Postby Paralus » Sun May 18, 2014 1:32 am
“Having drunk from the fountain of historical infallibility, I find nothing to disagree with in anything I've posted. This is as it should be, debate without end. Amen.”
Way back when Paralus wrote this, I took it as a humorous ‘bon mot’, but to my dismay now realise it was a declartion of intent! I don’t intend to respond to all of Paralus’ post since it is almost entirely repetitious, and simply demonstrates that he does not seem able to distinguish hypothetical from real/practical in the 3 versions of the manual, which in turn led to incorrect postulations such as “32 deep in close order” which were patently not possible for a variety of reasons I won’t repeat. This despite the fact that earlier Paralus accepted that much of the Manual was hypothetical theory.
Paralus now surprises us by accepting "32 deep in close order" is wrong, and now postulates that Philip’s right wing charged 16 deep in close order – just as Polybius specifically says [ XVIII.30], and with which Agesilaos and I concurred.
HALLELUJAH! We are all agreed ..... which just leaves the vexed problem of how they got into that formation.{ see last few pages of this thread passim]
Paralus wrote Feb 8 above:
The constant refrain and 'root of all ridicule' aimed at my position is that Macedonian phalanx drill is a ‘system’ and that system excludes a formation eight deep being in anything other than ‘close order’. This is not correct....... [no need to repeat quotations of Aelian and asclepiodotus quoted previously]
I’m afraid it IS correct, in general and practical reality terms. As is apparent from reading holistically, it was intended that the phalanx function in one particular manner generally, viz operate 16 deep in ‘open/normal’ order 6 ft spacing of files) as a general rule both on the march ( usually in column of sub-units, though it could also march as an ‘end-on’ phalanx etc in specialist situations) and deploying onto the battlefield, the standard method being that the lead sub-unit took position on its chosen spot, and the succeeding units would then deploy successively to its left, forming a phalanx/line-of battle.
Again generally speaking this battle-line was tailored to the terrain, so as not to leave vulnerable flanks if at all possible, and often light troops and cavalry provided flank guards. The approach march, in phalanx, was also undertaken in ‘open/normal’ order. Close to the enemy line, an assault formation of ‘close order/pyknosis’ was formed, by halving the depth of the phalanx to 8 deep, which also doubled the number of men in each rank, so that half-files now stood on a 3 ft spacing. I don't know off-hand of even a single example of Macedonian files deployed for battle 8 deep in 'open order' in our historical sources, and again, such a formation is mentioned in none of the three versions of the Manual. Close order/pyknosis 8 deep was the standard ‘fighting formation’ for most purposes ( c.f. earlier Greek hoplite phalanxes, which also fought in 'close order' of half-files.) Thanks to the ‘side-on’ method of holding pikes two-handed, and their smaller ‘pelta’ shields, a further refinement ( attributed to Philip II ) was ‘synaspismos/locked shields’ whereby the phalanx halved depth once more to four deep, doubling the men in the ranks once more, with each file now occupying a mere cubit/18 inches of frontage ( which Peter Connolly demonstrated was quite feasible). Thus jammed together, the phalanx could not manoeuvre other than a slow shuffle forward, but the formation presented an all but impenetrable hedgehog of pikes for ( usually) defensive purposes . Note that throughout, the frontage remains the same, 10 stades/2,000 yards/1828 metres for a full 16,000 man phalanx. This was essential, and shortening or lengthening frontage was highly dangerous, as the manuals advise us.[ e.g how were flanking cavalry and light troops expected to cope with a concertina like expanding or contracting phalanx ?]
Indeed the one occasion we are told it was attempted through force of circumstance, Kynoskephalae, it ended in disaster. [ see Polybius commentary on the phalanx at Kynoskephalae XVII.31.12 and 32.5]. To return to their original formations, the reverse procedure was adopted, with the files reforming at ‘double’ depth,[4,8, and 16] and ‘double’ frontal intervals each time [1.5 ft. 3 ft and 6 ft].
Now in theory ( see Paralus’ quotes ), this closing up could also be done laterally – so that Paralus' phalanx maintains the depth of its files, but quarters its frontage from 2,000 yards ( over a mile!!) to 500 yards. The question is why anyone would want to form their ‘fighting formation’ in such a fashion, [unless advancing down a funnel !!]
Militarily it somewhat suicidally invited flank attacks, and indeed even our Roman authors (Arrian; Aelian; Asclepiodotus) advise against it
.......down to.........
