pothos.org

Taphoi wrote:

Paralus wrote:…you might wish to update your information on "Mermerti". Much work has been done since Bevan and the location referred to is now considered to be Meroe - likely in lower Nubia.

This site http://www.reshafim.org.il/ad/egypt/texts/lagides.htm has another translation of the Satrap Stele and it comments “Mermerti: Marmarica, the eastern part of the Libyan coast.” Cyrene in other words. What is your reference for Meroe? What is the evidence for Ptolemy invading Meroe in person before 311BC?

A translation that is : After S. M. Drach, Tablet of Alexander IV Aegus, in S. Birch (ed.) Records of the Past Series 1, Vol. X, London, 1878. This will rely upon Brugsch in 1871. What has been read as Mr-mr-tl is actually Irem. As I say, you need to refer to more modern work on the stela. You could perhaps start with The Literature of Ancient Egypt (ed., Kelly Simpson, 2003).

Evidence? Why you, yourself, provide it.

Taphoi wrote:So it would seem that those who say that the statement that “the king did battle with the Satrap of Egypt” in the Babylonian Chronicle means that the king was there in person must also say that the Satrap Stele proves that Diodorus was wrong to say that Ophellas took Cyrene for Ptolemy and that Agis and Epaenetus retook it, since the Stele asserts that Ptolemy was present in person. Indeed, it is their general opinion that a king (or viceroy) cannot be said (by inscribed sources of this period) to act without being present in person. Is the Satrap Stele to be the exception that proves their rule?

As Agesilaos writes: you need to understand the facts of an argument before penning a derisory summary. It is clear that you do not or, more likely, will not. BCHP 3 clearly denotes the "king" and associates the title (lugal) directly with Philip Arrhidaeus and, later, Alexander IV. Antigonus is termed lugal eren ("royal general") and satraps are referred to as such. They are clearly delineated and thus when the Chronicle notes (Obv. 26-27) that the king (lugal) went to Macedonia, it refers to Philip Arrhidaeus not someone going on his behalf.

What is also abundantly clear is that Philip Arrhidaeus (as well as Alexander IV) was the titular head of the royal army in Egypt. That is incontrovertible no matter how you attempt to rationalise it away. Pausanias (1.6.3) had little problem in understanding that which what you so signally do not:

Perdiccas took Aridaeus, son of Philip, and the boy Alexander, whom Roxana, daughter of Oxyartes, had borne to Alexander, to lend color to the campaign...

Taphoi wrote:

agesilaos wrote:…Egyptian records and Babylonian ones belong to different traditions…

In other words you have revised your position such that a contemporaneous Egyptian scribe might attribute actions to the ruler of Egypt when he was not present, but a Babylonian scribe could not (in respect of his ruler). What a convenient rule.

Agesilaos has answered for himself and I would add that you are in absolutely no position to lecture on arguments of convenience. Your entire "position" is built on convenience and red herrings. In this - the Satrap Stela - you add yet another. In your view scribes from Egypt and Babylonia - two entirely different cultures to be certain - are all somehow homogenous. Perhaps they are all trained in some ancient international "school for scribes"? The Satrap Stela is demonstrably in the classic Egyptian Pharaonic tradition and little to do with either the Astronomical Diaries or the Babylonian "Chronicles". You either cannot see the absurdity of this or, more likely, refuse to as a matter of convenience.

Paralus wrote:What has been read as Mr-mr-tl is actually Irem.

Well the Kelly Simpson book that you mention refers back to P M Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria, on this matter. Fraser has a long note, which I have read. He consulted several professors and they thought that the spelling was closer to the name of a vicinity in Nubia, but Fraser concluded that it is still possible that it refers to Cyrene. Since there is no record of a campaign of Ptolemy in Nubia at this time, I think I am going to continue to prefer the Cyrene option. (By the way, Fraser also thinks it more likely that the campaign in Syria in the Satrap Stele is that in 320BC.)

It is you who is arguing for certainty, so the onus is on you to show that it is not Cyrene. However, since the matter is clouded by scholarly debate, let us look instead at Justin on Ptolemy’s acquisition of Cyrene.

Justin 13.6.20 wrote:Sed Ptolomeus… terminos quoque imperii adquisita Cyrene urbe ampliaverat…

Which translates, “But Ptolemy… also extended the boundaries of his rule by acquiring the city of Cyrene.” Justin makes no mention of the fact that Ptolemy did not go to Cyrene in person, but sent a lieutenant. Thus in a completely different tradition it is also possible for a ruler to act without being present in person. The entire stance that a ruler may not be deemed to act without being present in person is obviously untenable. Do you not see that I could continue to cite endless examples from many traditions?

Best wishes,

Andrew

P.S. I have not said that Philip-Arrhidaeus was not present in Egypt. I have said that it is unlikely that he fought, so the Babylonian tablet is not adhering to literalism when it says that he fought.

