pothos.org

marcus wrote:I don't know if you're referring to my comment from earlier:

marcus wrote:I'm not sure I really know what's being discussed here.

I was, to your and other comments. I was starting to get a feeling I must be posting from the Twilight Zone. I'm glad you (too) cleared that up.

amyntoros wrote: The comparison itself is somewhat provocative and if you don't mind I'd rather not discuss Hitler. We've already pretty much agreed that everybody lies in some form or another and I think your point is that I should judge Alexander more harshly for his lies and propaganda. Although there are some things he did which disturb me, I'm afraid that I can't share your concern in this instance.

Best regards,

Not more harshly than other people. Just not less harshly, either, which is how I perceive your disclaimer. But while we agree that “everyone” lies, you and I perhaps have different opinions regarding whether or not this says something about our characters. I assumed that we did not.

Hokey Hellenic culture and population fusion are no match for a good sarisa in their sides, kid!

Cleitus The Black, Maracanda.

Paralus wrote:Hokey Hellenic culture and population fusion are no match for a good sarisa in their sides, kid!

Cleitus The Black, Maracanda.

"Oh yeah!? Here's your good sarissa!"

Alexander of Macedon..scratch that..Alexander, King of Asia.

Paralus wrote:Hokey Hellenic culture and population fusion are no match for a good sarisa in their sides, kid!

Cleitus The Black, Maracanda.

A sarissa would be a 'fusion accelerator', then...
Ah, wrong movie!

Fiona

Hi Fiona, I appreciate the fact that you noted all the references to speed in Alexander's adventures. Then you asked the question if he had had a vision of what he had intended to do, or if he simply decided as he went along. The entire Macedonian and combined Persian armies later also had the same kind of speed that Alexander had except when he and a few select members went out on their own to chase someone down, such as when you mentioned Bessus.

Imagine what kind of horses had to be prepared to maintain that speed.

As for an overall objective from when he first went to Asia, I would imagine that after the cutting the Gordian Knot that he knew full well his main objective and that was to conquer Persia and make it his own. He had to have the endorsement and confirmation of the oracles at Siwa to attain his goals one would discern from the written histories.

By the way, just as an aside, Alexander is made mention in the movie The Watchmen. I see that you are mentioning movies also so I thought I would add that too.

jan wrote:The entire Macedonian and combined Persian armies later also had the same kind of speed that Alexander had except when he and a few select members went out on their own to chase someone down, such as when you mentioned Bessus.

What combined “Macedonian and Persian armies” might they be? No such beast existed – in conflict – under Alexander. There were Asian cavalry forces in India (and largely unused Indian infantry) – notably at Hydaspes.

Much is made of Alexander’s “speed”. It is well to remember just who it was that so “shocked” the Greeks with this speed: Philip II. Alexander may well have been “quick” but it was with a Camaro manufactured by GMP (General Motors Pella) and designed by Philip. Alexander, of course, fiddled with the fuel, timing advance and added seventeen inch rims but the vehicle was fashioned by dad.

Antigonus, of an age with Philip, gave a few in lessons in fast advance as well - Psidia and Alcetas' grisly end comes to mind:

Diod. 18.44.1-2:
Therefore Antigonus set out with all his forces from Cappadocia and pushed on toward Pisidia, where Alcetas and his army were staying. Making a forced march that strained the endurance of his men to the utmost, he traversed two thousand five hundred stades in seven days and the same number of nights, reaching Cretopolis, as it is called. He escaped the notice of the enemy because of the rapidity of his march, and drawing close to them while they were still ignorant of his coming, he stole a march on them by occupying certain rugged ridges.

Antigonus was one of the more militarily talented Diadochoi - if flawed (Lysimachus would fall into that category as well as I'm sure Agesilaos - not the Spartan King - would agree). Eumenes was the surprise packet (to all but his men). Antigonus's predictability at Gabiene should have been his end; Eumenes' misunderstanding of his mercenary majority (and the inportance of their baggage) was his salvation. Both flawed.

jan wrote:As for an overall objective from when he first went to Asia, I would imagine that after the cutting the Gordian Knot that he knew full well his main objective and that was to conquer Persia and make it his own. He had to have the endorsement and confirmation of the oracles at Siwa to attain his goals one would discern from the written histories.

