cavalry organisation

[agesilaos]

In both Marsden and Devine when they discuss the length of the Macedonian battleline at Gaugamela they assume that the whole of a cavalry ile formed up in a wedge. Thus, Devine

A cavalry wedge of 225 horsemen would be fifteen ranks deep with twenty-nine horsemen in the last and longest rank.

Or Marsden,

The Royal Squadron occupied a triangle of this size – 48 by 47 yds
(diagram appendix II)

Both have read their Polybios and tactical manuals but have failed to note that Polybios plainly states that cavalry are useless in formations deeper than eight rf.

If you work out the number of men in a solid wedge whose longest file is eight you arrive at a unit of sixty-four ; this would mean each ‘line’ ilai consisted of four of these units and the Agema of five; coincidentally the light cavalry three.

Sixty-four is also great number for doubling and figures in the manuals.

However, just like skinning cats there is more than one way to form a wedge – Swedish cavalry of the Great Northern War lined up with each trooper’s knee behind his neighbours, right for those left of centre left for those on the right, this produced a sweeping wedge with a depth of two or three. This precise arrangement would be impractical for troopers with no stirrups and rudimentary saddles but this type of wedge is feasible.

Since the Tacticians do describe a solid triangular edge I am inclined to favour the sixty-four man solution. This also has the benefit of making the introduction of lochoi intelligible; it merely meant the introduction of another officer with authority over two of these sub-units rather than an occasional wedge forming at half strength, which, given that the emphasis was always on maintaining your station with respect to your neighbours, does not make sense.

[Paralus]

In both Marsden and Devine when they discuss the length of the Macedonian battleline at Gaugamela they assume that the whole of a cavalry ile formed up in a wedge. Thus, Devine

A cavalry wedge of 225 horsemen would be fifteen ranks deep with twenty-nine horsemen in the last and longest rank.

Or Marsden,

The Royal Squadron occupied a triangle of this size – 48 by 47 yds .

The interminable debate on the indeterminable number of horse per ilai. The various solutions have all been used to define the unit numbers of the Companion cavalry of the invasion army. Much of it reads like the theory of Macedonian military relativity.

Marsden and Devine proceed from a false premise: when a "unit" is mentioned it is always a whole tactical entity. Thus at Gaugamela the Royal Ilai must be (insert your number here) strong and in one whole tactical formation. Devine continues to apply this logic to early Hellenistic formations (Paraetecene, Gabiene and Gaza). Unlike the "Alexander" battles, we have hard information for these formations.

At Paraetecene in 317 Diodorus (19.28.3-4) describes Eumenes' right thus: "as an advance-guard for them two troops of Eumenes' slaves, each composed of fifty mounted men, while at an angle beyond the end of the wing and guarding it were four troops, in which there were two hundred selected horsemen." The ilai here are all "fifty" men and the rendition of "paides" as "slaves" is misleading: these will be "satrapal boys". The "them" referred to are "the squadron of Peucestes and Antigenes, which contained three hundred horsemen arranged in a single unit" as well as "Eumenes' squadron with the same number of horsemen". "Squadron" is a translation of the Greek agema which might be better left in the original.

The only reason the qualification "in a single unit" is used is to indicate that the agemata of Peucestes and Antignenes are here deployed together: two lots of 150 representing three ilai. Antigonus, too, has this: "At the outer end of the wing was the squadron (agema) of three hundred horsemen with whom Antigonus himself was entering the battle. As an advance guard for these there were three troops from his own slaves" Thus Antigonus has six ilai of 50.

These dispositions are made even clearer at Gaza in 312 (19.82.1-2):

On the left wing, where he himself was going to take part in the battle, he placed first the two hundred selected horsemen of his guard, among whom were all his other friends and, in particular, Pithon, who had campaigned with Alexander and had been made by Antigonus co-general and partner in the whole undertaking. As an advanced guard he drew up three troops of cavalry and the same number as guards on the flank, and in addition to these and stationed separately outside the wing, three troops of Tarentines; thus those that were drawn up about his person amounted to five hundred horsemen armed with the xyston and one hundred Tarentines.

Diodorus even does the mathematics of Macedonian military relativity for us. Given the ancient (as well as modern) proclivity for rounding, these ilai were certainly 49 in wedge and they are consistent when numbers are given.

Alexander's "Royal squadron" was no different to the Diadoch agemata. Indeed, this term is used of the Royal Squadron in Alexander's latter years. Aside from the final attack formation at Gaugamela (which was "like a wedge") which was not cavalry only (it included the infantry phalanx), there's no compelling reason to assume this agema was an entire wedge in the original battle line up rather than smaller such units grouped.

