pothos.org

Agesilaos wrote:

“I can see there is still some confusion here,

3] ἅμα δὲ τῷ τοὺς πρώτους ἅψασθαι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς εὐθέως ἐξ ἀσπίδος παρενέβαλε καὶ προκατελάμβανε τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους:


Translates ‘As soon as [ama de] the first ones [toi tous protous] had reached [apsasthai] from the pass [tes hyperboles] they directly filled the line to the left [eutheos ex aspidos parenebale] and occupied the heights first [kai prokatelambane tous hyperdexious].

The ‘trusty Loeb’ is here completely wrong as ‘parenbalein’ does not mean ‘to wheel’ but to ‘fill the line’ literally ‘to set beside’....”

AHA !....light bulb moment here. One thing, a slight anomaly, is that if Philip’s column arrived at the ridge line, wheeled 90 degrees left and thus formed line, then the Guard Peltasts at the head of the column would have ended up in the ‘wrong’ position – on the left of the right wing ( and in the centre once the left wing joined ). Their proper place, of course, was in the place of honour on the right of the line. Given “wheel” is wrong, then it becomes apparent what actually happened is that the Peltasts, heading the column and likely led in turn by their ‘Agema’ halt on the ridge-line and form the right of the line, with the following files/sub-units forming up successively beside one another to their left – thus ‘filling the line to the left’ and extending it, in exactly the normal way of deploying into line from column !! And the Guard Peltasts are then exactly where they should be, on the right...... as so often, it pays to check the EXACT translation. Many thanks, Agesilaos....

I won’t comment on the rest of the post because I think that both Paralus and I ( see our last posts) have dealt with why the mechanics of them initially deploying 8 deep in close order is almost certainly incorrect....

“Philip arrived with his units sixteen deep in marching order and then halved their depth to eight in normal order viz....”

So now your hypothesis has Philip’s column forming 16 deep in ‘open order’, then 8 deep in ‘close order’ ( being pedantic, to call this ‘normal’ is incorrect), then opening out again to 16 deep in ‘open order’, then closing up to the right to end up 16 deep in close order, then closing up again into 'synaspismos' ( though perhaps you may not insist on the last part) ? Bit complex not to mention time-consuming with the Romans already charging up the slope. Think I prefer the simplicity of my suggested drill move.....

“Polybios describes the phalanx as fighting sixteen deep because that was its normal depth; consider the hybrid phalanx described by Aristoboulos, that can only fight sixteen deep, or Issos where Alexander had to move to eight deep to cover the ground.”

The first part of that statement is incorrect for the reasons I referred to in my last post ( and many other pieces of evidence). Poylybius [XII.19], quoting and paraphrasing Kallisthenes has Alexander’s phalanx at Issus open out as the column debouches from the pass onto the plain, and the phalanx finally closes up to ‘fighting formation’ 8 deep ; "....finally as he approached the enemy to eight deep.” – significantly the only time we are told the depth at which they fought. Significantly too, neither Polybius nor apparently Kallisthenes comment on the fact – it is not suggested that the phalanx was stretched exceptionally thin to cover the ground, which would therefore appear to be perfectly normal for ‘pyknosis’. Assuming that it was thinned to cover the ground is an unwarranted assumption, based on the incorrect assumption that ‘close order/pyknosis’ was 16 deep !
In fact this very passage is one of many that supports the view I expounded earlier vis-a-vis it being ‘open order’ that was 16 deep, for Polybius specifically says that “ ..a stade [200 yards aprox, depending on whose stade] when the men are 16 deep will hold sixteen hundred, each man being at a distance of six feet from the next..” ( i.e. 16 deep is in normal/open order)
Polybius also explains why a phalanx needs to advance in ‘open’ order in this passage too.

Incidently, Polybius’ criticisms of Kallishenes are somewhat flawed....

Confusion will be my epitaph…

Xenophon, my position has not changed since my first post; Paralus, let me put your mind at rest, it is not the depth of sixteen which makes the suggested formation useless but the open order/marching order. Let me break it down

