Alexander's remains

[Paralus]

Ancient armies were quite capable of 'sprinting' 40-50 miles/64-80 km per day, for several consecutive days when necessary - even faster if un-encumbered (latin; expeditos, Greek; kouphos) [...] For a Hellenistic example, consider the march prior to the battle of Pisidia 320 BC. Antigonos Monophthalmos marched to this battle against Alketas with an army of about 47,000 for seven consecutive days, at around 40 miles a day.

Indeed. Antigonus was responsible for quite a few of these force-marches al la Alexander. He marched on Cyzicus in similar circumstances and set out for Cilcia, after Eumenes, in exactly the same fashion. In that latter example we might another word to Xenophon's lexicon above (Diod.18.73.1):

For this end he selected from his entire army twenty thousand lightly equipped infantry (εὐζώνους πεζοὺς) and four thousand cavalry and set out for Cilicia...

This is similar to the force (the best from all his army, twenty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry) which he "flew" to Cyzicus with. I agree with Bosworth that here euzonos means "unencumbered" and equipped for the march. It is just as likely that this was how the force which marched on Cyzicus was equipped. I doubt Antigonus proposed to march on Eumenes - in Cilicia with mercenaries and the Argyraspids - with an army of slingers and bowmen and the like. Antigonus would force his army to march on Gabiene in a similar fashion (iron rations, et al).

... I found Anson's refutation of Bosworth's defence of the High Chronology, it is quite good but still frayed around the edges, he forgets the rest days without which every horse and mule would starve! I'll mail you the article....

Yes, I have read Anson's paper. His defence of the low - for this period - is on the money. The two chronologies overlap for the period winter 320/19 to spring 318. Diodorus, even though writing "chronology free" where archons and Olympiads disappear south for the winter, clearly places the decision to fight in Asia first as taken by Perdiccas as he goes into winter quarters (321/20). Anson's rationale for the "hijacking" of the cortege over this winter is likely correct and this, when it becomes known to Perdiccas, makes him "even more" (ἔτι μᾶλλον) determined to replace the satrap of Egypt. Although it is generally viewed that Polemon was sent to retrieve the cortege, nothing explicitly states that. I think it more likely he was sent to ensure its possession by Perdiccas. Ptolemy's "army" reduced Polemon to harrassment and hindering. Polemon's "associates" are sent back to Perdiccas where they report the alliances of Ptolemy with the Cypriot "princes". Another reason to deal with Ptolemy first and then Macedonia.

Notions that Ptolemy, the "loving half brother", stole the corpse "in order into keep faith with his dead king" are romantic naivety. Pausanias (1.6.3) records the tensions between Ptolemy and Perdiccas ( Ptolemy "killed Cleomenes, whom Alexander had appointed satrap of that country, considering him a friend of Perdiccas, and therefore not faithful to himself"). Diodorus tells us that Perdiccas viewed "with suspicion Ptolemy's increase in power" (18.29.1). Justin (13.6.18-20), likely working from the same source, summarises:

Ptolemy, by his wise exertions in Egypt, was acquiring great power; he had secured the favour of the Egyptians by his extraordinary prudence; he had attached the neighbouring princes by acts of kindness and courtesy; he had extended the boundaries of his kingdom by getting possession of the city Cyrene, and was grown so great that he did not fear his enemies so much as he was feared by them.

These things did not all occur over the winter 321/20. The "princes" will be the Cypriot Kings. By the time Perdiccas had decided to settle with Ptolemy, the latter had allied himself with Antipater, murdered Cleomenes and, far from "keeping faith with his dead king", "began to collect mercenaries and to form an army" (Diod.18.14.1) in outright defiance of his dead king's express orders for satrapal mercenary armies to be disbanded. Ptolemy had ignored Perdiccas' authority in the alliances he'd made, his annexation of Cyrene and in raising a mercenary army. The theft of the corpse simply reinforced a strategic decision already taken.

Diodorus notes that having brought the corpse to Egypt that "men, because of his (Ptolemy's) graciousness and nobility of heart, came together eagerly from all sides to Alexandria and gladly enrolled for the campaign, although the army of the kings was about to fight against that of Ptolemy; and, even though the risks were manifest and great, yet all of them willingly took upon themselves at their personal risk the preservation of Ptolemy's safety". "Keeping faith with his king" seems not have hurt Ptolemy's recruitment drive one whit.