At Gaza Ptolemy leads his cavalry of the right (3,000) in a "right hook" at Demetrius' stacked left. Diodorus (19.83.4-5) describes this:

But after a little, when Ptolemy and Seleucus had ridden around the wing and charged upon them more heavily with cavalry drawn up in depth, there was severe fighting because of the zeal of both sides. In the first charge, indeed, the fighting was with spears, most of which were shattered, and many of the antagonists were wounded; then, rallying again, the men rushed into battle at sword's point

This hardly occurred in thin, deep column. Rather this charge was delivered in stacked wedges which will have wheeled at the Antigonid left wing. It then "rallied" and charged in order again until the fight became a melee. Whilst it can be dangerous to ascribe to Alexander the practices of his successors, nevertheless, it is obvious that they aped the former king in many respects. It is most unlikely that they remade or altered the military practice basics in such a short time.

A 49 man solution?

[agesilaos]

Seems you agree in principal - of course the difference between a 49 man wedge and a 64 man one is merely the final rank of fifteen, the diadochoi may have thought it better use of their more limited Macedonian manpower, leading as it does to a 25% increase in strike units.

Alexander's ilai were clearly larger entities of roughly 215 men but that these need not be tactically discreet units may be demonstrated by analogy with British Regiments, in any Orbat the regiments will be listed with their colonels but the manouvre unit was the company which will only be found listed in Unit Histories or very anal research!

As regards the Diadochoi not innovating, I wonder if that is not an argument in favour of seeing the Thessalians as still light cavalry in the fourth century.

A 49 man solution? Sounds like a very gay Sherlock Holmes! (OK, Not as gay as 64 men)

Seasons Greetings

[chris_taylor]

I'm not a historian and know almost nothing about military tactics, but it seems to me we're dissecting the wrong problem.

AIUI, the only facts that are undisputed are:

* around 1800 Royal Cavalry
* split into 8 ilia, each commanded by an officer
* split into subunits

How did he split them?

Well, how would a Walmart manager who has 1800 staff to run 8 warehouses go about it?

"225 makes a nice average, but there's going to be sickness. A few guys more or less on each site won't make a difference, but no warehouse must drop below 190, because then it can't function at all. Except for Warehouse B, which always needs at least 210 because thats where the emergency supplies are kept. And if one of my deputies gets sick and another has to take over his team, then the total team size can't be bigger than 50, or else my instructions won't get through to everyone fast enough.

In other words: he's working on a minimum/ maximum *range*, dictated by function, safety and communication.

So to me, the real question is: what were the minimum and maximum limits for ilia and its subunits that struck the balance between these competing requirements - and within which no major reorganization would be necessary?

Chris.

[Paralus]

So to me, the real question is: what were the minimum and maximum limits for ilia and its subunits that struck the balance between these competing requirements - and within which no major reorganization would be necessary?

Chris.

The numbers posited are always "paper" strengths - like the phalanx taxeis. They will have varied according to depredations and deployment exigencies (scouting, escort work or battle line for example). The agema or "Royal Ile" will always have been kept up to strength one imagines (as with the hypaspists and its agema). The "wedge" is the oft noted formation and we have notations of light cavalry ("Tarentines") in "troops" (ilai) of likely 36 (Gaza: three troops making "100") and others of "50" (or 49 as above). Perhpas the smallest individual and useful unit was 36. Alexander may have begun with 64 as Agesilaos (and others) suggest. This might be the largest individual practical tactical unit?

Seems you agree in principal - of course the difference between a 49 man wedge and a 64 man one is merely the final rank of fifteen, the diadochoi may have thought it better use of their more limited Macedonian manpower, leading as it does to a 25% increase in strike units.
As regards the Diadochoi not innovating, I wonder if that is not an argument in favour of seeing the Thessalians as still light cavalry in the fourth century.

Seasons greetings indeed!

The other possibility which strongly raises its hand is that 49 became the smallest tactical unit of the reorganised cavalry towards the end of Alexander's reign. This would mean that the Diadochoi simply continued the current Alexandrian organisation into their own cavalry forces. Thus they all possess an agema - which remains so named after 306 - and their own hypaspists just like their dead conqueror's model. Polybios, writing of Antigonid and Achaean practice, names a tactical unit below the Ile (can't remember it now and, as I'm off for a NY's drink, won't look it up!). It is quite possible that, in the remodeled "Companion" cavalry, ile became the term for the smallest tactical unit (hence the preponderance of such numbered at "50" after his death).

