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Paralus wrote:Many see in the son far more ambition than the father. This is incorrect. There is no need to go into speculation about what Philip might have done; what he did should serve notice. Philip’s ambitions are often reduced to a “limited” excursus into Persia. This stands in stark contrast to what he’d already achieved. Dealing with aggressive neighbours and bellicose Greeks with notions of cultural superiority is not an easy matter when your brother has just died in the field along with a substantial amount of the state’s troops.

In two decades of reform, blood, bribery and matrimony Philip stood astride the Greek world. He’d got there without “Alexander’s speed” because he had to. He was a meticulous planner and deadly executioner of those plans. They may have involved force-marches and sharp confrontations, deftly placed bribes, neutralising nuptials or all of the preceding. I doubt very much – as opposed to another on this or another thread – that Alexander will have accomplished the same. He likely will have died in some “heroic” charge in yet another war which started behind his back whilst he was dealing with another war elsewhere.

But if he had died in that heroic charge, he'd still be 'great'. All Philip's solid achievements are just that - solid. Alexander is exciting. When the chips are down he does the daring, the extraordinary, the breathtaking thing - and time after time, he gets away with it, so I don't think he really would have died in that charge.
Actually I think he'd have crept up behind Onomarchus' hill in the middle of the night, up a goat path, and taken them by surprise, nicked all the artillery and been in Athens by morning...

Paralus wrote: Another Arrian might note another Parmenion advising “sire, they have far more infantry and they command the heights. We might win this but at what cost? Perhaps several talents to Aristarchus and Thrasyllus and the hand of his daughter….” To which Alexander would reply “I did not fight the Illyrians, the Paeonians, the Thebans, the Amphipolitans, the Illyrians again, and the Phocians simply to buy victory here Parmenion!”

Absolutely. Couldn't agree more.

Paralus wrote: That goes without the revulsion at the suggestion of marriage.

Another splendid thing about him. He knew who he loved. Did Philip truly love anyone, i wonder?

Paralus wrote: Philip will have taken on Persia in no “limited” war. He was not crossing the Hellespont for any limited “liberation” of Ionia: that was for dreamers and exponents of the grand gesture such as Agesilaos. Philip was going as far as his good leg and available scrounged funds would take him. To suggest otherwise is to suggest this brilliant and ruthless general and statesman was going to be happy with a Hadrian’s wall across the Halys River.

Not likely.

No, maybe that's not likely. But it's not likely either, that when India beckoned and sane counsels were urging 'Consolidate!' Philip wouldn't have done the boring thing and consolidated.
Fiona

Phoebus wrote: * There is, of course, the incident with the Malians. I tend to favor Arrian's account, though, and thus view the incident under its own context. In my eyes, Alexander was going through a crisis as that point. He may very well have wanted to die at that point. Did Philip ever suffer that kind of "disappointment" from his men? Does that mean the father was more cynical, more understanding of how far he could push his armies, or an equal dose of both?

That's an interesting thought, Phoebus. You think that when the men held back, that was some kind of final straw? He'd swallowed the disappointment of the mutiny and turned back, and now, even though they were heading home, they could still hold out on him? So he lost all sense of self-preservation and just threw himself recklessly over the wall - not so much to give a lead, as to throw his life away? Death or glory - it fits.
I think, personally, it's very telling that Hephaistion wasn't present on that occasion. If Alexander was going through some mental crisis, he was doing it without the support of the one person who could have helped him, with devastating results.
Fiona

Fiona wrote: But if he had died in that heroic charge, he'd still be 'great'.

Had he found himself in Philip’s position and had it occurred at, say, Crocus Field, he will have been remembered as nothing of the sort. Just another reckless footnote in history; not even a Jason of Pherae.

Fiona wrote: All Philip's solid achievements are just that - solid. Alexander is exciting. When the chips are down he does the daring, the extraordinary, the breathtaking thing [...] But it's not likely either, that when India beckoned and sane counsels were urging 'Consolidate!' Philip wouldn't have done the boring thing and consolidated.

All of which betrays, in my view, a serious misunderstanding of Philip and his accomplishments.

It is a fact that had Philip not done the “boring” and “solid” work of creating a Macedonian state with the capability to be not only the dominant player in Greek affairs but a “world player”; Alexander will have been another struggling Argead deciding just which state’s plaything he was at any given time. Perhaps he will have resembled Pelopidas’ plaything, his predecessor, Alexander II? Perhaps he will have concluded “breathtaking” alliances with Athens or made a “daring” intercession between the Chalcidian League and Athens with an “extraordinary” offer of support in Athens’ latest attempt at Amphipolitan recovery?

