς ὤμοις οὖσαι. συγκλείσαντες οὖν τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐχώρουν καὶ ἐώθουν. [34] οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἀντέχειν, ἅτε ἐν ἄκραις ταῖς χερσὶ τὰ γέρρα ἔχοντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ πόδα ἀνεχάζοντο παίοντες καὶ παιόμενοι, ἕως ὑπὸ ταῖς μηχαναῖς ἐγένοντο. ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἐνταῦθα ἦλθον, ἐπαίοντο αὖθις οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων: καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ οὐκ εἴων φεύγειν οὔτε τοὺς τοξότας οὔτε τοὺς ἀκοντιστάς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνατεταμένοι τὰς μαχαίρας ἠνάγκαζον καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ ἀκοντίζειν
33] Here, then, was a dreadful conflict with spears and lances and swords. The Egyptians, however, had the advantage both in numbers and in weapons; for the spears that they use even unto this day are long and powerful, and their shields cover their bodies much more effectually than corselets and targets, and as they rest against the shoulder they are a help in shoving. So, locking their shields Together, they advanced and showed. [34] And because the Persians had to hold out their little shields clutched in their hands, they were unable to hold the line, but were forced back foot by foot, giving and taking blows, until they came up under cover of the moving towers. When they reached that point, the Egyptians in turn received a volley from the towers; and the forces in the extreme rear would not allow any retreat on the part of either archers or javelinmen, but with drawn swords they compelled them to shoot and hurl.

For those who have been spared the joy of Kyroteadia, Kyros has allegedly deployed his men two deep to face these Egyptians, who are 100 deep ‘as is the custom of their land’. Kyros backs his thorakites with ‘akontistai’ javelinmen, ‘toxatoi’ and a veteran corps of ‘ouragoi’ presumably also two deep making an eight deep formation; the moving towers? Kyros has a tower for each taxis in the army, hauled by eight oxen and manned by twenty men, in an essay on ‘how to conduct hoplite warfare’?

What there is here is a clear reference to ‘othismos’ actually meaning pushing men back in combat with the shield, but I suppose that one can ignore that part.

The so-called Boeotian shield, also called Dipylon is indeed a similar shape to the Gerrhon, although it has a significant camber that gerrha lack. This is because, far from being the sort of shield anyone actually wielded, it is an artistic fossil, a remembrance of the figure of eight shields used in Mycenaean times and thus not germane to this discussion.

It will also be seen that the quote above makes no mention of a ‘porpax’ nor is it likely that Egyptian shield s possessed them, they were like the old ‘tower shield’
Xenophon had encountered Egyptian infantry at Kunaxa and describes them Anab I 8 ix

[9] There were horsemen in white cuirasses on the left wing of the enemy, under the command, it was reported, of Tissaphernes; next to them were troops with wicker shields and, farther on, hoplites with wooden shields which reached to their feet, these latter being Egyptians, people said; and then more horsemen and more bowmen. All these troops were marching in national divisions, each nation in a solid square.
[9] καὶ ἦσαν ἱππεῖς μὲν λευκοθώρακες ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐωνύμου τῶν πολεμίων: Τισσαφέρνης ἐλέγετο τούτων ἄρχειν: ἐχόμενοι δὲ γερροφόροι, ἐχόμενοι δὲ ὁπλῖται σὺν ποδήρεσι ξυλίναις ἀσπίσιν. Αἰγύπτιοι δ᾽ οὗτοι ἐλέγοντο εἶναι: ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἱππεῖς, ἄλλοι τοξόται. πάντες δ᾽ οὗτοι κατὰ ἔθνη ἐν πλαισίῳ πλήρει ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστον τὸ ἔθνος ἐπορεύετο

Note that here too, the gerrhon is contrasted to the xylinais aspis. So the gerrophoroi are not ‘hoplites’ nor the gerrha a hoplite style heavy shield.

Since you happily bandy the ‘sparabara’ ‘takabara’ terms I had assumed you were aware of the suggested tactical system implied therein; for those not in the know, it posits that the Persian army of the early Achaemenid period consisted of a front rank of spearmen carrying large pavise like wicker shields which the propped up as a barricade from the shelter of which the greater proportion of their units, archers would shoot, in addition there were bands of men armed as Xenophon describes Kyros’ New Model Army and as are depicted on several Greek vases, though none I could find online sadly, who would rush upon the enemy once they had been disrupted by the arrow storm. Herodotos describes the Persians falling upon the Greeks in small bands and it is these men to whom he is assumed to refer.

The Dinner drill, of course has no mention of order at all and could be performed in open intermediate or close order, nor is any move from open order to close order implied nor in any Classical author is there a mention of the measurements that might be described by these terms.

Cod is a synonym for fake, our Civil Service release cod-faxes to scupper Government policies of which they disapprove; yes the British Government still uses fax, Foreign Office excepted, they still have pigeons.

Yes, Cyrus’ army is fictional, and there are anomalies arising from mixing Persian and Greek details, but the ‘dinner drill’ is not – it is the standard drill of a phalanx, and Cyrus’ army is reported as forming up in files 12 deep, like contemporary Spartans ( even though 12 doesn’t divide into the decimal ‘100’ men of a ‘taxis’, hence reference to “dodekadarchs” and “hekadarchs”. Since these terms are used only once by Xenophon, and occur nowhere else as far as I can determine, they may be words he has made up to emphasise his advocacy of a 12 deep formation.

