pothos.org

Paralus wrote:No "king" in sight, no royal army and no "slaughter" of the king's troops to be seen here.

With all due respect Philip-Arrhidaeus probably wasn't "in sight" very much during the Perdiccan invasion of Egypt either. People did everything on his behalf, but decorum required that all the actions be attributed to him nevertheless.
Ptolemy "subdued the whole land" without any slaughter? I fear your 20:20 hindsight goggles have a slightly rosy tint to their lenses!

Best wishes,

Andrew

Taphoi wrote:I have simply changed my mind on this subtle point. I do not now believe it is strictly necessary to read the Parian Marble as dating the invasion to 321/320BC. The matter is a subtle one because, as you have understood, the invasion straddles the Attic year boundary. Furthermore, the arrival of the body of Alexander in Egypt and its eventual entombment in the Serapeum at Memphis also straddles the same year boundary, so it was somewhat arbitrary which year the Parian Marble assigned these events to. It chose to assign both to their completion rather than their instigation. This is not surprising, since it counts years backwards from its date of creation.

First of all, there was nothing subtle about the points raised in this debate and discussed in my previous post. On the one hand you said, "A near contemporary inscription from the island of Paros dates the offensive to July 321 BC" (your book) and on the other hand you exclaimed, "It does no such thing" (here on the forum). These are two completely contrasting statements! You did not say here that you were discussing something that could be open to interpretation. You were adamant! Nowhere had you stated in this thread that the comment regarding the marble was only your opinion. Yet now you claim that you have changed your mind since writing your book! Now you no longer "believe it is strictly necessary to read the Parian Marble as dating the invasion to 321/320BC." Yet you did not say this in your response to Paralus. You said, "It does no such thing. The event it dates is the death of Perdiccas, not his invasion."

:sigh:

Best regards

Taphoi wrote:With all due respect Philip-Arrhidaeus probably wasn't "in sight" very much during the Perdiccan invasion of Egypt either. People did everything on his behalf, but decorum required that all the actions be attributed to him nevertheless.

Ptolemy "subdued the whole land" without any slaughter? I fear your 20:20 hindsight goggles have a slightly rosy tint to their lenses!

You have an endless capacity for divagation and irrelevancy in the face of contrary evidence.

The king, Arrhidaeus (as well as Alexander IV), was clearly with Perdiccas who led Arrhidaeus' royal army on the campaign to Egypt. Thus the Babyloninan Chronicle of the Successors notes that the "king" (Arrhidaeus) did battle with the satrap of Egypt (in Arrhidaeus' fourth regnal year - 320/19). Ptolemy's annexation of Syria has no bearing here: the "king" was the one who did battle with the satrap of Egypt; not the other way around. Again, as you appear quite uncertain on this, Laomedon led no royal army, in fact, had no royal army at all. He at no stage spoke or acted for the king. At the time of Ptolemy's annexation of Syria, the Chronicle's king is in Asia Minor with Antipater and the royal army under its strategos, Antigonus, attempting to deal with the remaining Perdiccan army groups under Attalus, Alcetas and Eumenes. It was, at this time, Antipater who acted on behalf of the kings not Laomedon. There is no "king" doing battle with the satrap of Egypt.

The Chronicle clearly records a disaster for the king and his troops (who were "slaughtered") when he did battle with the satrap of Egypt; a record of "one of the key events of classical history". No such disaster is recorded for Laomedon and nor is any battle attested where his satrapal (rather than royal army) troops are "slaughtered". Your scenario, describing Laomedon defending Syria as the "king doing battle with the satrap of Egypt" is desperate and utterly unpersuasive.

On the matter of my goggles - rose coloured or otherwise - I'd suggest you try them out only you'd see little until the scales fall from your eyes.

Here are some incomplete thoughts

Diodoros gives us two chronological markers outside his archon framework; the ‘nearly two years’ (XVIII 28ii) that Arrhidaios had spent constructing the Hearse and preparing for the body’s journey and ‘Perdikkas died in this manner after he had ruled for three years.’ (XVIII 36 vii). These indications may be Diodoros’ own but may equally well be repeated from his source.

