All about Alexander the Great
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Again, I'm not at all certain we can say that any of the left were descending to join with the right. In fact, it's highly possible that not all of the right had made it. As I wrote earlier, if one leaves out Poybios' repeating of the reasons why Philip's mercenaries are repulsed it reads somewhat easier:Xenophon wrote:Also, where do you get the idea that the left wing was ‘delayed’? Polybius says that Nikanor was ordered to follow “at once”, and as the right wing charged down the slopes, some of the left were also descending- to link up - while others had halted on the summit to wait for the rear to come up. They simply hadn’t yet had the chance to form ‘battle line’ and were largely in ‘marching’ or ‘open’ order.[ Pol XVIII.25.5-7] There’s no inference of any ‘delay’ that I can see.
Now, what's been excised is the explanation ("for as I said just now..."). So, in terms of events and timing, Philip has received these returning troops while still getting his right into line. Some - not necessarily a lot (possibly a syntagma or so?) - may have missed the charge.But while he was still engaged in getting the right wing of his army into line, his mercenaries came on the ground, having been decisively repulsed by the enemy [...] Receiving therefore the men who had been already engaged, he massed them all upon his right wing, both infantry and cavalry; while he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right.
Then when Flamininus leads his right against the Macedonian left:but as for the rest of the army, that part of it which was in the rear of the actual fighters did not get into contact with the enemy; while the left wing, which had but just made the ascent, was only beginning to show on the ridge.
part being in contact with the actual fighters, part just in the act of mounting the ridge, and part halting on it and not yet beginning to descend
All of which indicates that the Macedonian left had not engaged in the battle at all. The only two possible contrary indicators are "part being in contact with the actual fighters" and "that part of it which was in the rear of the actual fighters did not get into contact with the enemy". These are not clear though I'd suggest the former is the right and that which had not gotten into proper order. The latter may well be the rear of the phalanx itself if not those of the right who did not quite make the charge. Either way, Polybios is crystal in claiming that Philip's right was in the midst of success while the left wing had "but just made the ascent" and was only "beginning to show on the ridge".The Macedonians having no one to give them orders, and unable to form a proper phalanx, owing to the inequalities of the ground and to the fact that, being engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants, they were still in column of march...
and when he observed that the Romans in their pursuit of his left wing were already approaching the tops of the hills, he rallied as many Thracians and Macedonians as he could at the moment, and fled. [9] As Flamininus was pursuing the fugitives he came upon the lines of the Macedonian left, just as they were scaling the ridge in their attempt to cross the hills
I disagree. Diodorus has Antigonos in the middle of nowhere and marching by night due to the Susiane summer heat. Arriving at the river he sets about getting his army across. Diodorus says that due to the nature of the river it could only be crossed by boat and that Antigonos seized a small number of punts (ὀλίγα πλοῖα κοντωτὰ). With these he sent “some of the infantry across in them, ordering them to dig a moat and build a palisade in front of it and to receive the rest of the army”. These troops were to prepare a defensive encampment to prevent the disaster which actually occurred. We later find out that this force (or at least those there by the time Eumenes arrived) was “more than three thousand foot soldiers” and “four hundred cavalry”. Antigonos obviously intended conveying the rest of his army across and, as such, the ‘few’ punts were crucial. It would, then, beggar belief that 6,000 “looters” took to the few punts and crossed – without orders – for some light fingered work across the other side. Either the One Eye ordered them across to forage for the army which was following or we must accept that Antigonos was extremely lax in his discipline. I’d suggest these are those in the army whose customary job was to do exactly what Antigonos had given them his precious punts to do.Xenophon wrote:As to Paralus’ post,[Thurs 29 may] I’d agree his first paragraph, but not his second. In regard to foraging, I strongly suspect that Diodorus’ “those soldiers who were in the habit of crossing in scattered groups in search of forage" really is a euphemism for looting – note that these are not ordered to go out, but habitually go of their own accord....... i.e. “unofficial” foragers.