And here we have the crux, absolutely nothing says that the Dinner Drill was standard to anything, apart from your continual and unsubstantiated assertion; the most laughable point is that it is definitely conducted by files of TEN and the lochoi end up four abreast and five deep.

I am afraid to say that your post of the 7th demonstrated nothing more than that your lack of understanding of the necessary mathematics is compounded with a wilful ignorance of the language; you have painted yourself into a corner with broad strokes of error and wishful thinking, all you need do is admit that your interpretation of the Dinner drill is flawed, strangely at the beginning of the thread you do not seem to have considered the lochoi ending in four files so crucial; but maybe that was my misconception of your position.

Since in the Anabasis it is the ‘etaxqsan/battle array/ battle line’ that is ‘in fours’, it can only mean ‘four deep’, and cannot mean ‘four abreast’

Do you deny, then that the Spartan enomotiai at Mantineia 418 BC were not arranged in four files? Thus showing that a battle line can be formed with the lowest unit formed in four files. You will struggle to find an example of one four DEEP.

As for 8 deep being considered "weak" against massed formations, the Spartans - "seasoned troops"- were evidently concerned that attrition might wear down an 8/4 deep line, and increased it to 12/6 deep. Do you think Spartan tactical responses to massed formations "preposterous"?

Since you have failed to explain what these ‘Spartan tactical responses’ were it is impossible to say whether they are ‘preposterous’ or not, your suggestions here certainly are! I think you are suggesting that the mercenaries who are eight deep, according to you, make a quick calculation about attrition and decide to, somehow increase their lines depth by one half and in shortening their front expose their flank?! No wonder they were caught trying to execute this supposed manoeuvre, you fulminate against Paralus suggesting that a formation might double its depth in open order and temporarily end up on an eight cubit interval which is never mentioned in the Sacred Manuals and post THIS!!? Reference it in a manual, if you can.

Let me tell you how you should have proceeded. There are two issues, the meaning of ‘ep’okto’ and the meaning of ‘anastrophe’. Now I looked at all of Xenophon’s uses of this term and in each it signifies no more than a retreat in the opposite direction to which one was facing; modern commentators have confused the manoeuvre of Agesilaos with a description of what ‘anastrophe’ means, Xenophon mere says that part of the manoeuvre was ‘anatrophe’ and then goes on to describe the subsequent evolutions, similarly in the Kyrou Paideia VII 5 iii, Xenophon has Kyros fold back each of his wings in order to specifically double his depth, yet there is no hint of an ‘anastrophe’.

This does, at least, suggest why they were feeling ‘weak’; they were too close to walls, as indeed was proven by their getting caught whilst retiring. So they were not trying to deepen the line only put more distance between then and the walls. The reason why a formation in the standard depth should think this expedient is still unclear, although why a weak line should is clear enough.

Now, I must own to a gaff of my own making, I missed out a ‘not’ the line should have read

Greek and Latin both allow words to be ‘understood’, so the fact that enomotiai are NOT mentioned is unimportant.

This in response to your suggestion that since no lesser units are mentioned the whole army must be meant, this is simply untrue.

How can the fact that the ‘taxqhnai/battle formation’ was ‘in fours’/four deep, as Xenophon very specifically tells us “strengthen the case for them being eight deep”(presumably in close order) ? You’ll be saying black is white next.....

Oh dear! Liguistic problems again; the Greek is Anab. I 2 xv

[15] ἐκέλευσε δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὡς νόμος αὐτοῖς εἰς μάχην οὕτω ταχθῆναι καὶ στῆναι, συντάξαι δ᾽ ἕκαστον τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ. ἐτάχθησαν οὖν ἐπὶ τεττάρων:

He ordered [ἐκέλευσε] the Greeks [δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας] to form up and stand [ταχθῆναι καὶ στῆναι] as if for battle [εἰς μάχην οὕτω] according to their custom [ὡς νόμος αὐτοῖς], each organised his own men [συντάξαι δ᾽ ἕκαστον τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ]. They were formed up [ἐτάχθησαν] thus [οὖν] by fours [ἐπὶ τεττάρων].

ταχθῆναι is a verb, aorist infinitive in fact, rather than a noun, ‘to draw up’ not ‘battle formation’, Xenophon does not ‘very specifically say’ that the line was drawn up four deep, that is your interpretation based on what you want it to say; I say it strengthens the case for the meaning being ‘four abreast’ and hence eight deep, because the formation is described as ‘according to their custom for battle’ and by far the majority of mentioned depths are eight, neither linguistically nor logically challenging methinks.

So you are saying that “in fours/eights” is ambiguous, and can mean abreast or deep, depending on which you want it to be ?

Yet we examined the various references to depth previously, including the half-dozen references to 'epi/eis number', and in context it turned out all had to refer to depth. ( see my post page 9 Aug 5).

I don’t think I ever said or implied that one could just choose what one wants it to mean; this is surely your method LOL! And I seem to remember concluding that some references had to concern frontage and others could be ambiguous whilst your ‘analysis’ consisted of simple contradiction.

So let’s run through that check list

In summary then, this; “The notion that Xenophon was disguising hoplites as his reformed Persians founders once one reads the text;” is completely wrong. In fact the opposite is true, as most commentators recognise. The fictional Cyrus’ reforms his army of Persians into heavy close-order infantry – hoplites, so that Xenophon can expound on hoplite ‘taktike’.

As usual a self arrived at conclusion at odds with the evidence but supported by anonymous testators and the tale is a moralistic drag not a tract on taktike.