Together with these we have the Marmor Parium assigning Perdikkas’ death to the archon year of Archippos which ran 19 July 321 to 9 July 320 and the Chronicle of the Diadochoi placing the battle of Memphis in the 4th regnal year of Philip Arrhidaios which ran 12 April 320 to 1 April 319, this source further limits the range by the following entry which makes 14 November 320 a terminus ante quem.

This gives us a range of 12 April 320 to 9 July 320, these in turn represent 37-40 months after Alexander’s death which, even allowing for months of dissension at Babylon would give Perdikkas his three years at the top.

The distance from Damascus to Memphis is about 450 miles, which would represent 45 days marching for Perdikkas’ army plus a rest day in every seven so let us say 52 days, a round 60 to include the action at the Fort of the Camel and manoeuvres around the canal. Perdikkas had only to set out before April 9 for this timeline to fit.

But, what of the cortege? Arrhidaios took nearly two years preparing it, but two years from his commission not from Alexander’s death. Unfortunately we don’t know how long the dissension lasted. So let us start from the ‘nearly two years’, I would assume that must mean at least twenty months, but Macedonian months rather than modern ones. Twenty such months takes us to 25 January 321 another four to May 21.

There is good reason to believe that Damascus did not represent a detour for the procession. We are talking about an Aesopian ‘Tortoise and Hare’ situation, the hearse cannot have moved at much more than walking pace or 3mph, nor can its teams have sustained the effort for extended periods. Six miles per day is probably optimistic. Perdikkas would be informed of any deviation in its set route and be able to pounce, that he failed to do so in time must mean that he was unaware of anything amiss until it was too late. The question, then is how long would it take to get the funeral procession to Damascus?

Eratosthenes gives the distance from Babylon to Thapsacus as Strabo II 26 as 4800 stadia, which is just over 550 miles, this would represent about 92 days for the cortege. As a check Darius covered the same route in 45 days which, allowing for halts gives his army a speed of 14 mpd which is a fair rate if slightly fast.

From Thapsacus to Damascus is about 300 miles or 50 days, yielding a total time of 142 days at 6mpd or 170 at 5mpd. This gives a range of dates when the body may have reached Damascus between May 16 and September 7.

The distance between Damascus and Memphis by land is about 450 miles a good three months for the funeral carriage and maybe 45 days by wagon. Perdikkas seems to have been in Pisidia with the army as he is said to have ‘moved into Cilicia’ after hearing of Ptolemy’s coup-de-main (Cod.Rescrit. Vat 2). Placing him at Isauria he would be 450 miles from Damascus. Alexander moved at 45 mpd with cavalry forces and single messengers could move at 90mpd, so Perdikkas could have news of Ptolemy appearing at Damascus and Arrhidaios’ defection within five days, his response force would take ten to reach Damascus. This would not be enough time for the body to escape pursuit overland but by heading for the coast and embarking upon a ship he could have outwitted Polemon’s cavalry pursuit by sending the hearse in another direction, as Aelian says but taking the coffin on board ship. This would certainly allow the body to outdistance any terrestrial pursuit and a dating in September would bring the close of the sailing season (14 Sept according to Vegetius) into play, possibly foiling a Perdikkan maritime pursuit. After the assassination of Perdikkas, Attalos is attested as in command of the fleet, a hint but no more, that his part may have been naval.

This scenario reconciles all the evidence, even placing the initial movement of the cortege in the archon year to which Diodoros assigns it as the first item.

We still have to find a year’s worth of activity for Perdikkas.

From Babylon to Ankara is c.790 miles, a march of probably 95 days. After the final settlement in Babylon the satraps dispersed to their provinces amongst these was Eumenes who was sent to take control of the unconquered kingdom of Cappadocia; he must therefore have had an army and travelled at army speed. It is unlikely that he could have reached his satrapy before October 323, he then has to plan his attack and be shunned by his erstwhile allies; given the lateness of the season Antigonos, Leonnatos et al may have had legitimate concerns about initiating hostilities with winter approaching and a mountain fastness to attack.