Then again, perhaps he may – after another successful raid by Cersobleptes – have served as his hostage for the good behaviour of Macedonia’s puppet ruler, Philip II, who’d not the wherewithal to do the boring consolidating hard work of establishing a strong state.

the_accursed wrote:Would it be correct to draw the conclusion, Paralus, that you think that Alexander III, had the circumstances been similar, could also not have matched the “accomplishments” of Cyrus II?

“Shields up Mr Sulu!”

That is a comparison not made. Whilst not a trick question, it is also not a simple question.

Marcus and Accursed,

Regarding Phillip’s ambitions – this is pure speculation on my part of course. Phillip was an aggressor; however we look at his career. Could he have planned his dominance of the Greek cities - especially in Asia minor - thinking that Persia would not object? Artaxerxes III’s reign was not the most stable - peppered with rebellions. Egypt was being especially troublesome, even by its usual naughty standards. With Artabazus in the Macedonian court around the time Alexander was born, is it not possible that the thought of attacking the Persian heartland in the future had crossed Phillip's mind? It’s hard to imagine that full-time army twiddling its thumbs for too long. Could the Macedonian state really survive without conquest?

the_accursed wrote:Regarding the last plans of Philip II, specifically the timing of these plans, I’d say that the financial state of the Macedonian empire at the time of his death was the single most important reason for the timing of the campaign against Persia.

Which was the author – was it Green - who described Macedonia as “bankrupt” when Parmenion was sent across?

I tend to think that Darius III’s troop numbers are massively inflated in the sources. It’s entirely possible that Phillip had a more realistic estimate of the number of troops he would have to face. If we take the sources at face value regarding troop numbers of the Persian Great Kings, Alexander’s decision to face them was militarily a terrible idea (courageous and romantic too of course). But if we don’t, there emerges a more logical picture of long-term plans guided by capacity and necessity.

Phoebus and Paralus,

Agree with Phoebus' assessment of Parmenion’s “words”. They seem to fit perfectly into the propaganda image of our brave and dashing hero contrasted by boring old "safe" Parmenion. This man tends to get even less than his fair share of credit for Alexander’s military successes than Phillip does.

I think that like Phillip, Alexander too was capable and willing to use the carrot rather than the stick. This is not to suggest that he wanted to avoid bloodshed or inducing terror out of some humanistic principle. I think it was rather a matter of pragmatism, of preserving his army, rims and all.

I don’t think Alexander wanted to die in Mali. He took many risks in the battlefield and it was one of those rare times his good fortune deserted him. Not to mention any exaggerations of Alexander’s bravery that may have played a part in the future telling of that story.

Perhaps the only time it can be argued that Alexander wanted to die would be after Hephaistion’s death. It’s possible that when he ordered the royal fires to be extinguished, he understood the symbolism.

As for the marriage to Roxanne – the sources are unanimous in suggesting that love at least played a part in the decision and I have come across no strong reason to doubt this. I don’t find it impossible that a man in his 20s fell in love with a girl of apparent astonishing beauty. That she was suitable for making an alliance and her daddy’s cavalry was useful is beyond debate.

Semiramis wrote:Regarding Phillip’s ambitions – this is pure speculation on my part of course. Phillip was an aggressor; however we look at his career. Could he have planned his dominance of the Greek cities - especially in Asia minor - thinking that Persia would not object? Artaxerxes III’s reign was not the most stable - peppered with rebellions. Egypt was being especially troublesome, even by its usual naughty standards. With Artabazus in the Macedonian court around the time Alexander was born, is it not possible that the thought of attacking the Persian heartland in the future had crossed Phillip's mind? It’s hard to imagine that full-time army twiddling its thumbs for too long. Could the Macedonian state really survive without conquest?

Philip was indeed an aggressor. But there was never any suggestion that he planned to 'liberate' (or 'dominate', as you put it) Asia Minor without rousing the Persians - after all, Ionia was part of the Persian empire. The question was when he hit upon the idea of crossing the Hellespont.

But until at least 346, and only after that while the Peace of Philocrates held (which wasn't long), there was no way Philip could have contemplated an invasion of Persia, even if he had already considered it as a future possibility. Significantly, it was in 346 that Isocrates wrote to him on the subject. But once the Peace of Philocrates had fallen through Philip was in no position to further any plans he had made, or even harboured, until after Chaeronea in 338 - he would have crossed the Hellespont with much of Greece, Illyria and Thrace just laughing at the opportunity he had left them to carve up his kingdom in his wake.

ATB

Semiramis wrote:I don’t think Alexander wanted to die in Mali. He took many risks in the battlefield and it was one of those rare times his good fortune deserted him. Not to mention any exaggerations of Alexander’s bravery that may have played a part in the future telling of that story.