There are further problems, the Egyyptians did not associate Philip Arrhidaios and Alexander IV in their reigns, they are kept separate. His Holiness in 320 was Philip Arrhidaios who has not been mentioned and cannot be the subject of the 'he' in 'He being as King in the stranger's world, as was His Holiness 8 in Inner Asia, ' . Alexander did not become 'His Holiness' until sometime between 17 Jan 318 and 10 April 318 by which time he had been in Macedonia for about a year, never to leave its confines.

Ivan A Ladynin has shown that the word here translated as 'Inner Asia', Stt, had come to mean the Achaemenid Empire and posited that as Alexander had become 'King of Kings' the term now subsumed Macedonia and possibly the whole Balkan penninsular cf 'The Toponym Stt in the Satrap Stele (Urk II 13.4); On the Perception of the Argead Empire in the Orient', Vestnik Drevny Istorii, 2/241 (2002), pp3-19 but more summarily and accessibly, since it is in English not Russian! 'The Olympic Games of 324 B.C. and the unification of lands under Alexander’s sway' which is available free at academia.com.

Germane, also is John Coleman Darnell's 'The Kbn.wt Vessels of the Late Period' where ll 15. 2-10 are shown to be more correctly rendered as

'He (Ptolemy) assembled numerous Phoenicians and their cavalry,
numerous kbn.wt-vessels and their crews.
He advanced with his host against the Land of the Syrians;
they fought against him;
he entered among them, violent like a falcon in pursuit of small fowl,
with the result that heconquered them at once.
To Egypt he brought back all their chiefs, their horses, their kbn.wt vessels, and all their marvels'

Clearly, Ptolemy could hardly have levied Phoenicians in order to take over Phoenicia.

On the continuing shibbolleth of the presence of the king I wrote

Since I doubt anyone would accept that a Royal Army operated with the Royal presence in the cases of Peithon (against the Greek Rebellion in the Upper Satrapies), Antigonos against Eumenes and amazingly, vice-versa; but in each case the generals were deputed Royal powers and given Royal troops as strategoi autokratoi. If you wish to summarise an argument try to understand it.

Can you now see the point is completely irrelevant?

I will not deal with the straw man set-up of "I could continue to cite endless examples from many traditions" - which is presumably to explain your absurd equation of Egyptian and Babylonian scribes (and culture / "traditions") - for this is exactly that. Your "evidence" of the Satrap Stela and Justin is of the same nature.

Taphoi wrote:It is you who is arguing for certainty...

And, so, you continue to attempt to redefine the debate upon your own terms. One wonders why it is you continue to try. The answer is self evident. No one - Xenophon or myself - has argued "certainty" as Xenophon has been at pains to explain (to your blind eyes). Your arguments - based on red herrings and evidence of convenience - are desperate rather than the "balance of probability".

Taphoi wrote:P.S. I have not said that Philip-Arrhidaeus was not present in Egypt. I have said that it is unlikely that he fought, so the Babylonian tablet is not adhering to literalism when it says that he fought.

No one has said that he fought; only that Arrhidaeus, as king, led the invasion of Egypt as the Chronicle states. Another of your red herrings. Again, you need to deal with the evidence. So far this has been:

Diodorus states that Arrhidaeus spent nearly two years making ready the cortege:

Chugg:It seems unlikely.

BCHP 3 Obv. 23-24 "the King did battle with the satrap of Egypt" in Philip year 4 (320/19)

Chugg: A scribe was "inconsistent" in his writing and referred to Laomendon being attacked by the satrap of Egypt. Further, the royal army sat about in Sinai, after invading Egypt in early summer 321, only moving to Triparadeisus a year later.

The Marmor Parium (B 11): "Antigonus crossed into Asia [...] and Perdiccas invaded Egypt and was killed"; Archonship of Archippus (321/20).

Chugg: It does no such thing. The event it dates is the death of Perdiccas, NOT his invasion.

Diod. 18.36.7: Perdiccas was murdered "after he had ruled for three years".

Chugg:

• A) The rule was dated in Attic archon years and could be either 2 years or 3 years or even 4 years

• B) The rule was dated in Macedonian years

• C) The years were rounded up.

• D) All of the above

This before we even get to the chronological errors in Diodorus (unanswered). I note there is still no acknowledgement of the baseless allegation that I'd ignored a missing year in Diodorus to the convenience of my argument. Holding one's breath is not an option when dealing with such an individual I fear.

In a paraphrase of Bertie Russell; were it to be postulated that there is a teapot orbiting in the asteroid belt, Meissen I think, though I would not swear to it, your position would be that anyone contesting this would have to prove beyond all possible doubt that it simply could not be whereas the perpetrator of this suggestion need only remain 'uncertain'. Think that covers your 'method', if such it may be called.

 Since there is no record of a campaign of Ptolemy in Nubia at this time, I think I am going to continue to prefer the Cyrene option

(However, there is also a slight possibility that the Chronicle records an action not mentioned elsewhere.)

