Contingency plans

[Paralus]

The Marshals must have been used to co-operating throughout the campaign... Meleager's complaint that Perdikkas is seeking to rule through the Guardianship... I think it was very much a case of necessity forcing ad hoc agreements under the aegis of Perdikkas' de facto influence, the receipt of Alexander's ring and his chiliarchy.

Yes they will have been used to co-operation – even if it was forced in some cases. The situation in India (Alexander's near death) will have required some rather furious re-assessment of ambitions with the main objective to return the army to Babylon in one piece.

The death at Babylon will still have come as a shock. At this stage – on a necessarily distant reading of the politics at court – Craterus and Perdiccas were the senior marshals (the less effective but better embraced Hephaestion having preceded his mentor). Had both been in Babylon, it is likely that any power struggle will have devolved down to these individuals. Whether or not Craterus – on what we know of him – had the "political balls" for such a showdown is debatable. Craterus' popularity with the army will have ensured support for him though. This will not have been lost on Perdiccas.

Meleager – his own ambitions aside – with a rather inspired sense of perspicacity read Perdiccas well. In the time the gods left to him, Perdiccas did little but ensure his own position and manoeuvre the chess pieces for his "succession". In the end, this simply ensured the first Diadoch war. It is possible, had he set his towering ambitions aside, he may have united the disparate forces under "the kings". Craterus – who deferred to the senior man and Regent, Antipater – may well have brought the rank and file to support the Argaed house (or what was left of it). This, though, seems never to have been Perdiccas' aim. His attempted marriage to Alexander's sister said all there is to say. Not least to Antipater and Antigonus; the latter, of course, fearfully upset that his own rightful place as King of Asia was slipping away.

Necessity did indeed force "ad-hoc" agreements. Those agreements were only ever made when one or more of the Diadoch chess pieces became too powerful. The history of the fifty year period after Alexander is replete with such self serving and much renounced and re-drawn agreements. Given the way Ptolemy played the contented Egyptian ruler whilst accreting as much of the empire and mainland Greece to his rule as he reasonably could (all the while proclaiming the "freedom of the Greeks") made him – for a short time – the most powerful chess piece on the board (a situation that would change utterly after Ipsus). He may have carried Philip's genes after all!

Such a marvellous period. Such a damned shame that Professor Bosworth has set aside his history of the Diadoch period so as to finish off volume three of his Arrian commentary. Perhaps the gods will grant him the time to get 'round to it and me the time to read it.

[Paralus]

... that there was no concerted plot or contingency plan can be shown by the disparate plans offered by the various nobles ...

And that too is true; in as far as it goes. The historical tradition we have of the period really devolves down to Arrian (the fragmentary "Successors") and Hieronymus. We may as well say Ptolemy and Antigonus (or the Antigonids – assertions of Hieronymus' reticence to upset Ptolemy, safely ensconced in the Antigonid embrace, aside). Either way, it is hardly likely to implicate any one or more of the marshals in Alexander's death – unless he resided far from court in Macedonia.

There is no concrete evidence of a plot to kill Alexander by one or more of his marshals. That is a case that cannot be made with any certainty. It is my own opinion that few of those marshals harboured any pothos for yet another campaign in Arabia and ever further. Indeed, the rather rude enthusiasm of the army's embrace of Perdiccas' recision of the "last plans" would indicate that it too had had quite enough, thank you. Payment in full and a nice extended, well deserved furlough in Babylon, thank you King and commander!

Much is made of the Opis "rebellion" and the subsequent "reconciliation". This is a side show. The army was little interested in what might yet become another India. Resentment was rife and the constant campaigning had more than taken its toll. The King's reply – retire them – was not exactly the answer required; especially when the corollary was replacement by recently defeated "barbarians".

This army – given its gratuities and the well deserved rest and enjoyment of conquest it so richly deserved – may well have followed its king to the Pillars of Hercules. Its King though, as per usual, was not about to wait. Conquest and erstwhile free peoples wait for no man and Alexander was no man.