On the Thessalians, I don't know they were ever "light" cavalry - certainly not in tactical terms. Whilst they aren't always well described in action (everything focuses on the heroic conqueror king), it is reasonably clear that they perform an extremely similar tactical task to the Companions. Philip II took to Crocus Field with (from memory) 2,000 Thessalian cavalry. He will have used them similarly. Parmenion has what is clearly his own 'agema' - "Pharsalian horsemen, who were both the best and most numerous squadron of the Thessalian cavalry" as Arrian puts it. I imagine these were xystophoproi.

The fourth century might bear some looking into but my recollection is the Antigonids used them in the same tactical fashion: "heavy" cavalry.

[agesilaos]

Paralus, maybe some Shiraz maths there! The Antigonids are Third century BC, in the fifth Thessallians are clearly light cavalry skirmishing with javelins, they appear on Attic black-figure vases in petasoi; greek sombreroes.(ish). Having said that, it could well be that Alexander reduced the size of the constituent units, Gedrosia had killed more than camp-followers and may have reduced the Companions by five sevenths; prior to the march there had been seven line hipparchiai but in the admittedly problematic list of grievances at Opis we find reference to the FIFTH hipparchy being mainly foreign.

Chris your feelings seem sound but it makes a world of difference whether you divide the ilai into smaller units, you will have your Marsden by the end of the week so you'll be able to judge for yourself just how these fiddly points have significant effects; just for the record i have no cavalry experience but have read widely of more modern experienced people eg Napoleonic hussars and 17th C AD manuals; but I am still only working theoretically.

[Paralus]

Paralus, maybe some Shiraz maths there! The Antigonids are Third century BC, in the fifth Thessallians are clearly light cavalry skirmishing with javelins, they appear on Attic black-figure vases in petasoi; greek sombreroes.(ish).

Can't even use the shiraz as a reason: hadn't had any!

Clearly I meant foruth and third with the third century bearing some looking into. Oh dear...

In any case I think that the Thessalians in the fourth century were tactically a "heavy" cavalry. This appears their purpose at Crocus Field in an admittedly sparse description by Diodorus (16.35.4-5):

Philip, having persuaded the Thessalians to prosecute the war in common, gathered them all together, numbering more than twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse. A severe battle took place and since the Thessalian cavalry were superior in numbers and valour, Philip won.

It is interesting that the Macedonian cavalry aren't mentioned. Given the soldier "revolt" against Philip (after two defeats the previous year) perhaps his hetairoi weren't terribly persuaded to follow?!

As for Thessalian cavalry during the third century, evidence is scant. They would still be "heavy" though as it is Echectrates, the Thessalian who'd seen service under the Antigonids, who is recruited and put in charge of the training of the Ptolemaic "Greek" and mercenary cavalry prior to Raphia. This arm delivers the victorius charge of the Ptolemaic right

Having said that, it could well be that Alexander reduced the size of the constituent units, Gedrosia had killed more than camp-followers and may have reduced the Companions by five sevenths; prior to the march there had been seven line hipparchiai but in the admittedly problematic list of grievances at Opis we find reference to the FIFTH hipparchy being mainly foreign.

I must re-read the information on the reforming of the cavalry into hipparchies resulting in "Hephaestion's hipparchy" etc. Seems this was a more decimal system (per Persian practice) and might suit a smaller 50 man ile (or 49 wedge).

[agesilaos]

I think the lack of mention of the Macedonians is merely an artefact of Diodoros' poor rationalisation of his sources; he notesthe Thessallian accretion to the macedonian cause and then gives the numbers for the combined force.

[Paralus]

Having said that, it could well be that Alexander reduced the size of the constituent units, Gedrosia had killed more than camp-followers and may have reduced the Companions by five sevenths; prior to the march there had been seven line hipparchiai but in the admittedly problematic list of grievances at Opis we find reference to the FIFTH hipparchy being mainly foreign.

They were disgusted that the Bactrian, Sogdianian, Arachotian, Zarangian, Arian, and Parthian horsemen, as well as the Persian horsemen called the Evacae, had been distributed among the squadrons (ἵππον τὴν ἑταιρικὴν - Companion cavalry) of the Companion cavalry as many of them at least as were seen to excel in reputation, fineness of stature, or any other good quality; and a fifth cavalry hipparchy (ἱππαρχία) added in addition to these, not entirely barbarian (but partially), for when the entire cavalry was expanded some barbarians were assigned to it.

So the much discussed Anabasis 7.6.2-4. The italics are the translation of Brian Bosworth (Alexander and the Iranians). The entire passage, as Bosworth notes, says nothing about the number of hipparchies in the cavalry at the time of the grievance airing. To quote the good man:

Besides these Iranians assigned to the companion cavalry there was a fifth hipparchy which was not entirely barbarian. The phrase implies clearly that there were four hipparchies consisting wholly of Iranian cavalry and a fifth which was only partially so.