See, Taphoi, you DO recognise a difference between the Babylonian material and the Egyptian! The latter can only record corroborated events while the former is not so restricted, or is each just an example of the 'Convenient Interpretation Method'?

agesilaos wrote:Think that covers your 'method', if such it may be called.

Agreed. And, yes, the different treatment of the Babylonian and Egyptian material should really come as no surprise: convenience decides all at bottom.

The entire “argument” is that the validation of the “low” (for this period) is based solely upon BCHP 3 and its reference to Memphis. As I’ve listed above, that is demonstrably not true and merely an attempt to define the debate on Tapohoi’s terms. By continually claiming that the “low” here is based upon the “certainty” of BCHP 3 Obv 23-24 Taphoi pretends to rational refutation by claiming uncertainty and asserting this must be Ptolemy attacking Laomedon. No evidence is supplied for said assertion.

In the end, without BCHP 3 Obv. 23-24, we have three chronological markers: Almost two years to complete the construction of the cortege; Perdiccas died having ruled for three years (which "brooks no demurral” – Wheatley/Heckel) and BCHP 3 Obv. 24-25 - "Month VIII, day 10 (14 November 320) the satrap of Akkad entered Babylon" – which, at that date, can only be Seleucus, post Triparadeisus.

Diodorus' places Triparadeisus as the next event in Asia following the arrangements made in the aftermath of Perdiccas' murder. Once arrived, Peithon and Arrhidaeus "called an assembly" of the Macedonians and Antipater was appointed regent. Antipater was not there at this time and clearly held off from the rebellious royal army ("When Antipater arrived at Triparadeisus a few days later..." 18.39.3). Likely enough he was were he was last attested: Cilicia realising Perdiccas’ alacrity had dealt him out of Memphis.

This is a difficult piece of evidence for any supporter of the “high” for this period. Only one satrap is known to be installed late in 320: Seleucus after Triparadeisus (above Obv. 24-25). If Triparadeisus took place in autumn 321 as per the “high” then Seleucus, taking something of sabbatical, presumably took a Greek Island cruise before taking up his appointment some twelve or more months later. In the scenario proposed on this thread by Taphoi, although the royal army is at Memphis in the early summer of 321, Triparadeisus is supposed to have taken place in 320. Thus the royal army spends a minimum of six to eight months on its collective backside in the Sinai whilst Attalus, now voted ‘enemy of state’ along with other supporters of Perdiccas, leads the fleet off to Tyre where he gathers an army of 10,000 and collects other Perdiccan refugees. Meanwhile Antipater, having been too late to help out at Memphis, sits in Cilicia patiently awaiting the arrival of the royal army which will not arrive in his vicinity until sometime in the next year.

It is a patently absurd scenario and it does not follow the literary evidence. There is no winter between Memphis and Triparadeisus and it cannot have happened in the following year as Diodorus’ narrative makes plain. Why the need for such an incongruous scenario? So as to support the bald assertion that BCHP 3 Obv. 23-24 is referring to Ptolemy attacking Laomedon which had to take place long enough after Triparadeisus for the royal army to have moved from the area and be otherwise occupied. One desperate, unsupported assertion backed by another equally desperate, unsupported assertion.

Catafalques coming for Christmas? Merry Christmas to all just in case...

Diodorus gives a detailed description the funerary cortege of Alexander and rounds it out by noting that it was finally ready “after nearly two years” (18.28.2). The construction, then, was completed by sometime in the spring of 321 (depending upon when construction actually commenced). The story is well known: the cortege, accompanied by road makers, mechanics and soldiers (ibid), set off from Babylon on its slow procession. Somewhere in Syria the cortege was “hijacked” by Ptolemy who “met it with an army” and took it on to Egypt (18.28.3). Perdiccas’ lieutenants, Polemon and Attalus and their force, though able to hinder the hijackers, failed in their efforts to secure the cortege. Perdiccas, once the news reached him, turned upon Egypt with the object of the removal of Ptolemy by force (Arrian, Succ. 1.25).

Now, the cortege was intended to go to Egypt. Diodorus (18.3.5) explicitly writes that “the transportation of the body of the deceased king and the preparation of the vehicle that was to carry the body to Ammon they assigned to Arrhidaeus” and Justin (13.4.6) writes much the same. Pausanias (1.6.3), on the other hand, writes that “the Macedonians who had been entrusted with the task of carrying the corpse of Alexander to Aegae” were persuaded, instead, to give the corpse to Ptolemy. Pausanias is the only source to mention Aegae but he is not alone in claiming a different destination for the cortege. Strabo says that Ptolemy “took away the body of Alexander from Perdiccas, as he was conveying it down from Babylon” and Arrian (Succ. 1.25) states that Arrhidaeus “contrary to the wish of Perdiccas, took it from Babylon by way of Damascus” to Egypt. Both clearly imply a destination different to Egypt had been the intention and Aegae is the logical candidate given Pausanias’ statement. The destination – clearly Egypt as part of the Babylonian Settlement – had been altered.