1. Philip’s men form a marching column by the camp, probably on the frontage of a tetrarchy, ie four men at six feet intervals (sorry I find the Imperial more convenient than metric, since two cubits are one yard etc); this yields a frontage of about twenty feet. The men will be in their normal sixteen deep files so each tetrarchy will stretch for about 90feet front to back.
2. Upon reaching the top of the pass they wheel right in sequence and maintain their open order.
3. Philip who is on the scene and can see the space and is experienced enough to be able to judge how far his men will stretch orders them, not to ‘close up to the right’ to put them on a fighting frontage but rather to halve their depth, since they have to cover the ground. There are clearly two ways half ones available force can cover the ground which is to be occupied by the whole, either they remain at double intervals (four cubits used for marching but not fighting) or they halve their depth and form a fighting front.
4. The advanced party is driven back by the advent of the Roman heavies before the whole half of the army is fully deployed. The trigger for Flamininus deploying his heavy infantry (who are close order swordsmen with a short ranged javelin (Latin pilum, hyssos in Greek so not not skirmishers at all, nor a missile based system but one based on a two foot lump of sharp steel being thrust into the enemy’s face or guts). Roughly 80 men can get out of a Roman camp per minute due to the restricted gateways, so it would take 25 minutes for the 2,000 heavies with which Flamininus reinforced his advanced party to extracastrament (get out of the camp, is soooo prosaic!) they then have to organise and get into action and turn the tide, another 15 minutes does not seem excessive.
5. Philip has been deploying for 40 minutes so 2/3 s of his column are now in line, or 6,000 of 9,000 men. He now sees his advanced party falling back led by the mercenaries, this is not a rout and the Romans are not hard on their heels when they reach the phalanx and he directs them to the right flank which must comprise the slope down to and probably include the pass.
6. There is now certainly a lull, because the Roman advanced party now falls back as well, NOT through the maniples but ‘through the GAPS in the maniples ie the left wing legions have formed channels to allow them to move to the rear and, though this is not stated, to probably reform on the legions’ left, and the heavies to take up their position ether in the Roman legion or Allied Ala.
7. This would give sufficient time for Philip’s force to fully deploy, he now sees the left wing moving up to the hills and, as Paralus rightly says has to make room for them, but at the same time he can see that the Roman right is still coming out of camp and forming up (were I writing fiction I would have the elephants, which must have been in the van slowing things maybe even blocking the gates; it is unlikely that they had the practice in leaving camp that the legions and allies had).
8. Philip therefore orders his men to ‘double their depth’ to sixteen and ‘close to the right’ so as to be back on a fighting frontage (two cubits per man). Whilst he is obviously constrained by the terrain, he is equally obliged to not allow himself to be outflanked by the Romans, so the Roman frontage IS important and germane to the formation which he adopted.
9. Flamininus now can see that the Macedonian frontage is halving and as an experienced general understands that the ridge was not occupied at full depth, (something he would not be able to judge even if Philip were on a forward slope, though, I fancy he would be able to tell the difference between and force in open order and fighting order; in the sixteenth century and beyond, battlefield commanders could tell whether pike blocks were well trained or not by how much their pikes moved in the wind, our armies must have been at a similar distance). It would be now that Flamininus gave his speech as he decides to move to the attack.
10. This is when I suggest that Philip moved into ‘synaspismos’ not by further closing to the right, which evolution the manuals suggest would be impossible, as once in ‘synaspismos’ and turns are impossible but by insertion of the rear half files, so that the frontage would not change. As only the front five ranks lower their sarissai there would be nothing to prevent the rear eleven ranks turning unless they are prevented by the close packing of ‘synaspismos’; in attempting to turn, the soldier would exceed the 18 inches in which he has to turn.
None of this is complex and it does all fit the evidence (though given that I am saying the evidence is incomplete that is no guarantee) what is certain is that the two commands Polybios says were issued have to be complied with; no matter how often you repeat it, Xenophon the insertion of half files was NOT the way phalanxes generally closed up, nor is it the usual method given by Aelian, but until I dig him out of his hiding place I cannot demonstrate this with the appropriate quotes as I know I must (maybe a new thread for someone to start).

Paralus, you and I have read enough Hammond to be unsurprised by his reconstruction fitting his map; unfortunately it does not fit Polybios’ description (Philip deployed onto the ridge from the pass and to the left) nor can his thirty –two deep column make military sense when faced with twice its frontage of flexible enemies, it’s Cannae all over again. If the modern road follows the old pass then Hammond is on the wrong ridge it mustr be the eastern side of the road not the western where he places it.

agesilaos wrote:Confusion will be my epitaph…

Xenophon, my position has not changed since my first post; Paralus, let me put your mind at rest, it is not the depth of sixteen which makes the suggested formation useless but the open order/marching order. Let me break it down

I actually got it the first time. I didn't buy it then and my money remains firmly in pocket now. I remain unconvinced that Philip deployed into line eight deep. There is nothing at all in the text that supports such, nothing other than a speculation. You are making a sarsia out of a dory's sauroter! As Spock would intone, it is only logical that Philip's phalanx deployed into line sixteen deep as was the practice. If it shows nothing else, Polybios' splenetic criticism of Kallisthenes demonstrates this. In this formation it occupied over 1,140 metres, err, 1,246 yards. The same as the unsubstantiated eight deep in 'fighting' order. Just how much did it have to cover?!

Let's assume it deployed eight deep in close order. As Xenophon has correctly pointed out, just how is it to double its depth? Given what is going on a counter march of every second file to sixteen and then a closing up to spear is most awkward. That you would add doubling down just adds complexity where it is not required.It cannot double to the right lest it fall into syaspismos. This did not happen despite your suppositions for Polybios is clear: "By the time this was effected the enemy were close at hand; and, accordingly, the word was given to the phalanx to lower spears and charge". Now the "this" of which he speaks is "to double their depth and close up to the right". If the phalanx is in synaspismos there can be no doing anything with sarisae.

Xenophon, above, is correct in his visualising of the deployment into line. There is absolutely no reason to suppose that this phalanx did not follow the regular, well practiced drill rather than the convolutions you are proposing. Philip is reacting and deploying in as quick a fashion as is possible: he has been caught on the hop. This is not the time for involved extensions, contractions, insertions and doubling. This is a time for simple and straightforward. Thus the phalanx will have deployed into line from column in files of sixteen as was the boringly normal. It is from here that you have to work from Polybios clear, unequivocal statement of Philip's order "to double their depth and close up to the right". And, it is here that Xenophon has problems. As you rightly point out there is no escaping the bald fact that the files were ordered to double their depth after which they were to close to spear. As I've said, once the first was accomplished the second was absolutely crucial. One file steps into the other and then all bar the farthest right marches to right and turns to face front. Simple and straightforward just like Polybios' language yet the constructs being put upon it are reaching Sydney Opera House status!