Messengers back to Babylon, would have taken a further 18 days dragging any response into November. Perdikkas probably delayed his support until spring 322, he has two battles and a siege to conduct having arrived himself about July. Placing the following campaign against Laranda and Isauria in 321 seems more likely than a winter march in mountainous terrain.

The Diadoch chronicle does seem to note Perdikkas’ replacement of Archon by Docimos under the third year of Philip (April 321/0). The Vatican palimpsest to places the initial moves in regime change after Ptolemy’s seizure of Alexander’s corpse, which I have suggested occurred in September 321, fits this timescale.

There is (at least) one glaring omission from this analysis; naturally I have a response, but maybe that is flawed too; I do propose a logistical based study of the chronology here though, this should yeild results

Well, I have not considered riverine transport or the shorter, desert caravan route to Damascus. Either would considerably speed the cortege's journey.

However, Diodoros says that the procession passed through many cities causing a stir

XVIII 28 1 In this way the carriage was constructed and ornamented, and it appeared more magnificent when seen than when described. Because of its widespread fame it drew together many spectators; for from every city into which it came the whole people went forth to meet it and again escorted it on its way out, not becoming sated with the pleasure of beholding it. 2 To correspond to this magnificence, it was accompanied by a crowd of roadmenders and mechanics, and also by soldiers sent to escort it.

This is not a clincher,of course, but it seems to imply a march through populous areas rather than short hops between rver voyages. Similarly the fesert route would pass only one city, Palmyra, and Doura Europos would not be founded for another 21 years leaving no developed settlment at the start of the desert trail; there would, almost certainly, have been a caravanserai, but embarking and disembarking the massive bier would require heavy lifting gear, probably not available at a site more used to the sort of goods that could be moved on camelback. There would be no reason for such equipment not to have been built there, though. But the quality of the caravan trail would possibly not be suitable for the heavy wheeled traffic (never having been to Palmyra, this is an assumption). The 'road-menders' imply travel along the established roads of the Persian empire rather than trails, but a glance at LSJ for Diodoros' πλῆθος ὁδοποιῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν, shows 'a crowd of road-makers and craftsmen' would be a better translation, leaving the possibility that it was travel on unmade tracks that was envisaged. That said, Persian roads were hardly upto Roman standards, being packed earth sometimes faced with cobbles, so even the Royal Road would probably need alot of maintenance (I believe tablets from Persepolis detail many repairs ordered by Darius I, though I have not found a statistical analysis of these).

agesilaos wrote:Diodoros gives us two chronological markers outside his archon framework; the ‘nearly two years’ (XVIII 28ii) that Arrhidaios had spent constructing the Hearse and preparing for the body’s journey and ‘Perdikkas died in this manner after he had ruled for three years.’ (XVIII 36 vii). These indications may be Diodoros’ own but may equally well be repeated from his source.

Diodorus 18-20 (outside of the detailed Sicilian or "Agathoclean" narrative) ultimately goes back to Hieronymus whether that be via an intermediary (more likely to my view) or the use of Hieronymus direct (less likely to my view). Either way, the detail in these books (and the digressions such as the satrapy description and the Dead Sea excursus) go back, eventually, to the Cardian. The most obvious indicator is the narrative's chronological framework: campaign season and thus the going into winter quarters brings a close as does the departing from same the opening. Also these books contain far more - and precise - chronological markers (particularly astronomical) than Diodorus' other books. The import is that the ultimate source paid particular attention to such matters. Diodorus hasn't bothered to "translate" (for want of a better word) any of the other markers in these books ("late autumn" for "after the setting of Orion" for example - 19.56.5). I'd think it more likely that the chronological indicator is in the source rather than Diodorus' own. Perdiccas having "ruled" for three years easily suits three "regnal" years (June 323 - May/June 320, thinking in Babylonian terms).

agesilaos wrote:But, what of the cortege? Arrhidaios took nearly two years preparing it, but two years from his commission not from Alexander’s death. Unfortunately we don’t know how long the dissension lasted. So let us start from the ‘nearly two years’, I would assume that must mean at least twenty months, but Macedonian months rather than modern ones.