1. re-equipped with ‘hopla’ =arms for close quarter fighting[II.1.9-21], oops! not what ‘hopla’ means.
2. Drilled in close order drill [II.3.21] – no mention of order
3. fight in ‘lines’ that advance in good order [VII.1.10 and 26] - not many troops do not
4. form phalanx[VII.1.22] – LOL so do CHARIOTS! VII 1 xxx
5. stop and dress their ranks 3 times [VII.1.4] - Before they came in sight of the enemy, he halted the army as many as three times. – halting but no dressing, more ‘reading into’; the enemy are out of sight and Kyros has determined on a slow advance as he knows they intend to surround him.
6. advance in even step (like Spartans) [VI.1.4]. – amazing because at III 3 lvii they advance ‘at the double’ and then at III 3 lxi ‘at the run’ most unSpartan, are you cherry picking or using salami tactics?

The rest is equally guff, the social conventions throughout are Greek, Xenophon needs an excuse for his unending symposiai, nor was he in Persia for any great length of time like Ctesias, much of his Persianism recalls Herodotos to me. The work is fiction for a Greek audience written by an old man with limited knowledge of Persia and its customs, it is for the indulgent fantasies of a pseudo-Sokratic or do you credit the ‘moving towers’? The Persians described in Book II are clearly and emphatically NOT hoplites Xenophon is clear about that therefore his drill is not hoplite drill, nor indeed, is it even a sensible procedure,; your other ‘oft mentioned prop’ Anderson, even says on page 390, having forgotten that the officers leading the files are dekadarchoi rather than the dodekadarchoi he names, ‘In practice it might sometimes be more convenient to deploy each lochos separately before bringing it up to its place in the line.’ Tacitly recognising the essential unreality of Xenophon’s; though he does recognise that the frontage of each lochos moves to four ‘and a depth of six’. Zeus even without being here your allies are falling away, it is the kyropedia

agesilaos wrote:There are two issues, the meaning of ‘ep’okto’ and the meaning of ‘anastrophe’. Now I looked at all of Xenophon’s uses of this term and in each it signifies no more than a retreat in the opposite direction to which one was facing; modern commentators have confused the manoeuvre of Agesilaos with a description of what ‘anastrophe’ means, Xenophon mere says that part of the manoeuvre was ‘anatrophe’ and then goes on to describe the subsequent evolutions, similarly in the Kyrou Paideia VII 5 iii, Xenophon has Kyros fold back each of his wings in order to specifically double his depth, yet there is no hint of an ‘anastrophe’.

That's quite true. 'Anastrophe' is always used by Xenophon for 'turn about/around' or 'turn away' - very often in retreat; real or feigned. If this is sometimes a technical word, as modern commentators would seem to make it in the Agesialos instance, then triremes (4.8.7), too, perform such as do cavalry (5.2.42). It seems that in the Agesilaos instance, the 'anastrophe' was simply the about face and 'retire'. The march along the rear of the phalanx (thus deepening it) was not part of any technical 'anastrophe'.

What that means for Mnasippos I cannot guess.

agesilaos wrote: I think you are suggesting that the mercenaries who are eight deep, according to you, make a quick calculation about attrition and decide to, somehow increase their lines depth by one half and in shortening their front expose their flank?! No wonder they were caught trying to execute this supposed manoeuvre, you fulminate against Paralus suggesting that a formation might double its depth in open order and temporarily end up on an eight cubit interval which is never mentioned in the Sacred Manuals and post THIS!!? Reference it in a manual, if you can.

I don't think Xenophon of Brisvegas is suggesting that the mercenaries at Corcyra performed such calisthenics as to move from eight to twelve deep at all. Rather I believe his contention is that the Spartans, in general about this time, adopted a depth of twelve as a reaction to increased Theban depths.

Actually, 'fulminate' does not quite convey it. I was, in fact, accused of full scale 'invention' of fact to support a view. An accusation that still stands I believe.

The implication for interpreting 'anastrophe' as simplly retiring is that the problem is no longer depth explicitly; if the solution is to double your depth then you are in too shallow a formation, but if the solution is to retire then you are simply too close to something. One is still left with explaining why that proximity would be conceived as a weakness though if they are arrayed in the standard depth. They are not staring down the barrel of a Theban attack column either, the Korkyraians seem to have been mainly peltast types and they are issuing from a gate in 'a throng' not in any order; 'responses to depth' is a canard, remember this is the chap that claims the Spartans faced the Thebans SIX deep at Leuktra, these mercenaries are already eight deep, allegedly, if this is in open order then the correct response is either to close on a flank and become eight deep in close order or interject the half files and assume the alleged fighting formation; were they already in close order as would seem likely close to the city walls then it is hard to see their weakness were four the normal fighting depth; the correct response here would be to attack the sallying troops and drive them back into the city, the only way the line could be described as 'weak' is if it was four deep and this was not the normal fighting depth, withdrawl, in order to change formation at a sensible distance from the enemy would then be a good option. Unfortunately for them the Korkyraians had more nouse and struck them as they withdrew with their backs to the enemy (Xenophon makes it due to them mistaking the manouevre for flight but how would he know? I'd rather credit the defenders.)

