pothos.org

the_accursed wrote:

athenas owl wrote:
Keeping the army "contented" and having to fill the treasury are no mutually exclusive. In fact, the treasury was emptied in large part because Philip had to pay his army.

No. But Marcus is claiming, Philip II had to use the army whether he was rich or not, and whether he himself wanted to or not, because he needed to keep the army contented. "...once you have one, you have to use it". I don't think Philip II reasoned this way.

Hmmm....I think he did in part. I can see what you are saying, but "use it or lose it" is a part of it.
Once you get the army you want...you can't just let them be idle. Especially as they were now a "professional" force, and not farmers or land barons called on the off season for the next dust up.

Semiramis wrote:Hi Phoebus,
...
Just before his death, the Vulgate sources seem to suggest a court fearful of Alexander.

This reminded me of something. Ansen's book on Eumenes specifically cites Perdiccas, Alexander's Chiliarch after Hephaistion's death, as a man of fearful temperament--a man feared by all but a few. Given that the Somatophylakes and captains worthy of the court--hell, most of the veterans, I'd wager--weren't exactly clean of blood, that says a lot to me. It would seem the king was surrounding himself with people whose temper matched his own at this point.

Good to know there is at least one other person who thought of Alexander during 'Apocalypse Now'.

Here's where I throw a wink at Fiona as well, though:
Kurtz fits the bill for me because he began his descent with what he would probably have seen as "good intentions". It's doubtful that either he or Alexander still felt as connected to them by the time their lives were close to an end, but it helped reinforce my opinion that one can be a warlord and a dreamer at the same time--for a while, at least.

Phoebus wrote:
Here's where I throw a wink at Fiona as well, though:
Kurtz fits the bill for me because he began his descent with what he would probably have seen as "good intentions". It's doubtful that either he or Alexander still felt as connected to them by the time their lives were close to an end, but it helped reinforce my opinion that one can be a warlord and a dreamer at the same time--for a while, at least.

Have to confess I did think of Alexander during Apocalypse Now, but not because of Kurtz. I came away with the impression of Kurtz as a man who'd been overwhelmed by events beyond his control, and I think Alexander had the power to stay on top of things more. But I see what you mean about the warlord and the dreamer, and I agree, the pattern is there. If you're an imaginative soul, then a lot of killing is bound to have its effect in the end.
What I did think about Alexander during that movie was, I bet he'd have loved helicopters.
Fiona

athenas owl wrote:

the_accursed wrote:No. But Marcus is claiming, Philip II had to use the army whether he was rich or not, and whether he himself wanted to or not, because he needed to keep the army contented. "...once you have one, you have to use it". I don't think Philip II reasoned this way.

Hmmm....I think he did in part. I can see what you are saying, but "use it or lose it" is a part of it.
Once you get the army you want...you can't just let them be idle. Especially as they were now a "professional" force, and not farmers or land barons called on the off season for the next dust up.

Well, Athenas Owl is making my case for me. Once Philip had built up his big, professional army, they needed to be kept in trim, and loyal. The thing about an army is that, if it isn't used, it goes off the boil; and as a large part of ancient armies' upkeep was spoils, they needed campaigns to produce spoils. Irrespective of whether Philip was rich, if he didn't keep the army up to scratch and happy, they could easily turn on him ... or just melt away, leaving Macedonia as weak as it had been at the start of his reign. Philip was too clever *not* to have understood this.

I see that your reference to my previous answer being a historian's was not intended as a compliment. That's fine - I have a thick enough skin; but I also think that it's a bit much to say that "arguing like a historian" is being "artificial". If that's the case, then what the heck are we all doing wasting our time on Pothos? (Can't get the emoticons to work, but there's supposed to be a laughing smiley here.)

ATB

I have to say I agree with Marcus on this matter. Historians and readers can sometimes apply hindsight 20/20 on a situation a bit too much, using context and knowledge unknown to the people of that time, but I don't feel this is the case here. Philip had to have known what the consequence of not paying his soldiers would be. Professional armies, with very few exceptions have operated on guidelines of exactly the sort Marcus is mentioning.

Even today's professional armies, of what we would term free states, which aren't ostensibly working for profit, let alone loot and spoils, would eventually break down without pay. I'm not talking about emergency measures, of course, but situations wherein life went on "as normal" for the rest of the citizenry, but not the soldiers themselves.

marcus wrote:Well, Athenas Owl is making my case for me. Once Philip had built up his big, professional army, they needed to be kept in trim, and loyal. The thing about an army is that, if it isn't used, it goes off the boil; and as a large part of ancient armies' upkeep was spoils, they needed campaigns to produce spoils. Irrespective of whether Philip was rich, if he didn't keep the army up to scratch and happy, they could easily turn on him ... or just melt away, leaving Macedonia as weak as it had been at the start of his reign. Philip was too clever *not* to have understood this.