That Alexander led an army of invasion into the Persian Empire with little idea of what he was setting out to accomplish – until he’d cut the “Gordian knot” – is, pardon me, beyond credulity. You would have him as some latter day Agesilaos – all full of Panhellenic rhetoric and no real strategy or objective beyond the immediate. This saw Agesilaos wander up and down country brandishing arms here, promising freedom there, eyeing off satrap’s sons, making truces and then engaging other satrap’s forces after such truces were concluded.

Alexander needed no endorsement of oracles to effect his invasion. The propaganda was nice although, as Siwa would show, a double edged sword (or sarissa). His presenting himself as a “god” or the human incarnation of such was, in no way, new to those he was conquering. The Achaemenids had done all this before him.

O.K. parasalus, I just read your response to mine. I will respond after I get out all my books and find appropriate references to answer your questions or your statements. Off the top of my head at the moment, I can recall generals who had been with Darius's army who immediately came to Alexander and joined his, thus making up the combined beast as you call it...also Alexander was like Jesus in the respect that in Alexander one can see Philip, but Alexander's speed was his own and he did move extraordinarily fast on his horses's hooves, not on dear old daddy's, and I simply meant that with the cutting of the Gordian Knot, a kind of automatic declaration of yes dear Alexander you are the King of Asia and will always be the King of Asia, he set forth to make it his own and to assert his rightful rule as King of Asia.

Got it? NO grrrrrr emoticons to display! But I shall return with quotes abundant!

jan wrote: Off the top of my head at the moment, I can recall generals who had been with Darius's army who immediately came to Alexander and joined his, thus making up the combined beast as you call it....

"Generals" do not a combined army make. Nor does the accretion of Iranian notables to his court.

I await the quotes….

jan wrote:...and I simply meant that with the cutting of the Gordian Knot, a kind of automatic declaration of yes dear Alexander you are the King of Asia and will always be the King of Asia, he set forth to make it his own and to assert his rightful rule as King of Asia.

Which "rightful rule" he had asserted as he strode ashore at the Hellespont. Very much yesterday's news by the Gordian Knot.

Paralus wrote:

jan wrote: Off the top of my head at the moment, I can recall generals who had been with Darius's army who immediately came to Alexander and joined his, thus making up the combined beast as you call it....

"Generals" do not a combined army make. Nor does the accretion of Iranian notables to his court.

Anyway, as these Persian "Generals" were not given any sort of command in Alexander's army, even if they were introduced to the ranks of the hetairoi, it still wouldn't count as a "combined" army. (Even Artabazos was never sent to sort out the recalcitrant Bactrians and Sogdians without a very close coterie of Macedonians who were clearly the leaders.)

ATB

Wasn't Alexander's "goal" to conquer Persia actually Phillip's goal to conquer Persia? It was Phillip who was to be the commander and chief of that war, before a certain ex-boyfriend threw a spanner in the works. There must have been years of preparation, maybe from even before Alexander was born. To me, it seems more logical to assume that Alexander was carrying out Phillip's plans to attack Persia. Surely that's at least as important a factor as gods, pothos, oracles and miracles?

Semiramis wrote:Wasn't Alexander's "goal" to conquer Persia actually Phillip's goal to conquer Persia? It was Phillip who was to be the commander and chief of that war, before a certain ex-boyfriend threw a spanner in the works. There must have been years of preparation, maybe from even before Alexander was born. To me, it seems more logical to assume that Alexander was carrying out Phillip's plans to attack Persia. Surely that's at least as important a factor as gods, pothos, oracles and miracles?

It is continuously debated when Philip formed his plan to attack Persia. Generally it appears to be agreed that it's unlikely he had decided to do so before 346BC (when Alexander was 10 years old). Even then, he still had a lot to do in Greece and Thrace before he could properly plan an invasion of Persia.

The other problem is that we just don't know what Philip's plan was - merely to liberate the Ionian coast, or to take over all of Asia Minor ... or to go further? Added to that, we actually don't know what Alexander's original plan was - whatever people might throw in about Gordium, etc. we simply do not know whether his original plan was to conquer the entire Persian empire, or simply to conquer a part of it.