Since he contends that depth is of no help in hoplite warfare, which is how Leuktra reared its ugly head in the first place, it is rather contrary to now suggest that the Spartans adopted twelve deep to counter it, though only fighting six deep of course did they not know that three or four is deep enough to stop any amount of people? Nor can we say when the Spartans adopted the 36 man enomotia, which allows this; I fancy that Thukydides may have erred on giving the enomotiai a four man front, if not then anytime after Mantineia is a possible and rather inspired by the Theban success at Delion than in response to it; speculation of course and that is all it is likely to remain, in fact we never hear of a depth of twelve per se, we have to infer it from Xenophon's statement that the enomotiai had a front of three at Leuktra - Agesilaos' army in what must have been a similar array after restoring their line post-anastrophe only managed to be nine or ten deep, after all.

agesilaos wrote:- Agesilaos' army in what must have been a similar array after restoring their line post-anastrophe only managed to be nine or ten deep, after all.

And how does one fight in 'half files' at nine deep? That was the original question many, many posts ago: "This depth, Xenophon (of Athens) tells us, was “nine or ten shields deep” (Hell. 6.5.19). One assumes that should Agesilaos have actually fought then it would have to have been in the order he was in: nine deep or ten deep".

There would not be any difficulty because of the nine man files; the file leader would remain in the front rank and the half file leader just bring up his command be it four or five, we know that the Spartans were organised down to six men according to Lak Pol, only the Spartans were though. The situation, facing off the Mantineians and Eleians, would make me assume a combat posture for Agesilaos' men, the Mantineians certainly found them threatening enough to stop deploying from their city.

Xenophon wrote:The reference to Diodorus I take it is to the Spartan King Agis’ attempt on Athens 408 BC, where he formed up 4 deep. [Diod XIII.72.6].I have not mentioned it earlier, because again I do not wish to embark on yet another digression – in earlier private discussions some years ago, Paralus objected that this was not a battle formation, but a cordon against part of the city wall. I demurred, pointing out that it was not a cordon – not being long enough – but hoplites drawn up in battle formation to mask sorties.

I don't recall that it was in private discussions (though there have been many); I think you'll find it was here...

Xenophon wrote:This is also consistent with the hoplite ‘customary’ battle formation 4 deep in the “Anabasis”[I.2.15]. Diodorus too refers to a Spartan phalanx formed 4 deep [Diodorus XIII.72.6]. Xenophon also provides at least one other reference, mentioned above, to hoplite combat by half-files – at second Mantinea, when he tells us the Spartans “...had drawn up their cavalry like a phalanx of hoplites in a line six deep....”[ The Spartans formed in files of twelve at this time, this slight increase in depth perhaps being a reaction to the massively deep Theban columns.]

And my reply.

Having now read the whole of the Education of Cyrus we can now add the references to depth or frontage from that work and add a few general observations.

For those phrases compounded with ‘bathos’ or a variant we have II 4 ii, τὸ δὲ βάθος ἐφ᾽ ἑκατόν a depth of one hundred; and in the same paragraph ἐφ᾽ ἑνὸς ἄγοντα τὴν τάξιν the taxis coming up in single file and τὸ μὲν μέτωπον ἐπὶ τριακοσίων the frontage was three hundred. A little further on at 4 iv we have , παρήγγειλε τῷ πρώτῳ ταξιάρχῳ τὴν τάξιν εἰς δώδεκα τάττειν βάθος he ordered the first taxiarch to draw up his taxis twelve deep. None of these are controversial, nor is the single file ‘eph enos’a t V 3 xxxvi.

Book VI however has both clear indications of depth, 3 xix πάντες τεταγμένοι ἐπὶ τριάκοντα τὸ βάθος they [Kroesos’ troops] are all arrayed thirty deep; except the Egyptians who are 100 deep εἰς ἑκατὸν which is shown to mean depth by Kyros’ wish xxiii, ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ, ἔφη, τοὺς εἰς ἑκατὸν τούτους ὁπλίτας εἰς μυρίους ἂν μᾶλλον βουλοίμην τετάχθαι For my part, I would rather have these11 hoplites who are arranged in columns a hundred deep drawn up ten thousand deep . The question is what deos Xenophon mean when he says Kyros ordered his own men xxi παραγγείλατε δὲ τοῖς ταξιάρχοις καὶ λοχαγοῖς ἐπὶ φάλαγγος καθίστασθαι εἰς δύο ἔχοντας ἕκαστον τὸν λόχον “So instruct your taxiarchoi and lochagoi to form a line with each separate lochos eis duo.”

Our Xenophon wanted this to mean twelve deep ie in two files at the beginning of the thread, but has since claimed that eis + a numeral ALWAYS refers to depth so presumably sees this a s a two deep formation, unfortunately this ois the only time we are told of the depth of Kyros’ line so if it is not twelve here the oft mentioned parallel to the Spartans resolves itself to the one mention of standing guard about Kyaxares’ tent.

Were this an historical battle we could compare frontages and arrive at an answer, this being pure invention from an author with a slender grasp on his material it will prove more difficult. Xenophon is vague about Kroesos’ numbers aside from 120,000 Egyptians, Kyros’ spy, Araspas tells him that the Lydian front is forty stadia long and that they are thirty deep. The first question is does this figure include or exclude the Egyptians? Since they form the centre of the line it would be odd to exclude them from the frontage, so we could deduct 1,200m or six stadia to cover them, leaving 34 for the others which assuming a metre a man would give 6800 in the frontline and a total of 204,000 men. The maths tend to point in the other direction , though; if we take the 40 stadia as exclusive of the Egyptians we arrive at an army of 240,000, i.e. twice the size of the Egyptian contingent; Xenophon was most likely thinking in round numbers and does not seem to have allowed for any variation in troop density even between the foot and the horse or chariots. This is because such matters are unimportant to his purpose, which is to demonstrate Kyros’ cunning and bravery.