Bosworth goes on to detail that the grievances are listed in ascending order of "outrage" in the Macedonians' view. There are Iranians in separate hipparchies in the Companion cavalry; there is a hipparchy in which Macedonians suffer the indignity of serving with Iranians and finally the outrage of Persian grandees in the agema armed with the Macedonian spear (likely the cavalry xyston). With all this I'd tend to agree and it would appear that the "left over" Iranians were bracketed with Macedonians in this hipparchy.

You are likely quite correct about the depredations of the disastrous hubris of the Gedrosian crossing. To those Macedonian hipparchies of the Companion cavalry which survived, Alexander seems to have added hipparchies of Iranian cavalry. This would fill out the cavalry until the ordered reinforcements from Antipater arrived just as the epigoni would fill out his depleted phalanx. Those Persian nobles in the agema were re-armed with the xyston but, of the separate hipparchies of Iranians no such note is made. Presumably they continued to use their traditional weapons and would possibly be replaced (tactically likely) by Macedonians when they arrived?

[agesilaos]

Whilst I have the greatest respect for old ABB I think he goes too far here;

The phrase implies clearly that there were four hipparchies consisting wholly of Iranian cavalry and a fifth which was only partially so.

All it implies is what it says - the fifth hipparchy was not wholly barbarian - the natural next step is that it was mainly barbarian not that the previous four were wholly barbarian.

As usual we have a number of pieces from different jigsaws with no box lid and few edges; the data will support many hypotheses.

Here is one; during the Sogdian campaign Alexander found that he needed more cavalry and called up various barbarian subjects. Finding them useful he integrated them into his cavalry organisation by brigading a barbarian unit with a Macedonian hipparchy (Griffiths suggested this first, I think). Evidence? There are listed, VII 13, as crossing the Hydaspes with Alexander three hipparchies (Hephaistion, Perdikkas and Demetrios) and three barbarian contingents Bactrian, Sogdian and Scythian, the horse archers are a separate command in all the battles they take part in. At VII 6 3 seven barbarian nations are listed corresponding to the seven hipparchies. The Macedonian cavalry are described as throwing javelins and Alexander

ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας παρήγαγε τό τε ἄγημα τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἱππαρχιῶν τοὺς κρατίστους

he deployed on the right wing the cavalry agema and the best of the other hipparchies

Not conclusive but suggestive.

After Gedrosia the best of the barbarians, as judged during the indian campaign, were fully integrated into the Macedonian units in a minority in hipparchies one to four but the majority in the fifth. Still javelin-armed, otherwise the arming of the agemata with xystons would not have been a separate cause for grievance.

[Paralus]

As usual we have a number of pieces from different jigsaws with no box lid and few edges; the data will support many hypotheses.

Let there be no doubt of that. Here we are, something more than eighteen hundred years after the author's pen marks, arguing over his version of events already four centuries old. This is not to mention the transmission of the text. Still, I do think that's all we have to work with and I reckon Arrian is mostly comprehensible if not technically correct. His is a "Boys' Own" narrative - with the basileus boy as centre - before anything else.

There are listed, VII 13, as crossing the Hydaspes with Alexander three hipparchies (Hephaistion, Perdikkas and Demetrios) and three barbarian contingents Bactrian, Sogdian and Scythian, the horse archers are a separate command in all the battles they take part in [...]

ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας παρήγαγε τό τε ἄγημα τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἱππαρχιῶν τοὺς κρατίστους

he deployed on the right wing the cavalry agema and the best of the other hipparchies

Not conclusive but suggestive.

Arr.5.12.2:
He then picked the agema of the Companions, as well as the cavalry regiments of Hephaestion, Perdiccas, and Demetrius, the cavalry from Bactria, Sogdiana, and Scythia, and the Daan horse-archers; and from the phalanx of infantry the shield-bearing guards, the brigades of Clitus and Coenus, with the archers and Agrianians

So, of the Companion cavalry, Alexander took the agema (the former royal ile) and the regiments so noted. As well, he also took the barbarian cavalry of the Bactria, Sogdiana and Scythia. These are separate entities in the same fashion as the Daan horse archers. Whilst Arrian later writes that Alexander took "the agema, and the best of the other hippachies" this does not mean that the above named barbarians were part of or not part of those hipparchies. More likely is that he chose the best of the Comapanion hipparchies as these were the xyston armed troops that had so well served him to date (as opposed to javelin armed native levies or hipparchies). The Barbarians are never named in the battle and it is Macedonian troops who are so (Demetrious and the left out hipparchy of Coenus being sent to the left).