Whilst I agree with you re Hammond, we are not certain of the field. What we are absolutely certain of is that it was not suitable for Philip's phalanx as Polybios - again - makes as plain as the nose on one's face. Polybios notes that the Macedonians almost drove the Romans down onto the "level ground" before being forced to retire to the heights (18.22.6). Thus there was some distance from the tops of the ridges to the "level ground". Polybios describes these height on which the phalanx would have to operate (22.9-10):

The result was that he was induced to fight in spite of his dissatisfaction with the ground. For these hills, which are called Cynoscephalae, are rough, precipitous, and of considerable height; and it was because he foresaw the disadvantages of such a ground, that he was originally disinclined to accept battle there...

So, the ground was more than difficult for the phalanx and Philip did not wish to fight upon it though, in the end, there was no choice. From our remove and with debate about the actual location, we could go back and forth forever. What we do kmow is that having realised he had to commit on the ground in front of him, Philip ordered his phalanx to double depth and then to close to the right. A serious contraction. He most definitely had a reason and the immediate ground can only have been it. One either has to play with Polybios' words or to suppose words which aren't there otherwise.

The problem remains, that if the phalanx was initially 16 deep and doubled it ends up 32 deep and on too restricted a frontage not to be overlapped by the Roman left, and this does not seem the case. If it fights 16 deep then, prior to doubling its depth and closing to the right, it must have been 8 deep and if Philip was covering the ground that could hold his whole force in fighting order it follows that the half he had with him were also in fighting order and thus covered the same ground and that they contracted to allow the left wing which was coming up behind the room to deploy as you say; as you say the further move to synaspismos (in which one must have still been able to lower the Sarissa, by the way) is purely speculation, so let's not allow it.

We are hampered by the lack of a map but I will have that remedied soon, I hope; the only remaining trouble is that the ground has been extensively cultivated! Do you agree that the portion of the phalanx with which Philip attacked has to have a frontage ,at least, equal to the Romans he drives back?

Let's take both of those. No matter what one thinks of the mathematical-philosophically perfect world of the Tacticians (where all is flat and even and always perfectly constituted phalanxes are awarded 10/10 even by Russian gymnastic judges) they all denote the basic unit of the phalanx as the sixteen man file. It is from this sixteen man file that all other evolutions of the phalanx proceed. Now, one supposes there must be a reason for that and it cannot simply be the result of a mathematician's 'lucid dream'. Thus we may have instances where to preserve frontage - as the lucid dreamers relate - the sixteen man phalanx 'doubles down' to eight in close order (Xenophon incorrectly claims Kallisthenes' description as demonstrating this). This is not such an instance. This is a clear example of the other method which I've described at length above where, as the lucid dreamers state, a contraction is the result.

Your claim that "if it fights 16 deep then, prior to doubling its depth and closing to the right, it must have been 8 deep" ignores the fact that these options were available to a commander for a reason: the ground. The exigencies of the battle field completely overide notions of the phalanx "regularly" fighting either eight or sixteen deep. The phalanx was a proper tart and would accommodate any depth (excuse the imagery). Ground was the determining factor for the most part.Thus we have it described as fighting in 32 deep at Magnesia for example (cf the evolutions at Pelion). Philip has deployed into line sixteen deep. From here he decides what fits the circumstances of a field most unsuited to his phalanx. Does he double down? No, he doubles depth and closes to right: a contraction that can only have been dictated by the ground. No other reason makes any sense. That Polybios doesn't explain beyond the description of the "Dogs' Heads" is typical. We can 'guess back' over 2,200 years; Philip was on the ground and he decided.

As well as the above, Philip was in no way planning to fight on this day. He has no firm idea of where the enemy is only that he is on the southern side of the range somewhere. Deciding to re-encamp, he sends a 'holding force' to the intervening ridge tops so as to prevent any incursion by the enemy via those tops should he be nearby. The skirmish becomes 'heavy contact' and Philip scales the ridge tops ahead of the advancing right of his phalanx. He is not planning any of this and he has not scouted the battlefield; he is reacting. In short, the first he sees of the battlefield is when he crests the ridge ahead of his phalanx and all is laid out before him. What he sees he does not like in the slightest but his phalanx is turning to left and deploying into line. It is too late and he must deal with the field circumstance has dealt him.

The Roman frontage is another unknown as we have no clear idea of the location of their deployment or its nature - Polybios does not enlighten us. We are told they deployed abutting hills. In any case, the overriding factor for Philip was the ground he'd to contend with from the summits and immediately down before him. There is no reason to extend his phalanx if, some forty or so yards down, he has rocky outcrops or run-off gullies to cross for example. The Roman left is also advancing up the tops ("By the time this was effected the enemy were close at hand...") and so contact was firmly within Philip's part of the field - by Polybios' description, not too far from the summit - and so nowhere near the "level ground" on which the Romans deployed. After doubling depth and contracting Philip's phalanx is some 312 yards in frontage. He also has something in the order of 1,500 mercenaries and 2,000 light troops on his right flank as well as the Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry. It was enough, as Polybios relates, to deal with the Roman left as it then pushed it back down the hill.