When we come to the battle we are told that Kyros’ army was surrounded on three sides and was like a small tile set with a larger one, which sounds to me as if we are talking of three equal fronts, presumably each of 120,000, with Xenophon forgetting that the deeper Egyptians present a shorter front, despite having made the point himself!

The Persian infantry certainly seem only to engage the Egyptians whose imagined front may be 1200m or 4,000m, if Xenophon has nodded. The Persian consist of 30,000 of the original expedition and 40,000 new re-enforcements (V 5 iii). Of the originals 10,000 have been made into cavalry (VI 2 vii). So there are 20,000 to form the front line and the rear lines. A frontage of 5,000m if two deep or 833m if twelve deep, 2,000 men are absent however ( VI 3 xxxi) hiding in the baggage to ambush the enemy, since these are all from the ‘thorakophoroi’ there are only 8,000 to form the main body which matches the incorrect front of 4,000m for the Egyptians if two deep and leaves 666 in the front rank if twelve deep. Kyros says in his battle plan

According to the depth that I shall give my line of battle, I think I shall bring the entire line into action and make it everywhere mutually helpful.

He is not intending to make his line shorter than the enemies but to match it, making two deep the most likely choice of meaning (this also explains the worries about the shallow line versus the deep). We can further describe his line as two thorakophoroi (the only hoplites mentioned in Kyros’ army come in Book VIII, after the inclusion of the Egyptians but most probably a simple lapse from the author), then five akontistai (javelinmen), five archers and then two ouragoi, much like Alexander’s experimental phalanx (he had read this book) only with peltast-types replacing the phalangites.

So ‘eis duo’ here ‘two deep’ but in the next book , VII 5 xvii, we find Kyros marshalling his horse and chiliarchies ‘eis duo’ in order to enter Babylon via the river bed of the diverted Euphrates so ‘two abreast seem more appropriate, the river is not half a kilometre wide where it enters the walls of Babylon.

Book VIII is the last one, Zeus be praised! It is also the longest and most boring, but has further examples of depth and frontage. Kyros arranges a procession the 4,000 doryphoroi guarding it are said to be ‘eis tetteras’ which since they line the route must mean ‘four deep’ 3 ix.

Two sections later, 3 xi, bulls are led to sacrifice ‘eis tetteras’ four abreast here! They exit the Palace Gates so frontage makes most sense here.

VIII 3 xviii has the chariots in the procession ἐπὶ τεττάρων τεταγμένα , four abreast, there were three hundred chariots , the roads of Babylon would not accommodate seventy-five abreast and four deep, yet the walls were said to allow four chariots abreast to drive along them. This phrase certainly recalls Anabasis I 2 xv ἐτάχθησαν οὖν ἐπὶ τεττάρων .

So, study of usage in the Kyrou Paideia confirms the ambiguity of Xenophon’s language in that it is neither always one thing nor another but must be conditioned by the context.

Book VIII also gives the lie to claims of Kyros’ NMA being substitutes for hoplites, at 5 xi they are once again differentiated ὁπλίτας δὲ καὶ τοὺς τὰ μεγάλα γέρρα the hoplites and those with the large wicker shields and 8 xxiii states καὶ οἱ πεζοὶ ἔχουσι μὲν γέρρα καὶ κοπίδας καὶ σαγάρεις ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπὶ Κύρου τὴν μάχην ποιησάμενοι The infantry still have their wicker shields and bills and sabres, just as those had who set the battle in array in the times of Cyrus; so they never were hoplites.

Xenophon also supplies a list of what he thinks comprises ‘Taktike’ at 5 xv

He believed also that tactics did not consist solely in being able easily to extend one's line or increase its depth, or to change it from a long column into a phalanx, or without error to change the front by a counter march according as the enemy came up on the right or the left or behind;2 but he considered it also a part of good tactics to break up one's army into several divisions whenever occasion demanded, and to place each division, too, where it would do the most good, and to make speed when it was necessary to reach a place before the enemy—all these and other such qualifications were essential, he believed, to a skilful tactician, and he devoted himself to them all alike
καὶ τὸ τακτικὸν δὲ εἶναι οὐ τοῦτο μόνον ἡγεῖτο εἴ τις ἐκτεῖναι φάλαγγα εὐπόρως δύναιτο ἢ βαθῦναι ἢ ἐκ κέρατος εἰς φάλαγγα καταστῆσαι ἢ ἐκ δεξιᾶς ἢ ἀριστερᾶς ἢ ὄπισθεν ἐπιφανέντων πολεμίων ὀρθῶς ἐξελίξαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ διασπᾶν ὁπότε δέοι τακτικὸν ἡγεῖτο, καὶ τὸ τιθέναι γε τὸ μέρος ἕκαστον ὅπου μάλιστα ἐν ὠφελείᾳ ἂν εἴη, καὶ τὸ ταχύνειν δὲ ὅπου φθάσαι δέοι, πάντα ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τακτικοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι καὶ ἐπεμελεῖτο τούτων πάντων ὁμοίως.

Not a hint of the allegedly essential interjection of half files.

Nor is Xenophon’s purpose to provide a manual for hoplite drill, he tells us his purpose at 8 xxvii

I think now that I have accomplished the task that I set before myself. For I maintain that I have proved that the Persians of the present day and those living in their dependencies are less reverent toward the gods, less dutiful to their relatives, less upright in their dealings with all men, and less brave in war than they were of old. But if anyone should entertain an opinion contrary to my own, let him examine their deeds and he will find that these testify to the truth of my statements.