Anson (Eumenes of Cardia, p. 89, n. 47) claims that “The body was from the beginning meant to go to Aegae”. Anson’s view here is based on a combination of Diodorus reporting “one of those hypomnenata rejected by the army in Babylon, or remembering a detail from his source for Alexander’s campaign, or something he may have heard on his own visit to Egypt” (ibid) and, presumably, the silence of Arrian in Photius’ summary of the Babylonian Settlement. Diodorus is, by far, the fullest narrative source for the period of the Diadochoi. It is unsurprising in the extreme that he would occasionally record information that does not find its way into other, less fulsome, sources. But Justin, as mentioned, records the same information in similar terms even though the cortege afterwards disappears from his description. Trogus is argued to have worked from a combined source tradition and thus his recording of it surely means that Diodorus was not misreporting – even if this came from the same source as Diodorus. The silence of Photius’ severe summary of Arrian is hardly compelling either given his shorthand of the Babylonian Settlement. Whilst nothing can prove that Alexander’s wish to be buried in Egypt was not overturned with the other “last plans” at Babylon, were Alexander’s express arrangements for his own funeral annulled, one might expect it to be mentioned, at least by Diodorus who lists other cancelled examples. The notion of the hubristic conqueror being denied his Egyptian apotheosis would have appealed to his interests. It is, to me, more likely that the change in destination was a result of the evolving political machinations that resulted in the first Diadoch War.

By the late winter of 323/22 Eumenes had returned to Babylon with tales of Leonnatus’ plan to further his Argaed aspirations by aiding Antipater. Later, in the spring of 322, Perdiccas set out for Cappadocia along with the kings and the royal army. He likely went via the royal road through Armenia as no mention is made of his meeting with Craterus who was still in Cilicia. The summer campaign, involving two battles against Arriarathes (Arr. Succ. 1.11), likely saw the return of Peithon’s 3,800 Macedonians to what will have been a royal army short of such. There followed the pacification and organising of Eumenes’ satrapy which will have seen in the autumn. At this stage Perdiccas, the kings and royal army in tow, move into Cilicia and Eumenes “not wishing to be parted” from them follows (Plut. Eum. 3.7). It is now the late autumn / early winter 322 and Perdiccas and the royal army go into winter quarters in Cilcia. By the following spring Eumenes had returned to his satrapy having been sent to settle matters in adjacent Armenia where Neoptolemus had managed to produce “confusion” (Plut. Eum. 4.1). Perdiccas and the royal army marched on Psidia where the cities of the Larandians and the Isaurians were reduced. We are now in the early summer of 321.

Up until this time relations between Antipater and Perdiccas had been anything but hostile. Antipater had referred the question of Athenian possession of Samos to “the kings” and Perdiccas had restored the island’s exiles “after they had been exiles for forty-three years” (Diod.18.18.9). Perdiccas, as Anson remarks (Eumenes, pp.82, 88), had shown a studied disinterest in the crucial satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia – still without a satrap – for a man interested in a move on Macedonia. The worst that could be said was that Antipater had been in contact with Ptolemy (323) with whom he’d made some sort of “treaty of co‑operation” (Diod. 18.14.2). This need mean no more than Antipater shoring up relations with the major players as he’d done with Perdiccas and likely at the same time. In any case, he had already arranged for his daughter Nicaea to marry the preeminent marshal and now, in the late spring / early summer, sent her east to consummate the alliance. Nicaea, though, was not the only female of dynastic opportunity to arrive in Asia Minor. Alexander’s sister, Cleopatra, also arrived with the backing of her formidable mother, Olympias. Perdiccas was presented with two options: alliance with Antipater and marriage to Nicaea or marry Cleopatra and with her, the royal house.

Two distinct councils begin to form amongst Perdiccas’ philoi. Alcetas advised that marriage to Nicaea and alliance with Antipater was the preferred course and Eumenes, who seems to have returned sometime over the summer, advised the hand of Cleopatra. Perdiccas dithered but, in the end, so as not to antagonise Antipater and “not wishing as yet to reveal his design” on the kingship (Diod. 18.23.3), married Nicaea whilst continuing a dialogue with Cleopatra. Also at this time, Perdiccas decided to deal Antigonus out the game and summon him to court on unspecified charges. The One Eye declared his intention to defend himself and set about escape plans though Perdiccas seems to have been in no hurry as other matters were occupying him. Cynnane, daughter of Philip II, and her daughter Adea (later Eurydice) arrived. Cynnane demanded a marriage between Adea and Philip III. Matters began to turn. Alcetas, surely with Perdiccas’ consent, murdered Cynnane and there followed a riot of royal army (Arr. Succ. 1.22-24; Diod. 19.52.5) and Perdiccas, with little choice, permitted the marriage. Perdiccas’ pretensions were, by now, clearly no great secret and Antigonus, in the late autumn, fled to Greece where he eventually found Antipater and Craterus engaged in a winter campaign against the Aetolians. Having described Cynnane’s murder to Antipater, Antigonus “told him the whole plot of Perdiccas, and that Perdiccas, after marrying Cleopatra, would come at once with his army to Macedonia as king and deprive Antipater of the supreme command” (18.25.3). To get the desired result, the One Eye could hardly represent it any other way and Antipater and Craterus duly set their sights on a spring campaign in Asia Minor.