In any case, as soon as the season allows, Perdiccas commences the campaign. First order of business is Cilicia, the replacement of Archon and the neutering of Ptolemy's Cypriot flanking move. He then proceeds to Egypt via Dmascus. There is broad agreement in the sources on this:

Just. 13.6.10-16
Perdiccas, as the aspect of affairs was unfavourable, called Arrhidaeus, and Alexander the Great's son, then in Cappadocia (the charge of both of whom had been committed to him), to a consultation concerning the management of the war. 11 Some were of opinion that it should be transferred to Macedonia, to the very head and metropolis of the kingdom, 12 where Olympias, the mother of Alexander, was, who would be no small support to their party, while the good will of their countrymen would be with them, from respect to the names of Alexander and Philippus; 13 but it seemed more to the purpose to begin with Egypt, lest, while they were gone into Macedonia, Asia should be seized by Ptolemaeus. 14 Paphlagonia, Caria, Lycia, and Phrygia were assigned to Eumenes, in addition to the provinces which he had already received; 15 and he was directed to wait in those parts for Craterus and Antipater. Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas, and Neoptolemus were appointed to support him with their forces. 16 The command of the fleet was given to Cleitus. Cilicia, being taken from Philotas, was given to Philoxenus. Perdiccas himself set out for Egypt with a large army.

Arr. Succ (Vatican palimpsest)
He was even more determined to make an attack on Egypt, in order to remove Ptolemaeus from power, to set up one of his friends as governor of Egypt, and to recover the body of Alexander. When he arrived with his army in Cilicia with this intention, because he knew that Philotas, the satrap of the country, was a friend of Craterus, he deprived Philotas of his command and set up Philoxenus, an undistinguished Macedonian, as governor in his place ... Sending to Babylon ... Docimus with the leading Macedonians, he appointed him to be satrap of Babylonia [...] Perdiccas gathered triremes from Phoenicia for an expedition from Cilicia over to Marium, and prepared many merchant ships . He put about 800 mercenaries on the ships, and about 500 cavalrymen. He appointed Sosigenes of Rhodes to be admiral, Medius of Thessaly to be leader of the mercenaries, Amyntas to be leader of the cavalry, and Aristonous the bodyguard of Alexander to be general of the entire force ...

So Perdiccas moves as soon as possible in the season and finds himself in Egypt likely in May/June. The Babylonian Chronicle of the Successors and the Marmor Parium both agree this was May/June of 320. Pediccas, with the army of the kings as well as those kings, has had some three to four months to make his way south to do battle with the satrap of Egypt and his appointment with death. To suggest that this notation in the Babylonian Chronicle of the Successors is of a mere satrap defending himself from Ptolemy (after this battle) is little more than a desperate stretch.

[agesilaos]

I shall address Xenophon's comments first, though the only real difference i have with Paralus is when Perdikkas moved to Damascus; I also wonder if Polemon was not a local supporter of Perdikkas rather than being sent from the army in Cilicia, but to the matter in hand.

You have to go back to Diodoros XVIII 40, then you will see that Antigonos is moving from Nora to Kretopolis i.e. from the Cappadocian to Pisidia, there is no coastal route and much of the route is mountainous. There is also something suspect about the numbers given for his troops.

Photios preserves the numbers of troops left with Antigonos by Antipatros just prior to this campaign towhit 8,500 macedonians the same number of foreign, probably meaning mercenary, cavalry and 70 elephants (sect 43); now, the cavalry figure does seem suspect but let's leave that for now.