So what can be said for the theory that hoplites entered the battleground in open order and then closed to a 3ft frontage by half-file insertion?

1) It is not mentioned as occurring in any ancient source at all.
2) The text from which it was inferred, the so-call Dinner Drill does not actually represent hoplites or the like doing anything, its purpose is purely to demonstrate Kyros rewarding drill (we do not hear much about the next taxiarch who is rewarded for teaching his men to simply about face and carry on with the worst men now in front! Is Xenophon denying the validity of the countermarching he later considers a good part of Taktike?)
3) We are asked to believe that the Greeks continually referred not to fighting depths when speaking of the depth of lines but to the initial approach depth in open order, apart from those odd numbers which do not fit viz. the 25 Theban depth at Delion.
4) The passage in Anabasis supporting a four deep norm is subject to more than one interpretation. And when looked at holistically is more likely to mean that thetroops were on a unit frontage of four and a depth of eight, certainly the most commonly reported depth
5) Modern analogies with riot police are deceptive as the situations are not the same; and both Ukranian and Korean police can be seen formed eight deep to resist rioters. Even if four is sufficient depth reserves are required as someone in the front rank is bound to die making a weak spot. Once broken through phalanxes tend to break.
6) The theory relies on a unique translation of ‘paragein’ in a passage that does not refer to hoplites.
7) The theory presupposes that every state was organised down to Spartan levels which they clearly were not and we are frequently told they were not by the sources.
The theory cannot cope with the weakened centre of the Athenians at Marathon without assuming they were two deep in combat, good enough for Kyros and his tower backed Persians but hardly a real option.
9) Xenophon’s description of Mnasippos’ defeat t Kerkyra contradicts the theory however one interprets it.

Theories based on mis-interpretation (Dinner Drill), mistranslation (paragein) AND a total lack of ancient reference are rarely correct.

Agesilaos wrote Aug 7 p.10:

Once again with ‘the implication’, the Greek is clear that pempadarchs command five men and dekadarchs ten, the only variance is whether the officers are to be included in the count. Xenophon clears up his usage at II 4 iv


,

παρήγγειλε τῷ πρώτῳ ταξιάρχῳ τὴν τάξιν εἰς δώδεκα τάττειν βάθος, τοὺς δὲ δωδεκάρχους ἐν μετώπῳ καθιστάναι
he ordered the first taxiarch to draw up his taxis twelve deep, while the dodekadarchs were to take their places on the front line

So when he says a commander of twelve he means a commander of twelve including the officer, it is not some generic term for ‘file-leader’, which no Greek author uses as such and it certainly does not mean a commander of eight. and at II 4 ii

I take it then that you do not count Arrian as a Greek author? For in Arrian’s ‘Anabasis’, a ‘Dekadarch’ clearly commands a file of 16, [e.g. VII.23] hence he is a generic file leader, not a specific commander of 10. Evidently at some time before Alexander the term acquired this generic meaning.
In the Cyropaedia, Xenophon refers to ‘dekadarch’ in the literal sense, based on real Persian organisation into tens ( dekadarch = Persian Dathabam) and specifically refers to ten men in the file a number of times [e.g.II.1.22;II.1.24; II.2.30].

However, in the Hellenica there is reference to a Phliasian ‘pempadas’[ VII.2.6] lit: squad of five, but since so far as we know Greeks were not organised on a decimal system, this likely means ‘half-file’. ( The only reference to 10 is Agesilaos’ “9 or 10 files” which was an ‘ad hoc’ arrangement on the march, and likely dictated by terrain in the narrow valley)

ἐν ὀλίγῳ δὲ χρόνῳ ἐγένοντο τὸ μὲν μέτωπον ἐπὶ τριακοσίων （τοσοῦτοι γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ ταξίαρχοι）, τὸ δὲ βάθος ἐφ᾽ ἑκατόν.
in a little while they were three hundred abreast on the front line, for that was the number of the captains, and a hundred men deep.

Which must mean four groups of 25, each of two dodekadarchs and a lochagos, just like the organisation at the dinner drill only with dodekadarchs and hexarchs replacing dekadarchs and pempadarchs.

This 30,000 is the whole of Cyrus’ original infantry, in 300 Taxeis, each 100 strong in single file. We are told several times that each taxis consists of 2 x Lochoi of 50, not 4 of 25 as in the un-numbered dinner drill.[e.g. XC II.2.9] As I pointed out previously, the ‘taxis’ of the dinner drill is different to the ‘taxis’ of the Cyrean organisation. The first consists of an unknown number, divided into 4 lochoi. Xenophon is probably here describing a more generalised drill, which works for files of differing possible strengths e.g. 8.10, 12 or any even number.

The dinner drill does NOT say “four groups of 25”. It seems you still persist in conflating two different organisations.What it does NOT work for is lochoi with a paper strength of 25 ( or other odd number), with ‘lochagoi’ standing suicidally outside the line as per your incorrect reconstruction – an obvious artificiality.

I note you now agree that the officers formed the front line, just as the ‘dinner drill’ plainly says......but wait....

Now let’s look ‘holistically’ at the dinner drill passage; Kyros sees a taxiarch bringing his taxis along by the river in single file (ἐφ᾽ ἑνός) he then orders the lochoi to come up into line one at a time so that the four lochagoi form the front rank, he then orders the lochoi to form into two files (παρηγγύησεν εἰς δύο ἄγειν τὸν λόχον:) bringing the dekadarchs into the front rank so that the lochoi are now ten deep with the lochagos out in front of the two dekadarchoi.