“...Given that the phalanx had closed up by depth, the second part is not required. But I see now that the original source of both these quotes is claimed only to have included this closing to the right because he knew of Kynoskephalai:
Xenophon wrote:Furthermore, consider that Asclep XII.8 and Aelian XXXIII both specifically describe this closing up to the right manoeuvre and how it is performed, but many other possible drill manoeuvres are not described. The obvious reason why this particular move is included, but not other drill/formation possibilities, must be that the original author knew of just this manoeuvre being used by Philip at Kynoskephalae, uniquely as far as we know, and hence described how it was performed in detail.
Well, “other possible drill manoeuvres” are, in fact, described including closing to the left and both wings closing to the centre; none of which transpired at Kynoskephalai. No rational argument is offered for all of these going back to presumed knowledge of Kynoskephalai in the original source and I cannot see that one could reasonably be made.
That is not a reasonable argument – and I trust not deliberately disingenuous, and a wilful misinterpretation of my point? Once you have ‘closing up laterally to the right’ described, based on Kynoskephalae, where it was uniquely performed because of the terrain, and the fact of the surprise ‘encounter’ battle, then it is an obvious corollary for a manual writer to add ‘closing up to the left’ and ‘closing up to the centre’ performed in essentially the same way. What I meant by “Other possible drill manoeuvres” includes, for example, forming hollow square/rectangle for all round defence, for which ‘how to’ details are not given – though we know it occurred on the battlefield [ e.g. Gaugemela, Magnesia, Xenophon’s Anabasis]. These are only very briefly mentioned as march formations, not battlefield ones, and not in any detail. [Asclep XI.6; Aelian XXXVII.2; Arrian 29] Also we are told “
Many other formations are in use, not merely on the battlefield but also on the march...” [Asclep X.22 ] for which no details are given, yet ‘closing up laterally to the right’ is described in detail down to the necessary drill moves [Aelian XXXiii.1-2]. Why should this be so, if not because it is what occurred at Kynoskephalae?
“The truth of the matter is that what we don’t know mostly outweighs what we do. We are rarely treated to descriptions of phalanx evolutions in our sources as we are at Kynoskephalai (or Issos – see Arrian’s generalisation from the same source). When we are it is parlous practice to claim such is an exception or ‘unique’ and therefore that a description of the same movement described in the tacticians must go back to knowledge of said exceptional or unique battle.”
Whilst largely true, this is simply the fallacy of ‘ad ignorandium’ again. All battles have their unique chacteristics, yet they are fought on the same underlying principles, and in our sources hundreds of battles are described in greater or lesser detail. If Paralus truly believes what he says here, then he really doesn't understand ancient battle at all. If we do not have information of every ancient battle, yet we still have a large enough sample to be ‘statistically significant’ and from which we may infer or deduce those underlying principles and methods ( just as the compilers of the Manual did).
“The evidence admits more than the one view no matter Xenophon’s strident admonishments.”
Of course there are many possibilities, but only one is most probable/likely. That is why we have principles such as ‘Occam’s razor’ which states that among competing hypotheses, the one with the fewest assumptions should be selected. Other, more complicated solutions may possibly ultimately prove correct, but—in the absence of certainty—the fewer assumptions that are made, the better for probability.
“For the record my position is as follows:
Philip led his right to the ridge top in a marching column of ‘eights’ (that is, by taxis – Asklep 2.8; Ael 9.3). On reaching the ridge he deployed into line eight deep, ‘open’ order (by half files) to occupy the length of high ridge. As it became apparent his left would not be in position in time, he ordered his line to double its depth (to sixteen) and close to the right.”
Which should read “...my NEW position is as follows:”
Unfortunately this has as many problems as his old one. Why would Philip have chosen to deploy at ‘half depth’? He had no idea of what the Romans were doing in the fog, save in the most general way. Such a line occupied a frontage of 2,000- 2,500 yards, yet all the indications are that the battlefield was ‘cramped’, but Philip did know a Roman deployment would be only around 1,000 yards long.[ for the heavy infantry]
'Doubling dept'h has the same problem as before – the new 16 deep files would be 12 feet apart, only worse because now the line must close up twice as far, with the leftmost file marching around a mile [1,500-2,000 yards], very possibly under missile fire from the Roman lights. There was no time, or space for this, in reality, with the Romans a few hundred yards at most when the Macedonian lights were pushed back through their ‘open order’ phalanx. ( they would not have withdrawn if the Romans were not an ‘immediate threat’.)
I’m afraid Paralus’ new position also fails to meet the criteria....alas his knowledge and understanding of ancient military matters still falls short of a viable hypothesis.