So…Philip II was “too clever” not to agree with you? I’m happy to see, then, that my clarification can not have done any permanent damage to your self-confidence.

(For the record: I don't use smileys myself. But if I did, I'd insert one here).

Myself, I think you underestimate the fact that there was always great risk involved in campaigning, and that defeat was always a very realistic possibility. I don’t believe that Philip II would ever have risked everything he’d fought for, for decades, for the sole purpose of keeping his soldier in shape and "contented".

If you already have a wealthy and flourishing empire, and personally don’t desire/need any more conquests, then the gain “contented soldiers” does not outweigh the risk of losing everything. Defeated soldiers, as Philip II found out, aren’t very contented either.

So what would Philip II’s soldiers have done, had he finally been satisfied with what he had? Well…what did Antipater’s soldiers do for ten years? Go mad? Run amok through Pella? Or was it, rather, practice, guard duty, training new recruits and, when needed (as when Sparta attacked) defend Macedonia and Macedonian interests?

On this topic, Marcus, you and I are just going to have to agree to disagree.

marcus wrote:I see that your reference to my previous answer being a historian's was not intended as a compliment. That's fine - I have a thick enough skin; but I also think that it's a bit much to say that "arguing like a historian" is being "artificial".

Don’t read too much into that, though. To me you seem like a reasonable, rational person. I just happen to disagree with you on this particular issue.

Phoebus wrote:I have to say I agree with Marcus on this matter. Historians and readers can sometimes apply hindsight 20/20 on a situation a bit too much, using context and knowledge unknown to the people of that time, but I don't feel this is the case here. Philip had to have known what the consequence of not paying his soldiers would be.

I think you must have misunderstood me. It was I who said, in this thread, that money indeed must have been Philip II's top priority, being that he was broke. That this was a problem that could not have been put on hold. This is not where Marcus and I disagree.

What I don't believe is that Philip II, in a theoretical situation, where he no longer neither wanted nor needed further conquests, still would have campaigned, and thus put everything he had at risk, for the sole purpose of keeping his soldiers in shape and “contented”.

Phoebus wrote:Even today's professional armies, of what we would term free states, which aren't ostensibly working for profit, let alone loot and spoils, would eventually break down without pay. I'm not talking about emergency measures, of course, but situations wherein life went on "as normal" for the rest of the citizenry, but not the soldiers themselves.

Indeed they would break down without pay. No disagreement there from me at all.

the_accursed wrote:Here's what I think, Marcus: I think you're arguing like a historian, and not like a warrior king having to deal with the very real problem of being broke.

Which does not make Marcus any less correct.

Macedon was, as Green put it, “bankrupt” by the time of the invasion of Persia. Its revenues – far and away in excess of Athens’ imperial pomp – will have refilled those coffers given time. Philip had been short of readies before and life had gone on.

There are a couple of things operating here that are going unnoticed or “under the radar” The first of these is the term “professional” with respect to the Macedonian army. This is often interpreted in a modern light, that is, a standing army of say 18 – 20,000 foot that were paid several obols per day. This is a misconception. The “professional” part of the citizen levy will likely have been the hypaspist corps. Mercenaries – whom Philip made extensive use of – were paid as and when required and so too, likely, were the “ordinary” infantry who were called up as and when required. A great part of the “wages” of these soldiers (citizen), as Marcus has touched on, came in the form of distributed plunder. Any reading of the anabasis and – a fortiori – events after clearly shows this

Another of Philip’s rewards – and absolutely integral to his “new state” – was the distribution of “king’s land” to his Makedones. This was quite important and the sources record the gifting of lands – worked by former occupants – to his soldiery and their commanders. Many settled here and provided the backbone of the citizen levy when mustered under a call up (as Alexander did during the early years of his anabasis). There was a limit as to how much of such land was available in Macedon (and surrounds – Illyria etc) and Greece. Hence the imperial expansion into Thrace and the Propontis.

The Persian Empire offered a huge and untapped reservoir of such “king’s land”: Macedonian lebensraum in the east.

the_accursed wrote:Personally, I'm not convinced that Philip II or Alexander III planned, from the very beginning, to conquer the Persian empire. I think the plan was to get their hands on a large sum of money, and fast. Preferably through extortion.

That is in stark contrast to the propaganda and stated aims of the war. One doesn’t declare war on a select and distinct section of the Persian Empire and declare war is what Philip did. That he did so with the intent of bashing enough of Asia Minor so as to extort money from the Ionian, Hellepontine and, possibly, Carian, Lydian and Cilician states as well as Sardis is not in the character of the bloke. It wasn’t exactly as if the National Bank of Macedon was about to foreclose on Philip Inc.

The line that we see the father in the son is not far off when it comes to the "foundations" of Alexander in the east: these are Greco-Macedonian implants supported by the former owners/inhabitants of the area. Crenides and its gold mines - supplying something in the order of 1,000 talents per year to Philip - being one example.