....This is contradictory, for as you have just pointed out, the lochagoi “form the front rank”, but then you put them out in front – which Xenophon does not - and on your numbers the two files should number 2 x 12 each, not ten.( with the lochagos stuck suicidally out in front). So having said the ‘dekadarch’ can only command ten, you now have him commanding 12 ?

The next evolution forms the lochoi εἰς τέτταρας, the same phraseology as each previous evolution and ending with the pempadarchoi joining the front rank so that the lochoi are now five deep.

....errr... shouldn’t that be six deep?....

The contextual picture is clear as are the numbers....

(!!!!!!!!!!)

εἰς τέτταρας here clearly means in four files. Can you see that yet? If not your credibility may be fatally weakened.
And after that little counting exercise, I would say it is your credibility that may be fatally weakened!

It would seem the Gods have taken notice of that little bit of ‘hubris’ of yours about counting ability! Like I said, GIGO.

There is one thing that does give pause for thought, and that is the reference to “eis duo”/in twos and this must mean ‘in two files’ in the contextof the dinner drill ( as universally translated, see my diagram page 1), then it may be that “eis tettaras”/in fours MIGHT possibly mean ‘in four files’, but even so this would not affect the overall picture of files and ‘half files’ which, because of the lack of numbers given, could conceivably be general and refer to half-files of four or six ( or possibly even five). However, the references to eis/epi (number) have been shown to refer to depth, in context.
Which leads us to the interesting passage at VI.3.21 where Cyrus is preparing his army for the fictional battle of ‘Thymbrara’:

“So instruct your taxiarchs and lochagoi to form a line with each separate lochos in twos/eis duo. <Now each platoon contained twenty-four men.>”

‘Eis duo’ ought to be the same as the dinner drill, which would mean two files i.e. two abreast, though it is usually translated as two deep. The words in brackets are an obvious, and likely, later emendation – an addition by way of explanation by someone who was aware that Xenophon deployed Cyrus’ hoplites 12 deep. [ at II.4.4]. If this is the correct meaning ( two abreast) then we have a phalanx of hoplites in files 12 deep ( and presumably 6 deep in close order of half-files), like contemporary Spartans. Behind these Cyrus deploys javelinmen and behind them archers, to give fire support by overhead shooting.

Once again, I find myself unable to keep up with the deluge of words from Agesilaos and Paralus – on the last two pages (10 and 11), Paralus has posted a dozen or so times, including some lengthy posts and Agesilaos nine or so times, including some truly massive posts, whilst I have only been able to put up four posts and am still dealing with matters back on page 10....

Some brief, if pedantic, clarifications:
Paralus wrote Aug 7

As can be seen, the “number of quotations” was actually two: one a single sentence and the other a phrase. They were ‘embedded’ so as not to disrupt the paragraph with quotation boxes.

...three actually, not that it matters...

A little more importantly :

I am mindful that someone who would lecture on ‘proper form’ should check for houses of glass before so lecturing:

Xenophon wrote:Oh, and its a bit rich accusing me of making 'rhetorical flourishes when you use expressions such as "and head home shields between legs"

The phrase in quotation marks is mine and, I note, unreferenced!! Worse still, the accusation attributed to me was not made by me at all. Once again, “let he who has not…”

Here is an example of the dangers of taking quotations out of context, for in fact as can be seen from the preceding sentence, I was referring to Agesilaos and Paralus collectively as to the accusation....

Xenophon wrote 16 July
... idea of the two of you that the Lacedaemonians somehow separated from their allies and mercenaries ? Oh, and its a bit rich accusing me of making 'rhetorical flourishes when you use expressions such as "and head home shields between legs" The ancient Xenophon's account of Leuktra ...

which in turn referred to this post by Agesilaos wherein he credits Paralus with dealing with my alleged rhetorical flourishes....

Agesilaos wrote 15 July
Paralus has dealt with the Rhetorical flourishes, so I can concentrate on the actual argument in a spirit of co-operative enquiry. First I have to confess to a massive cock up, the distance from Sparti to Aigosthena is 203 km which is ...

Hence the collective reference for the joint thrust. Apologies if that did not come across clearly.

Paralus wrote:
It would seem that should one disagree with you and concomitantly agree with another indicates a paucity of any objectivity. Fascinating.

My point was that over a period of several years and hundreds if not thousands of posts exchanged between the three of us, in almost all cases you side with Agesilaos’ views which would be statistically unlikely were you to be entirely objective. Even if your views were to be naturally weighted toward one side, they would not be quite so heavily so as they in fact are.....

Paralus wrote Thur Aug 7 page 10

Xenophon wrote:Oh, and for the record ( again!!) Xenophon does not say that Pelopidas, or any of the other ambassadors who went to the Great King were "medising". That word and its connotations are purely Paralus'.