Normally the left wing of the phalanx would enter the field of battle in column,immediately behind the right wing column, and would continue the deployment of the phalanx to the left. This would normally be 'seamless', so that the end result was a single solid phalanx. The column of march would be in 'syntagma' one behind the other, 16 x 16 in 'open/normal' order, called 'epagoge' [Aelian 36.2], and each 'syntagma' would deploy to the left of its predecessor. We might expect therefore that the 'head' of the left wing would be in immediate touch with the leftmost unit of the right wing, and would start deploying as soon as Philip 'closed up' the right wing, making room for them. Thus it is possible that a few of the left wing went with the right when they charged. This seems to be confirmed, as Paralus notes below, when Polybius says "part being in contact with the actual fighters, "Paralus wrote:Again, I'm not at all certain we can say that any of the left were descending to join with the right.Xenophon wrote:Also, where do you get the idea that the left wing was ‘delayed’? Polybius says that Nikanor was ordered to follow “at once”, and as the right wing charged down the slopes, some of the left were also descending- to link up - while others had halted on the summit to wait for the rear to come up. They simply hadn’t yet had the chance to form ‘battle line’ and were largely in ‘marching’ or ‘open’ order.[ Pol XVIII.25.5-7] There’s no inference of any ‘delay’ that I can see.
I think Polybius is quite clear in his description, at least in my eyes. The 'lights and cavalry' were essentially in front of Philip's right wing. As each of the phalanx units/syntagma came into line, they were in 'open/normal order'. As the last of the deployment was taking place on the left of the phalanx line, some 1,000 yards from its right, the lights and cavalry withdrew through the phalanx, and were ordered to the right flank to protect it. As soon as the 'lights' had cleared the phalanx and were now in its rear, Philip ordered them to 'close up' to their right into 'close order' preparatory to charging down the slope at the two advancing Roman Legions. For some to have missed the charge, Philip would have had to launch it before the 'closing up' was complete. This may be possible, given the proximity of the Romans, but what Polybius [XVII.24.8 ] actually says is :In fact, it's highly possible that not all of the right had made it. As I wrote earlier, if one leaves out Poybios' repeating of the reasons why Philip's mercenaries are repulsed it reads somewhat easier:
Now, what's been excised is the explanation ("for as I said just now..."). So, in terms of events and timing, Philip has received these returning troops while still getting his right into line. Some - not necessarily a lot (possibly a syntagma or so?) - may have missed the charge.But while he was still engaged in getting the right wing of his army into line, his mercenaries came on the ground, having been decisively repulsed by the enemy [...] Receiving therefore the men who had been already engaged, he massed them all upon his right wing, both infantry and cavalry; while he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right.
Again,I think Polybius is clear. "that part which was in the rear of the actual fighters" is the rear half of the right wing phalanx, which it will be recalled was 'double depth', some 16 deep in close order, and naturally the rear half/8 ranks "did not get into contact with the enemy" The left wing is just breasting the ridge - though the leading elements would have been in touch with the right wing, as described above.Secondly, unless we are to think the Megalopolitan contradicts himself within paragraphs, the left never made it into any order other than marching. Several passages show this:
but as for the rest of the army, that part of it which was in the rear of the actual fighters did not get into contact with the enemy; while the left wing, which had but just made the ascent, was only beginning to show on the ridge.
part being in contact with the actual fighters, part just in the act of mounting the ridge, and part halting on it and not yet beginning to descend
See above. The passage makes sense and is clear if we read the former as referring to the leading elements of the left wing, and the latter as the rear part of the right wing phalanx that charged. Polybius is merely telling us that the right wing formation was too deep for all to take part in the fight. It is not necessary to assume that any of the right wing did not make the charge - surely Polybius would have mentioned it if the charge was carried out partly in disarray, and as mentioned above, Polybius says specifically that the manoeuvre was completed. .Then when Flamininus leads his right against the Macedonian left:
All of which indicates that the Macedonian left had not engaged in the battle at all. The only two possible contrary indicators are "part being in contact with the actual fighters" and "that part of it which was in the rear of the actual fighters did not get into contact with the enemy". These are not clear though I'd suggest the former is the right and that which had not gotten into proper order. The latter may well be the rear of the phalanx itself if not those of the right who did not quite make the charge. Either way, Polybios is crystal in claiming that Philip's right was in the midst of success while the left wing had "but just made the ascent" and was only "beginning to show on the ridge".The Macedonians having no one to give them orders, and unable to form a proper phalanx, owing to the inequalities of the ground and to the fact that, being engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants, they were still in column of march...