ATB

marcus wrote: It is continuously debated when Philip formed his plan to attack Persia. Generally it appears to be agreed that it's unlikely he had decided to do so before 346BC (when Alexander was 10 years old). Even then, he still had a lot to do in Greece and Thrace before he could properly plan an invasion of Persia.

Absolutely. Naescent ideas may well have been present but Thrace was a problem that took some solving not least because of the rather large problem to the south: Athens.

Any move in eastern Thrace and the Chersonese was a step closer to Athens’ oesophagus (or should that be aegespotami?): the Hellespont. Here Philip, sans a decent fleet, needed to conquer lightly. In fact such was impossible and he pushed a siege too far and brought Athens’ former disaffected “allies” (who’d just finished the “Social War” with her) back into the Aegean at her side. Not to mention Persia. Time to regroup. The settlement – on Philip’s terms – with Athens would come and that, given Philip lacked MacArthur's Nimitz, would not be reached on the decks of a trireme.

marcus wrote: The other problem is that we just don't know what Philip's plan was - merely to liberate the Ionian coast, or to take over all of Asia Minor ... or to go further? Added to that, we actually don't know what Alexander's original plan was - whatever people might throw in about Gordium, etc. we simply do not know whether his original plan was to conquer the entire Persian empire, or simply to conquer a part of it.

Many see in the son far more ambition than the father. This is incorrect. There is no need to go into speculation about what Philip might have done; what he did should serve notice. Philip’s ambitions are often reduced to a “limited” excursus into Persia. This stands in stark contrast to what he’d already achieved. Dealing with aggressive neighbours and bellicose Greeks with notions of cultural superiority is not an easy matter when your brother has just died in the field along with a substantial amount of the state’s troops.

In two decades of reform, blood, bribery and matrimony Philip stood astride the Greek world. He’d got there without “Alexander’s speed” because he had to. He was a meticulous planner and deadly executioner of those plans. They may have involved force-marches and sharp confrontations, deftly placed bribes, neutralising nuptials or all of the preceding. I doubt very much – as opposed to another on this or another thread – that Alexander will have accomplished the same. He likely will have died in some “heroic” charge in yet another war which started behind his back whilst he was dealing with another war elsewhere.

Another Arrian might note another Parmenion advising “sire, they have far more infantry and they command the heights. We might win this but at what cost? Perhaps several talents to Aristarchus and Thrasyllus and the hand of his daughter….” To which Alexander would reply “I did not fight the Illyrians, the Paeonians, the Thebans, the Amphipolitans, the Illyrians again, and the Phocians simply to buy victory here Parmenion!”

That goes without the revulsion at the suggestion of marriage.

Philip will have taken on Persia in no “limited” war. He was not crossing the Hellespont for any limited “liberation” of Ionia: that was for dreamers and exponents of the grand gesture such as Agesilaos. Philip was going as far as his good leg and available scrounged funds would take him. To suggest otherwise is to suggest this brilliant and ruthless general and statesman was going to be happy with a Hadrian’s wall across the Halys River.

Not likely.

Paralus, you bitter, bitter man.

Paralus wrote:Many see in the son far more ambition than the father. This is incorrect. There is no need to go into speculation about what Philip might have done; what he did should serve notice. Philip’s ambitions are often reduced to a “limited” excursus into Persia. This stands in stark contrast to what he’d already achieved.

I tend to my wonder less about how far Philip would have gone and more about where he would have gone. That is, would Philip have been more interested in heading still farther to the east following a consolidation of the Phoenician coast or even Babylon... or would he have looked to the west-southwest and Carthage?

I doubt very much – as opposed to another on this or another thread – that Alexander will have accomplished the same. He likely will have died in some “heroic” charge in yet another war which started behind his back whilst he was dealing with another war elsewhere.

I don't know that this is necessarily fair... Alexander survived his share of charges, albeit whilst suffering a number of wounds*. Philip, too, suffered wounds--injuries more crippling than his son. Perhaps in time Alexander would also become a Monopthalmos, like Philip, or limited to limping about.

* There is, of course, the incident with the Malians. I tend to favor Arrian's account, though, and thus view the incident under its own context. In my eyes, Alexander was going through a crisis as that point. He may very well have wanted to die at that point. Did Philip ever suffer that kind of "disappointment" from his men? Does that mean the father was more cynical, more understanding of how far he could push his armies, or an equal dose of both?