It is at this time – the time Perdiccas continues his “dialogue” with Cleopatra after his marriage to Nicaea – that any change of plans for the catafalque is likely to have been made. Though it is nowhere stated, Perdiccas likely wished for the catafalque to come to the royal court and come under his “stewardship” and may well have sent word to this effect to Archon and Arrhidaeus before the cortege left Babylon. Thus Arrhidaeus is found acting “contrary to the wish of Perdiccas” and Archon is subsequently replaced by Docimus. In any case, Perdiccas decision, toward the end of 321 to repudiate Nicaea in favour of Cleopatra, is the seal. In the light of that, the cortege could never go to Ptolemy’s Egypt.

Ptolemy had spent his time well. The sums gathered by Cleomenes, Perdiccas’ hyparch whom he promptly murdered, financed mercenaries. These troops he added to those left by Alexander (Arrian, Anabasis, 3.5.3-5). He’d forged an arrangement with Antipater – eventually sealed by marriage – and had annexed Cyrene. Presently he was arranging alliances with the kings of Cyprus. It is also clear, by virtue of subsequent events, that he was in contact with Arrhidaeus (if not Archon as well). In the early winter of 321/20 Perdiccas, in winter quarters in Psidia, a looming war with Antipater and Craterus in the west and an increasingly hostile Egypt to his south, had a decision to make. Both Diodorus (18.25.6) and Justin record the council of Perdiccas and the decision that council came to . Diodorus places it at the end of the campaigning year (321). Both present it in similar terms: that Egypt should be put out of the way before any march on Macedonia.

Only then, later in the same winter, is the catafalque “hijacked” from somewhere in Syria. That the catafalque had left Babylon can have been no secret to anyone – it seemingly drew crowds wherever it went. Its itinerary would involve no great guess work either: the royal road from Babylon via Thapsacus and down through Damascus to Egypt. Perdiccas, wanting to ensure possession of the catafalque, sent Polemon and Attalus with a force to intercept and retain it for the regent who would be through in the coming spring. They met with the “army” that Ptolemy sent to meet it and came off second best. Reduced to hindering and achieving little, they reported back to Perdiccas what had transpired and he “was even more determined to make an attack on Egypt, in order to remove Ptolemaeus from power, to set up one of his friends as governor of Egypt, and to recover the body of Alexander”. Notions that this "hijack" was the reason that Perdiccas attacked Ptolemy rather than defend the Hellespont or attack Macedonia are inconsistent with the evidence. Anson, to whom my view is closest, claims that Perdiccas changed plans and marched on Egypt as a result. This, in my view, is incorrect. Anson relies upon Diodorus' report of Antigonus assertion that Perdiccas would march upon Macedonia and remove Antipater from a the "supreme command". To achieve his purpose Antigonus, as already stated, can hardly have presented it any other way and Macedonia was a target; just not the first. The first objective of the campaign was decided upon early in the winter and before Perdiccas' failure to secure the catafalque. That campaign began in spring 320 with the march into Cilicia and the replacement of the satrap. Similar arrangements were made for Babylonia (BCHP 3 Obv. 21-22; Arr.Succ. 25.3) and then the regent set about detaching a naval force to see to Ptolemy’s allies on Cyprus. After the regent had taken care of those matters he, the Kings and the royal army set out, from Damascus, on the fateful campaign that would end in murder at Memphis.

Καλά Χριστούγεννα / Merry Christmas.

Plutarch's Life of Eumenes contains an interesting clue to the chronology of the Perdikkan campaigns of 320; chapter 6 verse vi

[6] At once, then, he conjectured that the vision was in his favour, since he was fighting for a country that was most fertile and had at that time an abundance of fine young grain in the ear; for the land had everywhere been sown and bespoke a time of peace, now that its plains were covered with a luxuriant growth; and he was all the more strengthened in his belief when he learned that the enemy's watchword was ‘Athena and Alexander.’ Accordingly, he too gave out a watchword, namely, ‘Demeter and Alexander,’ and ordered all his men to crown themselves and wreathe their arms with ears of grain.

The crucial point is

ἐν κάλυκι στάχυν ἅπασα

'here translated as fine young grain in the ear' this fixes the battle between Krateros and Eumenes to before harvest time and almost certainly to around the stage of 'milk ripeness' which is about a month before harvest (25-35 days).

Sowing was in October and calculating the amount of time needed for wheat to ripen ( winter corn requires 2200 heat units, given by averaging the high and low daily temperature in Centigrade; fortunately the Mediterraean climate now is aboutthe same as in the 4th Century so use can be made of modern data) we get a date in mid-May for a mid-October sowing. This means Eumenes' battle was fought late April. The fighting was near Mount Ida and the news was sent to Perdikkas, arriving two days after his death. The journey would almost certainly have had to be overland, as Antipatros was moving down the coast to Kilikia. It is approximately 1250 miles to Memphis from Ida roughly 14 days @90mpd which would place Perdikkas' death around mid-May.