and when he observed that the Romans in their pursuit of his left wing were already approaching the tops of the hills, he rallied as many Thracians and Macedonians as he could at the moment, and fled. [9] As Flamininus was pursuing the fugitives he came upon the lines of the Macedonian left, just as they were scaling the ridge in their attempt to cross the hills
I might well agree with the first though, in defense as explained earlier, that was a pointer to the fact that one had to read through five more paragraphs (from recollection) before alighting on the substantiation for the original assertion.Xenophon wrote:I was merely taking my lead from your own attempted humour – see for example May 15 “But wait, what's that there.... below... I spies me an explanation........ Now, that's one of the better and more extensive glosses of a very clear text I've seen in a while. A gloss of convenience or a gloss of presumption?? More likely the latter.”
And yet ‘humour’, in generating the laugh, very often belittles. I have addressed the issues that have been raised by the thread as they’ve arisen. I do not see that I’ve raised any ‘irrelevancies’ for myself to argue with.Xenophon wrote:Nor were my comments in this instance intended as personal attack, merely a kinder way, via humour, to avoid saying bluntly that you were deliberately avoiding the issues under discussion..... not a personal criticism, rather drawing attention to a debating style of avoiding issues, evasions of the point in question and instead digressing into minor issues and irrelevancies that one can argue with.
I have never disagreed that the phalanx file was sixteen in open order and therefore haven’t somehow now agreed with that proposition on this thread (as that might seem to suggest). I have in fact stated it repeatedly on this thread. Also I have not had any epiphany relating to the fact that a phalanx could - and did - take close order eight deep as I’ve also remarked repeatedly on this thread (below). I do not hold with the parenthetic ‘exceptional’ though.Xenophon wrote:At last ! Having agreed that the basic file was 16 in open order previously, you now (apparently) unequivocally agree that ‘close order’ was half that depth, at 8. ( save for exceptional cases such as Kynoskephalae or Sellasia). Similarly for ‘synaspismos’.
~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~14/513/5Paralus wrote:Once into line (16 deep) on the ridge Philip could order it to 'double down' to eight deep in pyknosis or close up to the right sixteen deep.19/5Paralus wrote: The only other possible order for closing up would be to 'double down' by insertion which order was demonstrably not given.25/5Paralus wrote:The statement has been repeated throughout that the regular close order of the Macedonian phalanx was 8 deep and formed by half file insertion. I disagree and reiterate that the field and its circumstances dictated just how the phalanx condensed. Half file insertion is disingenuously presented as the 'normal' or regular method of making the phalanx more dense. Yet when Aelian introduces "compaction" of the phalanx, his first (and entire) example is by closing to right or left with the resultant diminished frontages involved. He goes on later in his treatise to describe insertion as another method.Paralus wrote:I have to agree with Xenophon. I cannot see the right of the phalanx deploying into line sixteen deep (as usual), then 'doubling down' (by half file insertion) only to afterwards resume sixteen deep open order (by counter march of the inserted half file?) and then close up to the right.
Now that may well be true. In the interminable to and fro ranks and files have become confused. That said…Xenophon wrote:It appears to me that Paralus is confused on the matter and its terminology.
The passages have been quoted and requoted and likely belong on the "Taktike" thread. That, though, seems to have taken off on another tangent. That said, one point needs restating though. Asklepiodotos (10.17), does indeed describe file insertion to attain a compact formation (“maintaining all the while the length of the phalanx”). Aelian futher expounds on this (as he promised to do) “as when from a front of 124 files we wish to make a front of 248, while still occupying the same length of ground, by interjecting in the spaces between the soldiers some of the rear-rank-men that constitute the depth” (and the other method noted by Xenophon). Asklepiodotos then describes the folding of one file into the other. This results in the doubling of the number of ranks (or the numbers in each file) “so that a compact order arises only by depth”. This latter is not presented as the ‘loosening’ of the former - that comes at 10.18 & 19 (where, at 19, Asklepiodotos writes:"doubling of place is performed by depth when we change the above mentioned compact formation by depth [that is, that just described at 17] into a loose formation or when the interjected men counter-march by file"). Rather, it is explicit in noting that numbers (in file) are doubled and the resultant doubled file takes on compact order. Aelian (29.6), again as promised, more fully describes this folding of one file into its neighbour thus doubling the number of ranks (or the numbers in each file) and producing the same result. It is nowhere stated that these files, now doubled in number (by depth) and compacted (also in depth), then ‘presumably’ open their depth from three feet to six feet. Thus should a commander wish to ‘double’ his file depth, the mechanism is available. It does not, of necessity, follow that these files, prior to such doubling, must be four deep (locked shields) or eight deep (close order) to do so.Xenophon wrote:‘Doubling depth’ [29.6] is the insertion of one file into another – two files become one, now with twice as many men ( two files of 8 become one of 16, and the interval between files doubles from, say, 3 ft to 6 ft. It does NOT render the ranks (men side by side originally) into ‘close order’, but just the opposite, the space between men in a given rank becomes looser, and twice what it was. ( but the files are now in ‘close order’ front to back - presumably they then open out the depth from 3 ft to 6 feet to achieve full 'open order'). It is only the closing up of the files by a following right turn, and marching to their right which brings soldiers in the same rank standing side by side back into ‘close order’.