That dissatisfaction and a want for rest and a period of consolidation and enjoyment of the spoils of empire will not have been limited to the rank and file. Some of those marshals will have felt it just as keenly, if not more so. Whether any felt it enough to contemplate regicide is another thing entirely.

There was a bloke in Pella who was – as far as he was concerned – going nowhere near Babylon.

[alejandro]

The Marshals must have been used to co-operating throughout the campaign; that there was no concerted plot or contingency plan can be shown by the disparate plans offered by the various nobles (it is here that Ptolemy suggests Eumenes later suggestion - though only in Curtius, I think) and also Meleager's complaint that Perdikkas is seeking to rule through the Guardianship.

Hi Agesilaos,

I don’t agree with this statement

The basic agreement was respected by all of them: the empire was to be ruled by a junta of marshals, each one in charge of a part of the empire.

The disagreement was about the primacy among them, which meant the “guardianship” of the kings.

From the outset Perdikkas’ intentions were clear, yes, but he was indeed the most senior marshal among those in Babylon. True, the agreement would very likely have been challenged by Krateros, Antipatros and Antigonos, had they been there as well, but they weren’t (the same could have been said of Hephaistion). This, however, only supports the idea of a temporary agreement among those in Babylon.

Going back to the nobles' "disparate plans", Meleager’s plot was a hopeless attempt since all the top officers were against him, and his only result was to add Arrhidaios as co-king. Even Nearchos’ transparent attempt at forwarding his relative and Alexander’s son Herakles was engineered to gain the “pole position”. The others were of minor importance (like delaying the decision on Roxane's child until it was born).

In summary, the key agreement (decentralization) was accepted, but the matter of primacy (ie, the regency, or guardianship of the kings) was not, and that was the topic that led to disparate plans.

At least, that is how I see it.

All the best,
Alejandro

[alejandro]

Dear Agesilaos and Paralus

I tend to agree with your comments, but I think you are reading too much in mine. As I said in a previous post, what Bosworth calls the “transition period” is the time from Alexander’s death to Perdikkas’ rejection of Antipatros’ daughter in favour of Kleopatra, that is, roughly a year. During that period, it is I guess rather obvious that no big problem arose (Meleager’s “coup attempt” only lasted a week, and all the marshals sided on the same team). True, it was more like “the calm before the shark attack”, as Amyntoros rightly put it, than an alliance, but still the outcome was the same: no major problems.

The next point is whether this was the result of a disguised coup d’etat, quick “thinking on your feet” or just plain luck. The last one is rather unlikely, and Bosworth analysis of the civil wars that followed the death of previous Macedonian kings is a compelling case against it. The first one we all agree is a far-fetched option, and Bosworth’s choice of it as the only alternative to the “luck” scenario ignores a bunch of intermediate cases.

Still, among the intermediate cases there are several shades of grey. From what I gather (I may well be wrong, but this is my impression), you two and Amyntoros seem to think that the marshals waited till Alexander died, and then feverishly engaged in negotiations that yielded ad hoc agreements. My idea is that they were at least aware of the key issues they should address (soldiers’ morale, control over the empire, interim administration and decision-making), and were able to leave their undoubtedly present personal ambitions aside for the sake of continuity, until the waters settle and they reassess the situation and their possible paths of action. The reason that they managed to “take a long term view” (“see the larger picture” =) is that they were able officers, but also that they had some previous experience in similar matters, like the Mallian town incident.

Again, I don’t mean that they were able to set up proper contingency “plans”, just that they agreed on some basic goals everyone would be interested in achieving (the above mentioned ones: keeping the troops and the empire together, run the empire until a more permanent agreement is reached, etc).

In the end, they all wanted to grab a piece of power (some a bigger, others a smaller one), but that didn’t cloud their minds, and their “wait and see” agreement was what rational and capable statesmen would have done at the time.

All the best,
Alejandro