Or Babylonian (same lunar-based calendar). Again, this would be in the source. I doubt Diodorus has summarised a notation of months in his source to "nearly two years". Whether or not a lunar calendar is used, the source is claiming near two years and the ancients well knew that the twelve month lunar cycle did not produce a year. The source who wrote in campaigning years and who noted many astronomical chronological markers, more likely means nearly two full years (whether or not they are counted in intercalated Babylonian or Macedonian months). That said, the only marker we have for the commencement of the cortege is the time of the satrapal distribution. This had to happen mid July 323 at the latest you'd think. A commencement on construction would proceed from late July or early August given that artisans, etc. need to be gathered. Either way, the better part of two years would take its completion to spring/early summer in 321.

I don't necessarily disagree greatly with your timing of events. My version follows...

The final - for the time being - settlement at Babylon probably saw the assignment of satrapies at the end of June or in July. There is the perception that Perdiccas -at this time - had total control over this for he was preeminent and spoke without contest for the king. I disagree with this. He had arrived as primes inter pares via an involved and dangerous game of power politics that near cost his life. The less than absolute nature of his resultant position is eloquently illustrated not only by the dissension (and distrust) amongst his "peers" but by the fact that he immediately felt the need to placate Antipater with a marriage alliance. This, too, explains the position given Craterus in the second stage of the "settlement". Although Craterus was well removed from Babylon he needed to be placated whilst the real machinations continued. This does not mean the statement that "the loving half brother", Ptolemy, "demanded and received" Egypt to ensure Alexander went to Egypt can be supported; merely that Perdiccas, though able to remove Meleagher and "demote" Leonnatus, was not in a position to absolutely dictate. Politics was all and Ptolemy's gaining of Egypt was simply part of the necessary give and take that the prospect of continued civil upheaval forced upon the "settlement" and its outcomes.

The taking up of those satrapal appointments will have taken time. Eumenes and Lysimachus will have needed to be sent with forces for the former's satrapy needed subjugation and the latter's near reconquering. Perhaps one of your "omissions" is the is the revolt of the Greeks in the far eastern provinces. Diodorus describes these as 20,000 infantry strong and, clearly, from many outposts. They did not organise via iPhone and would not move until incontestable confirmation of the conqueror's death was received. They will not have marched as any cohesive unit until near the late autumn / winter. Pithon is sent with 3,000 Macedonian troops who are drawn by lot from the royal army at Babylon along with satrapal levies along the way. The resultant battle cannot have been until after mid winter 322/3 as the Astronomical Diaries (AD 1 - 322D: obv.22) do not have Pithon in the field until Kislimu (Dec-Jan 323/2). Whilst the AD note may refer to Pithon's combined forces marching into Bactria, it is apparent that the back end of 323 was more involved that a quick reading shows. This is the reason for Perdiccas instructing Antigonus and Leonnatus to help Eumenes: 3,000 Macedonians are absent from a royal army already sans the 10,000 with Craterus. Perdiccas, then, is unlikely to have set off for a major campaign of reduction minus Pithon's important Macedonian infantry and cavalry. The campaign to Cappadoccia is thus late spring or summer 322 when he either receives Pithon's forces back or meets them en route. Plenty of time for Perdiccas to realise that neither satrap shifted sarissae in support of his order.

That campaign and the subsequent "settlement" of Eumenes' satrapy will also have taken time. The key here is that Eumenes is depicted (by Plutarch) as making his arrangements and setting up his philoi. Having done this he is still with the kings and Perdiccas as they leave Cappadoccia and accompanies them to Psidia. At the earliest this is the very late summer / autumn 322 and more likely the later. The campaign against the two towns does not take terribly long and it could be placed in the autumn / winter or the next spring though I favour the former.