This is at least the second time you have accused me of deliberate invention for a purpose. Above, in a ‘humorous’ discussion with Baldrick, you made it even plainer:Xenophon wrote: To bolster your interpretation you have invented a formation that not only never existed, but is quite impossible practically…
You may very well find the accusation of inventing material to ‘bolster’ an interpretation or to ‘allow’ an interpretation of a very clear and concise passage humorous (at least via Baldrick); I do not. The import is that having decided on the meaning of the passage I have then gone about inventing material to substantiate that meaning. I reject that.Xenophon wrote: a formation 32 deep which must entail ‘doubling’ the intervals between files to 12 feet – such 32 deep formation nowhere described in our sources - one which Paralus has invented to allow his interpretation of what Polybius meant by “double their depth and close up toward the right.” ? ( he even used Aelian’s method 29.6 above).
Wholeheartedly agreed. In which case, let’s proceed without the ‘humorour' - interlocutory or otherwise.Xenophon wrote:I assure you no ‘jibe’ was intended, we have been friends far too long for such pettiness...
It is the last proposition that I have difficulty with. "Foraging" consisted largely of three things - fetching water, and an army consumed vast amounts daily, hence the importance of rivers in all campaigns; fetching fuel, usually wood, but often dung, for cooking and keeping warm; and finally crops as food for both men and animals ( the Romans had a separate word for each of these tasks). Since societies in those days were largely rural, pretty much everyone was familiar with these chores, which differed little from ordinary civil life. I am therefore sceptical that there were troops who 'specialised' in foraging, or whose 'customary job' it was. I certainly don't recall any references in our sources to such 'specialist' troops. Certainly “those soldiers who were in the habit of crossing in scattered groups in search of forage" doesn't sound like disciplined troops carrying out orders.....and it is an old military truism that the tougher the situation, the more the reins of discipline must be relaxed.Xenophon wrote:
As to Paralus’ post,[Thurs 29 may] I’d agree his first paragraph, but not his second. In regard to foraging, I strongly suspect that Diodorus’ “" really is a euphemism for looting – note that these are not ordered to go out, but habitually go of their own accord....... i.e. “unofficial” foragers.those soldiers who were in the habit of crossing in scattered groups in search of forage
I disagree. Diodorus has Antigonos in the middle of nowhere and marching by night due to the Susiane summer heat. Arriving at the river he sets about getting his army across. Diodorus says that due to the nature of the river it could only be crossed by boat and that Antigonos seized a small number of punts (ὀλίγα πλοῖα κοντωτὰ). With these he sent “some of the infantry across in them, ordering them to dig a moat and build a palisade in front of it and to receive the rest of the army”. These troops were to prepare a defensive encampment to prevent the disaster which actually occurred. We later find out that this force (or at least those there by the time Eumenes arrived) was “more than three thousand foot soldiers” and “four hundred cavalry”. Antigonos obviously intended conveying the rest of his army across and, as such, the ‘few’ punts were crucial. It would, then, beggar belief that 6,000 “looters” took to the few punts and crossed – without orders – for some light fingered work across the other side. Either the One Eye ordered them across to forage for the army which was following or we must accept that Antigonos was extremely lax in his discipline. I’d suggest these are those in the army whose customary job was to do exactly what Antigonos had given them his precious punts to do.