Diodoros XVIII 40 gives the number of troops with Antigonos at Orcyniia (Plut. Eum 9 ii) as 'more than 10,000 infantry of whom half were Macedonians...2,000 cavalry and 30 elephants' so Antigonos is shy 3,500 Macedonians 40 elephants and, potentially 6,500 cavalry, pretty remarkable when he was moving against the 20,000 foot and 5,000 cavalry of Eumenes . His motive for splitting his forces was the need to cover his rear against Alketas and his forces, 16,000 foot (possibly including 3,000 Macedonians) and 900 horse . The 3,500 Macedonians left behind would off-set Alketas’ and would undoubtedly have mercenary support perhaps as many as 10-15,000; the previous season had seen Asandros defeated by Alketas so Antigonos would have wanted to leave rough parity to discourage any attack. But the 6,500 cavalry would have given the subordinate great offensive power, certainly enough to preclude Alketas’ advance from Termessos. It would seem that the 8,500 cavalry is in error. Taking the 2,000 that Antigonos had at Orcyniia and the 5,000 that deserted from Eumenes yields the 7,000 attested at Kretopolis, however allowance must be made for losses in the forced march and cavalry left to besiege Nora (despite Diodoros’ statement that Antigonos left with all his forces). The 1,000 cavalry initially charged by Alketas may be the force Antigonos had left with the corps d’observation.
It is more likely that Antigonos left the elephants with which he had attacked Eumenes to follow him to Pisidia along with his baggage and most of his infantry. The 41 mpd stated for the forced march is attested for such a force under Alexander when in pursuit of Darieos, the whole army never moves faster than 15 miles per day. He will then have led the troops he had left to cover Alketas into action against him including the forty fresh elephants. This makes more sense than an elephant sprint through the mountains of Cappadocia. Diodoros has muddied the waters by citing the total of Antigonas’ forces after the battle as those engaged in it.
Antigonos fights Eumenes with 10,000 inf and 2,000 cav kills 8,000 of Eumenes’ 20,000inf, thus gaining 12,000 more infantry and 5,000 more cavalry which deserted as a body, add 10,000 inf from Alketas and we get 32,000 infantry and the 7,000 cavalry, the force left to watch need only have 8,000 foot to reach the 40,000 stated; I tend to think that the observation force was c. 15,000 and the 12,000 foot from Eumenes’ army are not counted here.

[Paralus]

I shall address Xenophon's comments first, though the only real difference i have with Paralus is when Perdikkas moved to Damascus;

Which may have something to do with something you wrote earlier:

The Diadoch chronicle does seem to note Perdikkas’ replacement of Archon by Docimos under the third year of Philip (April 321/0). The Vatican palimpsest to places the initial moves in regime change after Ptolemy’s seizure of Alexander’s corpse, which I have suggested occurred in September 321, fits this timescale.

BCHP 3 actually notes the replacement of Archon by Domicos in Philip's fourth regnal year (320/19). The satrap entering Akkad after the battle is thus Seleucus. Thus I would say that Perdiccas has ordered the replacement of Archon before or as he left winter quarters. Docimos, then, leaves camp for Babylon as Perdiccas moves into Cilicia proper to then depose Philotas and install Philoxenus in his place. This takes place as the first actions of the "campaigning year" of 320. Whilst in Cilicia he acts upon the information he has just received about Ptolemy's flanking alliances in Cyprus. Here the naval "flying column" is organised and detached and Perdiccas then marches onto Damascus. Docimus, as the palimpsest of Arrian indicates, faced stern resistance to his appointment leading to fighting and the eventual death of Archon. It would seem to follow that he did not establish himself until after the beginning of Philip's fourth year.

I agree with you that Damascus seems odd. Perhaps Perdiccas had originally planned to go via Damascus to collect the cortege he expected to be in the charge of Polemon. That it was not there was no reason to change that plan, after all, he'd no need to personally go to the Phoenician cities as his delegated and detached commanders will have seen to the regent's orders and his selected column was in Cilicia awaiting the supplied and fitted naval squadron. As you suggest, perhaps other elements of the royal army - forces or commanders - may have been required to meet him there. Either way, Damascus is early in the campaign season and comes after the the above activities. Photius' court stenography version of Arrian simply notes that Perdiccas set out for Egypt from Damascus. The monk evidently had no time for the detail preserved in the palimpsest and simply skipped to the the major action: the attack on Egypt. He does exactly the same thing for the Babylonian Settlement where he leaves out near everything producing a summary that makes Justin's account look like War and Peace by comparison. Likely enough Arrian, as he does in the Anabasis, wound up his digression on the activities surrounding the naval squadron, Docimus, the activities of the returned Antigonus and Eumenes in Phrygia et al (as the Palimpsest shows), and returned his narrative to the central action: Perdiccas and Egypt. Photius has most likely picked up the resumptive note (something along the lines of "Perdiccas then, having seen to these matters, set out from Damascus with the kings and the army and marched on Egypt").

I also wonder if Polemon was not a local supporter of Perdikkas rather than being sent from the army in Cilicia, but to the matter in hand.

And that is a reasonable wonder. I do not necessarily think that Polemon was sent to retrieve the corpse as I've said. In line with the musings above about Damascus he may have been there organising other matters on behalf of Perdiccas with the remit to secure the cortege on its arrival. That Ptolemy fronted with "an army" put him out of play. Perdiccas could have expected the troops traveling with the cortege to be loyal to the regent and so he likely expected no great trouble. That Arrhidaeus "deserted" to Ptolemy likely means so did his troops who, you'd expect, had been selected with this in mind. That immediately compromises Archon who is duly replaced when the hijack is reported.