Well, I think Agesilaos’ last post ( whoops! Last but one...he has posted again) speaks eloquently for itself in its complexity and consequent unlikelihood !! Although Paralus has expressed himself somewhat bluntly, he and I are in apparent agreement pretty much. We can summarise Philip’s movements of his right demi-phalanx as advance up the pass ( probably, according to Polybius’ information ) in column and deploy successively to the left into line in the usual fashion, 16 deep in ‘normal/open order’; receive the light troops and cavalry through his phalanx and then send them to the right flank; close up laterally to the right, ending in close order 16 deep (‘double depth’) on a 500 yard or so frontage opposite the two Legions of the Roman left wing on a similar frontage, lower sarisas and charge downhill.
As to the ten point exposition, I’ll just ‘nitpick’ point 6.in that I did originally say that the Roman lights withdrew through gaps : “The Romans also withdrew - through the gaps between the maniples [Polyb 24.10]”
(see my post 11 May, even if I did abbreviate this later on 14 May to just “maniples” )

In point 10. I note that you suggest that ‘synaspismos’ could be formed by ‘halving’ the depth, thereby doubling the number of men on the same frontage, but then go on to say:
“no matter how often you repeat it, Xenophon the insertion of half files was NOT the way phalanxes generally closed up, nor is it the usual method given by Aelian, but until I dig him out of his hiding place I cannot demonstrate this with the appropriate quotes as I know I must (maybe a new thread for someone to start).” Bit of a contradiction? They can form a denser formation by 'halving' depth, but this "was NOT the way phalanxes generally closed up..." ?

I have not just ‘repeated it’, but have cited evidence from the manuals, and also Polybius that supports this, whilst you haven’t because you can’t currently access Aelian. An old translation of Aelian ( 1814! ) is available online at :
http://books.google.com.au/books?id=khV ... edir_esc=y
....which you can readily reference, and I think Devine’s modern translation is also available.....

For the record, Aelian ( and the other versions) do indeed describe ‘closing up’ by insertion of the rear half-files e.g.: Aelian 30.1 “It is parembole/interjection when, in the intervals between some of the men posted in front, we station the men hitherto posted in rear, alongside them in a straight line.” i.e. the rear half of the file moves up.
Arrian describes another different way of achieving this at 25 “...doubling of number would be an increase in the line from 1,024 men to 2,048 without the phalanx taking up any more room. This is done by moving into the spaces between the men, those from alternate ranks.” ( and thus again halving the depth from 16 to 8 )
Ascepiodotus too describes the two ways of moving into close order from open order, including ‘interjection/parembole’ as in Aelian.
There is further proof. In Xenophon’s day, there were ‘half-file leaders’, who led up the rear-half-files ( Xenophon describes hoplite drill in detail in several works.)
In Alexander’s army and in the manuals we hear of ‘half-file leaders’ and also ‘quarter file leaders’ – the latter added to allow a further halving of depth into Philip II’s invention of ‘synaspismos’ at 1 cubit per man. One can follow the evolution of this phalanx 'closing up' from Xenophon through to the Hellenistic manuals, which offer alternative and even more sophisticated drills - but the traditional 'halving' depth seems to have existed throughout, and even the later alternatives produce the same result - 'close order/pyknosis on the same frontage as before, but at half the depth .....but again I digress !

Getting back to Cynoscephalae:
The only reason there is any difficulty with the above summary is Polybius’ description of Philip’s order as “ to double their depth and close up toward the right.”...which both Agesilaos and Paralus have taken very literally, and as I mentioned earlier, if we take this literally there is a problem – explored at length by all !

Firstly, I need hardly state the obvious – that Polybius wasn’t there and couldn’t know just how Philip’s demi-phalanx ended up in close order 16 deep – i.e. “double depth” - on half its original frontage. He cannot be ‘quoting’ the original order ( not least because he doesn’t seem to have had a Macedonian source who was there) and in reporting the various ‘orders’ he is describing the result, not the actual words – e.g. his reference to the light infantry being ‘ordered to place themselves on the flank’ or or ‘he placed them all, both foot and horse, on his right wing’ both orders which occur in the same section as the reference to the phalanx’s move [XVII.24.8-10]. Nor are Polybius’ words couched in the way actual orders were given - see the manuals for examples.

Far better, then, to follow the physical facts and use Occam’s razor to suggest how they came about than to slavishly follow Polybius’ words as being literal, when they quite plainly aren’t and cannot be.....
As to Agesilaos’ point that it might be possible for SOME of the phalanx to turn about, unless they were in ‘synaspismos’; firstly that still involves those ranks at the rear raising their pikes from forward sloping to vertical,in order to about turn, and would be bound to cause confusion etc with the phalanx part-turned.

I really do think we can rule out ‘synaspismos’.....

edited to correct 'smilie' back to correct number "8")

Strange, as I read it all three of us have different positions;
Paralus thinks that Philip arrived on the ridge in marching/open order (4 cubits), sixteen deep and then doubled his depth to thirty –two and closed to fighting order (2 cubits) thus fighting on a 312 yard frontage.

You agree that they arrived and stood in open order sixteen deep but only have them close up and thus occupy twice Paralus’ frontage and half his depth

I posit that they arrived as you both say but then stepped down to eight to cover the ground in a fighting formation and that from there they doubled their depth to sixteen and closed up to arrive at the same final formation as Xenophon but with a ‘doubling of depth ‘ actually having occurred. That I then suspect they formed ‘synaspismos’, is only a suspicion, as I think I have continually maintained.

There are, thus three choices on offer, with similarities admittedly, bit like a British Election.

With your assertion that Polybios had no Macedonian informant, I do find myself wondering if you have been sipping from the same spring as the former Mr Tombs, a fear re-inforced by your proposed treatment of our only real source (Livy being dependent upon Polybios).

It strikes me as almost impossible that Polybios did not have a Macedonian informant; there is more detail of the Macedonian movements than the Roman, including things that a Roman could not have known such as the short march over the eventual battleground in the mist and the subsequent decision to re-encamp; the reasons for both sides growing embroilment and eventual commitment of battle-line troops (the overly sanguine reports reaching Philip and Flamininus troops being daunted at the retreat of their advanced force). If you want to say that he had no Macedonian source then you have to say he lacked a Roman one too! The whole battle is a story and might as well be on the moon! Such a position may be tenable for Diodoros (cf. Granikos) but Polybios is the paragon of ‘enquiry’.