Paralus wrote:

the_accursed wrote:Here's what I think, Marcus: I think you're arguing like a historian, and not like a warrior king having to deal with the very real problem of being broke.

Which does not make Marcus any less correct.

Macedon was, as Green put it, “bankrupt” by the time of the invasion of Persia. Its revenues – far and away in excess of Athens’ imperial pomp – will have refilled those coffers given time. Philip had been short of readies before and life had gone on.

That’s downplaying the seriousness of the situation. When you have to pawn your inheritance to buy yourself time, money is clearly a big problem. This problem was Philip II's before it was Alexander III's. Philip II needed money. Persia was the richest empire in the world. I think it's reasonable to conclude, given the circumstances, that getting some of that money must have been the primary objective. As I said, after that: who knows? I believe that both Philip II and Alexander III were more flexible with their plans than, apparently, most pothosians do. They did not, unlike everyone here, know how things would turn out. For them, the risks they took were real.

Paralus wrote:There are a couple of things operating here that are going unnoticed or “under the radar” The first of these is the term “professional” with respect to the Macedonian army. This is often interpreted in a modern light, that is, a standing army of say 18 – 20,000 foot that were paid several obols per day. This is a misconception. The “professional” part of the citizen levy will likely have been the hypaspist corps. Mercenaries – whom Philip made extensive use of – were paid as and when required and so too, likely, were the “ordinary” infantry who were called up as and when required. A great part of the “wages” of these soldiers (citizen), as Marcus has touched on, came in the form of distributed plunder. Any reading of the anabasis and – a fortiori – events after clearly shows this

And plunder they’d get. An inevitable consequence of (and reward for) the “damage” I mentioned. But they also wanted to get paid.

Paralus wrote:Another of Philip’s rewards – and absolutely integral to his “new state” – was the distribution of “king’s land” to his Makedones. This was quite important and the sources record the gifting of lands – worked by former occupants – to his soldiery and their commanders. Many settled here and provided the backbone of the citizen levy when mustered under a call up (as Alexander did during the early years of his anabasis). There was a limit as to how much of such land was available in Macedon (and surrounds – Illyria etc) and Greece. Hence the imperial expansion into Thrace and the Propontis.

The Persian Empire offered a huge and untapped reservoir of such “king’s land”: Macedonian lebensraum in the east.

This is, in my opinion, a weak argument. Philip II had already provided the Macedonians the most “lebensraum” they’d ever had in their entire history, and had rewarded them for these conquests. Yet, having (approximately) quadrupled the size of the Macedonian empire in 23 years, he felt an urgent need to add 20 times (or so) as much to it, to...provide the Macedonians with sufficient space? And this speculation you prefer over something we actually know: the empty Macedonian treasure chamber, to explain why Philip II wanted to invade the richest empire in the world at a time when he had no money?

Paralus wrote:

the_accursed wrote:

the_accursed wrote:Personally, I'm not convinced that Philip II or Alexander III planned, from the very beginning, to conquer the Persian empire. I think the plan was to get their hands on a large sum of money, and fast. Preferably through extortion.

That is in stark contrast to the propaganda and stated aims of the war. One doesn’t declare war on a select and distinct section of the Persian Empire and declare war is what Philip did. That he did so with the intent of bashing enough of Asia Minor so as to extort money from the Ionian, Hellepontine and, possibly, Carian, Lydian and Cilician states as well as Sardis is not in the character of the bloke. It wasn’t exactly as if the National Bank of Macedon was about to foreclose on Philip Inc.

I didn’t say the "declaration of war" was on only a part of the Persian empire, nor that I think it was these parts they wanted to extort. The money would have come from Darius III, as it would have, had Alexander III accepted one of his offers (or, more likely, made Darius III an offer to accept or reject). Unfortunately for Darius III, when he began to seek diplomatic solutions, he’d already sponsored Alexander III's campaign against him with 3000 talents of gold.

the_accursed wrote:This is, in my opinion, a weak argument. Philip II had already provided the Macedonians the most “lebensraum” they’d ever had in their entire history, and had rewarded them for these conquests. Yet, having (approximately) quadrupled the size of the Macedonian empire in 23 years, he felt an urgent need to add 20 times (or so) as much to it, to...provide the Macedonians with sufficient space? And this speculation you prefer over something we actually know: the empty Macedonian treasure chamber, to explain why Philip II wanted to invade the richest empire in the world at a time when he had no money?

Then you understand little of the argument. I don't use "smileys" but were I to do so I would put one after the following two sentences. I might just a easily dismiss your reasoning for a Persian invasion by Philip II as "elementary". In fact I just did.

Paralus wrote:Then you understand little of the argument. I don't use "smileys" but were I to do so I would put one after the following two sentences. I might just a easily dismiss your reasoning for a Persian invasion by Philip II as "elementary". In fact I just did.

For naturally, anyone who understands you must also agree with you.