Whatever the case, there was a reason Perdiccas was to march via Damascus - supplies, money, cortege, army elements. Without a full version of Arrian we're never likely to be beyond speculation like the above.

[agesilaos]

You are referring to lines 21-2 where if Seleukos is meant then Triparadeisos is seemingly placed in the same (Babylonian) month as the battle at Memphis. Given that the two places are about 800 miles apart it seems highly improbable that the one could be within 30 days of the other, the march would take 65 days, including rests at 14mpd and since there were elephants 102 days would be nearer the mark.

But in lines 15 and 16 the satrap and a battle are mentioned; since, Archon was not present during the campaign in Pisidia which belongs in this Year Three nor the war against Ariarathres of Year two the only conflict can be Docimos' replacement of Archon. That said, given the state of the tablet here there is no certainty that the reference to the battle and the 'functionary of Babylon' are not separate entries; there is quite a gap between the two terms. But if they are in the same context it might suggest what prompted Arrhidaios to defect if we consider him friendly with Archon, which would seem reasonable as they must have co-operated over the building of the funeral carriage.

This is just probing for a context, really the harder history will return when my opisometer drops through the letter-box and I can get a better handle on the distances; then it'll be a long post, you lucky people

[Paralus]

You are referring to lines 21-2 where if Seleukos is meant then Triparadeisos is seemingly placed in the same (Babylonian) month as the battle at Memphis. Given that the two places are about 800 miles apart it seems highly improbable that the one could be within 30 days of the other, the march would take 65 days, including rests at 14mpd and since there were elephants 102 days would be nearer the mark.

But in lines 15 and 16 the satrap and a battle are mentioned; since, Archon was not present during the campaign in Pisidia which belongs in this Year Three nor the war against Ariarathres of Year two the only conflict can be Docimos' replacement of Archon.

Actually, I was referring to lines 21-22 in making reference to Docimus. The earlier lines that you mention (15-16) tell us very little due to the state of the tablet. "Nikanor" is, as admitted, speculative. The installation of a new satrap in Akkad, prior to the Battle of Memphis, can really only be Docimus for Babylonia already had such (Archon). This fits with the palimpsest of Arrian. If the "battle" indicated in line 16 occurs in Phil.03 (321/20), then it had to be spring / summer 321. Nothing really fits this and it is just as possible this is Phil.04. If so it may record the struggle between Docimus and Archon or it may - if lines 14 and 15 are exclusive of each other - refer to the kings' general of the Hellespont defeating the invading force under Craterus. The state of the tablet does not really allow a clear conclusion.

The reference to Seleucus, then, is (as I did not make clear) in lines 24-25:

The troops of the king were slaughtered. Month VIII, day 10 (14 November 320) [.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..] 25 {6'} ...the satrap of Akkad entered Babylon. That month, debris...

I take it that the scribe here reports activity under another month (VIII, day 10) than that which the battle in Memphis occurred, the month (missing) for Memphis being in line 22. Hence the new date notation and the "That month..." for the description of the debris of the temple of Marduk. Thus there is no issue with this satrap being Seleucus as he takes up his post on November of 320 - well after Triparadeisos.

Dociumus had to travel from Cilicia (or Psidia) to Babylon and then faced what seems to have been stern resistance. That resistance is led by the current satrap (unsurprisingly) Archon. That Docimus was in a position to eventually win this means he traveled with sufficient forces to remove Archon should he refuse - as could be expected given Perdiccas must have suspected collusion with Ptolemy and Arrhidaeus. As far as the Babylonian view is concerned, the satrap was "appointed" when he'd finally supplanted Archon. I doubt the scribe is recording his date of appointment by a regent in Cilicia. So for Seleucus who, though commisioned as such by Antipater at Triparadeisos, is not in Babylon until November 320.

[Xenophon]

Paralus wrote:

In that latter example we might add another word to Xenophon's lexicon above (Diod.18.73.1):

For this end he selected from his entire army twenty thousand lightly equipped infantry (εὐζώνους πεζοὺς) and four thousand cavalry and set out for Cilicia...

This is similar to the force (the best from all his army, twenty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry) which he "flew" to Cyzicus with. I agree with Bosworth that here euzonos means "unencumbered" and equipped for the march.