Calling regard for what the sources say ‘slavish’ may work in the playground but Para and I are dinner ladies at least and unlikely to be impressed. It is odd that someone who champions the manuals wishes to reject one of the few occasions when an author, himself the writer of a manual uses their language. Yet you presumably insist on giving a mistranslation of ‘prosdexamenos’ full force since this would indicate a phalanx in open enough order to allow lights and cavalry pass to the rear. Nor is Polybios’ language contrary to the way orders are given in the manuals, it is true that there are lists of commands at the end of Aelian et al, but Polybios is not reporting the detailed basic commands but the actual evolutions; it seems far more likely that experienced troops, like those with Philip would understand the drill moves necessary to ‘double by depth’ and ‘close to the right’, the manuals list only those required for the steps to achieve this for training purposes, on the field the fewer commands that need to be given the better, this is why the set of moves get a name, it is not just for the pleasure of the military philosopher.

I am glad that you have abandoned the idea that the rear of the hypaspists could about face to deal with the scythed chariots but despair of the fact that you deny things possible in three feet of space are impossible in eighteen inches. I am only 12 inches chest to back but 24 shoulder to shoulder, add a shield and a long pike and it would be impossible for me to revolve without the formation collapsing in synaspismos, with my fellows attempting the same thing, we can manage in a square yard though.

I am not going to go into the issues of interjection here, let that be a new thread. But you ought to recognise a distinction between what was ‘the usual method’ and what was a ‘possible one’. There are only two ways ‘synaspismos’ can actually be formed, by ‘closing’, which reduces the frontage by half or by ‘insertion’ which preserves it. This is what I read Aelian 29.2 final verse as describing.

Please don’t read this in any angry way….

Thanks for the Aelian, i had forgotten the 1814 version on google.

Xenophon wrote:Although Paralus has expressed himself somewhat bluntly...

Bluntly?! "Perhaps, Jim, I have overused a 'colourful metaphor' or two..."

Xenophon wrote:...he and I are in apparent agreement pretty much. We can summarise Philip’s movements of his right demi-phalanx as advance up the pass ( probably, according to Polybius’ information ) in column and deploy successively to the left into line in the usual fashion, 16 deep in ‘normal/open order’; receive the light troops and cavalry through his phalanx and then send them to the right flank; close up laterally to the right ending in close order 16 deep (‘double depth’)...

I take no issue with pretty much all of that; everything, that is, until "ending in close order 16 deep (‘double depth’)". The problem with that is the fact that Polybios' text is ignored in such a rendering. The phalanx did not simply close up to the right ending in double depth and close order. But wait, what's that there.... below... I spies me an explanation....

Xenophon wrote:The only reason there is any difficulty with the above summary is Polybius’ description of Philip’s order as “ to double their depth and close up toward the right.”...which both Agesilaos and Paralus have taken very literally, and as I mentioned earlier, if we take this literally there is a problem – explored at length by all ! [...] Polybius wasn’t there and couldn’t know just how Philip’s demi-phalanx ended up in close order 16 deep – i.e. “double depth” - on half its original frontage. He cannot be ‘quoting’ the original order ( not least because he doesn’t seem to have had a Macedonian source who was there) and in reporting the various ‘orders’ he is describing the result, not the actual words – e.g. his reference to the light infantry being ‘ordered to place themselves on the flank’ or or ‘he placed them all, both foot and horse, on his right wing’ both orders which occur in the same section as the reference to the phalanx’s move [XVII.24.8-10].

Now, that's one of the better and more extensive glosses of a very clear text I've seen in a while. A gloss of convenience or a gloss of presumption?? More likely the latter. The claim that Polybios couldn't know how Philip's phalanx wound up in its final disposition because he wasn't there (or "doesn't seem to have had a Macedonian source who was there" - though Polybios seems very well informed of Philp's movements and activity!) doesn't really merit consideration: on the basis of that we should discount his description of the orders given at Sellasia, Raphia and countless other battles. The real import of that sentence is the argument from presumption: a phalanx in 'double depth' is 16 deep for its 'regular' depth is eight. From here everything must proceed. As to just what Polybios might or might not have known, it is generally claimed that much of the "Tacticians" go back to the Megalopolitan. Even if they do not, Polybios was very well aware of the phalanx and its evolutions; enough to discourse on a comparison of it with the Roman system. I think we can readily discount any failure of understanding or imagination on Polybios' part or lack of information.

As to exactly what Polybios is reporting, he reports that Philip received his light armed, cavalry and mercenaries and "massed them all upon his right wing". After this Polybios says that "he (Philip) ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right". Now the claim is that both myself and Agesilaos are, somehow, being far too 'literal' here. I disagree entirely. Despite attempts at reducing Polybios' language to some sort of pale paraphrase because "he couldn't know", the Megalopolitan actually writes that Philip "ordered" (παρήγγελλε) both a doubling and to close to the right. Whatever the actual uttered words of Philip's orders, the required actions - which the phalanx produced - were to double depth and to close up to the right.

Xenophon wrote:Nor are Polybius’ words couched in the way actual orders were given - see the manuals for examples.