I'm not sure about this. Regarding his bravery, I think that, most of the time, it's a matter less of exaggeration and more of incomplete understanding. Granicus aside (when the focus is on him dashing across the river), I don't think we ever get a picture of Alexander ever engaging in a full battle without either his Somatophylakes and his royal squadron of Hetairoi around him (or, failing that, his Hypaspistai). Maybe he was covered in scars; maybe he wasn't. But I think it's telling that in Mali the record qualifies him as doing something, well, suicidal.

Mali also comes at a pretty interesting point in Alexander's life. We'd seen his capacity for brutality before (Thebes, Tyre), but I would cautiously point at the difference between his actions there (largely death aimed at prisoners and male populations, coupled with slavery) and in modern Afghanistan/Pakistan. Especially in the latter parts of those campaigns, the victims of Alexander's army were staggering in their number. This eventually has to take a toll on a man, and I personally think Alexander was as close to Colonel Kurtz from "Apocalypse Now" as one gets by the time they got to Mali.

What really sells it for me is that, heroic melee aside (though I have no doubt he was capable of taking on a few soldiers with his back to the wall), Alexander got exactly what one would expect from such a situation. He got shot, dropped, and was dead for sure until he got rescued. Compare that with Pyrrhus' tradition for duels, and his claim at being the first man to scale the walls of Eryx (with no record of his being harmed, IIRC).

Semiramis wrote:Regarding Phillip’s ambitions – this is pure speculation on my part of course. Phillip was an aggressor; however we look at his career. Could he have planned his dominance of the Greek cities - especially in Asia minor - thinking that Persia would not object? Artaxerxes III’s reign was not the most stable - peppered with rebellions. Egypt was being especially troublesome, even by its usual naughty standards. With Artabazus in the Macedonian court around the time Alexander was born, is it not possible that the thought of attacking the Persian heartland in the future had crossed Phillip's mind? It’s hard to imagine that full-time army twiddling its thumbs for too long. Could the Macedonian state really survive without conquest?

the_accursed wrote:Regarding the last plans of Philip II, specifically the timing of these plans, I’d say that the financial state of the Macedonian empire at the time of his death was the single most important reason for the timing of the campaign against Persia.

Which was the author – was it Green - who described Macedonia as “bankrupt” when Parmenion was sent across?

Which, considering how Alexander III had to pawn his inheritance just to buy himself some time, seems to me as the correct word to describe the situation. Macedonia was decidedly not a financially strong state when Philip II died. And while it could have (in my opinion) survived just fine without further conquests, it could not have survived for much longer without money. For that reason, I believe that the financial state of the Macedonian empire must be at the very centre of any discussion regarding the plans of Philip II at the end of his life – and the plans of Alexander III at the beginning of the campaign, before the victory at Issus.

Personally, I'm not convinced that Philip II or Alexander III planned, from the very beginning, to conquer the Persian empire. I think the plan was to get their hands on a large sum of money, and fast. Preferably through extortion. But after Issus, Alexander III’s financial problems were (unexpectedly) solved, and he also knew (rather than merely hope or suspect) that he could defeat the Persians in battle, and, quite possibly, take everything.

the_accursed wrote:Personally, I'm not convinced that Philip II or Alexander III planned, from the very beginning, to conquer the Persian empire. I think the plan was to get their hands on a large sum of money, and fast. Preferably through extortion. But after Issus, Alexander III’s financial problems were (unexpectedly) solved, and he also knew (rather than merely hope or suspect) that he could defeat the Persians in battle, and, quite possibly, take everything.

Except that, when one has built up a large, professional army, you have to use it. It would not have been possible to keep the army sitting idle, because they would get discontented, and you'd lose even more money by paying for their upkeep while not making any new conquests. It's a self-perpetuating situation - need army, so build one; once you have one, you have to use it.

ATB

marcus wrote:Except that, when one has built up a large, professional army, you have to use it. It would not have been possible to keep the army sitting idle, because they would get discontented, and you'd lose even more money by paying for their upkeep while not making any new conquests. It's a self-perpetuating situation - need army, so build one; once you have one, you have to use it.

ATB

Here's what I think, Marcus: I think you're arguing like a historian, and not like a warrior king having to deal with the very real problem of being broke.

the_accursed wrote:

marcus wrote:Except that, when one has built up a large, professional army, you have to use it. It would not have been possible to keep the army sitting idle, because they would get discontented, and you'd lose even more money by paying for their upkeep while not making any new conquests. It's a self-perpetuating situation - need army, so build one; once you have one, you have to use it.

ATB

Here's what I think, Marcus: I think you're arguing like a historian, and not like a warrior king having to deal with the very real problem of being broke.

Thanks ... I think!

ATB

Hi Marcus,

marcus wrote:Philip was indeed an aggressor. But there was never any suggestion that he planned to 'liberate' (or 'dominate', as you put it) Asia Minor without rousing the Persians - after all, Ionia was part of the Persian empire. The question was when he hit upon the idea of crossing the Hellespont.