The Xenophontic scales are firmly in place. Of course Xenophon presents the Thebans and Pelopidas as 'Medising'. The first time the Theban general and statesman is named he is seen as obsequiously currying favour with the Great King, on behalf of Thebes, to gain Persian backing for hegemony in Greece. What has not been related is the preface Xenophon gives to Pelopidas' mission:


The Thebans had been constantly scheming about how they might become the leaders of all Greece, and now decided that they might secure some advantage with the Persian King if they sent ambassadors to him. (7.1.33)


This is hardly anything but Medising:

A gross exaggeration. ‘Medising’ first occurs in Herodotus to describe the total submission of a city-state to Persian rule, by the sending of earth and water.[e.g Herodotus VII.138]. States that ‘medised’ were vassals of Persia and took up arms against the independent Greek city-states and were regarded as traitors by them. What was occurring here, as Xenophon says, is the sending of embassies to the Greeks most powerful neighbour to elicit aid, a very different thing, and nowhere does Xenophon suggest that such embassies from any Greek state were ‘medising’ with its connotations of submission and treachery. He treats it as perfectly natural that the Greeks should send embassies eliciting aid from their powerful Persian neighbour.

the Thebans schemed for hegemony of Greece and sought the help of the Great King in that scheming. Pelopidas is even presented as using Thebes' past Medising as an argument. Not a word from Xenophon that this was precisely what Sparta had done in 386. Again, we are not treated to a single syllable to indicate just what high-minded and righteous arguments Antalkidas had deployed to swing the Persian King behind Sparta's scheming at continued hegemony. Not a word. Yet when Thebes takes her turn we are treated to 'box and dice'.

I don’t think this is correct, nor is there the marked contrast between how Xenophon treats the two emabassies that Paralus alleges.
Xenophon IV.8.14 describes Antalcidas and the Spartan Embassy’s arguments:

“When they had reached their destination, Antalcidas said to Tiribazus that he had come desiring peace between his state and the King, and, furthermore, just such a peace as the King had wished for. For the Lacedaemonians, he said, urged no claim against the King to the Greek cities in Asia and they were content that all the islands and the Greek cities in general should be independent. “And yet,” he said, “if we are ready to agree to such conditions, why should the King be at war with us or be spending money? Indeed, if such terms were made, we could not take the field against the King, either; the Athenians could not unless we assumed the leadership, and we could not if the cities were independent. Now Tiribazus was mightily pleased at hearing the words of Antalcidas; but to the opponents of Antalcidas these proposals went no further than words only. For the Athenians were afraid to agree that the cities and the islands should be independent lest they should be deprived of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and the Thebans, lest they should be compelled to leave the Boeotian cities independent; while the Argives thought that they could not keep Corinth as Argos, a thing which they desired, if such an agreement and peace were concluded. So it was that this project of peace came to naught, and the ambassadors returned to their several homes.”

And at Xen Hell VII.1.34, Xenophon describes Pelopidas and the Theban embassy’s arguments in 367 BC:

“When the ambassadors arrived there, Pelopidas enjoyed a great advantage with the Persian. For he was able to say that his people were the only ones among the Greeks who had fought on the side of the King at Plataea, that they had never afterwards undertaken a campaign against the King, and that the Lacedaemonians had made war upon them for precisely the reason that they had declined to go with Agesilaus against him and had refused to permit Agesilaus to sacrifice to Artemis at Aulis, the very spot where Agamemnon, at the time when he was sailing forth to Asia, had sacrificed before he captured Troy. It also contributed greatly toward the winning of honour for Pelopidas that the Thebans had been victorious in battle at Leuctra, and that they had admittedly ravaged the country of the Lacedaemonians. Pelopidas also said that the Argives and Arcadians had been defeated by the Lacedaemonians when the Thebans were not present with them. And the Athenian, Timagoras, bore witness in his behalf that all these things which he said were true, and so stood second in honour to Pelopidas.”

As with Antalcidas’ efforts, the other cities would not agree to the terms:

“Thus it was that this attempt on the part of Pelopidas and the Thebans to gain the leadership came to nothing.”

It seems to me that there is little to choose between the two similar accounts of embassies to the Great King, and certainly not the huge contrast Paralus would have us believe. Xenophon simply gives a brief account of the statements of both parties, and the fact that ultimately both embassies failed to achieve their goals. Indeed Pelopidas gets more praise for his efforts than the Spartan Antilcidas.........

One can only conclude that Xenophon was reporting the two embassies in much the same factual manner, without any particular bias.

Agesilaos wrote Aug 7

you don't seem to have grasped the main issue with the overarm strike, so common in vase painting, which is that the point of balance for a dory is not central but much further to the rear, as is depicted in other paintings; certainly not a point to judged by wielding a broomstick.

Actually, the idea that the point of balance was much further to the rear only applies to a very small selection of spears depicted in iconography, and these usually have tapered shafts and are quite late. The vast majority of depicted spears show parallel sided shafts and their balance point is central. This is reinforced by archaeological samples, where spearheads and sauroters/spear butts have a socket diameter of 15-25 mm, with the vast majority close to 20 mm. Furthermore, those ( like C Matthew) who think the sauroter was some sort of ‘counterweight’ are quite wrong. In fact sauroters are invariably hollow cast bronze. One or two examples from Olympia have an added external lead weight added around the sauroter, but that is all there is in the way of examples of ‘counterweights’.

Incidently, proper “reconstructive archaeology” demonstrates that the overhead strike is by far the most powerful. Measured tests showed that the overarm strike generates around 38 joules of energy, while an underarm strike generates about 30% of this. Weakest of all is the ‘couched’ strike which generates about 7.1 joules or so –less than 20 % of the over-arm strike.

Combine this with the inability to be able to fight with and wield a couched spear, and it is no surprise that we hardly ever see this depicted....

The purpose of holding a couched broomstick or similar was simply to demonstrate for oneself just how limited its ability is to be wielded in this position, nothing more.