Whilst this was transpiring Diodorus (18.14.1-2) says that Ptolemy "finding eight thousand talents in the treasury, [he] began to collect mercenaries and to form an army". At the same time he "carried on a diplomatic correspondence (with Antipater) that led to a treaty of co‑operation, since he well knew that Perdiccas would attempt to wrest from him the satrapy of Egypt". Perdiccas' overtures to Antipater cannot have gone unnoticed and Ptolemy, as he would so often afterwards demonstrate, was more than adept at seeing to his own interests. Ptolemy will not have been unaware of what was happening in Cyrene either. The likelihood is that his intervention, resulting in his annexation of Cyrene and beginning likely early 321, saw the elimination of Perdiccas' "eye", the hipparch Cleomenes.

Perdiccas is still in Psisdia in the spring of 321. Here the diplomatic merry-go-round begins involving Antipater, Ptolemy, Craterus and, far more crucially, Perdiccas. Antipater, busy consolidating Greece and having already sent the question of Samos to the "kings" for adjudication, now sent his daughter Nicaea to their regent for consummation. The Aetolians are then left to the one side whilst he marries off Phila to secure Craterus. In Asia Perdiccas sees to the settling of affairs in Psisdia and seduces Cleopatra whist eventually marrying Nicaea. Cynnane, another daughter of Philip II, also arrived in Asia with her daughter Eurydice seeking dynastic marriage. Perdiccas, who might well have been able to chew gum and carry a sarissa, could not manage the waiting room and, via Alcetas, accidentally (or otherwise) kills off Cynnane and the royal army becomes incensed. It is then mollified,somewhat, by the marriage of Arrhidaeus and Eurydice in the aftermath. Ptolemy meanwhile, having bumped off Perdiccas' "eye", Cleomenes, has annexed Cyrene and is seeking an alliance with Antipater. By season's end Perdiccas has decided to repudiate Nicaea and become Alexander's brother-in-law posthumously. Antigonus has been summoned to appear to a kangaroo court and flees to Antipater who has, in the early winter 321, taken the field against the Aetolians. It has been a busy year.

Politically crucial is the fact that, by winter 321/20, Perdiccas had chosen to marry Cleopatra (and so repudiate his marriage alliance with Antipater). The dynastic consequences are as clear as Perdiccas' pretensions. It is now that the regent decides that Alexander's body going to Egypt is anything but helpful. Whilst it is clear that Alexander 's body was to go to Egypt, the surviving literary evidence is that Perdiccas wanted that body to go to Macedonia. The possibility of marching on Macedonia with himself as regent married to Alexander's sister - corpse, cortege and Cleopoatra in tow - was far too appealing to pass up. Arrhidaeus, the cortege ready to move in spring 321, is likely instructed to bring the corpse to Perdiccas rather than Egypt. These moves - including Perdiccas' diversion of the corpse - were obviously discussed with his philoi (as the debate over the marriages shows). Eventually Antigonus, threatened and harbouring his own ambitions, escaped and made plain what was strongly suspected to Antipater and Craterus. By now Antipater and Craterus are openly hostile and Ptolemey, fresh from Cyrene and the murder of his Perdiccan politburo eye, is allied with the pair. Thus we arrive at Diodorus 18.25.6 where Perdiccas puts to his friends the question of which front to deal with first: Macedonia or Egypt. The decision is to deal with Ptolemy and then march on Macedonia. Logically I would think the cortege would be met en route in Syria after the settlement of Cilicia.

Then, in spring 320, Ptolemy meets the cortege and ensures it falls into his hands in Egypt. As a result, "even more so", Perdiccas attacks Egypt first, a decision already taken over the winter. That decision, founded on sound strategy, was to march upon Macedonia at the head of the victorious royal army of the east with both the conqueror's corpse and his sister, now the Regent's wife, in tow. Difficult to resist.