That the barbarian cavalry are separate from the Macedonians - and not part of the Companion cavalry at this date - is made plain by Arrian when he gives the casualties:

Of Alexander’s forces, about 8o of the 6,ooo foot-soldiers who were engaged in the first attack were killed,; 10 of the horse-archers, who were also the first to engage in the action; about 20 of the Companion cavalry, and about 200 of the other horsemen fell.

The Daan are named as they were signally described as the first in action at battle's commencement and Arrian notes this again here. The Companion cavalry dead are named and "the other horsemen", that is not horsemen of the Comapnion cavalry, are clearly the Bactrians, Sogdians and Scythians.

After Gedrosia the best of the barbarians, as judged during the indian campaign, were fully integrated into the Macedonian units in a minority in hipparchies one to four but the majority in the fifth. Still javelin-armed, otherwise the arming of the agemata with xystons would not have been a separate cause for grievance.

Bosworth argues that the key word is καταλοχισθέντες. To quote the Professor:

In its technical sense it notes the division of an amphorous body of troops into files or lochoi, but it is most often used in the most general sense of καταλοχίζω. What it does not mean is assignment of extra troops to existing units.

I'd still tend to agree with Bosworth that the major angst was the fact that Macedonians found themeselves sharing a hipparchy with the barbarians. That they were still armed with javelins as opposed to the xyston furthers this view. On purely tactical grounds it would compare to brigading "Tarentines" and xystophoroi together into one tactical unit. It appears that these barbarians were "left overs" sorted into a hippacrchy with remaining Macedonians.

In any case there was no "integration" before the return to the west when the Macedonians vented their fury at the changes.

[agesilaos]

Absolutely the integration comes after Gedrosia and that is what katalochisthentes means here, 'assigned to the same lochos' which here is the cavalry lochos rather than the infantry 'file'. Basically I agree with A B, he must be relieved to know that! It is this closer integration that is galling, like drafting slave soldiers into a confederate regiment, or allowing women into the Long Room at Lord's!

Yes the barbarian cavalry only show up in the casualty figures and since they suffered ten times the Macedonian losses they must have been well engaged though with whom is a mystery. I don't seek to imply they were mixed in at lochos level at the Hydaspes merely attached to a hipparchy for administrative reasons or for tactical flexibility, it is useful when pursuing a fugitive enemy to have missile capability. Also we should say 'A fifth hipparchy', the Macedonians seem to have named their units for their commander's rather than assigning them numbers. That makes it more likely that we are talking about an establishment of only five hipparchies.

[chris_taylor]

[quote="Paralus"] You are likely quite correct about the depredations of the disastrous hubris of the Gedrosian crossing."

Researching for our Gaugamela project, I came across an interesting article on the Gedrosia crossing in Donald Engels "Alexander and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army".

Engels argues that Gedrosia was the end result of a chain of events that ultimately made the decision to cross the desert unavoidable. It's well worth reading. No need to resort to hubris, pothos or megalomania to explain it. Just the unescapable laws of logistics.

It turns Gedrosia into a feat of endurance and generalship that rivals anything he had done up to then.

Chris.

[Paralus]

Engels argues that Gedrosia was the end result of a chain of events that ultimately made the decision to cross the desert unavoidable. It's well worth reading. No need to resort to hubris, pothos or megalomania to explain it. Just the unescapable laws of logistics.

It turns Gedrosia into a feat of endurance and generalship that rivals anything he had done up to then.

Chris.

Engels is very good. Just as Bosworth is very good. Neither are always correct.

Been a while, but, if I recall Engels argues that Craterus was sent by the one route for had the entire army gone that route it will have revisited country already deprived of provisions (given Alexander's continued push south necessitating a return via his own route in that direction)?

The rude fact of the matter is that the conqueror, frustrated by his veteran troops at the Hyphasis, decided to - ostensibly - turn back. Instead he turned south in a totally deliberate move to continue doing what he did best: engage and conquer. Had he meant to actually turn back he could easily have done so. He did not. He might also have followed Craterus' column west. He did not.

The reasons why he did not turn back - as he supposedly acquiesced to his troops at the Hyphasis - I leave to you Chris. My view? Like the drunk at the bar: "should I go or have another?" At this stage craters of wine and another people yet to submit were one and the same.

[agesilaos]

One other thing Engels gets wrong is that he thinks Alexander intended the fleet to supply the army but its delay, due to contrary winds, proved disastrous; in fact it was the army that was to dig wells and leave suppliy dumps for the fleet. Still an important book, though.