Agesilaos wrote:
Ok, just one last attempt on the naval disparity.
I think we all agree that Memnon was a good general and an able admiral. It would also seem that he had good intelligence, at 19 ix the Persians ‘had learned’ ‘πεπυσμένοι ἦσαν’, that Alexander’s sailors were away gathering firewood and provisions. The situation seems to be of the main Persian fleet sitting out to sea, challenging the Macedonians to come out and fight, while a small squadron watched the harbour entrance. Or, perhaps, the five ships were bait (against that is the Iassian ship being a poor sailer, one would want the bait to escape and draw the pursuit onto the main body). In any case we see the Persians using small squadrons for observation and having intelligence assets ashore.
I think you overate the Persian “intelligence assets”. Fleets routinely observed one another with scouts, and could watch the comings and goings of crews – it was a common tactic to attack while crews were away provisioning – c.f. Battle of Aegospotami. Reports from ashore were simply un-necessary.
If the whole fleet did retire to Halikarnassos then Xenophon is right that it would be unable to respond to any seaborne dash from Miletos; if Memnon is a good general he would not yield his naval advantage. He would only have left the seas of the bay to the Macedonians if he was certain that they no longer possessed any seabourne forces. It must be borne in mind that Memnon was the advocate of a supply based strategy before Graneikos , unfortunately for him the Persian generals took Paralus’ view of logistics rather than Xenophon’s or mine! (I do recognise that is an unfair statement of Para’s position and can only plead my twisted sense of humour in mitigation). As to where the fleet could provision, the whole fleet had done so on Samos when denied the use of the Meander, smaller squadrons with a watching brief have a ring of islands and ports to choose from including Bargylia, Iassos and Myndos.
You have put your finger on the problem (logistics). Whilst Samos is a largeish island, its population then was of the order of 10-20,000. The influx of 300 ships and their 60,000 crew like a plague of locusts would soon exhaust both food and water supplies on an island – in fact the Persian fleet seems to have replenished there only once [Arrian I.19], or perhaps twice at most if they called in again on their way from Miletus to Halicarnassus. Scattering the fleet, or even squadrons around the bay was not an option, inviting piecemeal defeat. Moreover, such a strategy presented insurmountable command and control problems ( no radios then! How does Memnon tell his fleet when to sail ? Or where to go ? ). Moreover we know that Ionian ships and crews formed part of the Persian fleet. Once Alexander overran their homes at Miletus and other places, it is a fair surmise that many of these would want to ‘go home’. Splitting up the fleet would simply make desertion easier. Indeed, one wonders whether that Iassian ship really was such a “poor sailer”, or whether they simply slackened their sails so as to go over to Alexander – impossible to know, of course.
Worse still, there is no indication of 'splitting up' the fleet in our sources - even were your surmised sub-divisions of the fleet practical, there is nothing to suggest this was done in our sources. We are told the fleet went to Halicarnassus. Why did Memnon choose Halicarnassus to make his stand?
[*]It was the largest city in the region, and with its harbour the only place that could accommodate both army and fleet.
[*]It had 'new' walls, built by Mausolus, at least 6 ft thick. Being new it was designed with (non-torsion) artillery in mind and had roofed towers able to accommodate artillery.
[*]The city was well equipped with non-torsion artillery in its arsenal.
[*]The city had ample provisions, water etc to support the fleet and army.
In short, it offered excellent prospects for a successful defence, and also an excellent springboard and base for offence by both navy and army. Alexander could not afford to bypass it, and thanks to the Persian fleet, could not blockade the place either, nor starve it out. An extremely tough problem for Alexander.
The latter two probably remained in Persian hands until the fall of Halikarnassos (except Salamkis and the Island, which held out until just before Issos). Bargylia is on the ancient road from Mylasa to Halikarnassos, and so would have capitulated on Alexander’s approach; further indication that Memnon knew he did not face a naval threat, Bargylia is as defensible as Salamkis, only if a port did not significantly help his enemy would a good general abandon a defensible position, indeed it is almost a cardinal error to defend positions that do not hinder the opposition (the Duke of Wellington was famous for not favouring the garrisoning of outposts).
Why do you say that Bargylia/Bargylus was as defensible as the acropolis of Halicarnassus? I can’t find any evidence for this. Following the Duke of Wellington’s precept, Memnon would have been foolish to garrison Bargylia/Bargylus, even if it did have defensible walls, thus diluting his forces for no good reason. ( Bargylia/Bargylus could have been ‘masked/blockaded’ and the siege of Halicarnassus proceeded with, whilst any troops there were effectively ‘out of it’ )
The next thing to consider is not the raid on Myndos, but the abortive attempt to drive Alexander away as he approached from Mylasa. The incident is only in Arrian, it would be too minor to attract the epitomiser’s attention if it did figure in his source. Nor does it demonstrate anything beyond Halikarnassos’ defiance.
It also demonstrates the strength of Memnon’s forces, for this would be but the first of many ‘sallies’ by the defenders – only possible to a strong force.