This, in turn means that Perdikkas must have set out from Damascus either mid-March @10mpd or early April if we allow a speed of 15mpd. Either way there must have been magazines established as this invasion was passing through the Levant before crops were even milk-ripe, quite a feat and undoubtedly an unpopular one.

This fits with Philip III fourth year and the right archonship, it also allows time for the movements to and after Triparadeisos.

agesilaos wrote:The crucial point is

ἐν κάλυκι στάχυν ἅπασα

'here translated as fine young grain in the ear' this fixes the battle between Krateros and Eumenes to before harvest time and almost certainly to around the stage of 'milk ripeness' which is about a month before harvest (25-35 days).

Neatly found. The barley harvest (and wheat a little after), as near as can be told, was in late May / early June. Thus the Israelis celebrated festivals about its harvest time (Shavuot). The Babylonian year, which recognised only two seasons ('summer' and 'winter'), almost certainly reflected this with the 'new year' beginning at the commencement of the new agricultural year. On that basis your assessment of Eumenes' engagement with Craterus is as good a guess as can be made and would match the timetable for Antipater and Craterus crossing from Europe.

It is widely accepted that Antipater co-opted the naval forces in the Hellespont to facilitate the crossing and thus, with Perdiccas and the rest of the fleet en route to Egypt, Perdiccan naval resources will have been nil (though that cannot discount a single trireme entirely - witness the many missions of my avatar). The notice of the battle's result then would need to travel overland as you suggest. I will not debate marching or messenger times (Xenophon has that market cornered I suspect) and so the date of the notification's arrival within the royal army's camp seems just as good a guess. The timetable sees Perdiccas' murder, then, in late May / early June as has been long supposed.

agesilaos wrote:This, in turn means that Perdikkas must have set out from Damascus either mid-March @10mpd or early April if we allow a speed of 15mpd. Either way there must have been magazines established as this invasion was passing through the Levant before crops were even milk-ripe, quite a feat and undoubtedly an unpopular one.

This is quite important. As I've argued, Perdiccas had set his course late in the year (321 on the 'low') by deciding to repudiate Nicaea and seek marriage with Cleopatra. Eumenes is sent to the latter over the winter / spring of 321/20 where he is found offering her gifts on his way north to stop Antipater. The war was a forgone conclusion after Antigonus' scarpering to Greece in the mid to late Autumn; it was only a matter of which front to first engage on. Diodorus (18.25.6) reports that decision (to attack Egypt), taken in council, at the close of the year when Perdiccas goes into winter quarters (as does Justin) before confronting Antipater (Diodorus, at 18.29.1-3, repeats this decision in a resumptive doublet after describing the "hijack" of the catafalque. This is not unusual: he does exactly the same with the letters sent to Eumenes via Polyperchon for example - 18.57.3-4 and 58.1)*. At this time planning of the campaign will have been undertaken and a crucial part of that will have been supply. Thus the kings (Perdiccas) will have ordered that supply dumps be established for the campaign and its journey south. Psidia and, to a lesser extent, Cilicia will have been hard put upon over the preceding year and so Damascus (and Syria) would loom as a major hub in that supply train (probably explaining Photius' summary note about Perdiccas setting out for Egypt from Damascus after having replaced the satraps of Cilicia and Babylon and sent a force to counter Ptolemy's allies in Cyprus).

Positing an Egyptian campaign by Perdiccas in early 321 presumes that the decision to attack was reached in late 322. There is no reason for any war with Antipater at this time. The Greeks were defeated at Crannon in the late summer of 322 and Antipater set about negotiating a settlement with each state separately. Aetolia refused and was left to one side as Antipater dealt with the serial agitator, Athens. Diodorus tells us he remade the constitution with franchise based on wealth and selected some 12,000 of what Thucydides might call the "naval mob" to be transported to Thrace. In September a garrison was installed in Munychia (18.18.1-6). This did not take place overnight and the autumn will have been well progressed by the time Antipater had finished. When he had done so, he referred the Athenian possession of Samos to "the kings" (Perdiccas). Clearly relations between Antipater and Perdiccas (and the kings) were civil in the latter part of 322 and thus there is no need for the latter to be consulting his synhedrion of philoi about whether to attack Egypt or Macedonia first in the coming campaigning season.

The Parium Marble (B 11 "Archippus archon at Athens" 321/20); Diodorus "Perdiccas, after he had ruled for three years..." (18.36.7), "Arrhidaeus had spent nearly two years in making ready this work (the catafalque)..." (18.28.2); BCHP 3 23-24 "That same month the king did battle with the satrap of Egypt and the land [.. .. ] The troops of the king were slaughtered" all cohere. The timeline of the campaign, given Plutarch's chronological pointer, also fits. To argue a rift occasioning war with Antipater in the latter part of 322 and an invasion of Egypt in May 321 necessitates the resourceful manipulation of coherent sources if not a little legerdemain.