"Xenophons lexicon" indeed ! LOL! I too agree that 'euzonous' here is an adjective describing the foot/infantry ( as opposed to ‘euzanoi/psilo’/gymnetes ‘etc – noun forms meaning ‘ the light armed/light troops.’

Agesilaus has referred to a 'normal' march of 15 miles per day, which is rather slow. Roman armies expected to cover closer to 20 miles, but were less of a caravanserai than Alexander's army. Ancient armies typically arose at first light, quickly breakfasted, and marched for 5 or 6 hours only ( depending on how far a day's 'stage' was) then set up camp, and usually spent the afternoon foraging - for water, fodder, food and firewood. A large army on the march should be thought of more as a 'mobile city' especially when it was 'encumbered' with a 'tail' of sutlers and merchants and carts and wagons, and prostitutes and washerwomen and servants and slaves and baggage animals, and 'booty' both human and animal etc. The rearguard would usually arrive at the destination many hours after the vanguard.

Naturally, when just fit soldiers encumbered with only arms and a couple or three days hard tack rations, marched 12 hours a day and did not set up a formal camp, the distance could be readily tripled.

Also, I'm not sure whence came the idea that elephants can only cover 9 miles per day. Savannah elephants in the wild typically cover a lazy 20-40 miles per day, stopping to graze and drink en route ( the lower figure with calves in tow) and can cover over 50 when waterholes are a long way apart.

....Nor the idea that mules and horses necessarily need 'rest days' - they do not, any more than men do. In fact, under 'forced march' conditions, they too can be 'force marched' 12 hours per day for a week or so, and they will then graze at night, and since cavalry walk at a faster rate than infantry ( when mounted - again contrary to popular belief, cavalry often dismount on the march), there is ample opportunity for them to stop and graze from time to time, while the infantry catch up.

Which adds to my original point, namely that trying to calculate when an army was in a particular place by using 'average march rates' is fairly futile, because there are just too many variables ( and I haven't even mentioned weather! ). Any such calculation can be weeks, even months, out.

Agesilaos wrote:

You have to go back to Diodoros XVIII 40, then you will see that Antigonos is moving from Nora to Kretopolis i.e. from the Cappadocian to Pisidia, there is no coastal route and much of the route is mountainous. There is also something suspect about the numbers given for his troops.

A most interesting post and analysis regarding the troop numbers. Lots of food for thought there.

However, I disagree about the route taken. The problem is that for a long time the site of Cretopolis was unknown. A number of sites have been proposed as Cretopolis, all subsequently being discredited. Nor is the site of Nora known, other than in the vicinity of the Taurus mountains. Fairly recently, the archaeologist Stephen Mitchell has plausibly identified Cretopolis as modern Yuregil Turkey ( Stephen Mitchell: Three Cities in Pisidia. In: Anatolian Studies Vol 44 (1994), pp. 129-148 ).

Now bear with me a little. Go to Google Earth, and locate Yuregil, Turkey. You will find it located beside a lake, with the requisite plain referred to by Diodorus beside it, in Turkey's "Lake District". Now go to the vicinity of the Taurus mountains a little above the word 'Mersin', where you can have a little fun, without waiting for your 'opisomiter' to arrive !

Google Earth has a built in 'electronic' opisomiter. Better yet, it flows over the ground in '3D', unlike a 2D map and opisomiter ( though whether this is taken into account in calculating distances, or just a visual display, only the programmers know !! ). You can also 'zoom in' and out, check out heights, 'fly' over the terrain etc.

If you use the opisomiter/path tool, and go 'as the crow flies' straight across country, the distance is only circa 200-220 miles ( depending on how far east you start from). Worse still, it is 'cross-grain' over the mountains - a nightmarish route that no sane military commander would even contemplate. Nor a 'backpacker' on a hiking trip - each mountain range you cross is aprox 3,000 ft high ! Logistics would be impossible for a large army on such a route. 'Fly' over the terrain yourself and see. Zoom in and fly down the valleys, and up over the ridges.

Now instead, head south or south-west down any of the watershed river valleys to the coast - 40 to 50 miles. Follow the fertile coastline , filled with villages and crops, and conveniently adjacent to a coastal seaborne supply route, to the coastal plain to the east of modern Antalya, and continue on N-W in pretty much a straight line to Yuregil/Cretopolis, crossing but one 3,000 ft mountain range. Check out some of the photos too - there is a very nice reasonably intact theatre at the east end of the Antalya plain, at Aspendos....