A1) [….the watchmen] must not reply to the patrols, but must keep quiet and show that they are present and on their feet. Concerning patrols. In each strategia the tetrarchs must go th ethe rounds in turn / without any light and anyone found sitting down or [sleeping] while on guard duty the tetrarchs shall fine one drachma for every offence and the secretaries (grammateis) shall obtain th epayment [of the fine]…
A2) …[if they do not report] the offenders [to the king] they shall be fined three twelfths of a drachma(?) which shall be given to the Hypaspists in the event of their being the first to send in a written denunciation of the offenders./Concerning the construction of the camp. When they have completed the enclosure for the king and the rest of his quarters and an interval has been left, they shall straightaway build barracks for the Hypaspists…
A3)[…][anyone who has been awarded?] a crown shall receive a double share of the booty, but nothing is to be given to the cheiristes, [and] the royal philoi [shall adjudicate?]./ Concerning the watchwords. They shall also take the [watchword…when?] they close the entrances to th e[king’s quarters?]…
B1)… they shall punish according to the written rules those who are not bearing the arms appropriate to them : two obols for the kottybos, the same amount for the konos, three obols for the sarissa, the same amount for the dagger, two obols for the greaves, a drachma for the shield./ In 5the case of the officers (hegemones) double the fine for the weapons mentioned, and two drachmai for the corselet and one drachma for the half-corselet. The secretaries and the chief attendants (archyperetai) swhall receive the fines after reporting the offenders to the king./ Concerning Discipline over War Booty. [If] anyone brings booty to the camp , the generals taking with them the speirarchs and the tetrarchs and the other officers (hegemones), and together with these the [attendants] in sufficient numbers shall go to meet them at a distance of three stadia from the camp,/ [and they shall not allow] those who captured the booty to keep it. And shouls any insubordination [of this kind ] take place, the [generals], speirarchs, tetrarchs and the chief attendants shall pay a sum equivalent [to what each of them owes?] last 4 lines very mutilated.
B2)First 10,lines very fragmentary
[…the superintendent] of the court; and if […they shall fine him] a twelth of an obol and the superintendent of the [court ]shall do the same thing….Concerning [Foraging]/ If anyone forages in enemy territory, [a reward for his denunciation?] shall be promised and given…[And if anyone?] burns crops or [cuts] vines [or] is guilty [of any other offence, the generals shall promise?] a rerwrd for his denunciation….
Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 12 Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 11 Meletemata 22, Epig. App. 13
Makedonia (Edonis) — Amphipolis — ca. 200 BC — ISE II 114 — SEG 40.524
See also: SEG 52:589; SEG 53:589
frg. A.col. I
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
1
μηθὲν ἀποκρινομένους τοῖς ἐφόδοις, ἀλλὰ μετὰ σιωπῆς
αὑτοὺς ἀποδεικνύοντας ὅτι μένουσιν ὀρθοί.
ἐφόδων.
ἐφοδεύειν δὲ τὴν μὲν στρατηγίαν ἑκάστην κατὰ μέρος
5
τοὺς τετράρχας ἄνευ φωτὸς καὶ τὸν συγκαθήμενον ἢ κα-
θ̣εύ̣δ̣οντα φύλακα {ι} ζημιούτωσαν οἱ τετράρχαι καθ’ ἑκάστην
ἀ̣τ̣α̣ξί[α]ν δραχμῆι καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς ποιείσθωσαν τὴν πρᾶ-
col. II
[ξιν — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
1
[— — — — — — — — ἐὰν μὴ παραδείξωσι τῶι βασι]-
λεῖ τοὺς ἀτακτοῦτας ζημιούσθωσ{θ}αν {²⁶ζημιούσθωσαν}²⁶ δωδεκαίοις
τρισὶν καὶ διδόσθωσαν τοῖς ὑπασπισταῖς, ἐὰν φθά-
σωσιν εἰσπέμψαντες οὗτοι τὴν τῶν ἀτακτούτων γραφήν.
5
περὶ στεγνοποίας.