* That this decision had already been made is indicated by Arrian's note that Perdiccas was "even more determined to make an attack on Egypt" after news the catafalque had fallen into Ptolemy's hands.

I think we can discern even more of Perdikkas' strategy. The crucial passage being

6 Meanwhile Perdiccas learnt that the kings of Cyprus, Nicocreon of Salamis and his vassals Pasicrates of Soli and Nicocles of Paphos, and also Androcles of Amathus, had made an alliance with Ptolemaeus. They had collected almost two hundred ships and were besieging the city of Marium and its governor. Perdiccas gathered triremes from Phoenicia for an expedition from Cilicia over to Marium, and prepared many merchant ships . He put about 800 mercenaries on the ships, and about 500 cavalrymen. He appointed Sosigenes of Rhodes to be admiral, Medius of Thessaly to be leader of the mercenaries, Amyntas to be leader of the cavalry, and Aristonous the bodyguard of Alexander to be general of the entire force ...

From the Codex Resc. Vat.

A triereme could carry 50 hoplites and, converted to a horse transport 30 horses (Thuc VI 42, see Morrison 'The Athenian Triereme'). The land forces, then required 40 + c20 = 60 trieremes; it is unlikely that Perdikkas would have moved with fewer warships than the Cypriot Kings so there seems to have been a lot of spare capacity, although I suspect the word used for the Cypriot ships is the neutral 'naus' even 200 pentekontereis would need to be countered by more than 40 trieremes. So, why the 'many merchant ships'? Such a small force would not require a large supply fleet in fact one ship could have supplied the force for a week!

I suggest that the merchant ships were collected so that an early harvest could be sailed to meet the army at Pelusium and resupply them, this would still only be 'milk-ripe' grain which would need to be gathered in greater quantity than properly ripe grain; as this would already be a time of want it could only alienate the communities upon whom the tithe was levied. We are told that Tyre was where Perdikkas left his war-chest of 500 Talents, it is reasonable to suppose that it was Phoenicia and Coele-Syria that sufffered the extraordinary levy, which, in turn helps explain the ease of Ptolemy's take over after Triparadeisos. This assistance to the Perdikkan cause was clearly explained as coercion since Laomedon remained in place after Triparadeisos. It is telling, however that upon escaping from Ptolemy Laomedon fled, not to the Royal Army at Sardis but to Alketas and the Perdikkans.

Appian 'Syrian Wars' 52

Not long afterward, when the true kings died, these satraps became kings [3]. The first satrap of
Syria was Laomedon of Mitylene, who derived his authority from Perdiccas and from Antipater,
who succeeded the latter as regent. To this Laomedon, Ptolemy, the satrap of Egypt, came with a
fleet and offered him a large sum of money if he would hand over Syria to him, because it was
well situated for defending Egypt and for attacking Cyprus. When Laomedon refused Ptolemy
seized him. Laomedon bribed his guards and escaped to Alcetas in Caria. Thus Ptolemy ruled Syria
for a while, left a garrison there, and returned to Egypt.

The importance of settling Cyprus, which in enemy hands would threaten the naval re-supply, coupled with the evident early start in 320 must place the suppression of the Cypriot Kings and the associated material, the replacement of Philotas in Kilikia and Archon in Babylonia, as well as the diversion of the body of Alexander before the end of the sailing season of 321.

These suspicions are, perhaps, borne out by Diodoros XVIII 36 vi

6 On the next day when there was an assembly of the soldiers, Ptolemy came, greeted the Macedonians, and spoke in defence of his own attitude; and as their supplies had run short, he provided at his own expense grain in abundance for the armies and filled the camp with the other needful things.

There is no inference that supply lines had been cut; indeed, Ptolemy seems to have been numerically weak, resorting to strategems while shuffling his men along the line of the Nile. As Perdikkas had captured Pelusion he had a fully functioning port and a fleet. Re-supply in the normal season should not have presented too much problem, but his early strike had left the closest satrapies depleted and the grain he had secured so prematurely harvested that it could not sustain the army very long. Had he managed to cross the Nile and defeat Ptolemy, Egypt’s harvest would have provided plenty and allowed him to re-deploy against Antipatros and Krateros.

This was a daring plan and hoodwinked the old rope and his cohort; they moved about the same time as Alexander had, Perdikkas almost a month earlier and probably from a base at Damascus; the extra time entailed for a movement from Kilikia, a further 250 odd miles would drag an army moving at 10mpd too far back into the close season, that said one moving at 15mpd would depart about the same day as a 10mpd one from Damascus. There would be no reason to divert the march to Damascus, speed was of the essence, whereas a progress during the winter of 321/0 to sanction those guilty of allowing Ptolemy’s coup-de-main does make sense. In fact the removal of Philotas could have more to do with denying the enemy intelligence than just pique, having already suffered from Antigonos’ escape Perdikkas could well have been sensitised to security measures.