The distance, surprise, surprise, is 285 miles aprox as per Diodorus. ( and depending on where the unknown Nora is exactly, and where you come down onto the coast ).

I submit that this exercise will demonstrate that the likely probability is that the march took place along the coast because:-
1. The distance involved fits a coastal route better. ( an inland route would have to be a very meandering one to get to the right order of distance)
2. The terrain is extremely difficult - especially for a rapid forced march - on any feasible overland route.
3. A coastal route solves all logistic problems - otherwise all but impossible for a large army overland.
4. Apart from one 3,000 foot ridgeline to cross, the coastal route is flat - the best 'going' for a rapid march.
5. Any inland route is subject to getting lost, every time you take the wrong route out of a valley - ask Hannibal !

This is a game that all Pothosians are welcome to play - hours of fun!

Once you know the location of any ancient battlefield, or march route, Google Earth can answer many questions.....and you don't need vast numbers of clumsy sheet maps and an opisomiter either

compliments of the season to all !!

Paul Mac

[agesilaos]

As you might suppose I have been messing around with Google Earth; I am still looking forward to my stone-age opisometer, though

I have considered your suggestion of starting near Mersin but that is too far south and west. But the location of Nora is unknown you cry! Well, spurred by your post I went to the sources and Strabo has this interesting tidbit XII ii

Neither do the other prefectures, except two, contain cities; and of the remaining prefectures, Sargarausenê contains a small town Herpa, and also the Carmalas River, this too emptying into the Cilician Sea. In the other prefectures are Argos, a lofty stronghold near the Taurus, and Nora, now called Neroassus, in which Eumenes held out against a siege for a long time. In my time it served as the treasury of Sisines, who made an attack upon the empire of the Cappadocians. To him also belonged Cadena, which had the royal palace and had the aspect of a city. Situated on the borders of Lycaonia is also a town called Garsauira.

Now Sisines rang bells, he was the Persian stitched up in the Alexander Lynkestes affair, but it is also the sobriquet or sibling of Archelaos whom Marcus Antonius made King of Cappadocia in 34 BC This seems confusing as a King of Cappadocia ought not to want to attack his own kingdom! And despite being Anthony's appointment Archelaos did not just keep his kingdom on Octavian's victory he saw it dramatically expanded and was never ousted.

The key to the conundrum is supplied by Cicero Letters to his Friends XV 4, where we find Archelaos' father another Archelaos supporting rebels in Cappadocia with troops and money; interestingly he was not the king of an extensive realm but the priest of Bellona at Comana which is  the modern Turkish village of Şar, Tufanbeyli district, Adana Province. And later in XVII Strabo tells us that Pompey had added to the temple's territory

34 Now in the times of the kings the affairs of Comana were administered in the manner already described, but when Pompey took over the authority, he appointed Archelaüs priest and included within his boundaries, in addition to the sacred land, a territory of two schoeni (that is, sixty stadia) in circuit and ordered the inhabitants to obey his rule. Now he was governor of these, and also master of the temple-servants who lived in the city, except that he was not empowered to sell them. And even here the temple servants were no fewer in number than six thousand.

So Nora should be within 1.5 miles of Sar.

[agesilaos]

Re elephants: we are dealing here with Asian elephants whose range is only 7-13 miles per day, and they will be feeding and drinking all the time, this does not happen on a march and it is the water breaks especially which curtail the distance elephants can move, they can become dehydrated quite quickly, this is why there were no pachyderms in Dareios' battle line at Gaugamela; they had been ruined by standing to all night and the previous day.

African savannah elephants were never used in battle by the ancients, as I am sure you know, it was the smaller forest species that were used by the Carthaginians and Ptolemies (as they are now rare indeed I have not found any stats for this species).

Any chance of a copy of Mitchell's paper?

[Xenophon]

Agesilaos wrote:

So Nora should be within 1.5 miles of Sar.

Nice reasoning, but it seems to me that there are a couple of missing links in your deductive logic chain.
1. Sisines ( sobriquet or sibling of King Archelaos) used Nora as a treasury.
2. Their/his father, also Archelaos began as a priest of Bellona, and ruled an area only afew miles in diameter, based at Sar.
3. Therefore Nora must be within 1.5 miles of Sar
(??)

We are not told when Sisines used Nora as a treasury, nor is there any reason to suppose it was in the ancestral territory. So the links are far from complete.