It is necessary to say something further about logistics (England might not be able to play a dead bat but I have Boycott in my blood). Seriously, the Bodrum peninsular is rocky and not well watered, Alexander has daily requirements of 154 tons (Imperial) of grain and fodder and 91,700 gallons (328 tons) of fresh water. Since this cannot have been coming in by sea it must have been being supplied from the Carian heartland, and through the agency of Ada’s re-installation. The sources, of course, ignore the logistic angle and give us guff about putative Oedipal relations and such like.
Though there are rivers in the area, it is highly likely they would have been dry at that time of year, so Alexander would indeed be reliant on the ‘friendly’ Carians. The adoption of Alexander by Ada was surely to ensure that her kingdom reverted to her ‘son and heir’, Alexander, rather than some branch relative.....
Caria cannot have been heavily garrisoned by the Persians, if the whole provincial army was concentrated at Halikarnassos, there seem to have been only 2,000 Greek mercenaries, of whom a fleet of 300 could have supplied 1,500, and perhaps a further 1,000 Persians, Memnon’s alleged reluctance to commit them is strange if they were much more numerous.
The question of just how strong the garrison was is a good one – as we shall see, they put up impressive resistance, but Alexander’s “ace in the hole” was his ‘new’ torsion catapults.....
Not sure where your calculations for the garrison come from. At this time, for example, triremes typically carried up to 40 ‘epibatai’/hoplite marines – so the fleet could theoretically supply up to 12,000 heavy infantry and archers. Add to that your estimate of 2,000 Gk mercenaries, and 1,000 Persians and the total garrison is potentially 15,000.....though probably rather less in reality. Diodorus says Memnon had “large numbers of men in the city”[XVII.24.5] and Arrian [I.20] says that along with the whole fleet Memnon was given “a powerful force of of Persian troops and mercenaries.” Ephialtes later leads a sally of 2,000 men at one point [XVII.26.3], which is probably all the Greek mercenaries, but perhaps less. Arrian refers to a double sally, one part of which loses 1,000 men at the Tripolion gate.[I.22]. The walls too were over 5.5 km in circumference, and to properly man the walls would require many thousands of men. On the other hand, Alexander’s army numbered around 18,000 Macedonians or so plus at least 10,000 Greek allies and Greek and Balkan mercenaries. If we say Memnon had around 10,000 defenders plus or minus, we shan’t be far off the mark in all likelihood.
On the topography I prefer the written account of the 1862 excavator to the photo-montage of google earth. The German map does not show a demi-lune just the line of the walls.
The account of the excavator is necessarily subjective, and while valuable hardly gives us a complete picture of the terrain. It does not mention, for example, that the city rises like a tiered Greek theatre from the ‘stage’ of the harbour. Nor is the German 1914 sketch map of much use. It is inaccurate and misleading, with its ‘hachured’ terrain, only ever meant to give an impression of it.(which is why it is called a 'sketch' map)
If you don’t like Google Earth ( Why not? It is demonstrably accurate.), here is a proper 3D map with correct contour lines......
On the subject of the breach/breaches, we are getting ahead of ourselves as to where these were, let us consider the Myndos episode first. Myndos lay to the west of Halicarnassus, further down the peninsula at its end. It was relatively small, but had a small harbour. Possession of it would allow Alexander to ship supplies through it, and provide a harbour facility for his reduced flotilla in addition to Bargylus. Certain factions within Myndos offerred to open the gates if Alexander would come after dark. Alexander took half his Macedonian troops to reconnoitre the Myndus gate side of the city. (see maps) After dark he marched the 20 or so kilometres and arrived about midnight. The gates stayed barred, the plot obviously betrayed. Without even scaling ladders, Alexander ordered the troops to try undermining, and a fort duly came down - which tells us that the defenders were too few to keep the Macedonians away from the walls.. The situation was saved when the fleet brought re-inforcements from Halicarnassus. Frustrated, Alexander had no choice but to return empty handed.....
Given that all other towns approached by Alexander promptly surrendered, he had every reason to expect the same here, except that there must have been a 'pro-Persian', probably oligarchical faction, in the town - unsurprising when one considers its proximity to the Satrapal capital. It could be safely ignored for once Halicarnassus fell, stuck down the peninsula, it would have to yield.....
P.S : The excavator, commenting on the spontaneous assault by Perdiccas' men, translated that it was
the two Macedonians who had the advantage of high ground, whereas every other translation says it was the Halicarnassians who had the height advantage, which is what we would expect if this breach was in the eastern wall of the 'akra'/fortress facing Mylasa, as Arrian tells us. Also, De Selincourt has "
to attack the wall on the high ground facing Mylasa.
"....Chinnock has "
assault the wall facing the citadel, which for the most part was turned towards Mylasa."
and Diodorus has
"attack on the walls of the citadel."
Could someone check the Greek, please on these two points ? ( height advantage; description of where attack/breach was), which I suspect may be ambiguous. I also strongly suspect this breach is in the
east facing wall rather than the
west facing 'demi-lune'...... though it now becomes apparent why someone decided this major breach was in the vicinity of the 'demi-lune'. This is the only wall which faces both west ( toward the citadel ) and north ( toward Mylasa). Add to that the archaeologically attested 'demi-lune' being mistaken for the Halicarnassian 'secondary back-up wall', whereas it is far more likely just a curve in the main wall, and one can see how someone might position this breach here.......