Another Arrian might note another Parmenion advising “sire, they have far more infantry and they command the heights. We might win this but at what cost? Perhaps several talents to Aristarchus and Thrasyllus and the hand of his daughter….” To which Alexander would reply “I did not fight the Illyrians, the Paeonians, the Thebans, the Amphipolitans, the Illyrians again, and the Phocians simply to buy victory here Parmenion!”

Isn't that more a case of post-facto propaganda, though?

That goes without the revulsion at the suggestion of marriage.

I'd posit that the main difference between father and son in this case was need. Philip felt he needed to do certain things to win his alliances and/or battles. Clearly he was a cunning, brilliant man, but I also think it goes without saying that if he could effect a lasting victory without marrying so-and-so or having to spend money, he would have done so.

I'd further argue that, when he had to, Alexander did settle down for a marriage of necessity (even though I might wish that there was some romance in that affair).

Cheers,
P.

Phoebus wrote: I tend to my wonder less about how far Philip would have gone and more about where he would have gone. That is, would Philip have been more interested in heading still farther to the east following a consolidation of the Phoenician coast or even Babylon... or would he have looked to the west-southwest and Carthage?

The one thing that is certain – in my mind – is that there will have been no thousand kilometres long “Argead Wall” across Asia agreed to after Issos. This is the logical conclusion to the suggestion – by more than a few – that he will have negotiated an arrangement with Darius because he was not his son. Philip will have sought a defining conclusion with the armed forces of Persia prior to any settlement. The Roman’s inability to conquer Persia (Parthia) provides a small window here.

Southwest or Carthage? The pickings of Egypt – long in the Athenian if not Greek mind – will have inevitably led in that direction. Ditto Sicily.

Phoebus wrote: * There is, of course, the incident with the Malians. I tend to favor Arrian's account, though, and thus view the incident under its own context. In my eyes, Alexander was going through a crisis as that point. He may very well have wanted to die at that point. Did Philip ever suffer that kind of "disappointment" from his men? Does that mean the father was more cynical, more understanding of how far he could push his armies, or an equal dose of both?

I don’t quite follow that. It seems the suggestion is that Alexander was indulging in indigenous slaughter due to a personal crisis that led to a death wish? Interesting. Personally, I think it was a result of monsoons, resistance and an army at the end of its tether: a marvellous combination that gave way to much vented spleen.

Philip suffered a “rebellion” of sorts when Onomarchus – having parked catapults behind hills – lobbed loads of torsion-charged munitions amongst his dense phalanx during the Sacred War. Philip had to retire defeated to Macedon – his men dispirited and “rebellious” – for the winter. He recovered his mojo and the respect of his soldiery and marched south to Crocus Field where he demolished Onomarchus’ army and, just like the son, slaughtered the Phocians and their mercenaries without any compassion whatsoever. He either crucified Onomarchus or beheaded him at day’s end.

Phoebus wrote: Clearly he was a cunning, brilliant man, but I also think it goes without saying that if he could effect a lasting victory without marrying so-and-so or having to spend money, he would have done so.

There is the lasting impression that Philip, either at campaign’s end or outset , would marry at the drop of a Phrygian helm if it secured his desired result. I do not see this in the son who spent almost his entire adult life avoiding marriages – dynastic, diplomatic or otherwise. His marriage in Sogdhia was clearly diplomatic – the waxing lyrical of the sources notwithstanding – and forced upon him by two years of intense fighting that presaged the bloody and indiscriminate killing to come in India. Indeed there is the tradition that he “encouraged” his hetairoi to do the same. Later, they would be given no choice.

Paralus wrote:I doubt very much – as opposed to another on this or another thread – that Alexander will have accomplished the same. He likely will have died in some “heroic” charge in yet another war which started behind his back whilst he was dealing with another war elsewhere.

Would it be correct to draw the conclusion, Paralus, that you think that Alexander III, had the circumstances been similar, could also not have matched the “accomplishments” of Cyrus II? Or do you rate Philip II as a greater empire builder than Cyrus II? Not a trick question, by the way. Just curiosity.

Regarding the last plans of Philip II, specifically the timing of these plans, I’d say that the financial state of the Macedonian empire at the time of his death was the single most important reason for the timing of the campaign against Persia.