More importantly, that area lies in a river valley, and there are no mountains within 1.5 miles of Sar. Furthermore, the distance from Cretopolis - as the crow flies - is 350 miles/565 km, and any route must be much longer, so that Sar and its vicinity is way too far East to plausibly be Nora. Incidently, Mitchell suggests a 'plausible' location for Nora of Gelin Tepe, Sivrihisar, on the northern slopes of Melendiz Dag, some 34 km ESE of modern Aksaray. ( following earlier suggestions- see his paper)
This is more or less 100 miles due west of Sar, and it is presumably 'plausible' because there are some ruins of hellenistic fortifications there, and it is about the right distance. I would reject this site, on the grounds that Anatolia is dotted with 'castles' from all sorts of eras, plenty of them originating in Hellenistic times, and because any route for the march from such a location does not overcome the 'cross graining' and logistic problems. Indeed when one looks at Mitchell's sketch map, Antigonus follows no known route to get to Cretopolis, which is firmly identified by surviving inscriptions.
As well, neither location is anywhere near the Taurus mountains.

Still, the 'interesting tidbit' is indeed interesting for it provides, I think, some valuable clues. We are in the Taurus mountain region apparently, and south of the Taurus watershed, for the Carmalas ( a.k.a Melas) river empties into the Mediterranean. He also mentions 'the borders of Lycaonia'. Plutarch too places Nora in that area:
"Taking refuge at Nora, a place on the confines of Lycaonia and Cappadocia, with five hundred horse and two hundred heavy-armed foot, he again dismissed as many of his friends as desired it, through fear of the probable hardships to be encountered there...." (Life of Eumenes) The implication too, of Archelaos senior supplying Cappadocian rebels with troops and money is that it is being done from outside Cappadocia, and similarly with 'Sisines'. All this points to a location in the Taurus mountains somewhere west of Cappadocia, probably along the rugged border country between the two. [BTW: the 'Mersin' I was referring to is the area to the SE of the words 'Taurus Mountains', not the coastal town of Mersin]

That is the area I used as a starting point.....

[Xenophon]

Re elephants: we are dealing here with Asian elephants whose range is only 7-13 miles per day, and they will be feeding and drinking all the time, this does not happen on a march and it is the water breaks especially which curtail the distance elephants can move, they can become dehydrated quite quickly, this is why there were no pachyderms in Dareios' battle line at Gaugamela; they had been ruined by standing to all night and the previous day.

African savannah elephants were never used in battle by the ancients, as I am sure you know, it was the smaller forest species that were used by the Carthaginians and Ptolemies (as they are now rare indeed I have not found any stats for this species).

Any chance of a copy of Mitchell's paper?

The reason that the range of Asian elephants is only 7-13 miles per day is that their natural habitat is jungle !! This has two effects:
1. There is plenty of food and water nearby, so an elephant does not need to go far
2. Natural jungle is very dense and difficult to pass through, whether you are a bulky elephant, or a man with a machete!

The reason I mentioned savannah elephants ( a.k.a Bush elephants) was to show how far elephants can naturally range physically without hardship, or urging by a driver, in open country. The extinct North African elephants used by Ptolemies, Carthaginians and Numidians, are not now thought to be the forest elephants, but rather a related, slightly larger, species ( albeit still smaller than Asian elephants)

As per my previous post, happy to provide Mitchell's paper - just let me know where to send it electronically.....

[Paralus]

Incidently, Mitchell suggests a 'plausible' location for Nora of Gelin Tepe, Sivrihisar, on the northern slopes of Melendiz Dag, some 34 km ESE of modern Aksaray. ( following earlier suggestions- see his paper)
This is more or less 100 miles due west of Sar, and it is presumably 'plausible' because there are some ruins of hellenistic fortifications there, and it is about the right distance. I would reject this site, on the grounds that Anatolia is dotted with 'castles' from all sorts of eras, plenty of them originating in Hellenistic times...

Still, the 'interesting tidbit' is indeed interesting for it provides, I think, some valuable clues. We are in the Taurus mountain region apparently, and south of the Taurus watershed, for the Carmalas ( a.k.a Melas) river empties into the Mediterranean. He also mentions 'the borders of Lycaonia'. Plutarch too places Nora in that area

The location is likely never to be settled. It has to be north of the Taurus range for if it were the Mediterranean side it will have been identified as being in Cilicia. Eumenes can hardly be said to have departed Nora for Cilicia if it were the seaward side of the range.