When did Phillip first conceive Operation Ionian Liberation? Apparently a title for a more recent incursion into the region was dismissed due to the shared acronym. Did Phillip also want to attack Iran? Are these questions really answerable with the information we have? You mention excellent points regarding the viability of such plans. I always took that cautious Phillip vs bold Alexander dichotomy with a pinch of salt. And as you said, once you have a professional army...

Hi Phoebus,

Phoebus wrote:I'm not sure about this. Regarding his bravery, I think that, most of the time, it's a matter less of exaggeration and more of incomplete understanding. Granicus aside (when the focus is on him dashing across the river), I don't think we ever get a picture of Alexander ever engaging in a full battle without either his Somatophylakes and his royal squadron of Hetairoi around him (or, failing that, his Hypaspistai). Maybe he was covered in scars; maybe he wasn't. But I think it's telling that in Mali the record qualifies him as doing something, well, suicidal.

Mali also comes at a pretty interesting point in Alexander's life. We'd seen his capacity for brutality before (Thebes, Tyre), but I would cautiously point at the difference between his actions there (largely death aimed at prisoners and male populations, coupled with slavery) and in modern Afghanistan/Pakistan. Especially in the latter parts of those campaigns, the victims of Alexander's army were staggering in their number. This eventually has to take a toll on a man, and I personally think Alexander was as close to Colonel Kurtz from "Apocalypse Now" as one gets by the time they got to Mali.

What really sells it for me is that, heroic melee aside (though I have no doubt he was capable of taking on a few soldiers with his back to the wall), Alexander got exactly what one would expect from such a situation. He got shot, dropped, and was dead for sure until he got rescued. Compare that with Pyrrhus' tradition for duels, and his claim at being the first man to scale the walls of Eryx (with no record of his being harmed, IIRC).

Brilliant post. I am as near convinced as I ever get. Put the picture you painted together with the binge drinking that had become regular. Medication? Then you have the possible paranoia displayed through the satrapal purges upon his return from India. Just before his death, the Vulgate sources seem to suggest a court fearful of Alexander. Good to know there is at least one other person who thought of Alexander during 'Apocalypse Now'.

marcus wrote: Thanks ... I think!

ATB

What I’m saying is: to me, your argument appears artificial.

I don’t believe this is how leaders with professional armies at their disposal reason/have reasoned. Philip II would not have invaded the greatest empire in the world, or any other part of the world, because he felt he needed to keep the army contented.

Philip II’s nearly empty treasure chamber was not theory, but fact. And as it was not the kind of problem that could have been put on hold, then anymore than now, I think it’s reasonable to conclude that filling it must have been top priority. After that: who knows (and can prove it)? But before that: money.

Naturally, Philip II would have had to to some damage before being able to extort any money. But he would not have had to plan, from the very beginning, to conquer the entire Persian empire.

Alexander III, though, would probably have liked your claim. It's a useful rationalisation: he had to keep on conquering, forever, whether he wanted to or not...to keep the army from getting discontented.

the_accursed wrote:

marcus wrote: Thanks ... I think!

ATB

What I’m saying is: to me, your argument appears artificial.

I don’t believe this is how leaders with professional armies at their disposal reason/have reasoned. Philip II would not have invaded the greatest empire in the world, or any other part of the world, because he felt he needed to keep the army contented.

Philip II’s nearly empty treasure chamber was not theory, but fact. And as it was not the kind of problem that could have been put on hold, then anymore than now, I think it’s reasonable to conclude that filling it must have been top priority. After that: who knows (and can prove it)? But before that: money.

Naturally, Philip II would have had to to some damage before being able to extort any money. But he would not have had to plan, from the very beginning, to conquer the entire Persian empire.

Alexander III, though, would probably have liked your claim. It's a useful rationalisation: he had to keep on conquering, forever, whether he wanted to or not...to keep the army from getting discontented.

Keeping the army "contented" and having to fill the treasury are no mutually exclusive. In fact, the treasury was emptied in large part because Philip had to pay his army.

Remember, though we see the Macedonians through the eyes of their veneer of Greek culture they were an older, more conservative society...a palace society with an army that expected rewards. I'm tired and I'm not sure I am making myself clear here. Philip did create a professional army, but the transition to something like our own modern armies was not made.

athenas owl wrote:
Keeping the army "contented" and having to fill the treasury are no mutually exclusive. In fact, the treasury was emptied in large part because Philip had to pay his army.

No. But Marcus is claiming, Philip II had to use the army whether he was rich or not, and whether he himself wanted to or not, because he needed to keep the army contented. "...once you have one, you have to use it". I don't think Philip II reasoned this way.