I'm somewhat unsure but I'm assuming this is a reference to the "commands" mentioned by the tacticians. I confess to being mildly amused if this is so for Polybios is writing a history not a technical treatise. Firstly, there is no reason for him to reproduce every command as reported by the tacticians when writing his prose and I fail to see why one might expect such. Secondly, Polybios' wording "ordered then to double thier depth" is perilously close to "double depth" which is listed by Aelian.

On which, the tacticians describe a method for doubling depth aside from that described by Xenophon - the method Philip ordered (Ael. Tact. 29.6):

The depth is doubled by inserting the second file into the first, so that the file-leader of the second file will be posted behind the file-leader of the first file, and the second man of the second file will be the fourth man of the first file, and the third man of the second file will be the sixth in the first file, and so also for the next until the whole of the second file is integrated into the first file, and likewise the fourth file into the third...

Which is precisely what I've been at pains to describe throughout. Despite Xenophon's linguistic calisthenics, Polybios is not reporting a result, he is reporting what Philip instructed his phalanx to do. Deployed into line 16 deep in open order (as per usual), the phalanx was told to double its depth which it duly did and almost certainly in the above manner.

That it did so in this manner is supported by the fact that Philip instructed it to close up to the right. Something simple to do as the files (other than the first) are now facing right. A simple march to right as Aelian describes (33.1):

If we want to compact the phalanx on the right wing, we order the file on the extreme right wing to stand still and the rest to face spearward and close up to the right, then to face to the front to restore the line, and have the rearward ranks close up forward.

Having already doubled depth by insertion, the latter part is unnecessary as the ranks are already closed up. Hence "double depth" and "close up to the right" Indeed, this may well be the 'regular' method (unless frontage must be preserved) as Aelian clearly uses this as the 'basic' version when discussing "density" (11.6):

Therefore, since there are 1,024 file-leaders drawn up along the front of the phalanx, it is evident that deployed they occupy 4,096 cubits (6,144 ft.) in length, that is, 10 stades and 96 cubits, 5 stades and 48 cubits (3,072 ft.) in compact order (pyknosis)...

Precisely the rationale Polybios uses to criticise Kallisthenes as the latter describes Alexander's phalanx moving from 32 deep through sixteen to eight (12.19.6-9 & 21.1-3).

agesilaos wrote:Another major problem with this interpretation is that the left wing coming up to the same ground found it unsuitable to deploy upon; which makes it unlikely that the right wing could occupy that same ground in open order and manoeuvre across it.

Xenophon wrote:This doesn't seem to be entirely correct. The left wing did not find the ridge line unsuitable to deploy on. They understandably had problems doing so ; “in part owing to the difficulty of the ground [the ridgeline] and because they were trying to reach the combatants and were still in marching order and not in line....but gave way thrown into confusion and broken up by the elephants alone.”[Polyb XVIII.25.6-7] In fact earlier we are told some went down, attempting to link with the successful advancing right wing, while others “halted on the heights” to await their still marching comrades at the rear of the column coming up and deploying.

Meant to address these interrelated posts earlier but things took on a life of their own.

Philip can have expected the left of his phalanx to follow reasonably closely upon the ascent of the right, hence he formed up his right without any left flank cover whatsoever. The right deploys onto the right hand side of the ridge in open order sixteen deep from whence the evolutions subject to the above discussion occur. Despite difficulties with the ridge tops, it copes with this in open order and closes to the right. At this point we should - despite proclivities to a "literal" reading and accepting the Megalopolitan wasn't there - read closely what Polybios has to say (18.25.4-5; trans. Shuckberg):

Flamininus hastily transferred himself to the latter wing; and when he perceived that the enemy's force was not well together—part being in contact with the actual fighters, part just in the act of mounting the ridge, and part halting on it and not yet beginning to descend — keeping the elephants in front he led the maniples of his right against the enemy. The Macedonians having no one to give them orders, and unable to form a proper phalanx, owing to the inequalities of the ground and to the fact that, being engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants, they were still in column of march...

That part of the ridge upon which the left had to deploy did, according to Polybios, present the phalanx with difficulties in forming in its 'peculuiar fashion (ἴδιον σχῆμα) through the "inequalities of the ground" (τόπων δυσχερείας). So, to form into a proper phalanx was more difficult for the left either due to the ground - further to the left of the right - than for the right or, because there was far less time for the left than had been the case for the right. Most likely the both applied. Again, this is a very clear indication that where Philip had to deploy was far from satisfactory for a phalanx and ground which was was hardly the Salsbury Plain. His reaction was to contract his phalanx to suit this cramped ground.

Secondly, there's no reason to assume any part of the left phalanx joined up with the advancing right. Polybios does not say so only that it was still mounting the ridge and that it had no time to deploy into its "peculiar fashion" before being destroyed by the Roman right. Reading the Loeb will lure one into this notion for its editors insert a word (not in the text) which is translated as "idle". This gives the rendition that some of "those of the enemy who were next the actual combatants were idle". It is hard to imagine that had they attempted to link with the right they could be so described. Shuckburgh's translation (above) makes far more sense and has the advantage of actually sticking to the manuscript. As she explains:

Polybius is thinking of the Macedonian army as being so dislocated by the nature of the ground, that, while some parts were in contact with the enemy, the rest had not arrived on the scene of the fighting.

So Polybios describes part of the Macedonian army engaged (the right, lights, mercs and cavalry), part halting on the ridge (the van of the left) and part still ascending the ridge (the left). The Macedonian line is in disarray and Flamininus will destroy the as yet unformed left and save his own engaged left which is in the process of defeat.