The most likely location for mine has always been that of Ramsay (Military Operations on the North Front of Mount Taurus Continued; The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 43, Part 1 [1923], pp. 1-10) who places it some 10 kilometres east of Eregli (Konya, Turkey). Here there are ridges of the Taurus and several 1200-1400 metre high "rocks" on the road to Ulukisla (which leads on, eventually, to the Cilician Gates).

Now onto geographical matters pertaining to Thapsacus and Damascus relevant corteges, corpses, hijackings and "loving half brothers" of negligible territorial ambition interested only in the wishes of a dead king. Also a road to Damascus moment...

[agesilaos]

One further obfuscation is that we cannot completely exclude an approach march followed by the forced march of seven days! This is the Siceliot after all

[Paralus]

This is the Siceliot after all

Giving you the benefit of the doubt here, I imagine you posit the universal "confusion" of Diodorus? For some (many?) he seems to be the ancient historian version of Vinnie Barbarino ("I'm sooo confused!" for those unaware). If exaggeration exists here it likely comes from his source. Books 18-20 contain many clear statements of distances, astronomical chronological markers, march times, army numbers, etc. These near certainly come from whichever source Diodorus used; whether he always reproduced them accurately or not. In any case, the note of the forced march is hardly invention - or exaggeration - on the part of the Sicilian.

Back to catafalques, conniving and kleptomania...

[agesilaos]

No, not confusion, but the possibility of compression or even a lacuna, although that is an explanation I prefer to reserve as an absolute last resort without clear evidence. It is clear, to me at any rate that an army of the numbers claimed cannot move as quickly as is claimed; Mitchell (Three Cities) agrees and posits propagandist exaggeration but the point seems obscure, the forced march was successful why exaggerate its speed? And then there is that statement that Antigonos took 'all his troops' when we know he left a garrison to besiege Nora. This suggests the possibility that a notice of the formation of the flying column and its initial unforced march to within 2500 odd stadia of Kretopolis. I see no reason to doubt the forced march, the statement is full and precise not something I see Diodoros working out from scattered references but one might suppose in making his notes he latched onto the spectacular feat and omitted its detailed circumstance.

It also means Comana can enter the equation; treasuries are usually set up in ones own territory and the timescale is given by Strabo's 'in my time' . He was possibly born as early as 66 BC but certainly was taught by a man, Tyrannio, who died in 44BC, so 58 BC is a terminus ante quem. This would fit the activity cited by Cicero. The area was awash with dynasts so Archelaos would be confined to his own patch pretty much.

Off to play with my opisometer now

On a linguistic note; euzonos would be equivalent to expeditos both terms relating to the equipment of the soldiers; kouphos refers to the nimbleness of the individual men i.e. their fitness the latin for which would be agilis.

[Paralus]

Mitchell (Three Cities) agrees and posits propagandist exaggeration but the point seems obscure, the forced march was successful why exaggerate its speed?

Probably because it fits the pattern of such alacrity in his source. Antigonos seems to have moved with great speed and daring in near every campaign recorded. The only such time he seems not to have was Ipsos where Seleucus and Lysimachus are given time to combine forces. The great pity is that we don't have Diodorus' recounting of this campaign. Perhaps there was some comparison implicit or explicit against his former alacrity?

And then there is that statement that Antigonos took 'all his troops' when we know he left a garrison to besiege Nora. This suggests the possibility that a notice of the formation of the flying column and its initial unforced march to within 2500 odd stadia of Kretopolis. I see no reason to doubt the forced march, the statement is full and precise not something I see Diodoros working out from scattered references but one might suppose in making his notes he latched onto the spectacular feat and omitted its detailed circumstance.

And that is what I would suppose. The note of "all his forces" (at 18.44.1) likely summarises out the needless (to Diodorus) detaching of a holding force for Nora (certainly rather small), picking up with the fact that Antigonos marched on Psidia with all his forces selected for the campaign. Whilst Diodorus, unfortunately, finds it necessary to regale us with all the ins and outs of fortune regarding the generals captured in the campaign (this being one of his overriding interests), he feels no such need to detail the division of forces and other - to him - useless details. Thus, too, does Photius when he summarises out the entire opening of the campaign season of 320 deciding rather to pick it up from Damascus. With the main game being the king doing battle with the satrap of Egypt, the settlement of Cilicia, the replacement of Archon and the detachment of a naval squadron to deal with Ptolemy's allies on Cyprus all become unnecessary detail to the monk.

In any case, this distracts me from matters more germane to wandering corpses and chronologies...