ὅταν δὲ τὸν φραγμὸν συντελέσωσιν τῷ βασιλεῖ
καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σκηνοποιίαν καὶ γένηται διάστασις,
εὐθὺ τοῖς ὑπασπισταῖς ποιείτωσαν ἐκκοίτιον
col. III
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
1
σ̣τ̣ρ̣α̣τ̣η̣γίαν̣ ΕΠ[․]#⁷[․․]ΑΝ̣[․․․]Ι̣ΔΗ[․․․․․․]Ε̣Ρ̣Ι̣ΕΜ̣[․․․․․]-
χέτω στέφανος, διπλῆν λαμβάνειν τὴν μερίδ[α τῆς ὠ]-
φελίας, τῶι δὲ χειριστᾷ μηδὲν δίδοσθαι, κρ̣[ίνειν δὲ]
τοὺς φίλους τοῦ βασιλέως. vacat
5
συνθη̣[μά]τ̣ων.
λαμβανέτωσαν δὲ καὶ τὸ σ[ύνθημα — — — — — ὅταν(?)]
κλείωσι τὰς διόδους τοῦ φ̣[ραγμοῦ(?) — — — — — — —]
vacat
frg. B.col. I
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]-
1
γειν τοὺς μὴ φέρο̣ντάς τι τῶν καθηκόντων αὐτοῖς ὅ-
πλων ζημιούτωσαν κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα· κοτθύβου̣
ὀβολοὺς δύο, κώνου τὸ ἴσον, σαρίσης ὀβολοὺ<ς> τρεῖς, μα-
χαίρας τὸ ἴσον, κνημίδων ὀβολοὺς δύο, ἀσπίδος δρα-
5
χμήν. vacat
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἡγεμόνων τῶν τε δεδηλωμένων ὅπλων
τὸ διπλοῦν καὶ θώρακος δραχμὰς δύο, ἡμιθωρακίου δραχμήν.
λ̣α̣μ̣β̣α̣νέτωσαν δὲ τὴν ζημίαν οἱ γραμματεῖς καὶ οἱ ἀρχυ-
[πηρέτ]αι, παραδείξαντες τῶι βασιλεῖ τοὺς ἠθετηκότας.
10
εὐταξίας τῆς ἐκ τῶν ὠφελιῶν.
[ἐὰν] δὲ ὠφελίαν ἄγωσί τινες εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, ὑπαν-
τάτω[σαν οἱ] στρατηγοὶ τοὺς σπειράρχας καὶ τετράρχας
ἔχον[τες κα]ὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἡγεμόνας καὶ μετὰ τούτων τοὺς
ἱκανο̣[ὺς ὑπηρ]έτας πρὸ τῆς παρεμβολῆς τρεῖς σταδίους
15
[καὶ μ]ὴ [ἐπ]ι̣τ̣ρεπέτωσαν τοῖς διαρπάζουσιν. ἐὰν δέ τι γένη-
[ται τοιοῦ]τον ἀτάκτημα, τὰς διατιμήσεις ἀποτινέτωσαν οἱ
[στρατηγοὶ] κ̣α̣ὶ οἱ σπειράρχαι καὶ τετράρχαι καὶ οἱ ἀρχυπηρέται,
[ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι ὀφ(?)]ε̣ίλωσιν.
[․․c.8․․․]#⁷Τ#⁷Ν
20
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]σθωσαν τὴν ἐνδε-
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —] vacat
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —] τῶν τετράρχων
[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]ν ἐλευθε-
vacat
25
col. II.1
Σ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
ΟΜΟΙ̣[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
ΝΑΣΩ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
ἐὰν δέ τι[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]-
5
μένων ἢ ΟΣ̣[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
ἢ ὁ ἀεὶ πρὸς τ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — στα]-
θμοὺς καὶ τ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
εἰσπρασσ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]-
ΣΤΑΙΣ ἀναγκ̣[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — ἀ]-
10
τακτεῖν τῶν τ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — ὁ ἐπὶ]
τῆς αὐλῆς· ἐὰν [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
δωδεκαίωι {⁷ΔΩΔΕΚΑΙΩΝ}⁷ καὶ προστ̣[ίμου(?) — — — — — — — — τὸ]
αὐτὸ ποιείτω καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ τ̣[ῆς αὐλῆς — — — — — — — — — — — — — —].
περὶ τῶν [προνομῶν].
15
ἐὰν δέ τις ἐν τῆι τῶ%⁸⁰ν π[ολεμίων προνομὰς ποιήσηι, μήνυτρον(?) ἐ]-
παγγελῆναι καὶ δοθῆναι [— — — — — — — — — — — — — ἐὰν δέ τις(?)]