I have to disagree with putting the abduction in spring 320. Perdikkas is in Cilicia when Polemon reports back and goes on to arrange the attack on Ptolemy's Cypriot allies. As I mentioned above he has to leave Damascus by April 9 for the chronology to be reconciled successfully; the march to Damascus would add a further 52 days for which there is too little time to accommodate in early 320, also the corpse must have been moved by sea to outdistance the pursuit so the sailing season limits the time as well. September 321 allows for Perdikkas to complete his arrangements over winter and move to Damascus before the campaigning season opened, the implication of Photios 28 is surely that he started the campaigning season at Damascus.

This would also mean that Perdikkas had good intelligence security as Antipatros still believed him to be in Cilicia, apparently even as he was engaged at Pelusium; which speaks well of Perdikkas the general, Antipatros seems not to have been a good field commander more of a politico.

One could argue that the army was dispersed about Cilicia and Syria and then concentrated on Damascus, only Damascus seems somewhat out of the way for a move on Egypt.

Otherwise broad agreement, it seems from Diodoros that Antipatros and Krateros had failed in a standard campaign against the Aetolians who had avoided battle by hiding in the mountains and that they decided on the winter campaign as a way of turning their terrain against the Aetolians following the failure of conventional warfare; the lack of any battles would also explain Diodoros cursory mention, it was a minor campaign with nothing happening!

In June/July 323 the cortege was definitely going to Egypt. By the time of the cortege's arrival in Damascus that was no longer the case. The surviving literary evidence indicates that Perdiccas wanted it to go to Macedonia. That change in destination can really only be as a result of Perdiccas repudiating Nicaea and choosing to marry Cleopatra. This is toward the end of 321 and we have wretched notes of the discussions that transpired over this decision. In the end Diodorus records the decision, over the winter, of which front to engage first and Eumenes is to be sent north with gifts for the intended bride as well as appropriate forces for the Hellespont.

Having only seriously abridged summaries, the detail is lost. It would be fair to suggest that Perdiccas, his dynastic decision made, will have either issued instructions for the cortege to come to him or, if it were on the way from Babylon late in that winter, to meet it and ensure its conveyance to him. It is possible that Polemon was sent south for this purpose - to enforce the order - and that Ptolemy, meeting the corpse and Polemon "with an army", had him cold - pardon the pun. Arrhidaeus is party to the plot as Arrian describes him as "deserting" - likely with the soldiers accompanying the cortege. Polemon harries but can achieve little and so returns to Perdiccas.

agesilaos wrote: September 321 allows for Perdikkas to complete his arrangements over winter and move to Damascus before the campaigning season opened, the implication of Photios 28 is surely that he started the campaigning season at Damascus.

No. Over the winter Perdiccas is decided upon a campaign against Egypt first. The Photius note is merely a severe contraction of the whole. The Vatican Palimpsest shows that much more was involved in the campaign and, whilst the attack proper against Egypt launched from Damascus, the campaign commenced with the royal army settling Cilicia and Ptolemy's allies in Cyprus. The first part of this is the removal of Philotas as Cilician satrap and the replacement of Archon:

When he arrived with his army in Cilicia with this intention, because he knew that Philotas, the satrap of the country, was a friend of Craterus, he deprived Philotas of his command and set up Philoxenus, an undistinguished Macedonian, as governor in his place ... Sending to Babylon ... Docimus with the leading Macedonians, he appointed him to be satrap of Babylonia, and put Archon, the previous governor, in charge of the collection of revenue

It would be nice to have the undamaged text for there are titillating indications of what is going on behind the scenes. Docimus is clearly opposed by Archon (hence he and Arrhidaeus are not in the Perdiccan camp), who organises resistance, telling those who gather to him about how Perdiccas has changed his mind over something ("gathering ... and telling them about Perdiccas' change of mind ... to gather ... in order to prevent Docimus from taking over the command"). This could be a simple as the changing the satrap or it could relate to the more important overall situation of his dynastic pretensions in marrying into Alexander's family and tilting at outright rule. We do not know.