The argument of a battlefield obstruction is superficially attractive, or at least not obviously BS; but, I do not think this can be the case. Were Philip forced to contract his front because of an obstruction, say a ravine or gully, on his left flank then his own men could hardly be described as trying to get in touch with the combatants but, far more telling, the battle winnning tribune and his twenty maniples would have been sorely hampered in crossing from their right to Philip's rear. He seems to have led the decisive move before the troops with him had reached the tops (I presume they are the principes and triarii of the right hand Roman legion), The Macedonian left crumbled before either the elephants of the Romans actually reached them thus Shukckburgh

The Macedonians having no one to give them orders, and unable to form a proper phalanx, owing to the inequalities of the ground and to the fact that, being engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants, they were still in column of march, did not even wait for the Romans to come to close quarters: but, thrown into confusion by the mere charge of the elephants, their ranks were disordered and they broke into flight.

Further the tribune is described as heading'straight for where the combat was continuing' this does not speak of any obstruction on Philip's left to me. That said Polybios has introduced several comments to enliven his narrative (whose import he goes on to contradict) eg. the Romans are in 'hot pusuit' of Phlip's retiring advanced force, but are next retreating through the gaps between the maniples, again Flamininus moves all his men out of camp and into line (since no special formation is noted we should assume the standard 'triplex acies') in the twinkling of an eye and then only uses half of them, who'd have thought the Romans so sporting?

A very cool, illustrative re-enactment animated video of the clash between the two military systems... of course, it's the battle of Pydna, and there are several inaccuracies and embellishments, but even so, it gave me goosebumps...

The animation clip commences about a minute into the vid'.

ENJOY!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SA-o9Ddz-dY

I'm not so certain you're reading this as I do. Whilst not accusing you of misreading it, I intend to travel awfully close to that claim...

agesilaos wrote:Flamininus moves all his men out of camp and into line (since no special formation is noted we should assume the standard 'triplex acies') in the twinkling of an eye and then only uses half of them, who'd have thought the Romans so sporting?

A 'summary' description and, if Flaminus did manage to get his whole line into order before the main clash of phalanx and legion, this speaks to what I wrote earlier of a "two theatre" battle. If the Romans are in complete line (as per usual deployment) it is inconceivable that the lights or maniples to the immediate right of the engagement did not take the engaged Macedonian right in is left flank. Even more telling is that the tribune left the victorious Roman right and "directing his march towards the part of the field where a struggle was still going on" to take the Macedonian tight in the rear (there being no struggle going on in line of his march). Thus the force which did tackle the Macedonian right had to march from the other side of the field. Where where the maniples adjacent to the Macedonian right if the Roman line was continuous? I would suggest there are two sections of combat here probably due to the nature of the field. Perhaps there was a gully or a ridge line down the slope? We do not know as there is no certainty in the identification of the battlefield.

agesilaos wrote:That said Polybios has introduced several comments to enliven his narrative (whose import he goes on to contradict) eg. the Romans are in 'hot pusuit' of Phlip's retiring advanced force, but are next retreating through the gaps between the maniples....

"The Romans" here refers to the lights with their attendant cavalry. These have been driven back down from the heights though "not forced back again quite on to the level ground" as they clearly were before. The 'level ground" is near to the Roman camp and the Romans have not deployed. Flamininus sees that these light troops are in danger of being overwhelmed (the Macedonians having added to their force) and "owing to them, his whole force was rendered uneasy, he drew out his entire army and got them into order of battle close to the hills". The hills are the Dogs' Heads from which Philip is fighting. The Romans occupy the "level ground"; the Macedonians the heights of Kynoskephalai which "are rough, precipitous, and of considerable height". Once he's deployed enough of his left these lights and cavalry drive the Macedonians off. The legions are hardly to be thought of a rushing "in hot pursuit"; these are the lights and cavalry who, job done, are received via the gaps between maniples as they march uphill to meet the Macedonian right.

You are correct with the "sporting" observation. Most unlikely that the Romans only utilised half their force if all was deployed. Either only half was was or the nature of the ground up which they had to advance necessitated a 'dual' wing deployment. Most likely the former as the Roman deployment will have contended with the ground more easily that a phalanx in close order. The phalanx was far more likely to break ranks - especially descending "rough" and "precipitous" ground. I thus agree with you (think it was you ) that the Roman deployment had not finished (the right) at the time Flamininus gets his left into order to stop the impending rout of his lights and cavalry. I thus see Philip as taking what little favour tyche offered him and that was very little. He was forced to fight on ground not at all suitable to his tactical system and he was reacting rather than directing. In short, he was facing (excuse me) the most uphill of uphill battles. His one chance was what, in the end, Flamininus did to him. The Roman left, having been under pressure, was deployed but not, as yet, the right, which was still forming into line. Philip gambled on getting enough of his phalanx into order to crush the Roman left. He will have hoped that Nikanor managed to do the same before the Roman right was ready or at least at the same time. On the deployment I postulate he'd have attacked the Romans across a 563 yard frontage. If he succeeded in putting a good portion of the Roman forces to rout he'd likely have won.