σῖτον ἐμπυρίσηι ἢ ἄμπελο[ν τέμηι ἢ ἄλλο τι ἀτά]-
κτημα ποιήσηι, μήνυτρον ἐ[παγγελέτωσαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ(?) — — — —]
καὶ τῶν εἰωθότων σποράδην διαβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὰς προνομὰς οὐκ ἐλάττους ἑξακισχιλίων.
So these 6,000 may, in fact be camp servants, it is difficult to see what plunder there is to be found in the mountainous foothills, maybe they were hoping to mug a lone boulder!and of those who were accustomed to proceed in loose formation ( lit.scatteredly) after forage not less than six thousand
Normally the left wing of the phalanx would enter the field of battle in column,immediately behind the right wing column, and would continue the deployment of the phalanx to the left. This would normally be 'seamless', so that the end result was a single solid phalanx. The column of march would be in 'syntagma' one behind the other, 16 x 16 in 'open/normal' order, called 'epagoge' [Aelian 36.2], and each 'syntagma' would deploy to the left of its predecessor. We might expect therefore that the 'head' of the left wing would be in immediate touch with the leftmost unit of the right wing, and would start deploying as soon as Philip 'closed up' the right wing, making room for them. Thus it is possible that a few of the left wing went with the right when they charged. This seems to be confirmed, as Paralus notes below, when Polybius says "part being in contact with the actual fighters, "
Polybios IS clear, he is describing the various states of disorder in the oncoming left, the right wing has advanced the troops behind are from the left, as are those still in marching order attempting to catch up with the melee; they will be from the lead units of the left whose officers have decided to get into the action without getting into line first (something like kids playing soccer, who crowd towards the ball and ignore formation) other units proceeded along the ridge in order to make room for those following before deploying themselves; it is clear that all the left were in marching formation; the various positions of the troops are down to local level decisions, Polybios is also clear that lack of direction was a root cause of the disorder.Again,I think Polybius is clear. "that part which was in the rear of the actual fighters" is the rear half of the right wing phalanx, which it will be recalled was 'double depth', some 16 deep in close order, and naturally the rear half/8 ranks "did not get into contact with the enemy" The left wing is just breasting the ridge - though the leading elements would have been in touch with the right wing, as described above.
Whoa there laddie!! I don't believe I said 'file insertion' above (might have way back earlier in the thread). When I say 'double down' I use it as a general term for either method of doubling the files. That is, either the rear eight inserting or the method you employ. Both result in the doubling of the number of files and the halving of the depth thus 'double down'.agesilaos wrote:Paralus, I have NEVER said that Philip's wing went from marching column to eight deep in fighting order by file insertion, rather they use the every even man moving to the left ie the method for doubling by depth reversed.
Touche! From your post before my last, but it was no splenetic outburst, as I have said I do not find this method to be the standard one, going against the general feeling that one wants the best fighters in the front ranks.You rely on Polybios not informing us that a major evolution of the phalanx had taken place. Two in fact: close order by file insertion and open order by reversing that.
Xenophon wrote:As to Macedonian sources, Polybius is unlikely to have interviewed any witnesses, writing as he was some two generations later. Being Achaean, he was somewhat anti-Macedonian, and so far as is known, never went there. That he knew little or nothing of the Macedonian viewpoint is shown by his comments on Andriscus’ rebellion [xxxvi.17.15], and by his treatment of Philip and his son Perseus as simple tyrants. He may have relied for his information on Macedon second-hand from Demetrias of Phalerum, whom elsewhere he dismisses as ‘a cheap explanation’. Hence his information is at best second-hand, and not from a contemporary Macedonian source. I rely here on Walbank’s commentaries.
I’m uncertain just which part of Walbank’s ‘Historical Commentary’ you were reading , but that dealing with Kynoskephalai is pretty clear. It hardly supports your view.Xenophon wrote:As to 'Macedonian sources' for Cynoscephalae, you may have noted I said “contemporary” Macedonian sources, for obviously it is POSSIBLE that Polybius consulted the Macedonian exiles of his own era, some 40 years later, for matters Macedonian, but he does not appear to have done from the evidence of his writings, as Walbank points out.