In any case, Psidia is contiguous with Cilicia; indeed it is a part of the province as Diodorus notes when describing Balacrus' death (18.22.1) and so we find Perdiccas, at the beginning of the campaign year, in Cilicia where he receives the news from Polemon's "associates" that the cortege has been taken by a larger force (Ptolemy). With a war on two fronts, Perdiccas will have moved, a la Alexander, at the very earliest opportunity afforded by the season and he will have moved quickly. The army will have been in winter billets and orders will have been issued for immediate assembly. He immediately settles affairs in Cilicia (as above) and then deals with Ptolemy's allies on Cyprus whilst still in the area ("Perdiccas gathered triremes from Phoenicia for an expedition from Cilicia over to Marium") by ordering ships and sending mercenaries and cavalry under his appointed commanders. With a Macedonian army on the march from home, Perdiccas will then have left at best possible "Alexandrian" pace for Egypt. Photius, in summarising the entire foregoing out of his narrative, begins the entire campaign as if Perdiccas had wintered in Damascus. This was not the case.

agesilaos wrote:This would also mean that Perdikkas had good intelligence security as Antipatros still believed him to be in Cilicia,

There is a considerable amount going on behind the scenes that we are extremely scantily informed about. Whatever Antipater may or may not have though, Antigonus - far better informed with a network cultivated over a decade - knew that Perdiccas must be on the march. He sails back into Lydia before Antipater and Craterus have crossed into Asia. He arrives in Caria and Menander and Assander come over to him. It is from here that Antigonus confirms the details of Perdiccas' dynastic plans and Eumenes' mission to Sardis which he attempts to disrupt.

When this became known to Antigonus through Menander the governor of Lydia, he informed Antipater and Craterus [...] Menander the satrap of Lydia, when he learnt of the arrival of Antigonus and the withdrawal of Asander towards him [...] Cleopatra was ... and of Eumenes [...] The cities around Ephesus gave him a friendly welcome, and he prepared to march on Sardis [from there]. Meanwhile, Cleopatra heard about Antigonus' arrival and the ambush which he planned for Eumenes...

All the while Antipater and Craterus are making their way to the Chersonnese and Perdiccas is preparing to or has left Cilicia. The notes in Diodorus (18.29.6 and 33.1) almost certainly reflect the original intentions of the campaign. That would be to engage the royal army before an attack on Egypt. That Antipater was unaware of Perdiccas' departure for Egypt is testimony to Perdiccas command abilities and "security". As noted above, Perdiccas likely moved into Cilicia proper as soon as the passes would might just about allow.

In the end, Perdiccas has altered the destination of the funeral cortege. This cortege might have been instructed to leave as soon as possible over the winter 321/20 so as to meet Perdiccas somewhere in Syria. It is speculation but engagingly possible that the tantalising note of "Perdiccas' change of mind" refers to this and the other machinations surrounding it. How fast the cortege traveled too can only be speculation but leaving Babylon over the winter of 321/20 does not rule out it being in Damascus in the spring.

What you are missing, and I must confess to have forgotten too, is that the Royal army contained elephants;they figure prominently in the battle at Camel fort. They mean that the army can only travel at nine miles per day, fortunately I reckoned Perdikkas at moving only ten per day then added the rests so my calculations are not badly effected.

The eureka moment came when searching for hauben's 'Problems in the chronology of the first war of the successors' I found Anson's refutation of Bosworth's defence of the High Chronology, it is quite good but still frayed around the edges, he forgets the rest days without which every horse and mule would starve! I'll mail you the article....but am still working on a real presentation, when I get my opisometer the map is my oyster to toss on the barbie along with the shrimps, many of whom seemed to be wearing the rose on Saturday Whatever happened to just kicking penalties? Bit off topic but AtG would have understood rugger phalanx/scrum in the centre making space for a decisive strike from the wings...or not in England's case.