Had Perdikkas pulled it off would the Empire have survived? I rather think he was too much of an Agamemnon among a throng of Achilleses.

I don't disagree with the overall strategy. As I remarked above, Perdiccas obviously set out as early in the year as was possible. The decision, taken late in 321, to confront Ptolemy before dealing with an army from Macedon demanded such and there would be limited time for even Alexander's army to deal with Egypt and turn to confront the invasion from Europe.

agesilaos wrote:The importance of settling Cyprus, which in enemy hands would threaten the naval re-supply, coupled with the evident early start in 320 must place the suppression of the Cypriot Kings and the associated material, the replacement of Philotas in Kilikia and Archon in Babylonia, as well as the diversion of the body of Alexander before the end of the sailing season of 321.

Cyprus was indeed crucial and the scaffolding you lay out for the royal army's advance to Egypt and its supply is reasonable. That the rearrangement of Cilicia and the dealing with Cyrpus happened late in 321 does not, I think, accord with what evidence we have. The Codex Resc. Vat. is a tantalisingly lacunose piece of work. Most importantly, we do not know what came prior to the first words we have; we have no real context. The beginning of the text – as we have it – seems to be an explanation for Perdiccas’ attack on Egypt. It relates the loss of the corpse which makes Perdiccas “even more determined” to make the attack on Egypt. I’d venture to suggest that this followed a far more detailed relating of the events that Diodorus gives us for the latter part of 321 (Antigonus’ flight to Greece, etc). What is clear is that the loss of the corpse affirms a decision made.

Preparations for this invasion must have been an open secret; only the timing can have been kept mum (as you suggest). Antipater can have assumed a march from Psidia sometime during the spring: probably April – even mid to late April. Antigonus' arrival in Asia Minor and his further news to Antipater will have been too late to change the Old Rope's schedule. Perdiccas, though, had campaigned with Alexander and was experienced in early spring departures (Curt. 8.4.1. Winter campaigning would be routine in Asia under the Successors). Having decided on the invasion in late 321, Perdiccas will have ordered supplies be laid up in Cilicia and Damascus in Syria (likely residence of the governor of Ebir Nari under the Achaemenids). From Damascus Perdiccas would proceed to Tyre, where the fleet likely assembled, and then Egypt (the reverse of Alexander’s route from Egypt to Thapsacus in 331) having deposited his “war chest”. Perdiccas will have left Psidia as soon as he could cross the Taurus into Cilicia.

The codex says that “meanwhile” Perdiccas learned the extent of Ptoemaic influence in Cyprus and sorted the task force to deal with it. This is whilst he is in Cilicia deposing Philotas and sending Docimus to Babylon. It will also be whilst he gathers what surplus of grain from the previous harvest was available (Cilicia being proverbially fertile) according to his orders. That he sorts the strike force to be sent from Cilicia (with vessels from Phoenicia) indicates not only the urgency of dealing with Cyprus but also the fact that his line of march was not to be coastal. As I’ve remarked earlier, that Perdiccas ordered this strike force does not mean he stayed and watched it assemble – that was the job of his commanders.

I agree that the “many transports” (numbers unknown) will have included those for the expedition to Egypt. Immediate supplies for the army will have been carried by its supply train and the plan will have been to re-supply once Damascus was reached. The supply fleet will then have loaded supplies from Phoenicia and likely met up with the royal army at Tyre. The importance of seaborne supply for the rest of the journey is never to be underestimated. Polybius (5.80.1-7) records much skirmishing over sources of water before the conflict at Raphia, where Ptolemy had chosen his ground well, for here there is no possibility of seaborne supply (as Antigonus would find out in 306 - Diod. 20.74.1-3).

All of that, I dare to suggest, could have transpired in a timeframe encompassing early March to late May (or very early June). It might well be that the corpse was diverted late in 321 (late November or December ). In fact, the abduction may have happened at the time Perdiccas was cnvassing his options for the spring campaign. It is, though, irrelevant to the fact that Perdiccas had decided at the end of the campaigning season of 321 to deal with Egypt first. Once news reaches him of the loss of the corpse he’s affirmed in that decision and his first act of the campaign, “when he arrived with his army in Cilicia with this [now reinforced] intention” of attacking Egypt, is to reorganise Cilicia (and Babylonia).

agesilaos wrote:This assistance to the Perdikkan cause was clearly explained as coercion since Laomedon remained in place after Triparadeisos. It is telling, however that upon escaping from Ptolemy Laomedon fled, not to the Royal Army at Sardis but to Alketas and the Perdikkans.

An intriguing and likely never to be explained fact. Laomedon received confirmation of his satrapy from Antipater and so can really have had no great concern with the regent. Ptolemy’s imprisoning of Laomedon and his escape is over winter 320/19 or late winter / early spring 319. At this time it might have been a simple matter of the closest safe harbour: Caria. Perhaps there was a relationship with Alcetas? We aren’t told and Laomedon disappears from history once arrived in Caria. I’m open to any cogent theory!