I do not see there's any doubt that the battlefield presented obstructions / difficulties for the phalanx. Polybios is pretty clear on that. What were major difficulties for a close order phalanx are not necessarily difficulties for Roman maniples though. Again, the telling thing here is that the tribune has to cross the battlefield to get to Philip's successful phalanx. What has happened is that Flamininus knows his left is a lost cause and salvation lies in destroying the Macedonian right. This he does by sending the elephants against them followed by the maniples of the right led by himself. There are now two disticnt battles taking place (bit like Sellasia up hills). The Macedonian left, still in column cresting the hills, falls into complete disorder following the elephant charge and the Roman maniples set about pursuing and mopping up the column still making its way up ("As Flamininus was pursuing the fugitives he came upon the lines of the Macedonian left, just as they were scaling the ridge in their attempt to cross the hills..."). At this time the bright spark of a tribune notices the victorious Macedonian right is farther down the slopes pushing the Roman left, who have begun to "yield" (26.5), back to the "level ground". He detaches his maniples from a pursuit that is in hand and crosses the field to rescue the left. What a maniple might do is not what a close order phalanx might do (as Polybios notes in his comparison). There may well have been a ridge line down the slope or a wash gulley (particularly after heavy thunderstorms). Either way, it was not enough to prevent the more open order maniples making their way across and behind the Macedonians.

Just on that action of the tribune, he cannot have done so until the Roman right was near enough to victory. Had he done so before hand he risked the danger of unengaged Macedonian troops taking him in his cross field march from the tops.

I think you must be reading what I have written rather differently, Paralus, as there is not much here with which I disagree, You may have taken some of my sarcasm as serious comment, maybe.

You have made your frontage that of sixteen deep at fighting order (563 x 16 =9008), I presume you are not suggesting an attack in open order. Polybios is clear that it is the addition of the heavies, 2,000 of them, that turned the fight and would, presumably have joined any 'hot pursuit' but even the lights and cavalry do not seem to have pursued very hotly, the Macedonian force is not really routed and both seem actually to have broken off and retired on the battleline, to reform. Polybios is making things more exciting for his readers.

As you say, the Romans could cope with rough terrain much more easily than a deployed phalanx, but this also means that the right hand legion could have attacked Philip in the flank. I think it must have been that the right legion was still getting out of camp. Once it was formed the left wing of the phalanx was showing on the ridge, this would prevent a flanking move on Philip as it would expose the Romans in turn to a flank attack. Flamininus had to dispose of Philip's left and hope his own left would hold out. as it happened the Macedonian left did not stand up to the onset of the elephants but recognising that they were in no formation to fight they fled incontinently. The tribune could make his decision at any time, then.

I remain sceptical about an intervening obstruction but it is certainly possible, I just do not find it 'necessary', there are reasons other than the terrain for the course of the formation changes and the course of the battle, were there one it would certainly re-inforce the double battle picture. Polybios' quotes about the terrain are a bit cryptic, in that it does not seem to have impeded Philip's own attack only the deployment of the left on ground that Philip's force had just vacated. I think that the description of the heights being, 'rough, precipitous and of considerable height', applies generally to Kynoskephalai rather than specifically to the position adopted by Philip. It would be tempting to say that the phalanx was unsuited to fighting on hills but at Sellasia there are two phalanx battles on the two hills. I am now considering your terrain based view more kindly, we will have to await a decent map or if I win the lottery , a field trip! (I'll have to get a ticket first ,though )

agesilaos wrote:I think you must be reading what I have written rather differently, Paralus, as there is not much here with which I disagree, You may have taken some of my sarcasm as serious comment, maybe.

Possibly, possibly but...

agesilaos wrote:You have made your frontage that of sixteen deep at fighting order (563 x 16 =9008), I presume you are not suggesting an attack in open order.

No I haven't. What I've not done is make myself clear:

[Philip] will have hoped that Nikanor managed to do the same before the Roman right was ready or at least at the same time. On the deployment I postulate he'd have attacked the Romans across a 563 yard frontage. If he succeeded in putting a good portion of the Roman forces to rout he'd likely have won.

Meaning that Philip did not intend to engage simply with his right; he meant to engage with his whole phalanx. The problem was the left did not have the time to deploy. Had it done so, Philip will have attacked with his entire phalanx, thirty-two deep and in close order. Destruction of the Roman left was the aim.

agesilaos wrote:Polybios is clear that it is the addition of the heavies, 2,000 of them, that turned the fight and would, presumably have joined any 'hot pursuit' but even the lights and cavalry do not seem to have pursued very hotly, the Macedonian force is not really routed and both seem actually to have broken off and retired on the battleline, to reform. Polybios is making things more exciting for his readers.

Polybios is clear that the the light troops and their attendant cavalry did what they were supposed to do: clear the field for the 'heavy' infantry. I do not see any good reason for the Roman legionaries to "pursue" retreating enemy lights, leaving a forming line (as I think we both agree). What Polybios makes clear is that it is the deployment of these legionaries which places a coda on any further progress of the Macedonian lights and mercs. They are the stiffening these will have to deal with should they press further.

We both agree that the Roman right was not properly formed. This is one of the reasons Philip closed up to the right in depth and there is no reason he didn't expect the left part of his phalanx to do the same. He intended to destroy the Roman left and, once on the "level ground", deal with the rest. We know that Philip did not want to deploy on this ground and when he did he did so contracting to his right. Your notion that his left deployed on "the same ground" is not correct. The left had to deploy to the left of the ground used by the right for very obvious reasons. They left camp, following at whatever remove, the right. The right, in open order sixteen deep, would need a certain 'frontage' and the left would need to deploy into line to the left of that frontage if they arrived in good time. They cannot have set out to deploy on the same ground as the right unless they wished to take their right in the rear.

As to the tribune's decision, he took it once the Roman right had the day won. Polybios says that clearly enough and it is logical, captain. All that remains is to decide why Philip contracted his phalanx as he did. He'd no choice: ground and the offer of a knock-out punch.

OK, thanks for clarifying that; I can now go back to disagreeing