And, to add more ... er ... 'stuff' to the proceedings, it looks as if the FYROMs are getting in on the act ... again ...

This is from our old friends at RogueClassicism.

The comparison with Atlantis is apt; when he does find it there will be Elvis sharing a cocktail with Shergar and the Loch Ness Monster while their flying saucer refuels.

A secret grave for the most famous man in history, oh dear; one wonders whose nose he thinks Augustus broke off! Tosh

agesilaos wrote:The comparison with Atlantis is apt; when he does find it there will be Elvis sharing a cocktail with Shergar and the Loch Ness Monster while their flying saucer refuels.

A secret grave for the most famous man in history, oh dear; one wonders whose nose he thinks Augustus broke off! Tosh

Tosh! indeed. And anyway, if it were a secret grave, then how come he "knows" where it is?

marcus wrote:
Tosh! indeed. And anyway, if it were a secret grave, then how come he "knows" where it is?

He doesn't. He puts his hopes in advertising, sponsoring, a little faith in sicence, you know a bit from everything. I he's lucky he might find a very decorated grave of an ancient local elite -and why not?- with gold in it.

I am more of a pessimist as far as the fate of Alexander's remains go. I am afraid that the Christian destroyed the mummy entirely as well as the tomb itself. In such a case, the only thing we can hope for is identifying pieces of the luxurious tomb which may exist inside walls, in museums, in museum storages, in later graves whose owners were entombed with something that belonged to Alexander's tomb, in monasteries, in private collections, in antique shops etc. Believe me, even a simple identification process is very difficult. Just pray that maybe 2 pieces are found. One only offers suspicion, two give a potentially wrong insight.

Agesilaos wrote:

What you are missing, and I must confess to have forgotten too, is that the Royal army contained elephants;they figure prominently in the battle at Camel fort. They mean that the army can only travel at nine miles per day, fortunately I reckoned Perdikkas at moving only ten per day then added the rests so my calculations are not badly effected.

It is always a risky business to base time calculations on "march speeds", because these are based on 'average' speeds that were almost never adhered to in reality. The terrain, how many hours per day were 'marched', movement from one water supply to the next, how many hours per day were needed to feed the animals and men ( less in good forage country, more in bad) were all factors to conspire against an 'average' march speed being consistently maintained, even over the long term. Reality was inevitably faster or slower.

Ancient armies were quite capable of 'sprinting' 40-50 miles/64-80 km per day, for several consecutive days when necessary - even faster if un-encumbered (latin; expeditos, Greek; kouphos), and there are a number of well-attested Roman marches to this effect.

For a Hellenistic example, consider the march prior to the battle of Pisidia 320 BC. Antigonos Monophthalmos marched to this battle against Alketas with an army of about 47,000 for seven consecutive days, at around 40 miles a day.
Diodorus [XVIII.44-46]says ;
"Making a forced march that strained the endurance of his men to the utmost, he traversed 2,500 stades(285 miles, 457 km ) in seven days and the same number of nights, reaching Cretopolis as it is called."
This gives an average of a little over 40 miles, 64 km per day, and was evidently considered sufficiently noteworthy that the distance was recorded.
Bearing in mind that the larger the size of the army, the longer it takes the 'tail' to complete the march, this feat is all the more outstanding ! It consisted of 40,000 infantry, 7,000 cavalry, and up to 70 elephants. ( so much for 9 miles per day !! )

Of course, marching at this rate can have dire effects, with the number of 'straggler' casualties going up markedly.....

This took place in Lycia, the area of the southern coast of Turkey opposite the Dodecanese islands and Rhodes. The exact location of Cretopolis ( the city of the Cretans) is unknown, but was probably a Neo-Cretan colony on the coast, and the march itself probably took place along the coast (inland are rugged hills up to 3,000 ft,1,000 m high)

Antigonas' army took their foes by surprise,( Duh ! ) and fought and won a battle at the end of their march !!